Kennedy and the Israeli nuclear issue

The Dimona revelation provided an immediate trial for Kennedy’s nonproliferation agenda.

The intelligence community clearly questioned the peacefulness of Israel’s aims: CIA global estimate argued that Israel had “almost certainly” launched a nuclear weapon pro-gram and a JAEIC report concluded that Israel’s secrecy indicated that it aimed to use the Dimona site at least partly to produce weapon-grade material.¹⁷ The DOS took a less alarmed stance even with Kennedy: it told him that Israeli and French assurances regarding the plant seemed “satisfactory although several minor questions still require clarification”

and argued that the claim that secrecy around it resulted from a desire to protect contractors from boycotts was reasonable. It saw as the reasons for the US concern over the reactor that 1) the stance of both the legislative and the executive was in general to oppose prolif-eration and 2) prolifprolif-eration by Israel in particular could have serious effects, such as sta-tioning of Soviet nuclear weapons in Arab countries.¹⁸ Reid, who was leaving his position in Tel Aviv, indicated sympathy for Israel by telling Kennedy that Israeli statements about the reactor’s peacefulness could be accepted “at face value”, though he added that very few even among Israeli leaders knew the true goals of the nuclear program¹⁹. Towards the new president, who had the power to authorize aid to France’s nuclear weapon effort (by deter-mining that France had made significant progress towards nuclear weapons), Paris in turn now at least wanted to appear opposed to Israeli production of nuclear weapons and ex-pressed concern about this possibility to the USG²⁰.

Kennedy was showing special interest in the reactor. But despite his nonproliferation agenda, his ability to press Israel was in general somewhat restricted by the fact that his narrow election victory had depended on the votes of the Jewish electorate that he had won by expressing strong support for Israel during campaigning.²¹ To maintain Jewish support and so prevent problems with the Congress, Kennedy made the Jewish aide M. Feldman his special assistant for Israel and Middle East. Though Feldman did become Israel’s lobbyist in the USG, he was also a channel for the USG to make its views clear to the “Israel lobby”

and seems not to have greatly influenced the Kennedy (and Johnson) administration’s moves in the Israeli nuclear issue. And Kennedy ensured that also the views of those not tilted towards Israel would be fed into decision-making regarding the Middle East by hav-ing R. Komer, who favored efforts to improve relations with Cairo and represented prevail-ing DOS and CIA stances, as a NSCS member much involved in policies towards Israel.²²

17 D/2 NIE 1-61 “Estimate of the World Situation”, 17 Jan 61, FRUS 61-3:8; CIA “Post-Mortem…” (fn 16).

18 DOS/NEA to Rusk with memo to Kennedy “Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities” (san.), 30 Jan 61, USNA MWH B/4. See also Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 101-2.

19 D/6 Reid-Kennedy disc., 31 Jan 61, FRUS 61-3:17.

20 D/10 on US-UK talks, 13 Feb 61, ibid.

21 Rostow to Johnson, 20 Apr 67, with draft memo “1968 – American Jewry and Israel”, LBJL N/I VI M1;

Cohen, A. 1998 p. 100.

22 Feldman himself argued to Kennedy that he was maybe a bad choice for the position because of his pro-Israel bias. Kennedy replied that the bias was why he wanted to appoint Feldman. Komer and reportedly also Kennedy’s national security aide M. Bundy did not trust Feldman and sought to prevent the dissemination of

Domestic pro-Israel pressures implied problems regarding any moves to improve relations with Egypt. But for Kennedy, better relations were in US interest especially because this key Arab state was to be kept from ending up in the Soviet camp. Slow improvement in US-UAR relations reportedly took place during the first 1,5 years of his term. He nomi-nated pro-Arab J. Badeau as Ambassador to Egypt and indicated seeking of middle ground in the region through public statements and by launching direct correspondence with Nas-ser. Cairo seemed to share the wish of better relations and be prepared to orientate towards the West in return for economic aid.²³

But the Dimona issue caused problems to US-UAR relations and Cairo continued to warn the USG of possible consequences. Amb. M. Kamel again complained that Israel’s moves pushed the Arabs into Soviet arms despite their strong anti-communism and warned that if Israel produced nuclear bombs, the Arabs would have to get some, even if it meant joining the East bloc.²⁴

Also the new USG avoided publicly questioning Israel’s reassurances about its aims but, rather, supported them: in early February 1961, Kennedy saw an early US statement on

“the peaceful uses of the Israeli project” as maybe needed to prevent Cairo from pressing Moscow to help it get nuclear weapons²⁵. At the same time, behind the scenes the admini-stration saw itself as the only party that could maybe make Israel forgo nuclear weapons.

The intelligence community aimed to follow the matter and the DOS to press for an inspec-tion of the Dimona plant: regular visits were the only way to know what was going on there.²⁶ The USG also assured the Arabs that it was not giving Israel free hands in the nu-clear field, opposed proliferation also by Israel, and aimed to keep a close eye on Israel’s nuclear efforts.²⁷

The Israelis continued to make claims about peaceful aims to the USG. Harman said that if Cairo acquired a similar or even larger reactor than the one in Dimona, “to be dedicated to the same purposes intended for Israel’s, his Government would not be concerned”. The plant was to be used only for scientific experiments and preparing scientists for future large-scale civilian uses of nuclear energy.²⁸

sensitive information related to US-Arab policies to him, suspecting him to leak too much to the Israelis. See Feldman-Harman mtg and Komer to Feldman, 6-9 May 63, both with Komer’s comments to Bundy, JFKL N/I; Spiegel 1985 pp. 99-100; Hersh 1991 pp. 98-9 and Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 101, 375 fn 11 ref. to their inter-views with Feldman, Komer, Kaysen, and Bundy.

