Findings on Structural Disaggregation

As discussed in Chapter Three, according to Fedele et al. (2007), there are three core aspects to structural disaggregation: first, there is institutional distancing between agency and parent administration, which is often based on legal imperatives and features. It is about creating an identifiable, separate, organizational structure with its own name (see, e.g. Talbot et al.,

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power to determine the content of its own statue, furnished by the presence of a Corporate Board representative, which highlights the plurality of stakeholders (Fedele et al. 2007); Second, the complexity of the task transferred to the Agency in terms of heterogeneity of its activities and outputs. As Talbot et al. (2000) note the body is usually given a single or small set of functions. Third, the Agency specialisation on operational tasks is an indicator of the existence of clear-cut distinctions between the responsibility of policy formulation and the responsibility of policy delivery. All Agencies have legal status, unsurprising given the fact that in legalistic systems it is almost a pre-condition for disaggregation (Fedele et al., 2007). As stated in Chapter Three, other elements of structural disaggregation that have been identified in literature are: functions usually are primarily about delivery, execution or provision and not about policy-making; the body is given a clear ‘constitution’- in the form of some sort of legislation or at least a formal ( if not statutory) ‘framework document’- which sets out its purpose, powers, and governance arrangement; it has a single, named individual - usually a Chief Executive (CE) responsible for managing and reporting on the new body. Such a person is, or can be, appointed usually- actually or potentially- through an open process, separate from the normal civil service recruitment; the staff of the new body are usually different in some ways from mainstream civil servants, most often by changing their formal employment status, and there is a drawing up of formal reporting arrangements and putting in place separate accounts for the new body (Talbot et al., 2000).

Based on these definitions and elements identified above (as well as the key details of agencification and NPM discussed in Chapter Two and Three), the author will explore how TETFund Act disaggregated the Fund structurally from the parent Ministry (the Federal Ministry of Education) by a provision contained therein.

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The TETFund by its enabling law of 2011 is already structurally disaggregated from its supervisory ministry- the Federal Ministry of Education, Nigeria. The Tertiary Education Trust Fund Act 2011, Section 3 subsection 1 states that the Fund is established for the rehabilitation, restoration and consolidation of tertiary education in Nigeria, to be managed by the Board of Trustees established under section 4 of the Act. Also, the Act established the Fund as a corporate body with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in it’s a corporate name. To determine the extent at which structural disaggregation exist in the relationship between TETFund and the Federal Ministry of Education, questions were directed at the key stakeholders in order to unravel and to challenge what already exists in both the literature and statutory Act that established the Fund. Talbot et al. (2000:9) note that the separation of Agencies is usually one of degrees rather than absolutes, with some being clearly far more separate but with none being entirely independent. Also, most Agency ‘separations’ are more often movements along a spectrum (or multiple spectra) rather than ‘quantum leaps’ (Talbot et al., 2000:9). Going by the Act establishing it, the Fund is supposed to have a degree of distancing from the Federal Ministry of Education in its operations. In an attempt to seek clarity on the relationship between the Fund and the Ministry, questions were raised in relation to this. Interviewee B, who is part of the Management team note that:

First, the Fund is under the Federal Ministry of Education. Secondly, we were expected to render a report and audited account to the Ministry so that they play their role as a supervisory body’.

Interviewees B’s comment corresponds with what is in the literature - that Agencies are accountable to a Ministry but have some elements of administrative distancing. That is why Talbot (2004) argues that the separation of Agencies is usually that of degrees rather than absolutes. The Federal Ministry of Education is the parent Ministry and, as stipulated in the

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enabling Act, corroborated by the interviewee B, the Fund has a high degree of Ministerial distancing. The extent at which this is reflected in the literature in terms of supervisory roles is clear, for example in De Jong et al, 2002, Talbot, 2004. That TETFund is a Parastatal under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Education, which exercises supervisory responsibility, was also reinforced by Interviewee C.

Although the formation of Agencies across the World differs, whether you look at it from the viewpoint of nation states or international bodies, Agencies report to a Principal Organisation or Departments within an organisation, or Ministries, as in the case of a nation state. For instance, in the European Union, there are varieties of Agencies serving different purposes for EU institutions and member Countries, which are set up to achieve a specific purpose either on a long term or short-term basis. The remits of these Agencies are usually defined by the principal, in this case the European Unit. The key point is that structurally disaggregation is important to the effective functions and operations of agencies.

