The Russian administration was unwilling to abandon the VOPP even after the Bosnian Serbs had rejected it in their referendum. Like their Western European counterparts, Russian policy makers regarded the plan as the best basis for a just and lasting peace as well as a focus for international accord. On 16 May, after talks with David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg (who had replaced Vance as the UN negotiator), Kozyrev argued that it was ‘now essential, disregarding the obstructionist position o f those forces interested in war, to begin strict implementation of the provisions o f the Vance-Owen plan’.^^^ He believed that the international community ‘did not have to wait until the last Bosnian fighter endorses the plan’ and that it could ‘put out the fire in former Yugoslavia step by step’.^^^ Hence, Kozyrev and Yeltsin proposed ‘progressive implementation’ o f the plan, and called for a meeting o f the UNSC at foreign minister level to adopt a resolution drafted by Russia.
The idea was to apply the VOPP in areas controlled by Bosnian government and Croat forces, without waiting for acceptance by the Bosnian Serbs. Russia would join the US and European states in providing peace-keepers, although the question of numbers of the Russian contingent could only be tackled after the UNSC had adopted the plan and devised a mechanism for implementing it.^"^^ The problem was that, as we have seen, the Russian MF A would have found it extremely difficult to convince the Defence Ministry and the General Staff to commit significant numbers of troops to a continuing conflict situation outside the former Soviet space. Furthermore, since one side had rejected the VOPP, ultimately the plan could be enforced only by coercion, even if implementation was progressive. But Russia was very unlikely to endorse coercive action, even though the MF A fully supported the London Conference principles and the VOPP, and was itself proposing progressive implementation. In other words, the MF A was unlikely to follow through the logic of its own proposal. This was because of the likely political impact. It was also due to scepticism from the Defence Ministry and the armed forces which were unwilling to take part in a peace enforcement operation but refused to countenance an action in which they were not involved.
ITAR-TASS {\6 May 1993). Gow (1997a), p. 249.
Ermolovich (18 May 1993); ITAR-TASS Mày 1993). ITAR-TASS {19 May 1993).
The Clinton administration did not support ‘progressive implementation’ because it did not favour the VOPP and would not commit troops without a comprehensive peace settlement. The American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, refused to attend the planned ministerial meeting of the Security Council on 21 May; instead. Foreign Ministers of the four European UNSC members - Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Spain - met Christopher in Washington and drew up the so-called Joint Action Programme. This was a means of overcoming differences between the great powers over further responses to the continuing conflict. The result was a compromise that did little to promote an effective settlement. Although it supposed the achievement of a peace settlement through negotiations based on the VOPP, the Joint Action Programme marked a shift to concentration on the ‘safe area’ concept. This was to prove disastrous.
Kozyrev continued to portray the Joint Action Programme as a means of salvaging the VOPP; for instance, on the flight back from Washington, he told journalists that ‘urgent measures’ had been necessary to prevent the VOPP being derailed, but that it had undoubtedly been saved. A seven-point ‘Russian plan number two’ called for full respect for the experience, ideas, and principles o f the London Conference, the Vance- Owen plan and the Washington Joint Action Programme. But soon Churkin was admitting that the Geneva negotiators had ‘deviated a little’ from the VOPP and were instead considering a three-way federation (‘a unified Bosnian state consisting of three national entities - Serbian, Muslim and Croatian’), which Yeltsin described as ‘probably the most viable idea’.^"^^ On 31 July, Kozyrev issued a statement announcing an ‘important result’ at the Geneva talks, an agreement between the parties to create the United Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the constitutional framework for the co-existence o f the three peoples had been defined. An MF A declaration in August stated, like previous declarations, that the principles of the London Conference, the Washington Programme, as well as UN documents, provided the world community with a good basis for further activity in the Bosnian process; but there was no mention of the VOPP
Failure to enforce the VOPP was an admission that the ‘international community’ did not have the unity o f purpose to reverse ‘ethnic cleansing’ and Serb territorial gains in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This implied tacit acknowledgement that the Bosnian Serbs would achieve their constitutional purposes, if not their territorial ambitions. Hence, all
ITAR-TASS (24 May 1993); Maiak Radio (24 May 1993a). Serbian T V(29 June 1993); Russia'sRadio (30 June 1993). ^^UtAR-TASSOX July 1993).
subsequent plans were based on de facto partition, beginning with the three-part confederation plan proposed by the Serbs and Croats. Russia endorsed this, and, in fact, Kozyrev played an active role in facilitating acceptance of de facto partition. Nevertheless, Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch’s claim that the shelving of the VOPP, and the acceptance of Serb territorial gains as the basis o f a settlement, represented ‘a considerable victory for Russian diplomacy’, and that ‘the effective ratification of Serbian military gains in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... has come about largely through Russia’s diplomatic intervention’ is simply not true.^"^^ The MF A and Yeltsin genuinely favoured the adoption of the VOPP; whether they were prepared to countenance the kind of action necessary to see it implemented is another matter.
But there is also no evidence to prove James Gow’s assertion that the US failure to endorse ‘progressive implementation’ of the VOPP marked a turning-point in Russian policy after which there was a ‘realisation that its faith in Washington had not been returned’ leading to an emphasis on great power status and the need for forceful assertion of a policy based on national interests. This shift occurred, but the failure of the VOPP does not seem to have been the pivot. The change was more gradual than this implies and was also part of the overall adjustment in foreign policy. Certainly, the US approach was disheartening, given the full support that Russian diplomats had given Vance, Owen, Stoltenberg, and the ICFY as a process. It was also humiliating for Kozyrev in particular that the US Secretary of State refused to attend the UNSC meeting of foreign ministers that Russia had called for 21 May, and instead ‘summoned’ them to Washington. As the commentator Viktor Levin remarked on Maiak Radio, the American reaction after their ‘lift and strike’ proposal was turned down was ‘rather like a child in a sandpit: take your toys away. I’m not playing with you any more’.^"^^ Nevertheless, Russian diplomats continued to support international mediation efforts through the ICFY and remained active in the mediation process. Russia shared the fears of the other ‘Yugoslav Five’ that open divisions might develop between the major powers and was satisfied that the Joint Action Programme averted this.
And, given the problems inherent in it, there may in fact have been some relief in Moscow that the ‘progressive implementation’ strategy did not proceed. Russia’s real unwillingness to provide troops while the conflict continued was demonstrated by subsequent events. Although the Joint Action Programme stated that Russia intended to
Edemskii (1996), p. 41.
Lukic and Lynch (1996), p. 345. 148
149Gow (1997a), p. 199.
provide peace-keeping troops in Bosnia in addition to those in Croatia, Russian diplomats soon began to back down on this declaration/^^ Indeed, lastrzhembskii denied that Russia had ever made such a commitment; consequently, it could not renege on it. Instead, he suggested that the Russian Federation could participate in other ways in the UN operation in Bosnia, perhaps by providing observers stationed along the border (although no resolution on observers existed yet).^^^ In the event, no troops were sent until February 1994, and then it was to oversee a local cease-fire deal around Sarajevo accepted by all sides; crucially, the gain in Russian prestige was calculated as counter-balancing the risk to troops (chapter 6).