The function of religiosity

Religious signifiers and paraphernalia are abundantly distributed throughout the election of the nomophylakes. Each round of nominations is to take place in the “temple which the state considers to be the most venerable [τιμιώτατον]” (752b7-c1). Here the electors place their inscribed πινάκια directly “on the altar of the god” (752c1-3). The temple as a site of religiosity contrasts with the marketplace as a site of secularity, where those who wish may within the specified time-period remove πινάκια from the temple. As part of the third round of nominations, anyone who wishes to participate must “walk between the victims of a sacrifice” on the way to recording his vote (753d3-5). Indeed, the very duration of the election-period (at least thirty days) along with the cumbersome

140 _{Thus, note the significant theatricality of this electoral process, a tendency which also applies to that of}

the nomophylakes. Monoson, in her otherwise trenchant analysis of the role of the theatês in Plato, gives short shrift to the function of theatricality and spectatorship in the Laws. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements.

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series of necessary steps and the alternation of the public display of names and collective submission of πινάκια, is reminiscent of a religious ritual.141

This atmosphere of religiosity extends to other elections. The various military officers are to be elected by everyone once convened “in the holiest [ἱερώτατόν] and most capacious place they can find” (755e4-6). The selection of priests by lot is framed as the direct solicitation of divine intervention: “one should leave it to the god himself to express his wishes, and allow him to guide the luck of the draw” (759b7-c1). Likewise, the ultimate stage in the election of the exegetes requires that “nine names should then be sent to Delphi for the oracle to select one from each group of three” (759d7-8). Finally, with respect to the use of the lot in the election of the members of the βουλή, the

Athenian comments, “even then we prayed to the gods of good luck to make the lot give the right decisions” (757e4-6).142

The religiosity appropriate to Magnesia functions, much like the military ethic, as an anti-anarchical ideology in harmony with the preferred political culture of the state.143 Plato’s liberal use of the signifiers and paraphernalia of religion in the electoral process is politically efficacious inasmuch as these things instill in the citizens a generalized sense of reverence or piety that Plato thinks beneficial. As in the case of militarity, there is strong Athenian precedent for the link between religion and the political. As Balot comments, “As a result, the political was always intertwined with religious custom,

141 _{Additionally, there may be religious significance to the number three (as in three rounds of nomination),}

and the placement of the πινάκιον on the altar may be supposed to mimic the ritual of a religious offering.

142 _{See Chapter 3.}

143 _{Schofield suggests that an important function of religion in Magnesian society is to facilitate inter-}

personal knowledge among the citizens. Schofield, Plato, 314–15. If this is the case, then the markers of religiosity will also function to an end similar to the one I delineate under the heading of the “expanded ballot” below. Schofield also cites the utility of a “cohesive power of an ideology grounded in religion” more generally. Ibid., 333.

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belief, and practice.”144 _{Similarly, we should note that the political significance of an} atmosphere of religiosity is certainly not limited to certain institutional operations, but rather possesses a trans-institutional or extra-legal character wholly in keeping with the traditional Athenian practice Plato sought to bend to his purpose.145 _{Such trans-}

institutional ideologies function to tie together and undergird the official institutions of the state.146 _{They are part of the “total social phenomenon” with which Cartledge} identifies the politeia, beyond an “institutionalized political system.”147

Plato’s most comprehensive statement regarding the form religiosity should take in Magnesia can be found in the “theological address” to the colonists in 715e-718a. There he presents a sympathetic portrait of a man “who means to live in happiness” and adheres to justice “with meekness and humility” (716a3-4), followed by a scathing portrait of a man “whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief [μεθ’ ὕβρεως] that so far from needing someone to control and lead him [ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντος οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος], he can play the leader to others [ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι]” (716a7-b1).148 The Athenian refers to the latter as deserted by god (ἔρημος θεοῦ) and claims that “in his desolation he collects others like himself, and in his soaring frenzy he causes universal chaos…and brings himself, his home and state to rack and ruin” (716b1-5). In the wake of all this, the Athenian proposes to examine “what action” (τί…δρᾶν) a sensible man (τὸν ἑμφρονα) should take and “what outlook” (τί...διανοεῖσθαι) he should possess

144 _{Balot, Greek Political Thought, 4.} 145 _{Ibid., 5.}

146 _{Ibid., 49.}

147 _{Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, 57.}

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(715b5-7). This quickly takes the form of examining “what conduct” (τίς πρᾶξις) is favored by and in accordance with the wishes of god (φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ) (716c1).

