Interviews and discussions

There are alternative ways to gain access to sources where it had previously been denied. For instance, sources can be created, i.e., through interviews. Depending on the type of informa-tion one is looking for, a good interview might even be more fruitful than the minutes of meetings, often written in a highly formalistic language. This is certainly the case in regards to the hypothesis on the tripartite consensus: if I was able talk to a person who was party to those meetings, I might learn what was said there.

Previous experiences drawing on oral history had convinced me that it can be very useful source for the history of the union movement.¹¹⁴ Information on the views of actors in any given situation, the tensions within an organization and informal deals with employers, for instance, is valuable and likely to come out during an interview. Unless one is blessed with

114 In collecting material for a biography of the trade unionist and former head of the UNESCO in Canada, Jacques-Victor Morin, I conducted about 40 hours of interview with this person, and about the same number with former colleagues. See: Denis (Mathieu) 2003.

infinite amount of time, it is important to be careful when choosing the interviewees. Based on my personal experience, persons from the top hierarchy at trade unions often remain re-served in their responses and produce conventional explanations. It is frustrating to receive standard responses in line with the organization’s official position, when one suspects that, due to his or her position within the organizations, the interviewee must surely know the true facts behind the story. Mid-ranking union secretaries are often more open in their manner but are not always privy to backroom discussions. Persons who were directly involved in the events they describe as frustrating are more likely to speak of internal tensions, and bring vital new details to their narrative. Such information can be of great value.

For chapter 3.6, I notably attempted to locate individuals who might be able to confirm or deny that informal meetings between Helmut Kohl, DGB head Ernst Breit, IG Metall chief Franz Steinkühler and representatives of employers’ associations took place sometime in the second half of February 1990. Was there a time and place where union representatives told Chancellor Kohl in no uncertain terms that, if the West German labor law and rules of indus-trial relations were remained as their current state, in unified Germany, they would participate to the implementation of the Monetary, Economic and Social Union? If anything to that ex-tent had actually taken place, who would have know this?

All attempts to gain an interview with the union’s heads proved futile. Although I had re-ceived a recommendation from one of his friends, Franz Steinkühler refused my request for an interview, based on the fact that he had already given numerous interviews on reunification and that all details on the matter could be found in those interviews. I met with Media Indus-trial Union’s former head, Detlef Hensche, who categorically rejected the notion that informal meetings between government’s, unions’ and employers’ representatives from West Germany were stated a precondition to the implementation of the MESU. All attempts to contact former DGB head Ernst Breit and chemistry union leader Rappe proved unsuccessful.

As this work will attempt to demonstrate, there was a fundamental change in the actors in-volved in the process of restructuring the structure for defending East German workers’ inter-ests. While East Germans had determined the course of the process until February 1990, West German actors gained the upper hand at the beginning in March. East German unionists may have had an input on the exact nature of this transition, which they may have resented as a loss of power? The author’s interviews with “frustrated” East German reform unionists were no more successful. Two interviews and one discussion with East German unionists still ac-tive in IG Metall and the DGB today did not bring me any closer to resolving the issue of in-formal tripartite meetings, although they did consider the theory plausible.

The only indication of informal meetings during the fifteen days from February 20 to March 9, 1990, came in the form of faint nods of agreement, by one IG Metall secretary. This secre-tary had been one of the first West German IG Metall secretaries sent to Leipzig at the begin-ning of 1990. He had been a member of the GDR Working Group established at the union in January 1990. He seemed to be the person who could shed light on all my questions. When asked why Detlef Hensche had so vehemently rejected the possible occurrence of such infor-mal meetings, he replied that Hensche had probably never been informed of them, as he was not party to any such discussions. When I requested his assistance in gaining access to the (closed) minutes of the GDR Working Group, he instead offered to personally answer any question I may have.

My pleasure in having dug up the perfect interviewee was only matched by my disappoint-ment in not having been able to obtain a proper interview. There was little hint of hesitation in agreeing to the interview but, at some point, it was no longer possible to arrange an appoint-ment with him and all contact with said person faded away.¹¹⁵

While the time spent seeking out prospective interviewees and preparing the interviews did not always produce the desired results, informal discussions with union secretaries, journalists and activists, from both parties, were extremely valuable. Even if most of these meetings were planned, as I had contacted said person and scheduled an appointment, they were however informal in nature. They usually took place at his/her office, home or in a café. During those discussions it was not my original intent to gather specific information for for use in the story I wanted to tell, although this aspect was present as well. My main priority was instead to un-derstand the context in which these individuals were involved, the motives behind their ac-tions, the goals they were pursuing, the factors influencing their actions both positively and negatively, and their opinion on these events fifteen years later. To put it in slightly differ-ently, the author was trying to narrow the gap that separates the analysis of a specific reality created by historians and the experience of the actors who experienced the events in their own words. I am not saying that, as far as history writing goes, the memories of these actors could possibly replace thorough analysis. They, of course, cannot. Yet as this study deals with very recent topics, I wanted to dedicate special attention to various actors’ perceptions, in order to avoid the risk that, were they to look at the story told in the following pages, they would not

115 His reluctance may not have anything to do with the topics dicsussed in this work: all this took place during the 2003 crisis at IG Metall after the failed strike for the introduction of the 35-hour working week in the former East German Länder. My contact was constantly out of town. After the storm has passed over the union, how-ever, he never returned my calls. I was also unsuccessful to see him by appearing unannounced at his office twice.

recognize the events to which they were party. It is highly unlikely that any of the East and West German actors I was able to talk to would agree with the different arguments developed in this work. I do hope, however, that they will be able to somehow connect their experiences to them.

1.4.4 Sources for the study of the East German labor between 1986 and