The initiator: IG Metall

The first strategy implemented by all DGB unions was heavily influenced by the course of the IG Metall between the months of September 1989 and February 1990. In June 1989 IG Metall’s head, Franz Steinkühler, had counted among the very few DGB union leaders to comment on the evolution of the political situation in the GDR. In September, he reacted more thoroughly, as the wave of exits from the GDR was plunging the country into a political crisis. His reaction was articulated around two key ideas. On the one hand, Franz Steinkühler felt it necessary to stand up for the Ostpolitik and affirmed that it would be furthered.⁴⁴⁰

440 There was not going to be any contact between IG Metall and East German trade unions in 1989, until the meeting with the head of the newly-founded IG Metall (DDR), by December 7.

Auch die IG Metall unterhält Kontakte zu den Staatsgewerkschaften im Osten nicht deshalb, weil wir deren Politik für richtig halten oder weil sie uns besonders nahestehen.

Unser Ziel ist, politische Gegensätze nicht zu zwischenstaatlichen Gegensätzen werden zu lassen, für menschliche Erleichterungen einzutreten, Erfahrungen zu vermitteln, die den Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmern den Alltag erleichtern. (...) [D]er Abbruch von Kontakten würde niemanden nützen. Den Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmern in den Ländern des Ostens wäre nicht geholfen. Es ist ein Irrtum zu glauben, dass durch Kontaktsperren die Machthaber im Osten reformfreudiger werden würden. Durch Isola-tion würde die Starre und Bewegungslosigkeit noch zunehmen.

On the other hand, the wave of departures manifested the deep popular dissatisfaction towards the regime and its growing rejection among the population. Steinkühler depicted the East German system as a perversion of socialism and stressed the urgency of reforms.⁴⁴¹

Die zutiefst humanistische Idee des Sozialismus wird durch staatsbürokratische Systeme pervertiert. Die Machthaber in Ost-Berlin müssen endlich begreifen, dass sie nicht wei-ter die Menschen von der Teilhabe am politischen Leben ausschliessen können. (...) Al-lerdings wird die IG Metall es sich nicht nehmen lassen, öffentlich und vor allem in Ge-sprächen unmissverständlich deutlich zu machen, dass wir Reformen erwarten. Die Gewerkschaften im Osten müssen endlich zu Interessenvertretern der Arbeitnehmer werden und dürfen nicht Transmissionsriemen staatsbürokratischer Parteien bleiben.⁴⁴² During the five weeks separating this editorial and the IG Metall’s 16^th Congress (held from October 22 to 28), the union’s head made few public comments on the East German issue. It did not reconsider its contact policy. In that time, however, the political instability had evolved toward a revolutionary situation. Articles published in the union’s press had followed this evolution from the perspective of workers of the metal industry.⁴⁴³ During the congress, held two weeks before the opening of the Wall, Franz Steinkühler used stronger words against the East German government and trade unions. It was their arrogance and despise of funda-mental democratic rights by the regime, he accused, that was responsible of the revolution.

The refusal of the FDGB to gain its independence from the state and obtain the right to strike had its part in the popular dissatisfaction. Steinkühler greeted the East German upheaval, which he linked to the historical struggles of the German labor movement.

Wir, die vor 100 Jahren mit dem Gesang „Brüder zur Sonne, zur Freiheit“ angetreten sind; wir wissen nur zu gut, was dem arbeitenden Menschen Freiheit und soziale Ge-rechtigkeit bedeuten. Es ist nicht Hunger und Not, es ist nicht Elend und materieller Mangel allein, die Verzweiflung erzeugen. Es ist die Arroganz eines Obrigkeitsregimes, das die elementarsten demokratischen Rechte mit Füssen tritt und über die Köpfe hin-weg selbstherrlich alles zu reglementieren sucht. Damit muss Schluss sein! Ich habe

441 In August a special two-page feature of the union’s magazine Metall (17/89, pp. 8-9) had also called for re-forms, particularly in the FDGB, in order to stop the stream of departures.

