Relations between structure and agency

While structure and agency have been alluded to throughout this chapter, more close attention is required to be paid to the influence of both structure and agency in determining action, in line with critical realist logic (Rees & Gatenby, 2014). In order to extend the explanation of

emergentism and its emphasis within the present study, it is important to signify that the position

adopted relating to structure-agency relations again draws heavily upon the work of Elder-Vass (2007b) in his reconciliation of the positions of Pierre Bourdieu and Margaret Archer. Specifically, this standpoint critiques both Bourdieu and Archer’s approaches on their proposed interactions between structure and agency, before suggesting how they can be modified and integrated. While Bourdieu (1990) is viewed as downplaying the role of conscious deliberation, instead placing more emphasis on the role of social conditioning in determining actions, Archer (2003) is seen to place heavy focus on reflexive conscious deliberation and somewhat negate the influence of social structure on human action. Archer and Bourdieu are therefore in conflict at both an ontological and a theoretical level. At a level of ontology, the two positions disagree on the distinct existence of human causal powers and the way in which social structures are internalised (if indeed they are at all). Theoretically, Archer and Bourdieu are at conflict in their views of the degree to which conscious reflexive deliberation can explain action or modify dispositions. Elder-Vass (2007b) implies that the two theoretical positions presented can be reconciled through an emergentist lens, however.

Depending upon the reading of Bourdieu’s presentation of internalisation (i.e., how we store our experiences), emergentism provides an ontological bridge between the two positions. If we read Bourdieu’s internalisation metaphorically as opposed to literally:

when we “internalize” [sic] something, our beliefs about the world are affected by our experience in such a way that we accept it as a fact. Thus, for example, we may

are inferior by people around us. Metaphorically, we may say that we have

internalized our inferiority but, literally, what we mean is that we have acquired the

belief that we are inferior (Elder-Vass, 2007b, p. 334).

Hence beliefs are conceptualised as being affected by our experiences of social structure, and can also have an influence on our behaviour. These beliefs are seen as belonging to the agents who are inherently part of the social structure (Elder-Vass, 2007b). Secondly, at a theoretical level there is a need to recognise that some agential behaviour is more reflexively determined and other behaviour is determined to a greater degree by habitus (socially determined). Further, ‘many and perhaps most of our actions are co-determined by both our habitus and our reflexive deliberations’ (Elder-Vass, 2007b, p. 335).

In order to understand in more depth how the emergentist framework can conjoin the two perspectives, we require an understanding of mental states and how these are emergent from our neurological (physiological) base. Mental states (e.g., beliefs) have been stated as appearing at the level of neurons in the brain, which form networks of connections, with differing strengths (Fleetwood, 2008; Kaidesoja, 2013). Such connections are strengthened when we have experiences which confirm the mental state, or weakened when we have experiences that undermine the mental state (Elder-Vass, 2007b). Mental states are ‘thus emergent properties of neural networks, and can therefore be causally effective’ (Elder-Vass, 2007b, p. 337), which provides us with a basis to understand how habitus can unconsciously influence action, alongside more conscious factors (habitus – beliefs or dispositions – are formed and unconsciously drawn upon through mental states stored within connections of neurons and can thus be utilised as a schematic source).

Elder-Vass (2007b) then draws upon the work of Davidson (2001) in locating the

contribution of mental states to the determination of human action. It is argued that three ‘reasons’ can become causes of our actions: (a) a post-event description of beliefs surrounding the motivation for the action, (b) a conscious reason whereby conscious deliberation occurs underpinning an event, and (c) an unconscious reason whereby the reasons are implicit within neural structures. It is

postulated that a combination of (b) and (c) are required to fully conceptualise causal influences on human action, which clearly enlightens the possibility of connecting habitus and conscious

reflexivity more closely (Elder-Vass, 2007b). As such, ‘reasons co-determine our decisions, and decisions are stored in our brains as neural configurations – dispositions – which in turn co- determine our actions’ (Elder-Vass, 2007b, p. 340). Moreover, as will be discussed later in section 5.4.3, (a) had important implications for the methodological approach advanced in the current study, in light of contextual constraints and the desire to maintain a naturalistic approach.

In order to consolidate, and make clear the theoretical position adopted, actions are viewed as being ‘caused by the dispositions stored in our neural networks as a result of past decisions and experiences’ (Elder-Vass, 2007b, p. 341), while the role allowed to decision making ‘in amending this set of dispositions provides the mechanism by which the reflexive deliberation emphasized [sic] by Archer can enter into the same process of action determination as the habitus’ (Elder-Vass, 2007b, p. 341). Consequently, this theoretical view is well placed to account for the capability of coaching practice to influence and play a role in shaping the behaviour of others in a variety of (often unintended) ways. For example, it is capable of understanding how (inter)actions or experiences with coaches and conscious deliberation of athletes are able to shape subsequent (inter)action. As Elder-Vass (2007b, p. 340) put it himself, there are:

good reasons why there is no exceptionless empirical regularity connecting reasons and actions: like any other causal power, the causal powers of reasons to motivate actions are contingent on the operation of other causal powers with the capacity to co- determine our decisions and our subsequent behaviour.

Here, it is possible that performance can be guided not only through habitus arising from previous or current social fields, but also by new information which is utilised consciously (Elder-Vass, 2007b). Resultantly, this theory has real potential in explaining the influence of (ongoing) coaching practice on others (i.e., athletes), within a coherent picture of both structural and agential influences. From this emergentist position (e.g., the view that the whole is greater than simply the sum of its parts), there is a need to understand how and why

components of coaching practice interact together with other entities to influence others (e.g., athletes).