OF SUCH IMMUNITY; AND

.

 W/N THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONER ESTRADE SHOULD BE ENJOINED DUE TO PREJUDICIAL

PUBLICITY.

RULING: NO. Private respondent stresses that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power, that she has

already taken her oath as the President, that she has exercised her powers as President, and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket that the courts cannot enter.

The US case of Baker v. Carr spelled out what a political question is—―prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretions; or the impossibility of a court‘s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due to coordinate branches of government, or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments in question.‖

In the Philippine setting, the leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco, where the court held that political questions refer to ―those question which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

In fact, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review.

Respondent‘s reliance on cases involving the Aquino administration is not applicable here. The former was revolutionary in character. In contrast, the oath of President Arroyo was under the 1987 Constitution. EDSA I presented a political question, while EDSA II involves legal questions.

YES. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office

of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. The issue is whether Estrada was considered resigned. Resignation is not an abstraction. It is a factual question. There must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. Resignation does not need a formal requirement. Consequently, whether the petitioner resigned has to be determined by his acts and omission before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using the totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congresses recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Clearly, such question is a political one and is addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat.

NO. The principle of non-liability does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the President, that he

may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean tyranny. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary it means, that the President may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequence of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. Public policy forbids it. The President may be held liable when he acts in the case so plainly outside of his power and authority. In such case, he acts not as the President but as a private individual.

The Court also rejected the argument that Estrada cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Since the impeachment court was held to be functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.

.

With regard to the scope of immunity, the cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. In no sense can the crimes o f plunder, bribery and graft and corruption be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.

NO. The claim that petitioner was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity cannot be sustained. The right of

an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of the accused to a fair trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and has not discharged the burden.

SELL V. U.S. JUNE 16, 2003

FACTS: Dr. Charles Sell, once a practicing dentist, is charged criminally for attempted murder and fraud. Sell is suffering of

mental illnesses. He saw a leopard ride a bus. He claims that a gold tooth filling contaminated by "communists". He told cops to shoot him.

Sell is charged for fraud for submitting false insurance claims for payment ( soon after which charged with 56 counts of mail fraud, 6 counts medical fraud, and 1 count money laundering; with suspision of being under a psychotic spell)

Sell is charged for attempted murder for attacking/getting back on the FBI agent who arrested him and a witness on the fraud cases, after being released on bail. Being under psychotic spells and out of control, the Magistrate of the lower court ordered Sell to undergo "antipsychotic medication"

On the grounds that

the medication is to help Sell stand trial for the serious chrages against him

Sell is tagged as being "dangerous", a danger to himself and to the others in the Medical Center and thus MUST be forced to undergo medication.

Sell refused to undertake medication but the Magistrate ordered the Medical Center to put Sell under "forced" medication, making the process against Sell's will

Sell charged the Magistrate and the Medical Center for violating his right to not to undergo medication

Sell's appeal went up to the District Court. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate's decision to force medicate Sell to put him into proper trial. However, District Court went against the Magistrate's decision to label Sell as dangerous to put him under medication

ISSUES:

 SHOULD SELL UNDERGO FORCED MEDICATION?

 IS IT A VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS?

 HOW BEING "DANGEROUS" IS CRITICAL TO BEING FORCED INTO MEDICATION?

 IF NOT LABELED AS "DANGEROUS", WHY SHOULD SELL STILL UNDERGO MEDICATION?

RULING:

SC affirms the decision to undergo forced medication under jurisprudence (Washington v. Harper; Riggins v. Nevada). 1. The court must find that important governmental interest is at stake. (To put a person under trial for serious offenses) 2. Forced Medication must indeed help the court to pursue state interests and help the defendant to undergo trial.

3. Other alternatives are ineffective 4. The drug is medically appropriate.

Affirmed, Sell is not "dangerous" and will still undergo forced medication to stand trial

However, the case is still appealable.

Since Sell is deemed not to be dangerous, the solid ground in which the Magistrate used to put Sell under forced medication, the reason to put Sell under forced medication is now lacking. Dangerous was also labelled on the defendants of jurisprudence.

CRUZAN V. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 25 JUNE 1990

.

FACTS: Nancy Cruzan was a victim of an automobile accident who was paralyzed into a vegetative state. The hospital

employees refused w/o court approval, to honor the request of Cruzan‘s parents, to terminate her artificial nutrition and hydration, since it would result in death.

A State Trial Court authorized the termination, finding that a person in Cruzan‘s condition has a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constituents to direct or refuse the withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures. In addition, Cruzan‘s expression to a former housemate that she would not continue her life if sick or injured, unless she could live at least halfway normally suggested that she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration.

The State Supreme Court reversed. While recognizing a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent, the court questioned its applicability in this case. The Court then decided that the State Living Will stat ute embodied a state policy strongly favoring the preservation of life, and that Cruzan‘s statement to her housemate were unreliable for the purpose of determining her intent. It rejected the argument that her parents were entitled to order the termination o f her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of a Living Will statute or clear and convincing evidence of the patient‘s wishes.

ISSUE: W/N THE REQUIREMENT OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE IN WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-