The Juba peace talks between 2006 and

The LRA was at this stage between 2005 and 2006 literarily caught between a rock and a hard place. Among these numerous factors that together challenged the LRA, it is possible to identify pressure at the international, regional, national and more local levels. At the international level, the ICC arrest warrants against the LRA leadership served as an ever

83 increasing threat against them (Allen, 2006; Dunn, 2007; ICG, 2007, 2008; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007; Mwaniki et al, 2009:9-10). But although the ICC was partly responsible for strengthening the pressure against them, this must also be seen in relation to the regional challenge in the shape of the GoSS three layered ultimatum (ICG, 2006). As the GoSS had gained military strength and coupled with the CPA, which meant a definitive end to the arms supply from Khartoum in 2005 and Southern Sudan as a safe haven, the LRA had to find a new hiding place in the Garamba National Park in the easternmost part of the DRC (see appendix A). This dramatic reduction in alternative hideouts has also resulted in a significant limitation of their manoeuvring space. Even in the DRC they were feeling the heat at their new hiding place at Garamba, because of the nearby presence of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), that was deployed there as a peacekeeping force. The LRA eventually ended up encountering and killing eight of its personnel to make its presence felt. Although this demonstrated their skills in guerrilla warfare, it also serves as a symbol of their vulnerability in the DRC (ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:93; Quaranto, 2007:2). Furthermore, the UPDF threatened to pursue the LRA over the border from Uganda and into the DRC in a similar way as they had in Southern Sudan during Operation Iron Fist in 2002 (ICG, 2007; Mwaniki et al, 2009:4-5; Quaranto, 2007:2). Last, but not least, the recent collapse in the second round of Bigombe led peace talks had left the LRA leaders without any possibility for negotiations through a mediator they could trust (Allen, 2006; Dunn, 2007; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005). Nevertheless, this changed in the middle of 2006, as the vice-president of Southern Sudan, Riek Machar, offered to mediate between the LRA and the GoU, while maintaining the three layered ultimatum towards the rebels. As GoSS offer to mediate this time around was clearly positive, as a sustainable peace would gain both Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda, by taking into consideration that both countries are already struggling with more than enough internal problems on their own to have another and wider regional problem to deal with in addition (ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:98; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:2-3; Mwaniki et al 2009; Quaranto, 2007).

These peace talks, also referred to as the Juba talks, were a series of negotiations taking place between the GoU and the LRA from July 2006 to April 2008, concerning the conditions for a ceasefire and a possible final peace agreement between them. On a five point agenda in this agreement, the third point dealing with accountability and reconciliation, and hence the issue of peace and justice by regulating the relationship between the ICC indictments, the amnesty

84 procedures and the Acholis’ neo-traditional justice system through Mato Oput is clearly the most important in this regard for this study (ICG, 2007, 2008; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Oomen and Marchand, 2007). In the following, this subsection will describe what this peace agreement sought to achieve, before moving on to the next chapter, with a basis in point three concerning accountability and reconciliation, will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these three transitional justice mechanisms being mentioned here.

The first round in the Juba talks began on July 14th 2006 (Batanda, 2009; Latigo, 2008:98; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007). While the LRA clearly expressed from the start that they wanted to discuss and address the deeper underlying economic, political and social root causes of the conflict, the GoU in comparison entered the negotiations by perceiving it as a possible political solution to a military problem where they hoped to negotiate a solution with a ‘soft landing’ allowing the LRA leaders to avoid punishment. These completely different perceptions of what should be included on the agenda, illustrated that there still was a great deal of common mistrust between the two warring factions that was understandably extremely difficult to overcome. Because of this, there was constantly a ‘blame game’ between them, which threatened to undermine the Juba peace talks throughout the negotiations. This had to stop for a permanent solution to be reached, meaning that both parties would have to realise that it was now time to bring about an end to the fighting as no good would come out of constantly blaming each other for what had happened in the past (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2008; Latigo, 2008:98; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).

