THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDIGENOUS COMMITMENT
by
G.E. Fry
Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science
School of General Studies Australian National University
D E C L A R A T I O N
T h i s t h e s i s i s my own o r i g i n a l w o rk and a l l s o u r c e s u s e d h a v e b e e n a c k n o w le d g e d .
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
I would like to register my gratitude to Professor Jim Richardson who supervised the writing in its early stages, and to Dr Arthur Stockwin
for his assistance and encouragement in the later phases of the project. I am also indebted to the following friends and colleagues for their helpful comments on earlier drafts: Paul Keal, Allen Rix, James Horne, Ursula Doyle, Hugh Collins and Judy Bennett.
*
I am very grateful to the Faculty of Arts for the assistance given in connection with my attendance at the Eighteenth South Pacific Con ference held in Noumea in 1978. I am also indebted to the many, too numerous to mention individually, who showed me great kindness during my
travels through the region in 1975. In particular, I would like to thank Mahe Tupouniua, Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co operation, and Dr Macu Salato, Secretary-General of the South Pacific Commission, for giving me access to the people and documents in their organisations.
I am also very grateful to Bonnie Bauld for her assistance with the proof-reading and to Pauline Lyall for her patience and care in typing the final draft.
C O N T E N T S C O N T E N T S
Page
INTRODUCTION ... (vii)
CHAPTER 1 .. THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGION ... 1
CHAPTER 2 . . EVOLUTION OF SOUTH PACIFIC R E G I O N A L I S M ... 33
Nascent Regionalism ... 35
Colonial Regionalism 1943-1965 51 CHAPTER 3 .. INDIGENOUS REGIONALISM (1): TAKING CONTROL OF THE REGIONAL STRUCTURES 1965-1978 70 Demands for Change Within the South Pacific Commission . . . . ... . . 74
The Pacific Islands Producers' Association ... 95
The South Pacific Forum . . 104
Moves to Weaken the South Pacific Commission .. . . . . ... .. 116
CHAPTER 4 .. INDIGENOUS REGIONALISM (2): ATTEMPTS AT FUNCTIONAL CO-OPERATION ... 124
T r a n s p o r t ... 125
Economic Development, Trade and Telecommunications . . . . ... . . 146
Education, Health and Community Development .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 161
International Bargaining ... 166
i Functional Co-operation: An A s s e s s m e n t ... 173
CHAPTER 5 . . COHESIVE FACTORS ... 179
Shared Diplomatic Needs ... 180
Contents - Chapter 5 (continued) - Page
Pan-Pacific Ideology ... 210
Facilitators of Regional Identity ... 232
CHAPTER 6 .. DIVISIVE FACTORS ... 239
National Rivalries ... 240
Ethnic Divisions ... 251
Economic Realities ... 257
Continuing Political Dependency ... 266
- CHAPTER 7 .. EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT 276 CONCLUSION ...292
APPENDICES . . 1 Map of the South Pacific Region ... 299
2 Pacific Countries - Population and Constitutional Status ... 300
3 South Pacific Commission Structure - 1947 . . 301
4 South Pacific Commission Structure - 1978 . . 302
5 South Pacific Forum/SPEC Structure - 1978 . . 303
6 Membership of Multi-Functional Regional Organisations • • •• •• •• •• •• •• 304 7 Membership of Special Purpose Regional Organisations •• •• •- •• •• •• •• 305 8 Regional Institutions and Organisations . . . • 307
9 Government-level Regional Conferences held during 1977 • • • • ... 309
10 Regional Seminars and Training Courses held during 1977 311 11 Pacific Countries - Principal Trading P a r t n e r s ... 313
12 Pacific Countries - GDP and ODA ... 315
13 South Pacific - Flow of Official Bilateral Funds • • • • • • • • •• •• •• •• 317 14 200 Mile Zone M a p ... 319
A B B R E V I A T I O N S
k C P ^ f V ; c a o , C a < - » ^ e v c ^ c
-A D B A s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k
C F T C C o m m o n w e a l t h F u n d f o r T e c h n i c a l C o - o p e r a t i o n
C H O G R M C o m m o n w e a l t h H e a d s o f G o v e r n m e n t R e g i o n a l M e e t i n g
C R P G E C ^ £ E S C A P
C o m m i t t e e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f L P a r t i c i p a t i n g g o v e r n m e n t s t c o n o ^ c A f c i & ft W • W f ’’Äf t A S T . E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l C o m m i s s i o n f o r A s i a a n d t h e P a c i f i c
F A L F i j i A i r w a y s L i m i t e d
F A O F o o d a n d A g r i c u l t u r a l O r g a n i s a t i o n
F N P F i j i N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y
I L O I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a b o u r O r g a n i s a t i o n
I M F I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d
I T U I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s U n i o n
N F P
O K U
P E A C E S A T
N a t i o n a l F e d e r a t i o n P a r t y , ,
O r q o v o > s a ' V l o r \ j£ \ V " r P i v j r \ »
P a n P a c i f i c E d u c a t i o n a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n s E x p e r i m e n t s b y S a t e l l i t e
P F L P a c i f i c F o r u m L i n e
P I D C P a c i f i c I s l a n d s D e v e l o p m e n t C o m m i s s i o n
V I M P a c i f i c I s l a n d s M o n t h l y
P I P A P a c i f i c I s l a n d s P r o d u c e r s ' A s s o c i a t i o n
S P C S o u t h P a c i f i c C o m m i s s i o n
S P E C S o u t h P a c i f i c B u r e a u f o r E c o n o m i c C o - o p e r a t i o n
T T C T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s T r a i n i n g C e n t r e
U N C T A D U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e o n T r a d e a n d D e v e l o p m e n t
U N D A T U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t A d v i s o r y T e a m
U N D P U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e
U N E S C O U n i t e d N a t i o n s E d u c a t i o n a l , S c i e n t i f i c a n d C u l t u r a l O r g a n i s a t i o n
U N I D O U n i t e d N a t i o n s I n d u s t r i a l D e v e l o p m e n t O r g a n i s a t i o n
U P U U n i v e r s a l P o s t a l U n i o n
U S P U n i v e r s i t y o f t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c
INTRODUCTION
The South Pacific region1 has been recently undergoing the most rapid and fundamental political change it has experienced since its partition by the colonial powers in the nineteenth century. Beginning in 1962, with the granting of independence to Western Samoa, the decolonisation of the region has proceeded swiftly, if selectively. By 1979 ten British, New Zealand and Australian territories had achieved either independence or self- government; the only remaining dependent territories of any significance were those of France and the United States. The impact of this political change has not only been felt at the national level; it has also had
important repercussions at the regional level. These regional developments form the subject of this thesis.
