Non-volitional Culpability Views

Non-volitional culpability views reach the same conclusion as Harman’s view by a different route. They are based on non-volitional views of blame, according to which voluntary control is not necessary for culpability. Instead, proponents of non-volitional views of blame argue that the proper target of blame is our objectionable moral attitudes. According to some non-volitional views, blame consists of a judgment that an agent has or has displayed an objectionable moral attitude, and as is the case with any judgment, it is justified as long as this judgment is accurate and we are justified in reaching it, given our evidence.51 E.g. when we blame someone for driving recklessly, we judge him to have

51 _{For example, Scanlon (1998) argues that blame is a judgment that an agent has failed}

displayed a lack of respect for the lives and safety of others. This judgment is justified if he in fact displayed a lack of respect and we have sufficient evidence for judging him to have done so. According to other non-volitional views of blame, when we blame someone for X, we implicitly demand that she justify the moral attitudes reflected by X, and if she cannot, we blame her for them.52 For example, when I blame Sam for cheating on an exam in my class, I demand that Sam justify this action. To do so, he must defend his evaluation of the reasons for and against cheating. Perhaps he can do so. Perhaps, e.g., he had good reason to believe his life depended on passing this exam, and rightfully judged his life to be more valuable than being honest in this particular scenario. If so, I ought to rescind my blame. But, if he cannot do so—if he knows he behaved badly, or he falsely judges that getting good grades is more valuable than being honest—my blame is justified.53

argues that when we blame an agent, we simply acknowledge that the agent has exhibited an attitude of disrespect towards us or a fellow agent. Because blame simply consists of the observation that an agent has exhibited an attitude of disrespect, it will be justified just in case this observation is true and we have adequate reasons for believing it to be true (Hieronymi, 2004, p. 128-129).

52 _{This is Angela Smith’s view, which she develops over a series of papers. See, e.g.}

Smith (2005), Smith (2008), Smith (2012), and Smith (2015).

53 _{The description of non-volitional views of blame offered in this paragraph captures the}

most prominent non-volitional views, but does not capture all non-volitional views. E.g. Sher (2001) also argues for a non-volitional account of culpability. His view is that we’re culpable for our character traits even though he believes that we often cannot be reasonably expected to avoid them, or reform them. He also does not rely on the fact that these traits were developed through our voluntary actions to support his view. He instead suggests that the connection between an agent’s ability to avoid X (i.e. the agent’s control over X) is not as intimately linked to warranted blame as we typically think. Robert Adams (1985) argues for a similar view as well, suggesting that we can be rightfully blamed for that over which we lack any type of control. His reasoning for this is two-fold. First, he holds that morality is not only action guiding, but also correctional and therefore moral criticism applies even when the thing for which we are criticized is something over which we lacked power. Second, he thinks that it is important that agents accept responsibility for things (mental and emotional states in particular), even though they lacked control over them, insofar as doing so is necessary to repair moral relations amongst agents after wrongdoing.

On either non-volitional view of blame, we are directly culpable for our

objectionable moral attitudes. Our culpability for them need not be traced to culpability for past actions which led to them, or to a failure to perform actions that would have eliminated or mitigated them and their effects. In fact, how we came to have the objectionable attitudes in question is largely irrelevant to our culpability for them. Facts about the formation and maintenance of our attitudes do not affect whether or not our judgments that agents in question hold objectionable attitudes are true and justified, or whether or not their attitudes are defensible. E.g. the fact that Carol grew up in a very abusive household is not relevant to the accuracy or justification of my judgment that she is cruel. If blame simply amounts to such a judgment, and is justified if the judgment is true and we are justified in making it, then the fact that Carol grew up in a very abusive household is not relevant to whether or not she is blameworthy for being cruel and exhibiting her cruelty. Similarly, her background is not relevant to whether or not her cruelty is defensible. What if she defends this cruelty by asserting that the feelings of those she is harming are not important? If the parties in question (or their surrogate) were to object to this claim by asserting that their feelings are indeed important, it would not be appropriate for her to cite the abuse she endured in response.

Although proponents of non-volitional views do not directly address or focus on the issue of culpability for moral ignorance, their views are nevertheless a very important part of this discussion insofar as they entail some kind of culpability view with respect to moral ignorance. The latter is a fact that has been observed by a number of participants in the

moral ignorance debate.54 Pure moral ignorance in the form of a false moral belief, almost always manifests an objectionable moral attitude. And ignorance of a moral truth often does so as well55 According to non-volitional views of blame, then, moral ignorance is almost always culpable. Moreover, the conditions under which an agent formed her moral ignorance are not relevant to her culpability for it. The objectionable nature of ignorance entails that an agent is culpable for it, and these conditions do not do not bear on whether or not the content of the moral ignorance is objectionable or defensible.