Slowly, as the talks progressed, the delegations were able to bridge this divide by agreeing on a five point agenda which outlined what had to be discussed and agreed upon before a peace agreement could be reached at all. These five points, which included both military and more structural issues covered; (1) cessation of hostilities; (2) a comprehensive frame of solution to economic and social development; (3) accountability and reconciliation; (4) disarmament, demobilisation and resettlement (DDR), and; (5) a final comprehensive peace agreement (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:98-99; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:5; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).

After several delays, the first point on the agenda, a cessation of hostilities, was finally reached through a ceasefire agreement on August 26th, 2006, that was renewed for the first

85 time in December 2006, and later again in April 2007 (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99-100; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:2-4; Mwaniki et al, 2009:4; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007). Even if the situation on the ground remained tense, it was nevertheless peaceful, as there were only being reported some sporadic clashes between them after the talks began, and no outbreak of violence after this first agreement had been signed, which contributed to improving the humanitarian situation in Northern Uganda (ICG, 2007, 2008; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:2-4; VG, 2009). After this, the parties were seemingly much closer to a final settlement than ever before, and the Juba talks were therefore being described as the best chance ever for reaching a negotiated settlement between the GoU and the LRA in the conflict, which at this stage had lasted for more than two decades, and throughout this period no kind of negotiations, whether being mediated by a third party or not had resulted in a successful outcome (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:98-99; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:2; Mwaniki et al, 2009:4,9-11; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).

But this cessation of hostilities through a ceasefire was only the first item out of five points on the agenda, and many other difficult aspects had yet to be solved at numerous meetings before a final peace agreement could be reached. In January 2007, the first round of Juba peace talks did however collapse, since the LRA delegation argued that their safety was at stake. This was understandable given the increased pressure they were faced with from different angles at this stage (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:8; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).

After a two month delay the peace talks resumed in April 2007. When the Juba process had entered its second year, Machar was still in charge of the negotiations, but the team of negotiators was beefed up considerably, as he was now assisted by Joaqim Chissano, the former president of Mozambique and now a UN special envoy, in addition to monitors from the DRC, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99; Mwaniki et al, 2009:8-9; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).

Since only the first one of the five items on the agenda had been dealt with, the parties therefore decided to renew the ceasefire for another two months to be able to move on to the second item concerning a comprehensive solution to the conflict. This had to do with issues such as social and economic development for Northern Uganda, land titles and more detailed security arrangements for the rebels once they returned from the bush. As most of these issues had been discussed on previous occasions, they were able to move on to the third item on the

86 agenda dealing with the issue of accountability and reconciliation related to the questions about transitional justice (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007:5 and 2008; Latigo, 2008:99-100; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:6-8; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007). This ‘peace vs. justice’ dilemma was another issue that had complicated the Juba peace talks from the very beginning. Although the ICC indictments against Kony and four of his henchmen were just one of the several important issues that had to be resolved, the ICC clearly represented the biggest major obstacle threatening to undermine the whole process, and it provoked a great debate about this dichotomy between peace and justice concerning which one of them should come first (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:100; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:9-10; Mwaniki et al, 2009:11; Nielsen, 2008; Oomen and Marchand, 2007; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).

The LRA leaders demanded the withdrawal of the ICC indictments against them to make sure of that the peace talks would continue smoothly, as well as stronger guarantees about their fighters’ security. As such, a successful outcome with a comprehensive peace agreement depended on the Court to let the LRA leaders off their judicial hook by removing the indictments, which represented a massive obstacle for continued peace talks (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99-100; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:9-10; Mwaniki et al, 2009:10-11; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007). For its part, the GoU insisted that the ICC would not stand in the way as an obstacle when the prospects for achieving the greater good through a peace agreement was in sight, and promised to approach the Court to have the indictments against the LRA leaders lifted, but only after they had agreed to sign an agreement (Latigo, 2008:99; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:9-10). The problem with this was that even if Museveni clearly expressed his willingness to have them withdrawn and prepare the ground for a ‘soft landing’ for the rebel leaders, this is extremely difficult to achieve and not up to him to decide by himself. For its part, the ICC did not show any sign of removing the indictments, but to the contrary indicated that they interpreted this ‘soft landing’ through amnesty as a continuance of the practice of impunity that it sought to root out (Mail and Guardian, 2009c; Ogora, 2009). The arrest warrants would therefore remain in place as long as the Court had more than enough evidence to charge Kony and his four commanders for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the GoU made no attempts to prosecute the rebel leaders by themselves. But as long as the arrest warrants remained in place, the LRA would

