The Identity of the Basic Structure

The primary task of this dissertation is to show why the basic structure has primacy as a

distinct moral subject. As I discussed in the introduction, I will do this by explaining

three features of the basic structure; its identity, its moral indispensability, and its moral

distinctiveness. The account of this chapter addresses the identity of the basic structure

specifically. It explains that the basic structure consists of those institutions that establish

background security for individuals as members of society.

Starting from the idea of ostensibly binding practices and building up to the

notion of the basic structure, we have the tools to overcome many of the traditional

problems with the idea of the basic structure. According to this theory, the basic structure

consists of ostensibly binding social rules. It does not necessarily consist of rules that are

binding. Likewise, the rules are specific enough that they differ from the informal

structure. While our entire social structure consists in many ostensibly binding practices,

the basic structure does not include all of them. Rather, the basic structure consists of

only those ostensibly binding practices that establish obligations, rights, and powers for

individuals as members of society. This differentiates the basic structure from moral

practices that bind all persons, from social practices that persons choose to be part of, and

from the global structure that provides security for international actors. The basic

structure remains a distinct and unified aspect of the social structure.

Moreover, this articulation distinguishes the basic structure from the broader set

of practices that establish our social context. There is wide diversity of practices in social

life, and only some of them are part of the basic structure of society. In his objections to

Rawls, Cohen appeals to the example of a society with an “egalitarian ethos.”45 _{Even if}

our major social institutions maximally promote equality, we promote equality even

further if persons generally acted for the sake of equality in their personal decisions. In

his arguments from “On the Site of Distributive Justice,” G.A. Cohen argues that there is

no non-arbitrary way by which Rawls can distinguish the norms that form the basic

structure from the norms that would form an egalitarian ethos.46 _{Now, I have little doubt}

that such an ethos would be a significant part of social life. It might impact what

individuals in that society value, the shape of their life plan, and their relationships.

45_{Rescuing Justice and Equality, 134-150. While never defined explicitly, Cohen uses the idea to refer to}

the various social norms and attitudes that are prevalent and pervasive in society. An egalitarian ethos would be part of, but not the whole of, the informal structure of society.

46 _{In Rescuing Justice and Society, he amends this argument too suppose that even if there was some way to}

Moreover, I do recognize that both the basic structure and an egalitarian ethos are formed

by norms. However, neither of these points mean that there is no non-arbitrary way by

which to distinguish an egalitarian ethos from the basic structure.

While the norms of an egalitarian ethos outline patterns of behavior, the norms of

the basic structure require action or specify claims. The rules are particular in identifying specific actions as required and as rights-violations. Once one has security in property or

security in religious freedom, then there are certain actions that individuals cannot take.

With an egalitarian ethos, there is no such specificity. The fact that we live in a society

where members of the military are particularly esteemed does not require any particular

actions from individuals or give any persons claims. I do not act wrongly if I do not buy a

soldier a beer at the bar even if there is an ethos of appreciate for the military. Such

informal norms--whether esteem for military personnel or appreciation for equality--do

not establish particular obligations, rights, or powers in the way that basic structure

institutions do.

In his 2009 book, Cohen slightly changes his objection. He does not claim that

there is not way by which to distinguish the basic structure from informal norms like an

egalitarian ethos. Instead, he argues that any such distinction would be morally arbitrary.

Ultimately, we only care about identifying the basic structure as distinct from informal

norms because we think that there is something morally significant about the basic

structure and not about the informal structure. Instead of focusing on the possibility of a distinction between the basic structure and the informal structure, Cohen focuses on the

So far, I have only tried to show what the distinction is and not what the moral

significance of this distinction in. In Chapter 2, I will show why the basic structure is an

indispensable moral subject, and I show why the principles that apply to it will be distinct

from the principles that apply to individual action in Chapter 3. Here, I have identified

the basic structure as those institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers

as members of society. An egalitarian ethos does not establish specific rights or

obligations upon persons. In being concerned with the basic structure, Rawlsians are

concerned with these specific institutions. Next I argue for why they should be so concerned.

Chapter 2