Integration, marginalization, border-construction and state-building

Having established the nexus between state-formation and border creation and its non-linear na-ture in terms of territorialization as well as the factors that provide the ground for an integration-marginalization dichotomy during the territorialization of marginal areas – a process that itself is determined by political, economic and social circumstances on regional, state and international levels as well as the set of power relations on intraregional, interregional, intrastate and interstate levels – it becomes clear that what may seem as an eventual outcome is a sequence of circum-stances and actions informed by these circumcircum-stances that were periodically disrupted and time and again forced to adjust to a new equilibrium of power-relations.

Since the formation of the borderland is a process of several interrelated factors that follow a non-linear path ―pulling‖ at the borderland-entity, the core of the model can be described as an equilibrium, which is interrupted by the factors mentioned above, triggering a process to either alienation from or gravitation to the center until it finds a new resting position as shown in the graph below. The triggers can be formulated in terms of interests, if it remains unilateral, the more powerful actor will win, if it is a common interest, then a compromise will emerge. The triggers can have long-term or short-term effects on the new equilibrium, reinforcing territorial integration or bolstering a greater autonomy of the peripheral regions (WOMACK 2006, 90). In the end, though, both, the imperial models of China and Vietnam, as well as the galactic polity models of the states in Laos and Myanmar in cycles of expansion and retraction formalized their territorial reach and consolidated their statehood with a demarcated border to China.

Equilibrium

Disruptor

Adjustment to new equlibrium

Centralization Autonomy

The equilibrium, which essentially describes the resting position of power-relations between and among states and border-regions is therefore adaptable and shows a certain degree of resilience in the interrelationship between integration and fragmentation on local and interstate-levels. In the inner-state relations this is fairly easy to explain. Over time and with an ever more complex web of relationships, the border-region gets its own leverage and agency capacity, with opportunities to challenge the power of the state – a potential shift in the equilibrium of power-relations with impacts on territoriality on which in turn the state acts by either economic, military or policy means, along the factors pulling and pushing at the border-area shown in graph 4 tilting the equi-librium towards his preferred situation. The internal configurations of power relations to the pe-ripheral region are the driving force to establish a new equilibrium (BORNEMAN 2012, 121-122;

GOODHAND 2012, 334; WOMACK 2009, 2-3; BROWN 1996, 2). On the transnational level, activities outside the border-area and the state in question can inform activities that upset the ex-isting balance – by way of internalizing external events –, for example, when Christianized Hmong were torn between siding with the French or exploiting the Taiping-rebellion across the border in Guangxi for their own interests. Another example would be the conquest of Dali under the Yuan-dynasty, shifting the border-equilibrium to a far more militarized and centralized di-mension as defense against a possible Mongol invasion. Outside conflicts can be internalized at the edge of the state, rivalries, retreat, collapse or competition between states over territory and the different internal organization of the states in question show their impact on power-relations and actions between the protagonists in the center and the border-area. Thus, internal struggles and external changes have their share in the making of states and their borders, their non-linear occurrence allows though to show the sequence of changing circumstances that finally led to the statist incorporation of this area into the four states through an ebb and flow of territorialization processes (O‘DOWD 2012, 159-160; ALBERT/BROCK 2001, 30; cf. SAFMAN 2007). This is to be understood as a long-lasting process, taking into account the dynamics of the state and re-gional actors as well as the circumstances they found themselves in when dealing with disruptors of the existing order. The border is therefore not seen as a static institution but as a process that it shaped in various continual non-linear event-driven and multidirectional cycles that led to the re-sult of the border we know today (KAISER 2012, 522). The border over time is constantly con-tested and the outcome of actions that were taken during times of disruptions that helped restruc-turing and re-signifying the role of the borderland and the state. The contestation of the border internally and externally, actions taken on the level of the state as well as within the border area

define its meaning and its shape by their impact on economic, social and political relations. The joint effect of the disrupting contestations and the dynamics of power relations creates new equi-libria with new meanings of the border and the state on an abstract level as well as new relation-ships between the regions and the states within and across the border on a functional level. This means, disruptions shape the border and the border can shape the new balances of relations – manifesting or dissolving differences, giving or reducing access and influence on power-decisions (GRIMSON 2012, 194-195, 202; GOODHAND 2012, 341; PSARRAS 1993, 29;

PRESCOTT/TRIGGS 2008, 93). The impact on power relations between and within territories shows itself in the flow of power: from core to periphery or vice versa, from periphery to periph-ery or from core to core. Through the disruptions of these relations, the degree of dependence on and attitude towards the function and meaning of a border changes, so that a border that existed only on the map so manifests itself through the actions taken by the state and the local population in times of disruptions (RAEYMAEKERS 2012, 325). The unbalanced power-relations allow to determine how these disruptors impact the region: setting new political and cultural distinctions have long-lasting effects, tying the area closer to the state – after all it changes the daily life of people and impacts on worldview and practices in the region –, while short-lived rebellions – af-ter all the state‘s power trumps the capabilities of regional actors – only lead to a greaaf-ter autono-my through a reversal of power-relationships which is limited in time, given the mismatch in au-thority over the area, material capabilities and in political capital (GRIMSON 2012, 206;

RAEYMAEKERS 2012, 327).

The institutional arrangement of territoriality, borderlands and the border so changes from one equilibrium to the next, until a fixated outcome can be distinguished (GOODHAND 2012, 345).

This model already contains some punctuated examples but it will be in the next section exam-ined and tested from the year 938 – the independence of Vietnam from China – until the post World War II order of nation states. The dynamics of power relations, the multitude of factors determining strategies and decision of territorialization and the inclusion of the wider historical events will allow to show how this area became a borderland even though singular states and pol-ities existed. The analysis will show how the interplay of territorial integration also included a marginalization of the periphery which depended on the wider events of the area that disrupted the status-quo in a non-linear fashion, informed decision making and consequently actions to-wards the border-region, which accounted for a constant ebb and flow of territorialization, auton-omy and marginalization. Each of the disruptors had a different impact on this process by shaping

the decisions and means for territorialization and border-construction at a certain point of time.

Be it through civilian governance whose thickness increased with measures such as the integra-tion of minorities in state examinaintegra-tion or taxaintegra-tion or be it through military means, such as the for-tification of border-areas or the forced incorporation of autonomous chieftains into the state. For a comprehensive grasp of the development of the border between Southeast Asia and China it is therefore not sufficient to look on actions of the central state but also the power-relations, eco-nomic disruptions and the use of agency on all levels of stakeholders to understand why this re-gion eventually became marginalized and never developed its own long-lasting statehood even though there has never been a clear-cut economic/geographic distinction that could rationalize the situation of the current border.

In chapter 2, the model described above will be put to a test by showing how interrelated actions and processes in state-formation and territorialization efforts in an across all individual polities in the border area based on internal and external disruptions accounted for a shift in power-relations among the polities and the border-region as a whole which in turn marginalized this area as a whole step by step and let numerous small-scale polities or chiefdoms disappear to demarcate a border.