In addition, the existence of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer is also indication of structural disaggregation, as their roles and functions highlights. Interviewee B describes the role of the Executive Secretary of the Fund and this corresponds with what is acknowledged in the literature on Agencies and Agencification in terms of structural disaggregation. The position of interviewee B is also captured in the enabling Act which states that the Executive Secretary, who is appointed by the President with the recommendation of the Minister, is the Chief Executive and the Accounting Officer of the Fund. The Chief Executive heads the administration of the Fund and takes charge of the day to day administration of the Fund under the supervision and control of the Board of Trustees. According to the Act, the Executive Secretary reports to the Board of Trustees, that superintends on the entire activities of the Fund.

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In most literature (e.g. De Jong et al.,2002, Christensen and laegreid, 2006), the presence of an Executive Secretary is seen as imperative to understanding structural disaggregation. The Chief Executive superintends an Agency. According to McGuaran et al. (2005) CEOs of Agencies play an important function of determining the direction of an Agency, and the extent to which it delivers on its functions. This indeed is a crucial and important feature of an Agency.

However, it is the President’s prerogative to appoint and renew or otherwise the tenure of the Executive Secretary and this is corroborated by interviewee W:

where the appointment was done by the President I did not know that I was going to the Fund. I was called once to Abuja and told that I will be going to TETFund for President xxxxxxx and after the first three months in the Fund, I had the opportunity to brief him.

Whilst this is the case, of paramount importance is the structure of political administration in each Country where the Agencies are used as part of governance structure. In the case of the United Kingdom, where the form of government is Parliamentary, the appointment is made by the supervising Ministry (e.g. the Department of Education). However, whereas they are appointed by the Ministry or the President, the running of the organisation is principally done by the CEO and the Board. According to Talbot (2004), the Chief Executive should be such a person that is, or can be, appointed usually- actually or potentially- through an open process, separate from the normal Civil Service recruitment, nonetheless it is worth identifying that the appointment and renewal of tenure of such an officer in the case of TETFund is the prerogative of the President, without any advertised formal competition or application processes. McGuaran et al. (2005, p5) note that in addition to structural separation from Ministers and Government Departments, they are also accountable in some way to a Minister/Government.

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Talbot et al. (2000) note that an element of structural disaggregation is for the Agency to have in place a separate account. In the case of TETFund, a separate account exists in the Central Bank of Nigeria, where the Education Tax is deposited by the Inland Revenue after collection as mandated by the enabling laws of the Fund. Initially, the Fund was drawing budgetary allocation from government for payment of salaries and other recurring expenditure, but with the 2011 amendment to its Act, a provision is made for the Fund to utilise not more than five percent of the collection in a given year for the management and administration of the Fund, which includes payment of salaries and allowances and monitoring of diverse projects. As an example, prior to the amendment of the act, some of the income generated were used to fund monitoring but following the amendment of the Act we do not do that, a special fund not exceeding 5% of collection is set aside for the funds expenses including payment of salaries and allowances (comment attributed to Interviewee F).

Reflecting on the comments of the interviewees above and literature review, it is claimed TETFund to some extent exhibits a certain degree structurally disaggregated from the parent Ministry (Federal Ministry of Education) and other bodies that regulate its activities (which have been mentioned earlier). Structural disaggregation is about creating an identifiable, separate organisational structure with its own name, which is clearly grafted into the structure and operations of the TETFund. According to the principle of agencification, a public organisation is given name as well as single or small sets of functions and usually these functions are about delivery, execution or provision and not about policy making (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; Christensen and laegreid, 2006). Evidently, TETFund shows this character of performing the function of interventions in areas such as restoration, rehabilitation and consolidation of tertiary education in Nigeria, as stipulated in its enabling law. Likewise, an Agency is based on some form of legislation, or at least a formal document- which sets out its purpose, power and governance arrangements (see also, Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; Christensen,

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and laegreid, 2006). For an Agency, the Members of Staff are different in some way from mainstream Civil Servants, and this occurs usually by changing their formal employment (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). TETFund has its own Staff Conditions of Service and its Staff Members are Public Servants recruited from the Public and Private Sectors. However, Members of Staff are bound by the General Civil Service Rules and some aspects of its Conditions of Service or Employment, e.g. pension, health insurance, promotion processes and tenure of service.

To further Justify that the Fund is structurally disaggregated, the Tertiary Education Trust Fund Act, Section 3 (2) a and b states: The Fund (a) shall be a body Corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal; and (b) may sue and be sued in its corporate name (TETFund Act, 2011). This provision shows that the Fund is formally structurally disaggregated from the parent Ministry (The Federal Ministry of Education).