Existing Objections to the Skeptical Argument: Narrowing Its Application

The conclusion that agents are rarely culpable for their moral ignorance rests, in part, on the claims that (A) agents act from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance if they lack occurrent beliefs that their actions are morally wrong, and (D) agents rarely knowingly mismanage their moral beliefs. (A) offers a very broad notion of potentially exculpatory moral ignorance, and therefore suggests that a host of agents act from potentially

exculpatory moral ignorance including: those who simply fail to consider the wrongness of their actions; those who are undecided about the wrongness of their actions; and those who are disposed to believe their actions are wrong, but fail to advert to these beliefs at the time of acting. If agents are only culpable for their moral ignorance if they knowingly mismanage their moral beliefs, and (D) agents very rarely mismanage their moral beliefs, then the host of agents captured by (A) will turn out to be non-culpable.

Elizabeth Harman (2011) argues against (A) the claim that lack of a true belief that one’s action is morally wrong constitutes potentially exculpatory moral ignorance. In particular, she argues that only false beliefs that one’s action is morally permissible are potentially exculpatory. The mere absence of an occurrent belief that one’s actions are wrong is not. In support of her argument, she offers examples in which agents perform a morally wrong action while being uncertain of the wrongness of their action, due to factual ignorance (448).17 _{She considers, e.g., a case in which an agent has .5 credence that the}

substance she is putting in another person’s coffee is poison, and .5 credence it is sugar (448). The agent adds the substance despite her uncertainty. Harman (2011) argues that this agent is obviously directly culpable for her action; we need not determine whether or not she is culpable for her uncertainty in order to know this; she does not act from potentially

exculpatory ignorance (448). Therefore, Harman argues that one should hold, at most, that not ignorance in general, but only false moral belief of the permissibility of one’s action, can exculpate (448).

This conclusion needs to be both softened and broadened. It is very plausible that agents who act with the knowledge that their action poses risk of significant harm to others, while lacking a false belief that it is nevertheless justified, do not act from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance. However, it is not clear that we should conclude from this that false belief in the permissibility of one’s action is the only form potentially exculpatory ignorance can take. A proponent of the skeptical argument might argue that we should instead conclude that an agent acts from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance if she lacks

17 _{These examples are based on cases offered by Guerrero (2007). In his paper, Guerrero}

(2007) argues for a number of complex claims, but his overall position is that if an agent is unsure of the moral status of an action, and the action risks significant harm to others, then

a true belief in the wrongfulness of her action, and is not aware that her action poses risk of great, unjustified harm to others. 18 _{There is nothing contradictory about this view, and it}

explains the examples offered by Harman.

At the same time, Harman’s (2011) objection can be extended. After all, there are many objectionable moral features, such that if an agent is aware her action may have these features, but lacks a true belief in the wrongfulness of her action, it is not plausible she acts from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance. Included amongst these features is the fact that an action is dishonest, unkind, cruel, unfair, and so on. Imagine, for example, that a waiter finds a very generous tip on one of his tables. It has been a very busy shift, and he cannot recall if he served the patrons at this table, or if the waiter who had the shift before him served them. He is aware that keeping the money might be dishonest and unfair, but he doesn’t think about the matter long enough to form the belief that it would be wrong to do so. He keeps the money. This agent would likely be culpable for his moral ignorance according to the skeptical argument, but we need not determine whether or not he is culpable for it in order to judge that he is culpable for his action; he does not act from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance.

