1 For the important influence that the Cairo Conference had on Evatt's decision to take a regional initiative see A. Watt, The
Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p.73; and Hasluck, op. cit., pp.482, 487.
See C.H. Grattan, 'Australia and New Zealand and Pacific Asia1, Oceania and Beyond, ed. F.P. King (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976), pp.98-99.
O
Evatt, op. cit., p .176. 4 Ibid., p .172.
Australia and New Zealand had, however, entered the region very eagerly as administering powers during the First World War. See Grattan, op. cit., p.86.
The Australasian initiative can be seen, then, as having been motivated primarily by strategic and nationalistic factors. Whilst
trusteeship or 'native welfare' considerations were also a signifi cant influence, the evidence suggests that such considerations can be regarded as being of secondary importance.1 They can be viewed
as having influenced the form and intended preoccupations of the proposed regional commission, and as having provided the public
justification for its establishment, but not as the determining factors underlying the regional initiative. The initiative was taken whilst the War was still in progress and in the knowledge that larger powers were taking decisions about post-war international organisation. The Australasian Governments held the view that they should have primary responsibility for determining post-war arrangements for the South Pacific region. They wanted those arrangements to be such that they would minimise the opportunity for outside interests to gain a foothold
in the region and so be in a position to threaten their security. They saw a regional solution, in the form of a regional commission composed of friendly western powers responsible for all the territories in the region, as the appropriate organisational arrangement.
These attitudes can be seen as an extension of the Australasian Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century examined earlier in this chapter. The Australasian colonies had, in general terms, regarded the region as rightfully being their preserve and wanted to minimise the chances of other outside interests entering that preserve. They had also proposed a regional solution. They asked Britain to annex
For a view of the motives of the Australasian Governments which emphasises trusteeship or 'native welfare' considerations see Smith,
the Pacific Islands and so bring them all under one flag. Britain was not sympathetic to their proposal. In 1944, however, Australia and New Zealand were in a position to assert an independent foreign policy.
The other colonial powers - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, The Netherlands, and France - were not motivated by the same strategic considerations that affected the Australasian position on regionalism. Their removed geographical position and other commit ments made the security of the South Pacific a low priority for these
countries. If the stated purpose and subsequent activities of the South Pacific Commission tell the observer anything about their motives it is likely that they were at least partly motivated by the desire to promote 'native welfare' in their territories and saw regional co-operation as an effective way of approaching this task. However, as in the Australian and New Zealand case, more important considerations can be shown to underlie their support. In view of the attitude of these powers to the political development of their territories, as revealed in their refusal to have that subject come under the purview of the proposed regional commission, it could be argued that they viewed the establishment of the South Pacific
Commission as a means of keeping United Nations activity to a minimum in this area. In other words, it is possible to see the involvement of the colonial powers, other than Australia and New Zealand, as an exercise in tokenism - an effort to comply with the mood of world opinion by setting up an organisation seemingly taking care of the problems of the South Pacific, and consequently forestalling inter national examination of constitutional development in their territories.
SPC: Organisational Features
The membership of the South Pacific Commission was limited to the six governments which signed the Canberra Agreement. They are referred to in the Agreement as 'participating Governments'. The financial arrangements reflected the predominant role of Australia. The Agree ment provided for the following shares of the annual budget to be
contributed by participating Governments: Australia - 30 percent;
The Netherlands - 15 percent; New Zealand - 15 percent; United Kingdom - 15 percent; France - 12% percent; and the United States - 12% percent.'*’ The only changes in membership in the period under study occurred in 1962, when The Netherlands withdrew, and in 1964, when the membership
2
rules were amended to allow the admission of a newly independent Pacific state, Western Samoa.
The area to be covered by the SPC was originally limited to
territories 'south of the Equator and east from and including Netherlands 3
New Guinea'- The boundary line was adjusted twice over the next fifteen years; first in 1951, when the American territories north of
4
the Equator were included, and secondly in 1962, when West Irian was 5
excluded after becoming part of Indonesia. After these changes there
/C
were nineteen territories within the scope of the SPC.
Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, Article XIV, Section 49.
2
'Agreement Amending the Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, London, 6 October 1964', Australian Treaty Series (1965), No.11, Article VII(b).
3
Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, Article II, Section 2.
4
'Agreement Extending the Territorial Scope of the South Pacific Commission, Noumea, 7 November 1951', Australian Treaty Series (1951), No.18.
5
By way of Articles II and XIX of the Canberra Agreement.
This included Tonga which, although not officially part of the SPC's area of concern (in view of the fact that it was never a dependent terri tory), was nevertheless included under a special arrangement.
The SPC's role was limited by inclusion in the Agreement of a Saving Clause'1**' which ensured that there would be no interference by the Commission in the relationship between metropolitan powers and their island territories. In accordance with this principle the role of the SPC was restricted to a 'consultative and advisory' one. Its advice was to be given to the metropolitan governments, and not to the
2
territorial administrations. The powers and functions of the SPC were also limited specifically to economic and social development
3
fields to ensure that political matters were not discussed. This 'no politics' rule was later to have an important effect on indigenous participants in South Pacific Conferences.
The organisational structure proposed in the Agreement consisted of a twelve-man Commission (two representing each participating govern ment) and two 'auxiliary bodies' - a research council to recommend and undertake research, and a triennial South Pacific Conference to give the local inhabitants of the region an opportunity to discuss, and make recommendations concerning, matters that came within the SPC's
jurisdiction. To serve all three bodies a Secretariat was to be
established.4 Two points need to be stressed here. First, control of the organisation's activities rested firmly with the twelve Commissioners who were representatives of the metropolitan governments. They were to be the final authority on all matters. The other bodies established by
X Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, Article XVII (Saving Clause).
Ibid., Article IV, Section 6. Ibid., Article IV.
4 Ibid., Articles III, V, VI, IX, XIII. See Appendix 3 for a diagrammatic representation of this structure.
the Agreement was merely advisory to the central executive body. This arrangement, which ensured colonial power dominance in the organisation, became an important source of frustration for Islanders in later years. Secondly, there had been a special effort made to encourage indigenous involvement in the work of the Commission through participation in the South Pacific Conference. This decision was a crucial one for the development of a regional consciousness among Island leaders.
Regional Activities 1948-1965
It is not possible here to examine all, or even many, of the projects undertaken by the SPC. But it is worth noting the main changes in emphasis and direction which occurred in the Commission’s activities in the period under study. This will not only illustrate the diverse activities of the Commission; it will also show something of the nature and range of the contacts among Island peoples that the Commission's activities made possible. The first trend to note is that concerning the direction of the Commission's 'advice'. The Agreement had stipulated that this should flow directly to the
metropolitan governments. By 1957, however, the Secretariat and tech nical officers had established relations with the territorial admini
strations and 'advice' flowed to them rather than to the participating governments."'’ This change in direction was formalised by the decisions
2