The new South Pacific states have each opted to adopt, as a priority in their foreign policy, a commitment to the promotion of regional co operation. The leaders of these states have, through their own personal involvement in the regional movement, shown that this commitment is of great significance to them. Statements of commitment to the concept of
This thesis does not enter the debate as to what constitutes a region for the purposes of international relations. It proceeds on the assumption that the principal determinant should be acknowledgement of the existence of such a region on the part of the states within it and by key external actors (international agencies and states). On this basis the South Pacific region is defined as consisting of the twenty
island countries and territories within the area bounded by Papua New Guinea in the west, French Polynesia in the east, the Mariana Islands in the north and Norfolk Island in the south. This is also the territorial area covered by the South Pacific Commission. It is depicted on the map at Appendix 1. The constituent countries, together with their constitu tional status and population, are listed at Appendix 2.
regionalism1 have been constantly reiterated at regional conferences, at the inauguration of regional programmes and in press conferences. The expression of this commitment has not been confined to statements of intent. The Pacific leaders have, since the mid-1960s, taken joint action to gain control of the South Pacific Commission, the existing regional organisation established and managed by the colonial powers. They have also established a network of their own regional institutions and conferences. Further, through these regional structures, the South Pacific states have pursued co-operation in a wide range of functional areas including civil aviation, shipping, education, telecommunications, economic development and diplomacy.
The significance accorded this foreign policy commitment is also indicated by the substantial portion of each state's scarce resources which is allocated to regional activity. Participation has required an
investment of personnel and of finance. For the small staff concerned with foreign affairs in these countries, regionalism takes much of their
time, for example, in preparing briefing materials, speeches and position papers, and in attending the ever-increasing number of regional conferences. Personnel are also required for a more permanent contribution to
regionalism. Posts within the regional organisations have to be staffed by Pacific Islanders who, because of their special skills, are also needed in their home countries. A sacrificing of the services of personnel
when they are needed for development and administrative tasks at home indicates a substantial commitment to regionalism. The same can be said
The term 'regionalism' is used in J.S. Nye's 'descriptive sense' to refer to 'the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions'. See J.S. Nye Jr., 'Introduction', International Regionalism: Readings, ed. J.S. Nye (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
for the financial resources that are committed to regionalism. There are membership contributions to be paid to the regional organisations, the
cost of hosting regional gatherings, the cost of travel and attendance at regional conferences and financial contributions to regional projects. For countries with very small budgets and substantial development needs the expenditure in this area reflects the significance attached to it.
The Pacific leaders first began to express their commitment to the concept of regionalism during the early 1960s. Prior to this, the colonial powers with territorial interests in the region - Britain, the United States Australia, France,^and New Zealand - had promoted regional co-operation
through the South Pacific Commission, an organisation they had established in 1947. This thesis, however, focuses on what is here termed the
'indigenous commitment' to regionalism.^ It therefore concentrates on the period from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, although earlier regional efforts and schemes (from the mid-nineteenth century until the early 1960s) are presented to give the historical context within which the indigenous commitment developed. The main purpose of the thesis is to explain why a commitment to regionalism has emerged among the Pacific leaders, and why it has been sustained in the face of the considerable obstacles which have frustrated their integrative efforts. Such a task entails an investigation of the nature of this commitment - its origins, development, rhetorical and institutional expressions, and the obstacles it has met. It also
involves an examination of the wider international context within which this commitment has developed.
The proliferation of regional organisations has been a prominent feature of post-war international relations. In the Cold War context of the 1950s these mainly took the form of regional defence pacts, such as NATO, SEATO and ANZUS.1 2** However, the formation of the European Economic
Community in 1958 marked a departure from these security—oriented regional associations. The European developments were concerned with economic integration and with the gradual transfer of power to a supra- national authority. During the 1960s other regional organisations pro moting economic integration, but generally not having the political unification goal of European regionalism, were established in Africa,
4
South-east Asia, South and Central America, and the Caribbean. These organisations vary in terms of the function they perform - some promote only limited functional co-operation among member states whilst others
take the form of customs unions or free trade areas.5 Some of these organisations are also concerned with non-economic functions such as
conflict-management within the region and joint diplomacy.
1 see inis Claude Jr., Swords into Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress o f Internatiorial Organisation, 3rd ed. (London: University of London Press, 1965), p.107.
The European developments were nevertheless security-related. See
r.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye Jr., 'International Interdependence and
Integration', International Polities, eds. F.I. Greenstein and N.W.Polsby, Volume 8 of the Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), p.364.
2
See Claude, op. eit. , pp.101-103.
For a listing and categorisation of these regional organisations see Lynn Miller, 'Regional Organizations and Subordinate Systems', Regional Politics and World Order, eds. R.A. Falk and S.H. Mendlovitz (San Francisco W.H. Freeman and Co., 1973), pp.412-431.
South Pacific regionalism is, in a very general sense, similar in type to European regionalism in that the regional organisations are primarily concerned with promoting economic integration. Unlike the European case, however, the South Pacific states are not attempting political integration in the sense of transferring power to a supra
national authority or creating a confederation. South Pacific regionalism therefore more closely resembles the regional arrangements typical of most of the developing world. It is, however, different from many such regional efforts in relation to the degree of economic integration being attempted. Its relatively low-level economic integration attempts mark it off from higher-level economic integration forms such as regional customs unions and
free trade areas prevalent in Central and South America.1 In this respect, it is closer to an ASEAN or OAU type of operation.
