Factors shaping the borderland

From what has been described so far, it is possible to discern the markers for the asymmetric equilibrium that manifests itself at a border. Differences are manifested in the modalities of terri-toriality on side of the state, functionality the borderland shall pursue, how to deal with the mani-fold interests as well as ensuring social stability and the internal organization of the polities.

Across the relations between the actors, we have seen that for a stable and territorialized border to emerge with an area catering for this border‘s existence, it is necessary that the local and state-level measures, practices and interests somehow find a negotiated equilibrium within and across the state and the region. The different actors have their own capacity and means to act according to their interests, but are embedded in power-relations that curtail or reinforce these capabilities.

For a stable equilibrium to arrive at the border on the side of one state, various factors as shown before need to be taken into account and weighed against each other such as interests, administra-tive practices and the concern for inner-state stability. Since an equilibrium on the side of one state regarding its territoriality and approach to marginalize areas dedicated to be at the fringes of its power is not enough for the border to emerge, it is necessary to take into account a sometimes differently achieved equilibrium on the other side of the border, such as in the case of Ming-China, the Confederation of Shan states and the Toungoo dynasty. Each of the polities was at-tached to their own carefully balanced territoriality, which drastically differed in terms of struc-ture and organization (cf. LUSTICK 2004, 97). The following table gives an overview of the

fac-tors that determine equilibria within the state and the asymmetric equilibria at the border, which has to be understood in all levels of relations between states, local elites and population among and across each other.

Table 2: Factors determining border-equilibria (Cf. SOLOMON 1969, 38-40)

The interaction of these factors across and within the border regions and states dilute or reinforce the border depending on the circumstances and the differences of the equilibrium found at the border: they make social interactions, the identification with them and their organization and administration different within a territorialized space, delineating state territories. The border forms itself out of the equilibria brought about by different modalities of territorialization and marginalization in an on-going process of state formation in which these factors affect the final outcome in constant top-down and bottom-up transmissions of power, resistance, acceptance or defeat against the backdrop of perpetual cross-border relations between the two border-regions.

Given that the very foundations of this process are different in the states bordering each other, differentiated and unequal social components meet each other, entering also unbalanced relationships on the local, regional and state-level, accounting for the asymmetric equilibrium at

the border, which creates a differentiation and perpetuation of differences and inequalities that cement the border at the state-level (HEYMAN 2012, 50-51). On the regional level, inequalities may less pronounced, but differences fostered as in the case of all three Southeast Asian states vis-à-vis China who try to differentiate themselves at the border from their more or less equally prosperous neighbors. The flows and connections described so far involve therefore also the exacerbation of divisions and distinctions not least by different ideologies, political and economic concepts and state-sanctioned narratives that have the power to bind people to the state as well as mark the distinctive features of the border-area as not essentially part of the state. Different ideas and vision compete, so that the state may either win, retreat or collapse in the border region so that borders are constantly created, undermined or defended in a cage of multidimensional economic, political, administrative, cultural or military infrastructural power to different degrees and intensities on either side of the border: the strength of the state and the significance of its borders are a result of the role of power and coercion the state can wield within its borders (HEYMAN 2012, 55; O‘DOWD 2012, 161-162; SCOTT 2009, 100).

The core of the central state and the periphery are so in a complex equilibrium that can be interrupted if one of the factors in table 2 gets unbalanced. The state wields more material power than the border-region, it can deploy its military or use mercenaries while the border-area has the option to secede. All of this requires capital, manufacturing investments, raw materials, manpower and a transnational network on both sides, so that in case of unbalances, bargaining processes will take place between the center and the periphery, creating more interwoven and complex interdependencies leading to a new equilibrium in the hybrid model of power relations.

The border in this process is at the same time a bargaining chip as well as a factor shaping the negotiation by the changing nature of itself and the opportunities it provides for elites in the periphery to build their own power-base as a fallback option if negotiations falter. The complex web of interdependencies funds political relationships across the border regions which in turn brings increased penetration of the state back into the border-area setting off a cycle of coercion, wealth and power generation, resource exploitation and administrative penetration of all sorts (O‘DOWD 2012, 164; GOODHAND 2012, 333, 349).

The functions and the role of the border in transnational and regional relations is therefore closely related to the way internal power relations around the border are structured by the state: cross boundary flows become partly a result of local agency and interests as well as how the state determines the border-regime given the existing flows. The functional range of the border

includes military-strategic and defense and security dimensions, control over capital flows and resources, maintenance of territoriality and sovereignty, forging with the state and its legitimizing aspects also a national identity as well as a domestic dimension to structure internal affairs ranging from economy to education. How strongly each of these dimensions is stressed by the state depends on its capabilities and priorities so that opening or closing of borders, fortification or leniency, integration and marginalization are dependent how the state behaves towards and can act upon the border. This is a function of the state‘s size, its internal structure and goals in the international arena and its stage of development. On the international, state and regional levels, institutions and infrastructure according to the state‘s or the region‘s capabilities strengthen the relations between the border and the center to a certain degree, shaping the role of the border further as a pathway or a barrier, which in turn impacts the relations between the states and regions involved. As this process is duplicated on both sides of the border under sometimes different internal circumstances, it is important to keep in mind that the emphasis on the factors in table 2 for the development of a border may be different on either side of it: weak states have a different rationale focusing on a different set of factors to deal with their borders as they provide the state‘s right to exist while strong states may do so based on emphasizing other factors out of fear of spill-over-effects from weaker neighbors. As states can take different forms – state under construction, regular state, and empire – their borders and the way how they manage their borders is different over time depending on what stage of development they are and which internal issues are salient. A state under construction with a weak identity and lose control over its territory bordering an empire will have a different attitude towards its border than two regular states (KOLOSSOV 2011, 173-174; LUSTICK 2004, 83-85; ROBINSON 2007, 5; cf. TAN 2004, 31).

The borderland itself, as the place where the factors of asymmetric equilibria meet, has some influence over the shaping of its territory by using the border as a resource for their own interests, making the state manifestations sometimes merely a symbolic marker with reduced influence over the daily life (DEAN 2011 231). Thus, what determines the equilibria is pulling and pushing at the border and the borderland, drawing the state closer or alienating it from the border. This mutual impact puts a strain on the shape of the borderland and the border itself from both states who use their means, interests and capabilities to shape border and region while the borderland itself tries the same within its own capacities. The shaping factors so have a mutual impact, drawing state and borderland closer to each other if their objectives and interests align or pushing each other away in cases when practices or objectives in the borderland are meant to undermine

state-penetration or when the state‘s attitude towards the borderland causes an alienation of the latter (YIFTACHEL 2004, 363, 367; DOORNBOS 2006, 21, 22). In this sense, the borderland is under constant pressure from outside factors pulling it closer to getting integrated within the state, while these same factors emanating from the borderland exert their influence in a reverse direction, either pulling the borderland closer to the state – such as the Dali-Song dynasty case or pushing it further away as in the case of Sip Song Chau Tai and Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Taking the factors that determine the equilibria within the state and the asymmetric equilibria at the border and mapping their influence on the state-borderland power relationships taking into account the fluidity and ebbs and flows of Southeast-Asian state-building, what has been described in the previous chapters can be best illustrated as follows:

Graph 4: Factors penetrating the border area Means of capital

Borderland A

B

Means of capital

Means of coercion / military Means of coercion

Control over resources Control over resources

Control over territory Control over territory

Control over people Control over people

Bureaucratic pressure Bureaucratic pressure

Autonomous administration Autonomous administration

Dissemination of knowledge/information/technology