General Elections 2007

On 17 November 2007, for the third time, Assembly and Municipal elections took place. Municipal elections were already due in 2006, but with regard to the ongoing status process, UNMIK had decided to postpone them¹⁸⁷. In 2007 new electoral system was in place, in addition to voting for the Municipal and Kosovo-wide Assemblies, Mayors were elected directly for the first time. Since the last elections, several significant developments had happened. Although significantly delayed, the status process was well under way, and it seemed obvious that a solution was imminent. The next government would be the one to lead Kosova towards independence; therefore, the election was highly symbolic, at least for the ethnic Albanians. President Rugova had died in January 2006 and his party LDK was still in disarray, although Fatmir Sejdiu was able to succeed Rugova as both President and leader of LDK. Nevertheless, Nexhat Daci’s defection and the establishment of Democratic League of Dardania (LDD) in January 2007 had a serious impact on LDK. Daci took several LDK officials and Assembly Deputies with him¹⁸⁸.

In March 2006, another new contender had entered the political stage. Behgjet Pacolli, a prominent businessman, based in Switzerland, founded the New Alliance for Kosovo (AKR). Pacolli, originating from Kosova, sometimes touted to be the richest Albanian person, is a highly controversial figure. His company, Mabetex, is prominent for her activities in Russia and the Former Soviet Union, and there are allegations about corruption during the Jelzin era, when Mabetex was involved in the renovation of the Kremlin¹⁸⁹. Nevertheless, for a significant part of the

186 See: Kramer/Dzihic, p 209 cont.

187 UNMIK Press Release dated 16 June 2006. See:

http://www.unmikonline.org/dpi/pressrelease.nsf/0/BCABFE5B2C3F9DC5C1257196002A5001/$FILE/

pr%201567.pdf

188 Among those who changed their allegiance were members of Ibrahim Rugova´s nephew Naser Rugova and other prominent party members.

189 See for example an article in the online version of the German news magazine “Der Spiegel”:

http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/dokument/dokument.html?id=14443542&top=SPIEGEL

Albanian population Pacolli represents the prototype of a successful self-made-man, and he conducted an intensive election campaign.

For AAK the situation was not perfect as well, although Ceku held the office of Prime Minister. The status negotiations went too slowly, and especially PDK blamed the government for not achieving quicker results. Ramush Haradinaj was still in The Hague and not able to conduct an election campaign, but at least he could draw some sympathies and capitalize on his image as a war hero. Nevertheless, it was unclear how the trial in The Hague would end, and an eventual prison sentence, meaning a prolonged absence, would have posed a serious threat for the future of AAK.

For the Serbs, the situation remained as problematic as ever and especially in the light of the ongoing status negotiations, Belgrade continued with her policy to call for a boycott. This led to the withdrawal of the majority of previously registered Serbian political entities, and eventually less than one percent of Kosovo-Serbs cast their ballot.

The result of the Assembly elections was an overturn of the previous balance of power. LDK was punished severely and lost about half of their voters. The party gained only about 22 % (2004: 45 %). For the first time ever, Hashim Thaci´s PDK was able to replace the LDK at the top. PDK included a few smaller parties into a pre-election coalition and was supported by 34 %, a significant increase to the 29 % they had in 2004. Although the AAK could gain a few votes and ended up with slightly more than 9 %, it was one of the losers of the election. They lost their third ranking position to Pacolli´s AKR, which was able to achieve 12 %. Even Daci´s LDD, beat the AAK by a few thousand votes and achieved 10%. Unfortunately, with slightly more than 40 % the turnout was low (2004: 50 %). This was attributed to a widespread frustration among the population, concerning not only the delay in the status issue but also an increasing mistrust against politicians and the lack of improvements in everyday life¹⁹⁰. This feeling was also perceived as favourable for Pacolli´s AKR, since he represented economic success and a “new” type of politician.

190 In her preliminary statement on 18 November the Council of Europe Election Observation Mission in Kosovo commended the peaceful electoral process in general, but criticized the low turnout: “The confirmation of this continuous downward trend, which started in the 2001 elections, reveals

On the municipal level, the PDK success was reflected, and the party was able to win a majority of the municipalities. LDK suffered losses and the AAK remained on top in the municipalities of Western Kosovo, their traditional stronghold. For the Serbs, the boycott proved again detrimental, since they lost influence in ethnically mixed municipalities, where they were previously represented. In the North, the SRSG annulled the result. Representatives of the local ethnic Albanian minority in the North, who ran for election, were voted into office due to the Serbian boycott, but these results were not feasible and therefore cancelled. The overwhelming majority of Kosovo-Serbs held their Municipal elections together with the rest of Serbia in May 2008, but this was not acceptable for UNMIK and therefore considered illegal¹⁹¹.