The Athenian justifies his account of the inner orientation that best fits the above description by reference to two principles:(i) the “old saying” that “like approves of like” (716c1-4) and (ii) his own anti-Protagorean, anti-anarchic contention that “it is god who is preeminently the measure of all things [ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον], much more so than any man, as they say” (716c4-6). Thus, if one wishes to become favored by someone of this sort (τῷ τοιούτῳ προσφιλῆ), it is necessary as much possible to become of this sort oneself (αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι) (716c6-d1). In other words, it is the moderate man (ὁ σώφρων) who is “god’s friend” (θεῷ φίλος) by reason of being similar to god (ὅμοιος), while it is the “immoderate and unjust man” (μὴ σώφρων, ἄδικος) who is god’s enemy (διάφορος) by reason of being dissimilar to god (ἀνόμοιός) (716d1-3).149

To live one’s life according to the principle that god rather than any man is the measure of all things is the very opposite of the anarchic worldview held by the man bereft of god (ἔρημος θεοῦ), who vainly imagines that “so far from needing someone to control and lead him [ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντος οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος], he can play the leader to others [ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι]” (716a7-b1). According to Plato, this is the most essential expression of piety and the most important form of worship; engaging in other forms of worship in its absence will be useless at best and counterproductive at worst (716d-717a).150 _{Still, the good man is instructed to dwell in the company of the}

149 _{In addition, “The same reasoning applies to the other vices” (716d3-4).} 150 _{We receive perhaps an intimation of this belief-complex in the Euthyphro.}

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gods at all times (προσομιλεῖν ἀεὶ τοῖς θεοῖς) via prayers, offerings, and every form of worship (συμπάσῃ θεραπείᾳ θεῶν) (716d6-e1). Moreover, the supreme piety which Plato declares the “target [σκοπὸς] at which we should aim [οὗ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι]” (717a3-4) issues in a descending hierarchy of objects we owe reverence. We are also to honor the gods of Olympus, the gods of the underworld, the spirits (δαίμονες), heroes, ancestral gods (πατρῷοι θεοί), and finally our living parents (717a-718a).

Thus, Plato privileges under the auspices of the state religion a very specific inner orientation or mode of piety according to which we are to (i) look to god as the measure of all things, (ii) imitate god by cultivating moderation, etc., and (iii) engage in a range of traditional activities with a general attitude of “reverence.” Furthermore, as in the case of militarity above, the narratives from Book III can help illustrate the mode of piety

activated and propagated by the electoral process. In the course of the narrative of Athenian decadence, the average member of the “bad” audience gains the “arrogance to set himself up as a capable judge” in musical matters (700e5-6). Subsequently, this arrogance spreads to non-musical matters as well: everyone comes to possess “the conviction that he was an authority on everything” (701a5-6). This doubly universal arrogance gives rise to “effrontery” (ἀναισχυντία) – i.e., the willingness to traduce or gainsay all standards outside oneself (701a7-8). The great chain of piety is here

anticipated as a ladder of impiety as the effrontery of the citizens increases: defiance of authorities, then of parents and relatives, of the laws, and finally of “oaths and promises and religion in general” (701b-c).

In sum, an atmosphere of religiosity functions in Magnesia inasmuch as the latter is associated with a generalized reverence for what is beyond or due deference from the

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self. It is thus inherently anti-anarchical and counters the inherently anarchical framework of elections. Electors, suitably primed by the religious elements that figure in the

electoral process, are encouraged to make their electoral decisions in a manner that has the best interests of the state at heart – i.e., to choose as if they were not themselves the source of effective choice, but rather to make their choices in the light of social and cultural standards arising from subordination to the good of the community.