ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 2225(B) (1) VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

HELD: YES. The ―Son of Sam Law‖ violates the First Amendment of the US Constitution (freedom of speech). Jurisprudence

also dictates that a similar law in the State of New York was found unconstitutional (refer to Simon and Schuster, Inc. v Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.). The decision to reverse the CA ruling was unanimous in this case.

Additional ratio from the concurring opinion of Brown, J: In a nut shell, can you say to Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, and Saint Augustine that they cannot write their autobiographies because of their past criminal convictions?

AYER PRODUCTIONS V. CAPULONG 29 AUGUST 1988

FACTS: McElroy and petitioner Ayer Productions envisioned to produce a docu-drama regarding the EDSA Revolution entitled

―The Four-Day Revolution.‖ The script by David Williamson (of Gallipoli), included fictional characters who were used to trace the events of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. The proposed film was green-lighted by the MTRCB, as well as other governmental agencies, including Gen. Fidel Ramos.

The petitioners also contacted Juan Ponce Enrile to acquire his permission for the use of his name in the film, he being a ke y player in the 1986 EDSA Revolution. He denied the petitioners the permission, stating that: ―He would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation x x‖

The petitioners complied with the demands of private respondent and his name and character was deleted from the movie script, the petitioners then proceeded to film the motion picture.

Private respondent then filed a Complaint requesting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Makati, seeking to enjoin the petitioners from producing the movie. The private respondent allege that the filming, without his consent and over his objection, of the mini-series constitutes a violation of right to privacy. The trial court granted the TRO and set hearing.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the film would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that the Preliminary Injunction is a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Trial Court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Petitioner then raised the issue to the Supreme Court on certiorari with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order. Thus, the present complaint.

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 W/N THE FILM IS COVERED BY PETITIONER’S RIGHT OF FREE EXPRESSION.

 W/N THE FILM VIOLATED RESPONDENT’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY.

RULING: YES. The Court, citing Gonzales v. Katigbak stated that ―Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the

communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. x x‖ This freedom is available to both locally-owned and foreign-owned motion picture companies. The circumstance that this production is a commercial activity is not a disqualification for availing the said freedom, media, as the medium to disseminate information, being sustained by its commercial aspect.

NO. Our law does not expressly provide for a right to privacy, only jurisprudence provides for such. However, like most rights,

it is not an absolute one, and is liable to governmental intrusion for the right reasons. Specifically, the right of privacy can be intruded if that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from his or to be published from him constitute matters of public character. The right to privacy only protects from ―unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.‖

In Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, the Court held that being a public figure does not ipso facto destroy a public figure‘s right to privacy. The right to invade the right to privacy does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In that case, it was admitted that the producer included ―a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.‖

As differentiated from the cited case, the case was filed after the film was completed, therefore it was not a prior restraint on the right to free expression. As against in the case at bar, the respondent filed the complaint while the film is in production. Measure of prior restraint are invalid from the beginning as provided in the Constitution, this is without prejudice to subsequent punishment if such expression does not abide by our laws. The judge should‘ve stayed, because the clear and present danger may not be invoked for the film has yet to be completed.

The subject matter of the film is clearly of public concern, being the depiction of the bloodless 1986 EDSA Revolution, thus it must be regarded as having passed into the public domain as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of media. The synopsis of the film does not in anyway relate to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile unlike in Lagunzad. The extent of the intrusion of the present film therefore is limited to the role he played on the historical event, to make the filming an accurate account of the events.

A public figure defined as a person who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character has become a ―public personage‖, or a celebrity. Also included in such list are fugitives or convicts. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent, their right of privacy, this is because, they have consented to it for entering the public realm, their personalities and affairs had become public, and that the press has the duty to inform the public regarding matters of public concern.

PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA 4 FEBRUARY 1992

FACTS: The Narcotics Regional Unit in Legaspi City, headed by CIC Taduran conducted a buy-bust operation to apprehend

drug traffickers upon a tip from a confidential informer. Taduran met Segovia, one of the accused, who introduced him to the alleged seller of marijuana, accused Rodrigueza. Upon agreeing on the price to be paid, Rodrigueza boarded a tricycle operated by Luceras and left. He returned with a plastic package allegedly containing marijuana.

Thereafter, Taduran returned to their headquarters to prepare his report. Although without warrants of arrest, the suspects were apprehended later that evening. Likewise, a raid was conducted on the residence of Rodruigueza‘s father, without a search warrant.

The accused Rodrigueza tested positive for the presence of the ultraviolet powder, with which the bills (used in the operatio n) were treated. Rodrigueza and his co-accused gave alibis as their respective defenses. Moreover, they alleged that they were

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maltreated while in the custody of the authorities, and that they were made to hold the powder-treated bills so as to be implicated in the alleged sale of marijuana.

The lower court ruled against Rodrigueza finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. His two co-accused were acquitted.

ISSUE: W/N THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WERE VIOLATED, THUS WARRANTING