442 Franz Steinkühler, “Wir erwarten Reformen”, Metall, 19/89 (September 22), p. 3.

443 Robert Fuss, “Freiheit mit Fallen”, Metall, 19/89 (September 22), pp. 16-17; Klaus Klöppel, “Es gärt im VEB”, Ibid., p. 17; Klaus Klöppel, “Von unten nach oben regnet es nicht”, Metall, 20/89 (October 6), pp. 22-23.

mehrfach an den FDGB appelliert, sich aus der Umklammerung von Staat und Partei zu lösen und Unabhängigkeit und Streikrecht zu reklamieren.

For Steinkühler, the living conditions of the populations in the south-eastern parts of the world, the trade unions struggles in north-western countries and the ecological concerns eve-rywhere, imposed that a new economic system be developed that goes beyond the western capitalist model. Against the “eastern state-bureaucratic communism” and the “western inhu-man capitalism”, Steinkühler reaffirmed the relevance of the “democratic socialist” program put forward by his union.

Die Idee eines humanen und demokratischen Sozialismus steht noch immer deutlich ge-gen den staatsbürokratischer Kommunismus östlicher Prägung und den inhumanen Ka-pitalismus westlicher Prägung. Der Zusammenbruch des sogennanten Sozialismus ist keinesfalls eine Niederlage des Sozialismus. Und er ist schon gar kein Sieg des Kapita-lismus. (...) Kapitalismus ist eben nicht nur mit der Demokratie der Bundesrepublik, Frankreichs oder der USA verbunden, sondern ebenso mit den Diktaturen Chiles und Südafrikas. Und auch die fürchterliche Nazi-Diktatur war ein kapitalistisches System.

Es würde ein Stück gemeinsamer Zukunft verspielt werden, wenn Perestroika letztlich nur darauf hinausliefe, unser Zivilisationsmodell zu kopieren, auf unser Produktions- und Lebenstempo zu beschleunigen. (...) Die Konsequenz kann nur lauten, dass wir, die industriell hoch entwickelten Länder, vorangehen müssen mit der ökologischen Umges-taltung unserer Industriegesellschaft, und dass die weniger entwickelten Länder parallel zum industriellen Fortschritt den ökologischen Fortschritt planen.⁴⁴⁴

These strong words had little concrete outcomes. Despite its greeting, IG Metall looked at the East German revolution from the outside. The opening of the wall a few days later changed this perspective. In an article, Steinkühler referred to the developments taking place in the GDR as a political and economic self-determination process led by the people. He insisted on the protection of the autonomy of the process but offered the assistance of the West German unions. If this help was welcomed, IG Metall could support East German unionists in the de-velopment of structures for the defense of their interests, as well as political activists.

Die IG Metall steht gemeinsam mit den DGB-Gewerkschaften den Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmern in der DDR mit Rat und Tat zur Seite. Welche Organisationsform sie jedoch wählen, bleibt ihnen überlassen. Ich kann ihnen nur raten, sich die histori-schen Erfahrungen der Einheitgewerkschaft in der Bundesrepublik anzuschauen. Staats-ferne, parteipolitische Unabhängigkeit und einheitliche Interessenvertretung sind tra-gende Prinzipien einer starken und unabhängigen Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Wir mischen uns nicht ein. Wir geben aber gerne Erfahrungen an alle Parteien und Gruppie-rungen in der DDR weiter, wenn dies gewünscht wird.⁴⁴⁵

