Gorazde was one o f the six UN-designated ‘safe areas’. In the first week of April 1994, Serb forces besieging the city began to close in. The commander o f UNPROFOR, General Rose, initially played down the crisis, but the Serb bombardment and advance sharply escalated after 7 April. UN military representatives and UNHCR representatives in the town reported that the situation was ‘very serious’. When the Bosnian Serb commander, Ratko Mladic, ignored warnings by Rose to stop the attacks or face NATO action. Rose obtained approval from Yasushi Akashi, the UN Secretary-General’ s special envoy, and ordered an air attack by two US Air Force planes on a Serb artillery command bunker on 10 April. The following day. Rose ordered a second wave of air strikes, on a group of tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers that had been firing on Gorazde. NATO justified the action by referring to UNSCR 836.^^
This was the first attack by NATO on ground targets in its history. Its first military action had taken place on 28 February 1994, when NATO planes had intercepted and brought down four Serb planes that were violating the no-fly zone. On that occasion, the Russian MFA recognised that the action was in line with UNSC resolutions and the mandate given to NATO to implement the no-fly zone. A statement released by the MFA stated:
Any side that carried out a military flight over Bosnia in violation of corresponding resolutions of the UNSC about the no-fly zone itself bears full responsibility for the consequences.'^
The reaction to the air strikes around Gorazde was more critical, although not as strong as that to the NATO ultimatum over Sarajevo. This was because, in contrast to the Sarajevo declaration, the Gorazde strikes were in line with existing UNSC resolutions on deterring attacks on ‘safe areas’ and were not linked to an ultimatum to achieve additional aims, but Russian officials believed that matters were not as clear-cut as they were in the case o f the strikes of 28 February.
Firstly, Russia claimed that the crisis had begun with ‘provocative actions’ by Muslim forces, which had led to an ‘inappropriate’ response from Serb forces. The MFA declared that violations of UNSC resolutions establishing the ‘safe areas’ were 16
Ibid., pp. 363-4.
Russian Federation MFA (28 February 1994).
Russian Federation MFA (13 April 1994). According to Silber and Little, government forces regularly launched raids from within the enclave, but Mladic launched an offensive to tighten the Serb grip on the town (without necessarily capturing it) in order to secure Gorazde in advance of an overall peace settlement; Silber and LitÜe (1996), pp. 324-6.
unacceptable, but the international community must not ‘indulge Muslim provocations'/^ Secondly, as with the Sarajevo declaration, Russian officials objected to the fact that Russia had not been consulted before the air strikes, and was only informed after the event. Karasin argued that protection of ‘blue helmets’ was not an empty question for Russia since Russian peace-keeping forces were also present in Bosnia, and declared that Moscow would not ‘resign itself to the role of junior partner, which is informed only in those cases when it is expected to say “yes’” .^° Russian diplomats insisted on the unconditional observation o f the approval procedure for air support as affirmed by the UNSC; again they demanded consultation with the permanent members of the Security Council prior to any strikes, arguing that Akashi did not have the authority to approve such a c tio n s.T h ird ly , Russian diplomats claimed that the air strikes had aggravated the military-political situation and had created the danger of escalation; they warned against Western leaders ‘gambling on force in Bosnian as well as in general world affairs’. R u s s i a demanded that the UN Secretary- General prepare a full report on the mechanism used to make the decision on the use of air strikes and on the results of the strikes, including data about the targets hit, the number of victims, and an evaluation o f the implications of the strikes for the UN peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and the supply o f humanitarian aid.^^
The Gorazde crisis, like the Sarajevo crisis before it, had wider implications for NATO-Russian relations. Although Yeltsin claimed that Russia was making no direct linkage between events in Bosnia and the Partnership for Peace programme, he added that Russia was not ‘hurrying to sign’.^"^ Kozyrev also hinted that the decision to postpone signing the programme was linked to events in Bosnia:
We are interested in much more serious relations with NATO, than simply a framework document, so that surprises and unilateral measures, especially military ones, are ruled out in those areas where we must co-operate very closely.^
Nevertheless, the subsequent failure of Russian efforts to achieve an agreement in Gorazde similar to that achieved in Sarajevo actually encouraged closer co-operation
Russian Federation MFA (11 April 1994). lusin (13 April 1994).
Russian Federation MFA (14 April 1994). The NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Womer, answering these criticisms, argued that preliminary consultations with Moscow would have taken too much time, which would have made it impossible to accomplish the main objective o f protecting the UN personnel threatened by Serb guns; lusin (13 April 1994).
^ Russian Federation MFA (13 April 1994).
Russian Federation MFA (11 April 1994), (13 Aprü 1994), (14 April 1994). Rossiiskie vesti (13 April 1994).
with the West. This failure was due to the actions o f the Bosnian Serbs. After the first air strikes, Churkin went to Pale hoping to get an agreement that would avert the need for further NATO action. On 16 April, the Serbs announced that they had captured the strategic heights around Gorazde, and their attack continued. NATO aircraft again prepared to undertake air strikes after Rose requested close air support, but bad weather and the shooting down o f a British plane caused the mission to be abandoned. Concerned at potential escalation, Churkin met the most senior Bosnian Serb ‘official’ in Pale at that time, Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker in the Bosnian Serb ‘parliament’. Krajisnik promised to stop the shelling of Gorazde, to pull back Serb forces to a distance of three kilometres from the town centre, and to release the 150 UN personnel who had been taken hostage after the first air strikes. The agreement was due to take immediate effect, and talks would resume in the morning. As a result, Akashi agreed to call off the air strikes.