At the same time there are several aspects of the South Pacific situation which make its experience with regionalism quite different from that of Africa and South-east Asia. First, the South Pacific region is composed almost entirely of micro-states. The preoccupations, needs and capabilities of these states with regard to economic development and
international relations are very different from those of larger developing countries. Secondly, the South Pacific is a region of islands. There are, therefore, no borders between states in the region thus eliminating the possibility of border disputes which have plagued other regions. Thus the regional organisations do not have a peacekeeping or mediating function
1 These regional arrangements are examined in R.D. Baker, 'Latin American Economic Integration', Regional International Organizations - Structures and Functions, ed. P.A. Tharp, Jr. (New York: St Martins Press,
as, for example, the OAU has in Africa.1 Thirdly, regional co-operation was already being promoted in the South Pacific by the colonial powers
before the Pacific leaders became committed to the concept during the 1960s. Although the power structures have changed, the regional organisation
established by the colonial powers in 1947 is still in operation. The
regional activities promoted through the South Pacific Commission influenced the emergence and shape of the indigenous commitment to regionalism. This
2
factor was absent in relation to African and South-east Asian regionalism. The region that is most comparable to the South Pacific is the
Caribbean. Both regions are composed of developing island micro-states; they have similar economic problems; and in each region the colonial powers had promoted regionalism before an indigenous commitment had emerged.
There are, however, two significant distinctions to be made between the two regions which limit the extent to which they can be seen as comparable. First, the Caribbean is attempting a higher level of economic integration than the South Pacific, indicated, for example, by the establishment of a free trade area and a regional development bank. Secondly, whilst the South Pacific regional organisations include colonial and ex-colonial powers as members, the Caribbean organisations consist only of countries within the
3 region. Metropolitan countries outside the region are excluded.
For an examination of the OAU's peacekeeping role in a particular intra-regional conflict see Patricia Wild, 'The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict', in Tharp, op. oit. ,
pp.182-199. 2
This refers to continental regionalism. Of course in terms of sub continental regionalism the influence of the colonial legacy was very significant, for example, in relation to East Africa.
Whilst political scientists have studied regional integration in Europe, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere, their endeavours do not pro vide a suitable theoretical framework for examining the questions upon which this thesis is focusing, namely, the forces underlying South Pacific
regional integration. The established approach to the study of regional integration developed out of the study of European regionalism. The European developments, which involved the prospect of the voluntary
creation of a larger political unit than the nation-state, attracted the interest of political scientists who saw this as a very significant development in international relations and one that could be applied, with benefit for world order, elsewhere. The approach they adopted is
termed 'analytic neo-functionalism' because it is a development of the neo-functionalist strategy for achieving political integration, the
strategy which underlay European regionalism.
The neo-functionalist strategy is a suggested means of moving from fully independent nation states, through economic integration to full political unification. It involves first, the promotion of co-operation
in politically important economic or social fields; secondly the
'spillover' of co-operation into other fields as a result of the functional linkages between sectors; thirdly, the 'automatic politicisation' of this co-operation as it expands requiring the creation of supra-national
The pioneering works in the field were E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-57 (Stanford: ^Stanford University Press, 1958) ; and K.W. Deutsch et al• , Pol'iyt'ucal Community and the Forth Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
authorities; fourthly, the shift of power to a new centre; and finally, the achievement of full political integration. It is claimed that by the time the new political unit is created loyalties will have already shifted to the new centre. This, they argue, is a more effective means of
integration than the federalist approach which relies on a 'political act of will' and central institutions at the outset, and the hope that
loyalties could later be transferred to the new political unit.'1'
The approach adopted by Ernst Haas and other neo-functionalists to the study of economic integration in Europe, and later in Africa and Latin America, reflected their concern with the above strategy and with its proposed outcome, that of political integration or unification. The neo
functionalists wanted to establish the structural conditions which were 2
required for the neo-functionalist strategy to work. They also wanted to see how the strategy itself worked and to be able to provide a basis for prediction about integrative processes generally. The general theoretical question which has governed their approach to the study of regionalism is:
'Are there certain conditions under which economic integration of a group of nations automatically triggers political unity?'3
There are several reasons why the neo-functionalist approach to the examination of regional integration is inappropriate for the present study. The first relates to its central concerns. These concerns are conditioned
For a summary of the neo-functionalist strategy and a comparison with the federalist approach to integration see Ernst Haas, 'The Study of
Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing' International Organization
xxiv
(1970), pp.607-646.2
For a summary of the structural conditions thought to favour regional integration by Deutsch et a£.(1957), Haas and Schmitter (1964) , and Nye
(1971), see Keohane and Nye, op. cit. , pp.379-381. 3
J.S. Nye, 'Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration',
b y t h e i m p l i c i t , a n d so m e tim e s e x p l i c i t , d o c t r i n a l o r n o r m a t iv e a s p e c t s o f n e o - f u n c t i o n a l i s m . ^ I t s a d h e r e n t s h a v e b e e n u l t i m a t e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h
2
a d v o c a t i n g a s t r a t e g y f o r a c h i e v i n g p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . The r e a s o n t h a t t h e y a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n e c o n o m ic r e g i o n a l i s m i s t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e i t w i l l l e a d t o , an d s h o u ld l e a d t o , p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . T h is e x p e c t a t i o n