87 refuse to sit down and talk peace at all (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).

Most likely in an attempt to convince the Court of the need for greater flexibility and sensitivity to the local needs on the ground in Northern Uganda, and to create a ‘win-win’ situation, the Acholis’ neo-traditional justice system was introduced as a third and more viable solution to this impasse between the two polar opposites between the ICC and impunity through blanket amnesties. It was hoped that the ICC would be convinced of that there were other possible venues for justice where Kony and his four commanders would be held accountable and sufficiently dealt with through the use of national prosecutions coupled with the neo-traditional Acholi justice system (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:99- 100; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Quaranto, 2007).

On the 29th of June 2007, the GoU and the LRA finally signed an agreement on item three concerning accountability and reconciliation, which deals with the relationship between the ICC arrest warrants, amnesty procedures and the Acholis neo-traditional justice system (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:108; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:168; Quaranto, 2007). This agreement on agenda item number three concerning accountability and reconciliation was based on an acknowledgement of the atrocities committed by both parties throughout 22 years of conflict and ‘commits the parties to prevent impunity and to promote redress in accordance with the constitution as well as international obligations’, but it has also recognised the need for adopting appropriate justice mechanisms, including customary processes of accountability (Beyond Juba Project quoted in Batanda, 2009:5). This agenda item stresses the need for implementing neo-traditional justice mechanisms like Mato Oput in an attempt to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Northern Uganda (Batanda, 2009:5). As such, the signing of item number three concerning accountability and reconciliation on the agenda for the Juba peace agreement explicitly deals with the relationship between formal and non-formal transitional justice mechanisms. Whereas the former is expressed through the establishment of a Special Division of the High Court (SDHC) and the latter through the neo-traditional justice mechanisms associated with the tribes living in Northern Uganda, as for instance the Acholis Mato Oput rituals (Batanda, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2008; Latigo, 2008:108; Mwaniki et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:166; Quaranto, 2007).

88 At the core of the more formal transitional justice mechanisms being referred to in this agreement, the SDHC is intended to prosecute the individuals who allegedly had been responsible for committing the most serious crimes of concern for the international community throughout the entire conflict (ICG, 2008:8-9; Ogora, 2009). The Chief Justice of the Ugandan High Court did, however, clarify that the creation of the SDHC just like other conventional forms of justice elsewhere, especially with regards the ICC, would only be able to prosecute a handful of the most senior commanders in the LRA. This would either be the very same five LRA top commanders indicted by the ICC or a few more individuals (ICG, 2008:8-9; Ogora, 2009:3-4). Ogora (2009:3-4) argues that by assuming how ten individual LRA leaders would face formal prosecution by the SDHC, with the LRA’s current strength estimated at about 4000 fighters, this meant that it was not likely that any more than one percent would be dealt with in this way. The prospect of prosecuting such as low number seemed highly unlikely to have any major impact concerning the reconciliation at the grassroots level, as the large majority of mid-level rebels together with the rank and file combatants would not be prosecuted through the SDHC. They would instead have to be sent back to their respective communities and dealt with through the non-formal system of restorative mechanisms associated with the neo-traditional justice by undergoing reconciliation processes before being fully reintegrated back into society (Ogora, 2009:4-5). This is a reflection of the situation in Rwanda six years after the genocide, where more than 120,000 individuals were still in prison awaiting trial, and at that current stage it was believed that it would take the formal court system more than 180 years to deal adequately with all of these individuals. Despite this, more resources were directed towards the ICTR than to the development of the Gacaca courts (Quinn quoted in Ogora, 2009:3; van Zyl, 2005).