But the Bosnian Serbs made no attempt to honour the agreement, as Churkin himself explained:
They gave me this promise of three things they would do. [But] they had not released anybody. They had not pulled back a single inch from where they were standing. And the shelling continued.
Karadzic was procrastinating. After about two or three hours, it became clear to me that for reasons of his own he didn’t want to come to any kind of agreement.
So I told him of the opportunity to have sanctions lifted and I walked out of the meeting.
Churkin later told journalists that he had heard more broken promises in one weekend than he had heard all his life.^^
Russia’s leaders strongly condemned the way that the Bosnian Serbs had broken their promises. President Yeltsin said that, despite Russian efforts, ‘it has not proved possible to avoid the escalation of military action. The Bosnian Serbs do not keep their word.’^^ Kozyrev ‘resolutely recommended’ the Serb side ‘not to test the patience of the world c o m m u n i t y B u t the strongest reactions came from Churkin, who felt personally slighted and experienced the contrast with the Sarajevo ‘triumph’ most acutely. He believed that Russia, as a great power, had been insulted by the Bosnian Serbs who had used it to achieve their own aims. As he put it, ‘the tail shouldn’t wag the
Silber andLitUe (1996), pp. 329-31. Ibid., pp. 367-8.
ITAR-TASS (19 April 1994a). ITAR-TASS {\9 April 1994b).
dog. It’s really quite simple ... we have our own interests and our own positions, too.’^^ He urged Russian authorities to break off all contacts with the Bosnian Serbs who had ‘used Moscow’s mediation as a cover and simply played for time’;
The Bosnian Serbs must understand that in Russia they are dealing with a great power, not a banana republic. Russia must decide whether a group of extremists can be allowed to use a great country’s policy to achieve its own aims. Our answer is unequivocal: “never”.^*
Some Russian commentators went further, arguing that previous Russian diplomacy had encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to continue actions against the ‘safe areas’. For example, Leonid Mlechin wrote in Izvestiia.
Moscow is promising to prevent any NATO action, believing that such an action would lead to a major war.
Isn’t it worth considering that Russia’s diplomatic success in Sarajevo two months ago may have been one of the causes of the present catastrophe in Bosnia?
When Russia thwarted the NATO ultimatum issued to the Serbs blockading Sarajevo, the Serb leaders decided that they had finally succeeded in causing a clash between Russia and the West, and that Moscow would never allow NATO to bomb their positions and would, in general, protect them. Filled with this confidence, the Serbs attacked Gorazde.^^
Other commentators, however, continued to support the Bosnian Serbs and strongly opposed action by NATO and the West. In Rossiiskaia gazeta, Vladimir Kuznechevskii noticed that the situation in Bosnia had changed drastically as a result o f the events around Gorazde, where, as a result of the ‘military provocation’ by the Muslims and after ‘the support o f this provocation by NATO military aircraft’, the Serbs ‘stopped restraining t h e m s e l v e s A n d Evgenii Fadeev, in Pravda, concentrated his attack on Churkin, who ‘[cjompletely unexpectedly ... harshly and inappropriately condemned the Serb side in Bosnia’.
There appeared also to be differences within the administration. For example, the Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, stated: ‘I do not entirely agree with Vitalii Churkin, it would be wrong to put all the blame for the truce violations and the air strikes on the
Russia TV (20 April 1994). lusin (20 April 1994). Mlechin (23 April 1994). Kuznechevskii (19 April 1994). Fadeev (20 April 1994).
Bosnian Serbs... The situation in the Gorazde region is confused - both sides are guilty.
Reports suggested that the MFA accepted Churkin’s view that further contacts with the Bosnian Serb leadership would be pointless.^^ Immediately following Churkin’s return from Bosnia, the MFA prepared the text o f a presidential statement on Bosnia, which, according to sources in the Ministry, asserted that the Bosnian Serb leadership was taking a deliberately un-constructive position with the aim o f destroying the Muslim enclaves; that Russia’s reserves o f goodwill had run out and it saw no sense in continuing its mediation efforts; and that the world community could not reconcile itself to open aggression and genocide. Instead, peace must be enforced.^^ But the text was softened significantly in tone. According to Vladimir Abarinov, this was because Yeltsin ‘did not want an early confrontation with the Duma over what is, from his point of view, a secondary issue’. Furthermore, Yeltsin had protested against military intervention in Bosnia too often to support it now.^^
Nevertheless, the final statement still displayed a change of emphasis in Russian rhetoric:
The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina stands on the threshold of a dangerous escalation, despite Russia’s energetic diplomatic efforts in conjunction with the UN and other members of the international community. The Bosnian Serb leadership must fulfil the commitments it made to Russia to stop the attacks and withdraw from the town of Gorazde, a UN-declared ‘safe area’, to guarantee conditions for the introduction of UN forces, and release UN personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The world community must take decisive measures for a political resolution of the Bosnian crisis.
In this context, I re-affirm my proposal for a meeting at the highest level of Russia, the USA, the EU, wifti the participation of the UN.^^
These points were repeated in subsequent statements by Russian diplomats. While condemning Serb action, Russia continued to oppose the use of air strikes which contained ‘an inherent danger of escalation’, and of NATO being drawn in to the conflict and usurping the primacy o f the UNSC."^^
Fefgengauer (21 v^ril 1994). lusin (21 April 1994).
Abarinov (1994a); see also lusin (21 April 1994). Abarinov (1994a).
Russian Federation MFA (19 April 1994).