r e f l e c t s t h e E u r o - c e n t r e d n a t u r e o f t h e a p p r o a c h . I t w as a ssu m e d t h a t r e g i o n a l d e v e lo p m e n ts e ls e w h e r e i n t h e w o r l d w o u ld m i r r o r t h e E u ro p e a n e x p e r i e n c e . Thus a n e o - f u n c t i o n a l i s t a p p r o a c h t o t h e s t u d y o f r e g i o n a l e c o n o m ic i n t e g r a t i o n w o u ld f o c u s o n how s u c c e s s f u l t h e i n t e g r a t i o n p r o c e s s i s i n te r m s o f m ov in g a lo n g a n a ssu m e d c o n tin u u m to w a r d s p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n . 'S u c c e s s * , t h e n , i s m e a s u r e d i n te r m s o f m o v in g to w a r d s a g o a l t h a t t h e n e o - f u n c t i o n a l i s t s s e e a s d e s i r a b l e a n d a l o n g a c o n tin u u m t h a t t h e y s e e a s i n e v i t a b l e a s lo n g a s c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e m e t. T h e se h a v e p r o v e n t o b e f a l s e a s s u m p t io n s i n r e l a t i o n t o r e g i o n a l i s m
3
i n t h e d e v e lo p i n g w o r l d . N e o - f u n c t i o n a l i s m f a i l s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r e v a i l i n g c a s e o f r e g i o n a l i s m i n t h e T h i r d W o rld , w h e re t h e i n t e n t i o n i s n o t t o move to w a rd g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n ( in d e e d t h i s w i l l o f t e n b e a c t i v e l y o p p o s e d ) b u t w h e re t h e r e i s s e e n t o b e v a l u e i n a r e s t r i c t e d
fo rm o f i n t e g r a t i o n . F u r t h e r , b e c a u s e n e o - f u n c t i o n a l i s t s s e e e c o n o m ic r e g i o n a l i s m a s a s t e p p i n g - s t o n e t o p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n a n d e x a m in e i t i n te r m s o f how t h e i n t e g r a t i o n p r o c e s s i s w o r k in g i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s , t h i s
1 E r n s t H aas s t a t e s t h a t 'T h e m a in r e a s o n f o r s t u d y i n g r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s t h u s n o r m a t iv e : The u n i t s a n d a c t i o n s s t u d i e d p r o v i d e a l i v i n g l a b o r a t o r y f o r o b s e r v i n g t h e p e a c e f u l c r e a t i o n o f p o s s i b l e new t y p e s o f human c o m m u n itie s a t a v e r y h i g h l e v e l o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d o f t h e p r o c e s s e j
t h a t may l e a d t o s u c h c o n d i t i o n s . ' S ee H a a s ,
op. c i t .
, p . 6 0 8 .P o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n h a s b e e n s e e n , i n t u r n , a s a m eans o f p r o m o tin g w o r l d o r d e r . S e e , f o r e x a m p le , A m ita i E t z i o n i ,
P o litic a l U n ification:
A Comparative Study o f Leaders and Forces
(New Y o rk : H o l t , R i n e h a r t an d W in s to n , 1 9 6 5 ) , p p . x - x i .limits their understanding of the motives underlying a commitment to
restricted economic integration. In particular, it limits their under
standing of the political significance of limited economic regionalism in the developing world.
This thesis, on the other hand, is interested in economic regionalism in its own right and not as a stepping-stone to political unification.
In other words, it is not concerned with establishing whether the South Pacific is meeting the conditions necessary for ultimate political
unification but rather, attention is focused on explaining the political significance of the commitment to this limited level of integration.
A second reason why neo-functionalism is inappropriate for the present study is that the comparative literature it provides, and upon which its general theory is based, is oriented towards economic inte
gration at a higher level than that which is being attempted in the South Pacific. Nye and Keohane contend that:
. . . neo-functionalist scholars have made their principal contribution to understanding political integration by focusing closely and clearly on processes that follow the creation of a coirmon market and that tend to produce further
change.-*-There has been a tendency for neo-functionalists to see regional co operation of the South Pacific type as a step along the way but not high
2 enough to be worthy of study in terms of their concerns.
1 2
Keohane and Nye, op. oit. , p.383.
Thirdly, despite the many studies undertaken by neo-functionalists they have not been able to establish a prescriptive theory which has
universal application. This is admitted by the two most prominent members of the school, Joseph Nye and Ernst Haas.^ The structural conditions
found to be relevant in Europe were not applicable in Africa and Latin America. The theorists have only been able to establish region-specific
conclusions. Where they have attempted conclusions with supposed universal 2
applicability these tend to be so general as to be axiomatic.
It was stated earlier in this Introduction that the main purpose of this thesis is to explain the forces underlying South Pacific regionalism. Having established the unsuitability of a neo-functionalist approach to this question, we are now in a position to delineate more clearly the central hypothesis which guides the approach adopted here. It takes the form of several related propositions:
1. that economic regionalism in the South Pacific must be examined in terms of the functions it is serving now rather than in terms of some presumed move toward political unification.
2. that the economic orientation of the regional organisations (as indicated by their stated objectives and activities) disguises the essentially political forces underlying the commitment to regionalism.
3. that the political forces include
-(a) the use of regionalism by the Pacific states as an assertive mechanism against an outside
See Keohane and Nye,
op. oit.
, pp.365, 377-378, and Haas,op. oit.
, pp .627-629.2
world upon which they have been politically dependent, and continue to be economically dependent.
(b) the derivative political functions - diplomatic, national, personal - served by participation in regionalism.
(c) the strategic purposes that economic region alism in the South Pacific serves for countries outside the region.
4. that, therefore, the promotion of economic regionalism in the South Pacific, whether by the Pacific states or
countries external to the region, is primarily about the assertion of control rather than any substantive commitment to the supposed benefits of economic integration.
5. that there is, therefore, an inherent conflict between the indigenous Pacific elites on the one hand and the metro politan countries on the other, each seeking to use economic
regionalism as a mechanism for asserting control or influenc ing developments in the region.
There are several areas of academic writing which assist in under standing particular aspects of these questions and which have influenced the approach adopted in the following chapters. One such area of writing is that concerned with the problems confronting very small states, or
Two academic seminars have provided the main contributions to this literature; the first an ongoing seminar organised by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies from 1962 until 1964, and the second a conference organised by the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) in Barbados in 1972. These studies were concerned with establishing the special features and problems — economic, political and administrative - which mark off the micro-state situation from that of larger developing
countries. In a more recent study, P.J. Boyce examined the constraints operating on micro-states with regard to the conduct of their diplomatic
relations. The United Nations and its agencies have also contributed to this literature; first, through UNITAR's study of very small states
4
and their problems in international affairs, and since UNCTAD III, through the examination by several UN bodies of the special economic
5 problems facing such states.