444 Franz Steinkühler, “Fieberstunde der Geschichte”, Metall, 22/89 (November 3), pp. 20-21.

445 Franz Steinkühler, “Was jetzt zu tun ist”, Metall, 23/89 (November 17), pp. 8-9, quote p. 9.

Hence the IG Metall was strongly opposed to what it considered pressures exerted by the Fed-eral government in favor of the unification and the western market economy: “Eine Wied-ervereingungsdebatte jetzt würde darüber hinaus die Reformentwicklung in der DDR eher behindern als fördern.” “Auch die Wahl des Wirtschaftssystems muss eine Entscheidung der Menschen in der DDR bleiben und darf nicht von der Bundesregierung oder der bundesdeut-schen Wirtschaft entschieden werden.”⁴⁴⁶

Because of the insistence by IG Metall on the autonomy of the self-determination process, it is not surprising that Chancellor Kohl’s plan for a medium-term unification, the so-called 10-point plan made public by November 28, has been criticised in the union’s press. The vague-ness of the plan on the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border was condemned. The require-ment of market economy as a pre-condition to a program of economic assistance was depicted as “economic blackmail”. The unification envisioned in the plan aim at implementing “a so-cial system, that fits into a conservative, outdated idea of the world (konservatives Weltbild von vorgestern).”⁴⁴⁷

IG Metall’s press and the changes in the GDR

The IG Metall’s press in November and December documents the attention paid by this union to the changes taking place in the GDR. It also gives the details of the assistance to East Ger-man unionists developed from that moment on.

Three topics stand out from the articles published in IG Metall’s press in November 1989.

Furthermore one aspect misses in these articles. One of these topics was the reform process of the East German metal union. The articles covering that question allow to appreciate the vari-ety but also the uneven progress of this process. Among these, one analyzed how the “pres-sure of the streets” had made its way into the world of labor and, from there, rapidly shaken the entire FDGB structures.⁴⁴⁸ It recalled how the rank and file protests had forced the FDGB direction to resign, by November 2. Another article questioned the capacity of the FDGB, now more or less similar to an empty shell, to reform itself into a democratic confederation of independent unions dedicated to the defense of workers’ interests. “Everything is still opened”, concluded the journalist, who showed himself rather suspicious as to the likelihood

446 Idem.

447 Dieter Staadt, “Nach dem Rausch der Kater”, Metall, 25-26/89 (December 13), p. 4.

448 Klaus Klöppel, “Die Revolution nach Feierabend”, Metall, 23/89 (November 17), pp. 10, 15-16.

of decided steps intop that direction before the FDGB congress, to be held at the end of Janu-ary 1990.⁴⁴⁹

The re-foundation of IG Metall (DDR), on November 27, as the first independent FDGB un-ion member, was greeted. An enthuisiastic and extensive report of the debates and reforms undertaken during this congress was published in Metall.⁴⁵⁰ With regards to the relations be-tween both German metal unions, the new head of the East German metal union had declared:

“[Ich glaube] von der IG Metall der BRD viel lernen können, ohne alles übernehmen zu müssen.” He had also called for the organization of forums of discussions for unionists from both orgnizations in the next future.⁴⁵¹ These declarations, reproduced in IG Metall’s press, seemed to confirm the strategy implemented by the union’s head. The re-founding of IG Met-all (DDR) as an independent FDGB union member, its new democratic structures, the interest for a collaboration with IG Metall that would not deprive East German unionists of their power of determination over the reforms implemented: all these elements highlighted by the articles in IG Metall’s press founded the strategy of the union so far. Only the reservations toward the right to strike expressed by some members of IG Metal (DDR) were in contradic-tion with this strategy. The conquest of the right to strike had been repeatedly counted among the first priorities of the reform process, by IG Metall’s head. Many articles echoed these res-ervations toward the right to strike, usually together with disapproving comments.⁴⁵²

The second topic highlighted by the IG Metall press concerns a process closely connected to the reform of the East German metal union. Many articles portrayed the turbulent situation on the shop floors of the metal plants and workshops of the GDR. On the one hand, the East German metal industry, the first industrial sector of the country, was in a bad shape. In 1988, this sector counted 1.5 million workers and 44% of all East German enterprises. Its predomi-nance was also reflected in the fact that five out of eleven ministers were responsible for it.