On the Kosovo-wide level, the formation of a new government took until January 2008. On 10 December 2007, an ultimatum for the UN-appointed Troika to conclude their mission about the future status ran out. Kosova was under pressure to create functional institutions quickly, but the political situation was complicated. LDK was shocked by her losses, while Thaci saw a historic chance to become Prime Minister, and Haradinaj still was not present. Less than two months later, coalition talks were concluded and on 9 January, Thaci became Prime Minister in a PDK-LDK coalition, while Sejdiu retained his function as President. In the new coalition, PDK was able to secure the key ministerial posts, and LDK had to contend with the role of junior partner¹⁹². In line with the constitutional provisions, two Serbs participate as well¹⁹³.

dissatisfaction among the population, due to the lack of improvements expected following the previous four elections. To a certain extent, this turnout reflects a particular loss of trust due to widespread discontentment with the prevailing socio-economic situation, which affects all communities living in Kosovo in their day-to-day life.” The full statement is available at:

http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/events/2007_kosovo/prelim_statement_en.asp

191 This practice of competing elections led to ome chaos about who is the legitimate local representative. For example in the Southern enclave of Strpce, there are two competing ethnic Serb mayors, one installed after the Kosovo-wide elections in 2007, the other after the Serbian elections in 2008. Details are in the ICG Europe Report Nr. 200: Serb Integration in Kosovo: Taking the Plunge;

released on 12 May 2009.

192 By entering the coalition, the predicament for LDK continued. Like Rugova before him, Sejdiu was accused to put his personal ambitions before the interests of his party. Thaci demanded that all of the LDK-ministers who served in the previous coalition with AAK had to be replaced. Naturally, this loss of power meets resistance, and this group of former ministers is now threatening the cohesion of the party. For example see: the “Zëri” newspaper article: “New coalition followed by inter-party discontent”.

available at the 11 January 2008 UNMIK Media Monitoring website:

http://www.unmikonline.org/dpi/localmed.nsf/f0300?OpenForm&Seq=1#_RefreshKW_Media

193 More details are at the Prime Minister´s website: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,1

16.6. Conclusion

The various elections on Municipal and Kosovo-wide level held between 2000 and the declaration of independence in February 2008 undoubtedly helped to establish relevant political institutions. All of the elections were held without incidents, and – with international support- they were in line with international standards. Out of a non-existent party system, several political parties emerged. While it is true that virtually all of them have deficits concerning transparency, internal democratic structures or a structured program to deal with the challenges facing Kosova, one has to contend that the political landscape has developed.

State related structures like the Assembly and the executive developed as well, although there are still significant deficits and a serious amount of dealings behind the scenes. In order to guarantee a positive development, the international community remains present. Basically, the elections held so far gave proof that the institutional level of state-building has developed and that – with the continued support of the international community – a constructive path was taken.

Despite an overall positive assessment, at least concerning technical issues, the shortfalls need to be mentioned as well. Firstly, it was never possible to integrate a substantial share of Kosovo-Serbs into the system. Although there are far-reaching provisions in the electoral system and in the constitution, most of them simply refused to accept the system. They are still bound to Serbia proper and continue to listen to Belgrade more than to Pristina´s institutions or the international community. The few Kosovo-Serbs that participate in the institutions are not representative and often viewed as traitors by their own community. Even if they accepted a political office or a mandate in the Assembly, boycott was more the rule than the exception. In the end, nothing substantial was achievable for the Kosovo-Serbs within the PISG.

On the side of the ethnic Albanian majority, frustration seems to prevail. The rate of participation in elections is constantly falling, and polls show that the bad socio-economic situation as well as corruption and inefficiency shed a negative light on the political representatives. Despite the newly won democratic rights and opportunities, scepticism and a feeling of indifference seems to take hold. It is a responsibility of the elected political representatives as well as the international community to take care

that this potentially dangerous amount of frustration among the general population will not prevail.