Whilst these academic and UN studies do not extend to an examination of the operation and purposes of existing micro-state regionalism they do suggest characteristics of the micro—state situation which make regionalism appear attractive. These studies have in fact advocated regional co
operation as an effective means of approaching the problems facing micro- 6
states.
1 These papers are presented in Burton Benedict (ed.), Problems of Smaller Territories (London; Athlone Press, 1967).
2 See Percy Selwyn (ed.), Development Policy in Small Countries
(London: Croom Helm, 1975).
3 P. Boyce, Foreign Affairs for New States (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977).
4 u n i t a r, Small States and Territories: Status and Problems (New York:
UNITAR, 1969).
5 See Chapters 5 and 6 for a listing of some of these studies.
A second body of literature which provides some useful concepts for the present study is that concerned with ethnic identity, or ethnicity. These studies, undertaken mainly by sociologists, have been concerned primarily with understanding ethnic allegiance and its political impli
cations within the state. Although we are here concerned with the politicisation of ethnic identity at the regional level many of the
concepts put forward by these theorists can be usefully adapted. There are three which are of particular interest. First, many ethnicity theorists emphasise that subjective factors (or a feeling of belonging) are as important as objective cultural characteristics in determining ethnic allegiance.'1' Secondly, they show that an individual may experience several levels of ethnic identity and that the relevant level will depend
2
on the context in question. A third concept of relevance is that of 3
the political manipulation of cultural symbols. Each of these socio logical concepts is important in understanding the promotion of a
regional ethnic identity which has accompanied the Pacific state commit ment to regionalism. A detailed discussion of how they assist in
explaining such a development is left to Chapter 5.
The analysis is based largely on primary sources. A plethora of documents emanate from the regional organisations, especially from the
See George De Vos, 'Social Stratification and Ethnic Pluralism: An Overview from the Perspective of Psychological Anthropology', Race. No.4 (1972), especially pp.412-413.
2
See Pierre L. van den Berghe, 'Ethnicity: The African Experience', International Social Science Journal XXIII, No.4 (1971), especially p.513; and Andre Beteille, 'Race, Caste and Ethnic Identity', International
Social Science Journal,
x x i n ,
No.4 (1971) , p.535.See, for example, S.M. Lyman and W.A. Douglass, 'Ethnicity:
S o u th P a c i f i c C o m m issio n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e m e e t in g s o f t h e S o u th P a c i f i c F orum , t h e o t h e r m a jo r r e g i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n , a r e c l o s e d t o o b s e r v e r s a n d r e c o r d s o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a r e c o n f i d e n t i a l . T h i s p o s e s a q u i t e s e r i o u s p r o b le m f o r t h e r e s e a r c h e r l o o k i n g f o r m ore t h a n t h e
c o n s e n s u s v iew e x p r e s s e d i n t h e P r e s s com m u niq ue. I n a d d i t i o n , many o f t h e d o c u m e n ts p r o d u c e d b y t h e S o u th P a c i f i c B u re a u f o r E co nom ic C o - o p e r a t i o n , an e c o n o m ic r e s e a r c h o f f s h o o t o f t h e F o ru m , a r e a l s o c o n f i d e n t i a l . B e c a u s e t h e r e g i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s o n l y i n c l u d e t h e c o n s e n s u s v iew i n t h e i r r e p o r t s t h e r e s e a r c h e r h a s t o p l a c e a h e a v y r e l i a n c e on n e w s p a p e r and p e r i o d i c a l a r t i c l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e o f t h e
P a c ific Islands Monthly,
f o r t h e b a c k g r o u n d e v e n t s . The P a c i f i c l e a d e r s h a v e b e e n o n l y t o o r e a d y t o h a v e t h e i r v ie w s on r e g i o n a l i s m p u b l i s h e d i n n e w s p a p e rs a n d o t h e r d o c u m e n ts . T h ey h a v e g i v e n c o u n t l e s s s p e e c h e s e x p r e s s i n g t h e i r co m m itm ent t o t h e c o n c e p t . T h i s c r e a t e s a d i f f i c u l t y f o r t h e r e s e a r c h e r b e c a u s e t h e p u b l i s h e d m a t e r i a l , f o r t h e m o st p a r t , t e n d s t o e m p h a s is e t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e com m itm ent t o r e g i o n a l i s m ; t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e p i c t u r e i s n o t p u b l i c l y a i r e d t o t h e same e x t e n t . T h e re i s a p a u c i t y o f p u b l i s h e d m a t e r i a l on t h e p r o b le m s t h a t r e g i o n a l i s m m e e ts i n p r a c t i c e : t h e i n t e r - s t a t e r i v a l r y , t h e f i n a n c i a l p r o b le m s a n d t h e t e n s i o n s b e tw e e n p e r s o n a l i t i e s .
A f i e l d t r i p t o t h e r e g i o n , u n d e r t a k e n fro m S e p te m b e r t o D ecem ber 1 9 7 5 , p r o v e d i n v a l u a b l e . A m o n t h 's s t a y a t t h e r e g i o n a l u n i v e r s i t y , t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f t h e S o u th P a c i f i c , a t t e n d a n c e a t t h e S o u th P a c i f i c
C o n f e re n c e i n N a u ru a n d t h e R e g io n a l W omen's C o n f e r e n c e i n S u v a , an d
Interviews and less formal discussions were conducted with public servants, politicians, diplomats and academics in each of these countries. Visits were also made to the headquarters of the two main regional organisations,
the South Pacific Commission in Noumea, and the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation in Suva. The Director (Secretary-General in the
case of the South Pacific Commission) and staff of these organisations were extremely helpful with material and interview time. Subsequent attendance as an observer at the Eighteenth South Pacific Conference held at Noumea, New Caledonia in October 1978, provided an opportunity to make comparisons with the situation in 1975.