The productivity of the metal industry, estimated to reach 56% of its West German counter-part in 1988, had fell to 30%, by November 1989.⁴⁵³ On the other hand, in different metal plants, workers had started to transform the state of internal relationships. IG Metall’s journal-ists sent to the GDR portrayed the plants and workshops of the East German metal industry as the scene of far-reaching debates among workers and the location of fundamental

449 Steffen Uhlmann, “DDR-Gewerkschaften am Scheideweg. Kampf um Eigenständigkeit”, Der Gewerkschaf-ter, 12/89, pp. 12-13.

450 Michael Bohm, “An diesem Sonntag tat sich eine neue Welt auf”, Metall, 24/89 (December 1), p. 7-8.

451 Michael Böhm, “Von Papenburg nach Jena”, Metall, 24/89 (December 1), p. 7.

452 Uhlmann, “DDR-Gewerkschaften am Scheideweg.”; Böhm, “An diesem Sonntag”; Michael Bohm, “Wir fangen wieder bei null an”, Metall, 25-26/89, (December 13), pp. 8-10.

453 Schroeder 2000, pp. 60, 64

tion of the production process, the organization of work and the representation of workers. In many of these plants and workshops, as one journalist put it, workers were taking “their future in their own hands”.⁴⁵⁴

These articles in IG Metall’s press also showed how the IG Metall (DDR) was continuously challenged by groups of workers in plants and workshops, unconvinced by its renewal proc-ess. These workers directed unequivocal calls to the IG Metall for support and assistance:

Eigentlich sind wir mit unserer Arbeit wieder am Nullpunkt. (...) Wir brauchen jetzt den möglichst schnellen und praktischen Erfahrungsaustausch mit den westlichen Gewerk-schaften, wie man Tarife und Vereinbarungen wirklich macht. Wir müssen ja nicht alles übernehmen, aber kennen wollen wir es wenigstens. ⁴⁵⁵

The third aspect highlighted by IG Metall’s press between November and December was about the outcomes of the opening of the borders for the workers and the trade unions in the Federal Republic. Concerns were articulated as to the downward spiral effect on incomes ex-erted by illegal or underpaid East Germans working in the Federal Republic.⁴⁵⁶ As this aspect was to count among the causes that brought a shift in the strategy of the West German, it is analyzed in the following chapters. Let us just notice that these concerns appeared in IG Met-all’s press in November.

A fourth aspect of the coverage of the changes occurring in the GDR by IG Metall’s press has to be formulated negatively. It is missing beside the previous three. There has been no men-tion of the activity of the East German opposimen-tion or the initiatives for independent trade un-ions (IUG) in the plants and workshops of the metal industry. The numerous and detailed de-scriptions of the turbulent situation on the shop floors have however forgot this piece, which would have completed the puzzle. The result was a portray of the East German labor into which, although contested by its rank and file, IG Metall (DDR) appeared as the only organ-ized force of defense of workers’ interests above the representation in the shop floor. This is also how IG Metall’s head understood the situation, as the treaty of cooperation with IG Met-all (DDR) ratified by the beginning of December shows.

454 Michael Böhm, “Aufschwung oder Ausverkauf”, Metall, 1/90 (January 12), pp. 12-15.

455 Böhm, “Wir fangen wieder bei null an”, p. 9.

456 Michael Böhm, “Hilfestellen für den Dritten Weg”, Metall, 23/89 (November 17), p. 16; Waltraud Bierwirth,

“So geht’s nicht!”, Metall, 23/89 (November 17), p. 20; Klaus Klöppel, “Sozialdumping von gewissenlosen Unternehmern”, Metall, 24/89 (December 1), pp. 8-9.