Proponents of the skeptical argument need not accept the conclusion that the only form of potentially exculpatory moral ignorance is false belief in the permissibility of one’s action. However, they must accept a significantly curtailed understanding of potentially

18_{In a later paper, Rosen (2008) grants that agents who perform actions while being}

aware that they pose risk of great harm to others, while lacking a belief that their actions are morally wrong (and, presumably, also lacking a false belief that this behavior is justified), do not act from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance. Rosen (2008) suggests that an agent performs an action from (potentially exculpatory) ignorance if, at the time of acting, she is unaware of the wrong-making features of the action (598). In cases in which an agent acts while being aware that her action risks serious harm to others, she does not act in ignorance of the wrong-making features of her action; she acts recklessly (598, ftn. 14).

exculpatory moral ignorance. Moreover, this modified version of Harman’s (2011) objection significantly limits the scope of the skeptical argument. Only in cases in which agents act from a false moral belief in the permissibility of their action, or lack a true belief about the wrongfulness of their action, and are not aware that their action poses risk of significant unjustified harm to others, or that it may be otherwise vicious, do we need to determine if the agent is culpable for her moral ignorance in order to determine if she is culpable for her action performed from moral ignorance. So, the skeptical argument only applies to such cases. In all other cases, we need not determine whether or not an agent is culpable for her moral ignorance in order to determine whether she is culpable for her action performed from moral ignorance.

Objections to (D) the claim that agents very rarely knowingly mismanage their moral beliefs are similarly successful in limiting the scope of application of the skeptical argument. At first blush, (D) seems plausible. After all, it seems that very few individuals want to have false beliefs, and most agents would therefore not engage in activities that they believe would lead to false beliefs (or lack of true ones). However, upon reflection, it is plausible that many agents have a vested interest in having false moral beliefs insofar as doing so serves their interests. Moody-Adams (1993) argues that in many cases, agents who hold widespread, false moral beliefs benefit from the status quo, and therefore avoid examining whether or not the status quo is morally permissible, revealing “an unwillingness to entertain the possibility that one might be wrong” (122).19

19 _{For arguments that culture can in fact render an agent non-culpably ignorant see}

For example, she argues that agents living in cultures that endorse slavery remain ignorant because it is in their interest to be ignorant of the wrongness of slavery. Due to the fact that an agent benefits from the practice of slavery, they are reluctant to question or revise their beliefs concerning it (Moody-Adams, 1994, p. 301-302). This argument can be applied to individuals in sub-cultures as well, and not only to those who stand to gain materially through their ignorance (e.g. slave owners), but also to those who are otherwise invested in maintaining mistaken moral beliefs. Some individuals may be reluctant to give up or adopt a moral belief out of love, loyalty, or because they would otherwise be alienated from their communities. For example, an individual who is loyal to a political party, in the way a sports fan might be loyal to a team, might ignore arguments that point to the

reasonableness of opposing views, in order to maintain his or her loyalty to the party. Similarly, individuals who are invested in the truth of a particular religion might have a vested interest in ignoring or hastily denying evidence that its central tenants are mistaken.

A plausible interpretation of such agents is that they know their beliefs are, or may be mistaken, or that they ought to adopt a particular belief that they lack, but they

purposefully shield themselves from evidence to this effect. As FitzPatrick points out, this is a type of akrasia; agents who behave in this way, act in ways that they know they ought to manage their moral beliefs differently, and fail to do so (604). If this is true, then even on Rosen’s and Zimmerman’s view, these agents are culpable for their moral ignorance. Insofar

beliefs and actions. Calhoun (1989) argues that cultural ignorance is sometimes not culpable due to lack of accessibility of certain advanced ideas.

as it is plausible that many instances of moral ignorance are instances of affected ignorance, the skeptical argument applies to a smaller set of cases than Rosen and Zimmerman claim.

There are perhaps other plausible objections to (A) and (D) that would further narrow the scope of application of the skeptical argument. However, on its own, this is not a satisfying response to the skeptical argument. Even if we narrow the scope of the argument so that it only applies to a small subset of morally ignorant agents, its conclusion is still likely to be repugnant. It will still suggest, e.g. that Nazi’ sending Jews to their deaths under the false belief that they are complying with their moral duties are potentially non-culpable for their actions. To block this possibility, we must consider objections to (C) the claim that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance only if it is the result of a knowing

mismanagement of their moral beliefs.

2.4 Existing Objections to the Skeptical Argument: Culpability and Knowing