The thesis is structured around four broad subjects: context, indigenous regional activity, underlying cohesive and divisive factors, and external involvement. The first two chapters establish the context in which a Pacific state commitment to regionalism has emerged. Chapter 1 surveys the prominent features and historical experience of the South Pacific countries whilst Chapter 2 explores the nature of European efforts
to promote co-operation among the Island countries prior to the emergence of indigenous interest in the concept. These chapters provide more than
just historical and contextual background to the developments which form the main focus of this thesis. It will be shown that the factors
described in these chapters have had, in fact, an important influence on the shape and nature of such developments.
Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the dimensions and nature of regional activity initiated and controlled by the Pacific leaders. Chapter 3 examines their efforts to gain control of the existing regional
in Chapter 4. The two chapters following are concerned with the various factors that affect the level of cohesion within the regional movement: Chapter 5 deals with those factors which encourage the development of regionalism whilst Chapter 6 examines those factors which are divisive or disintegrative in effect in that they create obstacles to regional co operation and cause conflicting interests among the participating states. The final chapter places the indigenous commitment to regionalism in a wider international context. It examines the level of external involve ment in the integrative efforts of the Pacific states and the motives
THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGION
This chapter surveys the historical experience and prominent characteristics of the twenty states and territories that constitute the South Pacific region. Its purpose is to establish the context in which a commitment to regional activity has emerged and developed. All of the features examined have had an important bearing on regional ism, some contributing to its development, and others to its retard ation. It is not intended, however, to explore the nature and impact of these influences here. This is left to later chapters. The
characteristics of the region are surveyed within the following general categories: (1) geographical features, (2) traditional culture,
(3) European intrusion, (4) the decolonisation experience, (5) the post-independence political systems and their leadership, (6) the regional economy, and (7) increased external involvement in the region.
1. GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES
The first point to note about the region is that it has a very small population (4.7m^) inhabiting islands which are spread over a
2
very large area of ocean (30m sq km ). Most of the inhabitants (2.9m) live in Papua New Guinea, which also dwarfs the other Pacific countries
The population figures cited in this section are drawn from South Pacific Commission, South Pacific Economies: Statistical Summary
(Noumea: South Pacific Commission, March 1978), Table 1. The population figures for all South Pacific countries are listed in Appendix 2.
in terms of land area. Fiji, the second most populous country, has a population of 592,000. Nauru, Niue and Tuvalu, each with a population of less than 8,000, are among the world's smallest countries.
Nearly all countries in the region consist of groups of islands; in many cases hundreds of islands. The individual islands do not all resemble the Hollywood stereotype of the small coral atoll with its characteristic lagoon and swaying palm trees. There is a variety of landforms in the region although it is usual to think of them as falling within three general categories: the continental, the volcanic, and
the coral atoll.1 The continental landform is found in the west of the region. Le Grand Terre in New Caledonia, Viti Levu in Fiji, and the Papua New Guinea mainland, are examples of this type. These islands are very large and contain a range of minerals such as nickel and copper. Their geological nature is that of a continent, being composed primarily of granite, or other igneous rock.
Moving further east and north, we find volcanic islands, sometimes called 'high islands', such as those in the Samoan, Tongan or Society groups. These islands, which are actually built on an ocean volcano, have very fertile soil. Also found in the east and north of the region
are the 'low islands' of the Pacific, the coral atolls, which are built up on submerged volcanos by small marine creatures called polyps.
The atoll lagoons provide an important source of food in an environment generally lacking fresh water and soil. These differences in physical environment have contributed not only to a variety of economies but also
to variety in the nature of traditional social and political
1 See, for example, W.L. Thomas Jr., 'The Pacific Basin: An
organisation. The richer volcanic island environment, for example, generally facilitated the development of a more elaborate society than was possible in the harsher environment of the coral atoll. And the rugged terrain of the continental islands contributed to much greater cultural diversity than is evident in the volcanic island and atoll areas where the terrain has allowed easier contact between societal
1 groups.
2. TRADITIONAL CULTURE
The South Pacific peoples do not form a homogeneous ethnic group. To the contrary, there is considerable cultural diversity in the region.
2
Despite the linked origins of various groups, Pacific Islanders have developed within hundreds of distinct societies. This process has been assisted by the natural barriers of ocean and mountain which have caused many Pacific societies to develop in relative isolation. There is
considerable variation in the fundamental aspects of culture, for example, in relation to kinship, social structure, land tenure and political
authority. This diversity is further indicated by the variety of languages spoken in the area. Linguists have identified over 1,200 distinct languages, though it should be emphasised that about 700 of
3 these are spoken in Papua New Guinea.
J.W. Davidson, 'The Pacific and its Peoples', Pacific Islands
Portraits,
eds. D. Scarr and J.W. Davidson (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), p.l.2
For a recent assessment of the archaeological and linguistic
evidence concerning the linked origins of the Polynesians see P. Bellwood,
The Polynesians: Prehistory o f an Island People (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978).
3
It has been a generally accepted practice to divide the South Pacific into three broad cultural areas - Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia. The geographical boundaries of Polynesia are formed by the triangle connecting Easter Island, New Zealand and Hawaii. The main Polynesian groups are Tonga, the Samoas and those within present day French Polynesia. Melanesia stretches from the island of New Guinea'*' to New Caledonia and east to Fiji. It also includes the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. The hundreds of small islands making up Micronesia lie in the area of ocean north of Papua New Guinea and east of the Philippines. The main groups here are the Marianas, the Marshalls, the Carolines, the Gilberts, Guam and Nauru.
