Objections

On first look, this characterization of the basic structure might seem problematic for a

number of reasons. I want to address three of the most pressing objections here. By

addressing these objections, I should also be able to explain the central idea behind my

account.

First, one might be tempted to think that my characterization of the basic structure

would be too expansive. For example, does it include the obligations and rights we have

against deception? After all, if we are lost on a street corner and ask a random passerby

for directions, we can have a right to the truth and the passerby has an obligation to tell

38 _{Rousseau, Jean-Jacques “The First and Second Discourses,” trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters,}

the truth. Since I characterized the basic structure as establishing such rights, it would

seem like my characterization of the basic structure would include truth-telling. Since we

do not typically recognize truth-telling as part of the basic structure, this would be

problematic for my characterization.

In response, I only need to stress the importance of the clause that the basic

structure establishes obligations, rights, and powers “for individuals as members of

society.” When we have a right to the truth, it has nothing to do with our position as

member of society. Instead, if we do trust persons, it is either on the basis of a judgment

of their individual character or on the basis of our position as persons. Regardless of whether that street corner is in one’s own society or in a distant society, we likely will

still trust a random passerby to tell the truth. Accordingly, norms of non-deception are not

part of the basic structure because they do not establish rights for individuals as members

of society.

A second, and similar, objection would charge that my account would include

obligations like promise-keeping as part of the basic structure. If one thinks that it is a

moral obligation of all persons to keep their promises, then my response to this objection

will be the same as that above. Our promissory obligations are established by being

persons rather than being members of society. If one thinks that promise-keeping is a

moral obligation only because it is a social convention, then it seems more difficult to

claim that our promissory obligation is established by our role as persons.

Nonetheless, this obligation is still unproblematic. First, insofar as a person utters

keeping convention, regardless of whether they are a member of society or not. So, if

promise-keeping is conventional, it can still establish security for persons as persons

because our security is explained by their recognition of the convention rather than our

membership in society. To see the difference, compare the rights and obligations involved

in a signed contract between strangers and the rights and obligations involved in a

promise. The conditions that identify a contract as valid are specified by legal norms

specific to a society whereas the conditions that identify a promise as valid are more

important to interpretation and may vary from one social group to the next. In this way,

we can recognize security in contracts as arising from our role as members of society

while we explain security in promises as arising from our role as persons.

Finally, as a third objection, one could point out that foreigners and tourists have

obligations, rights, and powers specified by the major social institutions even though they

are not members of society. This objection might seem to show problems with the clause

that the basic structure establishes security for individuals as members of society.

Yet, if everything else about the account is not problematic, then this last

objection should be no worry. This is because when foreigners and tourists are treated as

members of a society that is not their own, they merely assume the role of member of

society.39 _{Now, this does not mean that they assume the role of citizen. To be a citizen--in}

the way, I distinguish the phrase--is to have a particular role in a political and legal

structure. Being a citizen entitles one to certain privileges and responsibilities, but being a

citizen and being a member of society are not synonymous. It is fair to say that illegal

immigrants are members of society even if they are not citizens in the proper sense.

Likewise, we might not consider tourists to ultimately be members of society, though we

do treat them accordingly. When we travel to other societies, we likewise should act

according to the norms that members of that society act in accordance with.

In this way, the identification of basic structure institutions does not include moral

rules because we do not have security in these rules as members of society, it does not

include aspects of the informal structure because the rules of the informal structure are

not sufficiently particular, and it does not rule out the possibility that those in a foreign

society assume the role as member of society.