It also explains why neo-traditional justice mechanisms practiced by the Acholi and other neighbouring ethnic communities being affected by the conflict also should be promoted with necessary modifications as a central part of the framework for the principles of accountability and reconciliation being mentioned in item three of the Juba agreement. These non-formal mechanisms refer to the traditional and customary mechanisms being practiced for decades among the local tribes living in Northern Uganda for conflict resolution and maintaining a stabile social order within their societies. Except from the Mato Oput being practiced among the Acholis, among several others it is worth mentioning Culo Kwor and Kayo Cuk by the

89 Acholis and Lango, Ailuc by the Iteso and Tonu ci Koka by the Madi9 (Ogora, 2009; Latigo, 2008:108; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:173). This is also a reflection of how, across the African continent, other similar neo-traditional justice mechanisms have been revived over the last few decades, like the Inkundla in South Africa, the Gacaca courts in Rwanda, Magamba in Mozambique, and Bashingantahe in Burundi10. Although they differ in their aim to achieve and way of being practiced, these traditional justice mechanisms are all being associated with the concept of Ubuntu, since most of them deal with restoring broken relations (Huyse 2008; Ogora, 2009).

This illustrates how retributive and restorative forms of transitional justice have different, yet equally important roles to play, whereas the former focus on bringing an end to the practice of impunity, the latter focus on restoring broken community relationships (Ogora, 2009:4). Many local NGOs and other actors in the local civil society in Northern Uganda supported the introduction and use of these unconventional neo-traditional justice mechanisms to be used as part of the transitional justice strategies to deal with the war crimes and crimes against humanity being committed after the conflict had ended. This was, however, not welcomed by human rights organisations like the AI and the HRW, who expressed their preference for the use of more direct punitive models associated with retributive justice. The result of this was arguably that the local ‘peace vs. justice’ debate from that stage went from being perceived as a dilemma between the ICC and impunity to become a confrontation between amnesties, the neo-traditional and the international forms of justice (Latigo, 2008:99-100; Ogora, 2005:1-3). After this major obstacle had been dealt with, the peace talks advanced further to the issue of DDR. For its part, the GoU demanded that the LRA laid down their weapons and subsequently moved all of its fighters to the assembly points. This meant that the LRA would have to respect the conditions in the cessation of hostilities, by moving all of their fighters to the assembly points. In their response to these demands, the LRA asked for protection by the

9 _{‘Ailuc’ refers to the traditional rituals performed by the Iteso to reconcile parties who formerly have been in}

conflict after full accountability; ‘Culo Kwor’, referring to the compensation to make up for homicides, and to any other form of reparations, again after full accountability, which is practiced by the Acholi and Lango, one of the neighbouring ethnic communities to the Acholi; ‘Kayo Cuk’ or the biting of charcoal, is a traditional ritual performed by the Lango, to reconcile parties formerly in conflict, after full accountability; ‘Tonu ci Koka’, the traditional rituals performed by the Madi to reconcile parties formerly in conflict, also after full accountability (Latigo, 2008:108; Oomen and Marchand, 2007:173).

10 _{For an excellent cross comparison between these traditional practices and their strenghts and weaknesses,}

please see International IDEA’s (2008) report ‘Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict:

90 UPDF once a final peace agreement had been reached, but also that their monthly allowances were raised. All of these demands were accepted by both sides. The GoU would also through this negotiated solution to the conflict have to start a serious and thorough analysis of how to address the issues associated with the North vs. South divide, as a central part of the Acholi grievances and the LRA’s insurgency, to avoid a repetition with a similar tragic conflicts unfolding in this part and elsewhere in Uganda in the future (ICG, 2008; Mwaniki et al, 2009;