There has been a tendency for Pacific scholars to distinguish 2
between the cultural features of each of the above areas. A particu-3
larly influential attempt was that of Marshall Sahlins. He describes the typical Melanesian polity as smaller in population and territorial extent than its Polynesian counterpart. Polynesian social structure he describes as pyramidal with a paramount chief at the top whereas the Melanesian social structure is 'segmental' (composed of equal seg ments) . His central argument concerns the distinction between the typical leader of a society in each area. The Melanesian 'big man', he says, is a leader who achieves his status through his own actions, not by nature of his ancestry. The Polynesian chief, on the other hand,
1 Melanesia includes Irian Jaya, a province of Indonesia.
p
See, for example, D. Oliver, The Pacific Islands (New York: Doubleday, 1961), chapters IV-VI; W. Howells, The Pacific Islanders (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973); and R. G . Crocombe, The New South Pacific (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), pp.10-13.
nature of political authority give rise to different societies; the Polynesian more able to get things done, to achieve stability; and the Melanesian less stable and not having the capacity to engineer great works. He argues that for these reasons the Polynesian kingdoms were more advanced than the Melanesian societies.
Although Sahlins has put forward his profiles of Melanesian and Polynesian leaders only as 'ideal' types, his stereotyping has never theless assisted in disguising the diversity within each of these broad cultural groups. A significant proportion of Melanesian societies do not conform to the 'big man' pattern, notably those in Fiji and New Caledonia. Even in Papua New Guinea, which is generally closest to the Sahlins pattern, there is a number of societies where hereditary
chieftanships exist.'1' Within Polynesia, too, there is much more 2
diversity than indicated by the 'chiefly' stereotype. This diversity is there, despite common origins, because of the relatively isolated subsequent development of Polynesian societies. This is not to say that the accepted practice of dividing the region into three ethnic areas is not useful. It will be shown later in this thesis that ethnic identification at this sub-regional level has been an important element in regional developments.
1 B. Standish, The Big-Man Model Reconsidered: Power and
Stratification in (Thimbu, IASER discussion paper No.22 (Port Moresby: Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, November 1978), p.33 2
Contrast, for example, the matai system in Western Samoa described in R.P. Gilson, Samoa 1830-1900: The Politics o f a Multi-cultural
3. EUROPEAN INTRUSION
All South Pacific societies have experienced, to some degree, the intrusion of European values and technology. Indeed all Pacific
countries, with the exception of Tonga,1 have experienced the colonial rule of a European power. It will be shown in later chapters that this has had an important bearing on developments in regionalism. It is therefore useful to briefly survey the nature and extent of European influence.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Europe was ignorant of the existence of the South Pacific islands. In 1520, Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese navigator sailing under the Spanish flag, became the first European to enter the Pacific Ocean. His voyage opened the way to exploration of this new ocean, and to a search for the great southern
2
continent which was believed to be in it. The Europeans came for various reasons. The Spanish, who dominated sixteenth century explor ation, primarily through the voyages of Mendana, Quiros and Torres, were seeking gold, and converts for the Church. Their efforts gave way to the Dutch, notably LeMaire and Tasman, in the seventeenth century. The Dutch were interested in trade but the islands lacked commodities of commercial significance. In the eighteenth century exploration was left to British and French navigators. Though not devoid of more selfish motives it is evident that a prime interest was discovery for the sake of science. By the time of Cook's death on his third Pacific voyage in
3 1779, all the major island groups had been discovered.
1 Even in the case of Tonga, which did not become a colony (though it did become a protectorate), British influence, and sometimes control, was evident.
2 See J.C. Beaglehole, The Exploration o f the Pacific (3rd ed.; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), Chapter II.
With the establishment of a European settlement at Sydney Cove in 1788, and the mapping of the main islands complete, other groups of Europeans followed in the wake of the explorers. Some, like the missionaries and later the planters, provided the first continual
contact between European and Pacific Islander, except for the odd casta way that had preceded them. Others, such as the traders, whalers and
labour recruiters moved in and out of the region chasing the profits to be had from pearl shell, whales, sandalwood, beche-de-mer and labourers.^ These Europeans had a very significant influence on the traditional societies of the Pacific. In Tahiti, Hawaii and Tonga in particular, the missionaries had successes with widespread conversion. Some became
2
heavily involved in local politics as advisers to chiefs. Labour recruiters operating primarily in the New Hebrides and Solomons groups took a significant proportion of the adult male population to Queensland
3
sugar cane plantations. Traders introduced a money economy into the region especially as trading centres such as Apia and Levuka began to develop.
There are several general histories of European influence in the Pacific in the nineteenth century. Among the most well-known are: C.H. Grattan, The Southwest Pacific to 1900: A Modern History (Michigan: Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press, 1963), Chapter XI; and W.P. Morrell, Britain in the Pacific Islands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), Chapters II-VII.
2
A prominent example was the influence of Shirley Baker, a Wesleyan missionary, on King George Tupou I of Tonga; see N. Rutherford,
Shirley Baker and the King o f Tonga (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1971).
3
The main aspects of labour recruitment throughout the South Pacific are discussed in D. Scarr, 'Recruits and Recruiters', Pacific Islands Portraits, eds. J.W. Davidson and D. Scarr (Canberra: ANU Press, 1973). A more detailed examination of the labour trade as it affected a
particular area, the Solomons group, is contained in P. Corris,Passage3 Port and Plantation: A History o f Solomon Islands Labour Migration
The activities of these groups of Europeans - British, French, German and American predominantly - in the early and mid-nineteenth century attracted the reluctant interest of their home governments. The indigenous people needed protection from the labour recruiters
('blackbirders'); some Europeans required protection from the islanders, and from other Europeans in the expanding settlements. British and American resident consuls failed to deal with the law and order problem. Thus, with some reluctance, European powers found it necessary to annex, or to declare protectorates over, island groups where activity of their nationals was predominant. Although France moved in 1843 and 1853 to declare protectorates over Tahiti and New Caledonia respectively, it was not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the other powers began to acquire territories in the area. Britain annexed Fiji in 1874 on the invitation of the paramount chief, Cakobau. Then from 1884 Germany, Britain, America and France moved quickly to annex or
declare protectorates over all remaining independent islands. An element of competition now replaced the reticence of earlier years. The
colonisation of the region was complete when in 1906 France and Britain agreed on a condominium arrangement for the New Hebrides. All islands except the Tongan group were now part of either the British, French,
