Chapter 4: Critical realism and theory
4.5 Theoretical framework
4.5.4 Fusing Elder-Vass’ work and orchestration
What should now be apparent is that the position put forward here neither commits to determinism, or voluntarism; it allows a role for both structure and agency in influencing action. As such, this theory is highly compatible with the notion of orchestration as posited by Jones and Wallace (2005, 2006). Specifically, orchestration can be defined as:
a coordinated activity within set parameters expressed by coaches to instigate, plan, organise, monitor and respond to evolving circumstances in order to bring about improvement in the individual and collective performance of those being coached (Jones & Wallace, 2005, p. 128).
As a metaphorical representation, orchestration implies that coaching is an activity which concerns ‘steering’ as opposed to exclusively controlling and thus being wholly responsible for the actions of others (Jones et al., 2013). Here, rather than coach behaviour directly determining athletes’ actions, Elder-Vass’ work is congruent with orchestration in that it is social structure – the norm circle – that is viewed as (casually) influencing action alongside the conscious reflexivity of agents. Though sets of relations (and interactions) between coaches and athletes, the norm circle has an emergent property to shape dispositions or beliefs in individuals (e.g., athletes) and thus shape the way that they act (alongside their capacity to consciously deliberate).
Orchestration was born from a dissatisfaction with previous rationalistic and simplistic representations of coaching which portrayed the activity as a linear mechanistic process (e.g., Christina & Corcos, 1988; Côté et al., 1995; Lyle, 2002; Martens, 1981, 1997; McConnell, 2000). Here, orchestration suggests that coaching is imbued with ambiguity and pathos. Ambiguity, in this sense, is characterised by coaches having limited control over the actions of their athletes, coaches’ allegiances to conflicting beliefs, or the novelty presented to coaches by each coaching situation (Jones & Wallace, 2005). Pathos, meanwhile, is understood as a gap between goals which have been set and the actual ability to then achieve
these goals in practice (Jones & Wallace, 2006). Coaches orchestrate by implementing strategies in attempt to manage pathos and reduce the distance between goals set and the actual ability to achieve them. Elder-Vass’ work provides an excellent opportunity to augment orchestration here by understanding potential (normative) strategies employed by coaches to manage pathos. Indeed, a key source of uncertainty for coaches is produced by the fact that it is always possible that role incumbents (e.g., athletes) might not perform in desired ways (to increase the likelihood of the team performing well). In order to work with or manage this pathos, coaches may therefore act on behalf of the organisation/norm circle to endorse or enforce specific (role) norms. They may do so in attempt make athletes aware that they face a systematic incentive to act in particular ways which are anticipated to make the achievement of the organisation’s goals (e.g., for successful team performance) more likely (Elder-Vass, 2010a). As Elder-Vass writes:
When individuals become parts of organisations, they do not lose the powers they have as individuals, but those powers are channelled and constrained as a result of the relations those individuals now have with others in the organisation (Elder-Vass, 2010a, p. 159).
The emergentist theory of action, then, also provides a means through which we can understand the actual influence of such orchestrated coaching (inter)actions. For example, we can attempt to explain the actions of others (e.g., athletes) in light of dispositions (stored through interactions with norm circles) and the capacity for the stakeholder to consciously reflect before acting (Elder-Vass, 2012a). As such, the theoretical framework holds strong potential to address the research questions of this thesis (please see section 1.3).
As highlighted in greater depth within Chapter Two, Jones et al. (2013) aimed to develop the notion of orchestration by incorporating work from organisation theory and educational change. Principally, this was achieved through integrating the core tenets of social irony, micro-political literacy, and noticing. More closely, this work contended that coaching is ‘imbued with elements of uncertainty, ambiguity and, irony’. In this sense, ‘uncertainty cannot be ‘solved’; the problem is one of living with it’ (Jones et al., 2013, p. 273). Coaching was also posited as a micro-political endeavour, which could be defined as
the use of power by groups or individuals who are constrained by structures and resources to achieve desired ends (Blase, 1991). Here, we begin to see the compatibility of language used in describing the ability of individuals to influence social structure, and also the ability for social structure to influence individuals – albeit, CR would call this a causal power. The basis of orchestration was also suggested to be the act of ‘noticing’: noticing opportunities to act appropriately (Mason, 2002). This is again compatible with the theory of norm circles, as we must notice the interactions of others before being able to (store or shape a belief or disposition and) act in a manner which is influenced by these interactions. In other words, we must be ‘able to see or notice opportunities to act in the first place’ (Jones et al., 2013, p. 276).
Closely observing the idea that coaches do not operate with unfettered freedom, but instead act within a set of complex structural constraints which must be navigated, Elder- Vass’ emergentist approach, I argue, marries with orchestration particularly well. For example, the emergentist theory of action recognises that agents (e.g., coaches and athletes) do not act using complete free agency; actions are also shaped by (normative) expectations, beliefs or dispositions which are often required to be negotiated or navigated. These beliefs or dispositions can be shaped through interactions with norm circles which produce a tendency for agents to act in a particular way (e.g., to play with intensity). As such, and as introduced above, the emergentist theory of action has the potential to augment orchestration by extending accounts which explain how coaches act and perform their roles (orchestrate), to also understand how, when, why and under which circumstances these actions influence others (i.e., athletes) or not. In this regard, the way in which a sports organisation is able to perform can be viewed as being an emergent property of the way in which its parts (e.g., its athletes, coaches, wider staff and stakeholders, among other entities) collectively coordinate their interactions. In other words, the emergent property of the squad as a whole (e.g., to perform well or not) is one which does not reside in its individual parts, but instead in the set of relations between its parts to arrange it into the particular structure formed. The
organisation’s emergent property to perform well can be said to be determined by both normative mechanisms (i.e., norm circles which define role norms) and non-normative mechanisms (i.e., the way in which those in these roles coordinate their interactions) (Elder- Vass, 2010a). In and of itself, this creates a further source of potential pathos or ambiguity for coaches and athletes. Here, although coaches and athletes can act on behalf of the organisation/norm circle to shape the normative expectations and pressures placed on role incumbents, if those within specific roles do not sufficiently coordinate their own actions with the actions of others, this may impact the potential for the organisation to achieve its goals (i.e., for the emergent properties of the organisation to be actualised).