The cooperation with IG Metall (DDR)

The analysis of the situation in East German labor developed by IG Metall's press seemed to find an echo in the clauses of the Cooperation Agreement between IG Metall and IG Metall (DDR), recently (re)founded as independent FDGB union member.⁴⁵⁷

Six articles built the substance of this agreement signed by December 6. The first was the creation of a twinning program (Partnerschaften) between workers of enterprises from compa-rable size from both Germanies. Twenty-five "partnerships" were hence initiated. This type of cooperation at the shop floor level aimed at supplying East German unionists on shop floors with material and information. The second article announced the organization of seminars by IG Metall on issues relating to the defense of workers' interests on the shop floor, to which East and West German unionists were to participate. Furthermore IG Metall pledged to open its seminars to GDR's shop floor delegates of the metal industry, and to develop new seminars on topics of specific consequence for East German unionists. The third article concerned the formation of East German union functionaries to issues relating to the internal organization, finances, membership and recruiting. The launching of collective bargaining rounds in the next future justified a special attention. Article four heralded a conference on this topic. The fifth article was about the development of formation programs for all categories of union functionaries of the East German metal industry. The sixth and last article announced that the seminars held in the IG Metall school of Spandau/West-Berlin were now going to include visits in metal plants and workshops of the GDR. These six initiatives built the "first steps" of a cooperation between both German metal unions which was to develop.

One obvious goal of IG Metall with this agreement was to sustain the reform process of its East German homologous. The strong emphasis on the shop floors in articles 1,2,6, is impor-tant. It were the East German structures of workers' representation, and their renewal, that had presided over the initiatives announced in the agreement. East German unions were enter-prise-based, West German were not. The attention to meeting the specific needs of East Ger-man unionists on the shop floors and to define the cooperation initiated as a mutual assistance, despite the evidence of a one-sided process of support, echoed the strategy that IG Metall de-veloped since a few months. It was in accordance with Steinkühler’s repeated pledge to an active assistance that would not interfere into the decision-making processes but simply offer help where it was required.

457 Koperationsvertrag zwischen der IG Metall der Bundesrepublik und der IG Metall der DDR published in:

Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 12/89 (December 1989), pp. 807-808.

On the following day (December 7), Franz Steinkühler and IG Metall (DDR)'s head Hartwig Bugiel, who were meeting for the first time, announced the creation of a GDR Working Group (DDR-Arbeitsgruppe) in every IG Metall regional divisions. The GDR Working Group was put under the direct supervision of Franz Steinkühler's cabinet. According to Jochen Kletzin, member of the GDR Working Group, both initiatives were regarded within IG Metall as resolute support of and collaboration to the East German self-determination movement.⁴⁵⁸ The agreement between both metal unions became a model for comparable agreements be-tween trade unions of both Germanies. Bebe-tween December 1989 and February 1990, the fol-lowing agreements were ratified between DGB unions and independent FDGB union mem-bers:

• Between the Construction Industrial Union (IG Bau-Steine-Erden) and the East German Construction and Wood Union (IG Bau-Holz (DDR)), by December 16, 1989;

• Between the Education and Science Union (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissen-schaft), the East German Education and Teachers Union (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Unterricht (DDR)) and the East German Science Union (Gewerkschaft Wissenschaft (DDR)), by the beginning of January 1990;

• Between the Mines and Energy Industrial Union (IG Bergbau und Energie), the East German Mines, Energy and Water Economy Union (IG Bergbau-Energie und Wasser-wirtschaft (DDR)) and the East German Wismut Industrial Union (IG Wismut (DDR)), by January 25, 1990;

• Between the Horticulture, Agriculture and Forestry Union (Gewerkschaft Gartenbau, Land- und Forstwirtschaft) and the East German Agriculture, Forestry and Alimentation Union (Gewerkschaft Land-, Forst- und Nahrungsgüterwirtschaft (DDR)), by January 26, 1990.

These agreements were not identical. All of them, however, intended to further the

These agreements were not identical. All of them, however, intended to further the