1 American or German empire.
The German colonies changed hands during the First World War. Western Samoa went to New Zealand, New Guinea to Australia (which had
taken over the responsibility for south-east New Guinea from Britain in 1906), Micronesia to Japan, and Nauru to Australia^ They were each given League of Nations mandate status. The only change in ruling power as a
result of the Second World War was in relation to Micronesia where the United States of America took over from Japan.1
Although all South Pacific countries have experienced colonialism, the nature of that experience has varied for several reasons. First, as was the case in other parts of the colonised world, colonial powers
adopted different approaches to the administration of their colonies. For example, the British adopted an approach to their colonies which
2 'preserved a separation between indigenous people and themselves'. They ruled where they could through local chiefs. Thus to a certain extent the traditional authority structure was kept intact. The French, on the other hand, 'have followed a practice of assimilation' which entails a centralised form of government and consequently a destruction
3
of traditional authority. Secondly, some societies, because they were more organised, were better able to effectively oppose or control the
4
extent of European influence. And finally, some islands were more attractive to European settlers either because of their geographical position, their resources, or their lack of infectious diseases.
Despite the differences in the specific nature of the colonial experience, the same general principle was at work - the subordination of a local technology, economy and culture to that of Europeans. As a result of European influence, Christianity was adopted region-wide and has become an important facilitator of regional identity. Another
1 See C.H. Grattan, The Southwest Pacific Since 1900 (Michigan, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963) , Chapter IX.
F.J. West, Political Advancement in the South Pacific: A Comparative Study of Colonial Practice in Fiji, Tahiti and American Samoa (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1961), p.172.
3
Ibid.
introduction of significance was that of language - English, French and Pidgin. These have had a unifying effect in an area with so many
indigenous languages. English, for example, is the 'i'tngua franca for all the Pacific except the French territories. And Pidgin, which is spoken, though with slight variation, in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides, promotes an identifying factor as well as a means of communication amongst those groups. The European intrusion affected all aspects of traditional life in the South Pacific. More importantly, the adoption of European values and technology often meant a rejection or subordination of traditional customs. The shared experi ence of this subordination is the root cause of many of the regionalist attitudes held today.'*'
4. DECOLONISATION
On 1 January 1962 Western Samoa became the first South Pacific state to gain independence. Over the next sixteen years it was joined by eight other Pacific countries. Two others will join their ranks by 1980. This was, and continues to be, a period of rapid political change for the
region. Western Samoan independence only came after a long struggle. The Samoans had always resented colonial rule and had been demanding
independ-2
ence since the time of the Mau in the 1920s. As early as 1921 the Fono of Faipule (an elected advisory council) had petitioned King George V for
1 European intrusion does not end with the conclusion of colonial rule. Its continuing influence - economic, cultural and political - is examined in Chapters 5 and 7.
2 The actions and attitudes of the Mau, a movement which was opposed to New Zealand rule and had as its catchcry 'Samoa mo Samoa' (Samoa for the Samoans) , are examined in J.W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: The
self-governing status.1 New Zealand finally bowed to this pressure after the War and in 1947 instituted constitutional developments aimed ulti mately at independence. Three years after Samoan independence another New Zealand territory, the Cook Islands, opted for a form of self- government that would ensure continued links with New Zealand and con tinuance of the benefits that derive from those links. This status is officially known as 'self governing in association with New Zealand'. Under this arrangement external affairs are handled by New Zealand in consultation with the Premier of the Cook Islands and Cook Islanders
2 retain New Zealand citizenship.
Nauru achieved independence in 1968 after a long struggle with a 3
reluctant Australia. Crucial elements in the Nauruan's ultimate
success were the tenacity of the Nauruan chiefs, particularly Hammer De Roburt, now Premier, and the constant pressure applied by the United Nations Trusteeship Council which as early as 1948 was supporting
4
political advancement for the Nauruans. Australia resisted to the last on political development and it was not until two years before independ ence that the first general election for a legislative assembly was held. Even then the Administering Authority thought that it was not
appropriate to set a definite date for independence but rather to talk
Ibid. , p .101.
2
C.C. Aikman, 'Constitutional Development in New Zealand's Island Territories and in Western Samoa', New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, ed. A. Ross (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1969) , pp.334-335.
3
The history of this struggle, and that of a related struggle to gain control of the phosphate industry, is told in N. Viviani, Nauru: Phosphate and Political Progress (Canberra: Australian National
University Press, 1970). 4
about 'the possibility of further political progress' in a few years' time.'1' Australia's administering partners, New Zealand and Britain, took a similar view to that of Australia. As late as 1967 they were advocating that Nauru only be given self-government leaving its external
2 affairs to be handled by Australia.
Tonga's 're-entry into the Comity of Nations', as it was termed, occurred in 1970. Under the Treaty of Friendship and Protection which had operated from 1900 to 1970 Tonga had assigned the conduct of its
foreign affairs to Britain. Its 're-entry' meant an end to this arrange-3
ment. This made little difference to the internal political situation as it was in 1970, though earlier in the century British influence had
4
extended to much more than foreign affairs. In the same year Fiji became independent. By this time a ministerial system had been in
operation for four years. Although the British Government had been eager during the 1960s to bring Fiji to independence its plans were delayed. The Fijians were anxious to ensure that there would be adequate safe guards of their position in an independent Fiji in which the Indian population would be numerically dominant. With compromise on the part of the Indians, represented by the National Federation Party, and the
Ibid., pp.152-154. Ibid. , p.17.
3
j.w.
Davidson, The Decolonization of Oceania-
A Survey 1945-1970 (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1971), p.9.This was particularly the case during the reign of Tupou II (1893 to 1918). This is described in Eseta Fusitu'a and N. Rutherford,
'George Tupou II and the British Protectorate', Friendly Islands: A History of Tonga, ed. N. Rutherford (Melbourne: Oxford University Press,
