The Sudanese influence

In the first round of peace negotiations led by Bigombe from November 1993 to February 1994, the LRA commanders clearly expressed their willingness to return to and be

77 reintegrated in Acholiland in return for receiving amnesty and forgiveness (Allen, 2006; Dunn, 2007). This could have meant that the LRA had realised its defeat, as its leaders only made demands concerned with avoiding prosecution and punishment before returning from the bush. It is, however, difficult to draw any conclusions about what would have been the final outcome if the negotiations had been successful and the LRA had accepted amnesty, as Museveni’s unrealistic demand of complete surrender within two weeks completely undermined the process (Bøås, 2004:290; Dunn, 2007:144).

Other facts nevertheless suggest that the LRA only pursued peace talks to buy precious time, as they were simultaneously communicating with Khartoum about arms supply (Quaranto, 2007:5). This is evidenced by the fact that around 1993 the LRA had, according to Gerard Prunier (2004:366-367), lost so many fighters that it had been reduced to around 300 rebels, but after the negotiations had failed it ‘was suddenly up to over 2,000 well-equipped troops by March 1994, and was in a position to raid the whole of Northern Uganda’. The reason for this connection is that Ugandan authorities in Kampala and its Sudanese counterpart in Khartoum have for many years been mutually hostile towards each other, which have resulted in their assistance to rebel groups in their respective territories in an attempt to destabilise each other (Bøås, 2004:289; Dunn, 2007:141-143; Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999:24-25; ICG, 2004:7 and 2006:14; Prunier, 2004; Van Acker, 2004). The result of this is that ‘in many ways Sudan and Uganda have been running an undeclared war on their common border since 1986, [where] Sudan has been supporting (…) the (...) LRA, which is still fighting the Museveni regime in northern Uganda. Meanwhile, Kampala has progressively given increased help and facilities to the (...) SPLA, which is fighting the Khartoum regime in the southern Sudan’ (Prunier, 2004:359).

It was, however, not until sometime after 1993 or 1994 that Khartoum was able to establish connections with the LRA, but as a direct consequence of this official support from Sudan to the rebels, a new and much more complicated regional dimension to the conflict was introduced, as the rebels’ operational and military capacities increased substantially because of the Sudanese providing them with financial and military support. The LRA could now retreat back into Southern Sudan, by using it as a safe haven, where they could regroup after military losses, turn their newly abducted children into child soldiers and get medical treatment for combat wounds, but most importantly receive a steady flow of arms and ammunition, which included antitank mines, at least until the end of 2002 (Doom and

78 Vlassenroot, 1999:24-25; Dunn, 2007:141-143; Mwaniki et al, 2009:7; Prunier, 2004:366- 367; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:4-5; Van Acker, 1999:337-338).

Before his death in a helicopter accident in 2005, the late SPLA chairman John Garang expressed that the removal of the LRA would have to be given priority, as an autonomous Southern Sudan experiencing peace and prosperity was depending on making its territory inhospitable for the LRA. That had not been the situation until then, as the LRA, after having established formal connections with Khartoum, who supplied them with a steady flow of weapons, also gave the rebels unlimited access to the border between Sudan and Uganda, where they could launch violent attacks in both countries. This made the LRA a force to be reckoned with in the wider region throughout the mid-1990s onwards and continued at least until 1999, when both countries signed an agreement to end their assistance to the LRA and the SPLA respectively. But despite this, the LRA still received support from parts of Khartoum, even if this was only a small fraction of what it received in the 1990s (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; Dunn, 2007:141-143; ICG, 2005b, 2006:8; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:2; Prunier, 2004; Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:11; Van Acker, 2004:352).

Nevertheless, in 2005 the central authorities in Khartoum and the SPLA signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that officially marked the end of the war between them and of all support to the LRA given by Khartoum, the establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) with autonomy from Khartoum, and a possible referendum over independence by 2011 (ICG, 2005b:4, 2006; Quaranto, 2007:6).

With Khartoum’s influence over Southern Sudan gradually being reduced, this weakened and finally ended the covert support Khartoum had continued to give to the LRA despite of the 1999 agreement, and made it possible for the SPLA under the new leadership of Salva Kiir, who took over in office after Garrang, to threaten the LRA with the use military force to remove it from its territory (Ruaudel and Timpson, 2005:11).

This was done by presenting the LRA with three different options: (1) agree to search for a peaceful solution to the conflict, or; (2) leave Southern Sudan once and for all, or; (3) be faced with a military solution, where the GoSS military forces would remove it by force and eventually defeat it (ICG, 2006:16; Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007:3). The LRA was now faced with a situation where it either could agree to find a peaceful solution to the conflict with the

79 GoSS as a mediator between it and the GoU, or face the use of force to remove and possibly annihilate it once and for all. This three layered ultimatum towards the LRA was, however, not unproblematic, as the SPLA at that stage had yet to be reorganised from a guerrilla force to become the armed forces of the GoSS and had because of this, a rather low morale and limited capacities to face the LRA (ICG, 2006; Quaranto, 2007:6).

However, the GoSS slowly gained military strength and as will be illustrated throughout the rest of this chapter, together with a number of other factors it forced the LRA to take a seat at the negotiation table at Juba (Mwaniki and Wepundi, 2007; Mwaniki et al, 2009:5).