Norm circles causally influence the action of agents within the group, but do not
compel individuals to strictly act according to these norms. Instead, coaches and athletes
have the capacity to consciously think and make decisions in co-determining their action alongside social structural influences. As such, this position is not only compatible with orchestration from the coach’s point of view. It also provides an avenue to theorise and explain the actions of athletes, and how these actions may have been shaped by previous (inter)action with others (i.e., coaches) and conscious reflexivity. To date, only Raabe et al. (2017) have used orchestration to understand how athletes navigate pathos as an inherent feature of their own role (please see section 2.3). However, this work focused on broad themes of strategies employed by athletes to orchestrate (e.g., communicating with others, maintaining a positive attitude and developing relationships). Although useful, more nuanced and specific understandings of what, how and why athletes orchestrate within situated acts (in relation to others) is required to better understand the (non)influence of agents’ (e.g., coaches’ and athletes’) interactions. Here, remaining true to the orchestration metaphor, athletes’ actions could be better situated within both structural and agential influences, and complex power relations. Elder-Vass’ work, then, presents an excellent opportunity to augment orchestration and understand how the (inter)actions of athletes are related to, shaped by and shape the (inter)actions of others. Thus, together, these theories again have
(further) potential to directly address the central questions of the present thesis (see section 1.3).
Compatibility between orchestration, emergentism and normative institutions (i.e., norm circles) can be further established on the grounds of ambiguity, noticing and micro-
political management. It is the conscious reflexivity element of Elder-Vass’ (2007)
emergentist theory of action which helps to explain the capacity of agents (coaches, athletes etc.) to act micro-politically (i.e., to use power in attempt to achieve their desired ends). Because agents have a conscious capacity to influence their action up until the action implementation phase (i.e., carrying out an action) (Davidson, 2001), this opens up the possibility for choice in terms of conformity or non-conformity to the norm. In turn, such experiences and decisions are then stored within our habitus (they shape beliefs or dispositions). Micro-political action is not necessarily the result of unfettered agency, however. It is also the presence of normative institutions according to Elder-Vass (2010, 2012) which can influence our (orchestrated) actions (i.e., a process which both shapes, and is shaped by structural entities). For instance, we might learn to micro-politically act
according to the norms of an organisation through observing the enactment and endorsement of a specific action by others. Adding further complexity here, Elder-Vass (2012a) argued that when individuals act there is no necessity that they are morally committed to the rightness of the norm; they may be acting in a specific manner for purely instrumental reasons.
The very concept of acting in a manner which is influenced by a norm circle rests upon individuals’ capacities to notice the enactment or endorsement of norms by others to (store or shape dispositions or beliefs which) guide their action. Unlike Durkheim (1964 [1894]), who suggested that this noticing is done at a societal level (i.e., the content of our norms or culture can exist in a collective form of belief, which is external to individual consciousness), Elder-Vass (2012a, p. 44) instead suggested that:
[o]nly individuals have the power to hold beliefs; only groups have the power to designate those beliefs as elements of shared culture. Culture is not simply belief, but socially endorsed belief, and that social endorsement can only be brought about by the group – a norm circle.
The influence of norm circles on us, then, is produced through our individual
impression of a specific behaviour or action that we take to be endorsed by a norm circle that we are exposed to, and thus a disposition to (tend to) behave in that kind of way is created (Elder-Vass, 2012a). This is clearly dependent upon our ability to notice and recognise ‘whether any action conforms to the understanding of the norm’ and that these
‘understandings of the norm are reasonably consistent with each other’ (Elder-Vass, 2012a, p. 51). For example, agents may notice feedback and correction (i.e., sanctioning non- conformity and praising or endorsing conformity) delivered by other agents.
What is more, the emergentist theory of action appears to rest on the premise that there may be ambiguity in: (a) our reading of others’ conformity to norms, (b) the
intersectionality of (and sometimes conflict between) norms, and subsequently (c) our own implementation, enactment or endorsement of these norms. This is perhaps best captured by considering Elder-Vass’ contentions that:
cultures are composed of many cross-cutting norm circles, that different norm circles may have different social significance due to differences in the social standing, power, and resources of their members, and that culture is a locus of constant struggle over which norms people should observe (Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 46).
Indeed Jones and Wallace (2005, p. 127) agree in this regard: ‘[a]mbiguity also derives from the prevalence of differing and contradictory beliefs among individuals involved, generating divergence amongst the goals pursued’. Here, agents are often required to engage in
conscious reflexivity to decide between norms in order to achieve skilled social performance. Ambiguity is also closely tied to Elder-Vass’ work in the sense that, even when the norm circle strongly endorses or enforces a norm, there is no guarantee that role incumbents will act in alignment with the norm. Indeed, individuals have the conscious capacity to think and act in a manner which deviates from the role norm. In other words, the norm (circle) does not