23 Rostow to Kennedy with Rostow-Kamel mtg, 6 Dec 61, JFKL PR; D/159 Rusk to Kennedy, 10 Jan 62, FRUS 61-3:17; Walt 1987 p. 94; Hersh 1991 pp. 107-8. On Kennedy’s Middle East and Israel policy in gen-eral, see, e.g., Spiegel 1985 Chapter 4; Ben-Zvi 1998 Chapter 4.

24 D/9 DOS to E/Cairo (C), 8 Feb 61, FRUS 61-3:17; NE-Kamel mtg, 17 May, USNA ND B/4.

25 D/7 FRUS 61-3:17 fn 2 ref. to USNA SOS staff mtgs Lot 66D147.

26 NEA “Israel’s Atomic…” (fn 18); Briefing book (Bb) for Ben-Gurion visit II A-3 Israel’s nuclear program, May 61, JFKL POF Israel B/119a security; Reeves 1994 pp. 32-3; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 101.

27 D/9 DOS to E/C, 8 Feb 61, FRUS 61-3:17; Rusk to Emb. Baghdad & Beirut, 3 March, DNSA NP00755.

28 D/12 Bundy-Harman mtg, 16 Feb 61, FRUS 61-3:17.

8.1.1 Views and expectations of the Kennedy administration

As nonproliferation was on Kennedy’s agenda, any proliferation challenge posed the prob-lem of how to protect this general goal: states’ proliferation choises were expected to de-pend on what others decided and on major powers’ reactions. Another question was whether the USG saw nuclear weapon ambitions of a specific state as very harmful as such.

Though officially, the USG came to oppose all proliferation, senior USG officials contin-ued to disagree on whether it was in US interest to actively pursue this policy in each case.

For war-avoidance and balance-of-power reasons, Israel’s case did cause particular con-cern to the administration as shown by, e.g., a fall 1961 NIE on Israel and summer 1961 JCS and March 1963 CIA papers on the impact of Israel acquiring a nuclear weapon capa-bility (the CIA defined this as testing or declaring; it was possible that Israel would forgo testing and use a foreign weapon design). The memos argued that US interests called for preventing war and easing tensions in the area and that Israel’s nuclear ambitions and Jor-dan water issues were the key potential sources of greater Arab-Israel tension. A nuclear weapon capability was expected to make Israel promote its interests more assertively, be tougher towards Arabs, and use the capability in a psychological battle against them. The capability was expected to much disturb Arabs, but they were probably unable to take co-ordinated action against Israel or develop nuclear weapons early. A preventive attack was possible if Nasser thought Israel was about to produce nuclear arms, but his expected loss in ensuing hostilities inhibited him. Biological or chemical weapon efforts by Arabs were possible and Cairo was likely to use the issue to strengthen Arab unity. US interests in the region and West-Arab relations were likely to suffer as Arabs would maybe blame also the US for Israel’s capability: the regional conflict would increasingly become one of the Ar-abs and the East against Israel and the West. Several Arab leaders thought that only the US could stop Israel from going nuclear. If it acquired a nuclear weapon capability, Israel was expected to portray itself towards the US as the only valuable ally in the area, press the US to accept its capability, and demand a part in international disarmament talks.

Though such a capability was no direct threat to the US or its allies, it was expected to clearly affect US policies towards the region and possibly complicate arms limitation talks. Moscow was thought to want to prevent Israel’s going nuclear because it opposed proliferation and wanted to avoid Chinese and UAR pressure for help in producing nuclear weapons. It was not likely to give Cairo such help (it did not want to give it to WP states, either) or set up nuclear bases in area (Arabs did not want it to and doing so was risky and of little military benefit for it). But Moscow could also benefit from an Israeli capability if Cairo in reaction sought its political and military support. Possible Soviet reactions in-cluded trying to get the US put pressure on Israel and France; maybe blaming the US; re-newed proposals for a NWFZ that would include Turkey; use of the issue to increase Western and non-aligned interest in its disarmament ideas; and either stronger efforts for a test ban and nuclear arms limitation or, on the contrary, discounting of such moves. Espe-cially neutral powers and small NATO states were expected to react to Israel’s pursuing of

nuclear arms by pressing for nonproliferation efforts. But if Israel demonstrated a weapon capability, it was possible that, e.g., Switzerland, Sweden, and maybe Japan would follow suit.²⁹ The DOS expected proliferation in the area to limit US intervention capability, have a destabilizing impact in the world, and thus push even larger states towards developing a nuclear capability. It was moreover seen in the USG that even unclarity about Israel’s aims, if it just tried to appear to have a nuclear weapon program and bluff the Arabs, was almost as bad as its having one: the issue with the reactor was “not only one of not pro-ducing weapons but also of convincing the Arabs that weapons were not being produced”, the latter being more challenging.³⁰

Thus the US feared Israel’s nuclear aims both to lead to much trouble in the Middle East and to contribute to a setting in motion of a proliferation chain reaction in the world, albeit the latter effect was expected especially if Israel went overtly nuclear. This explains the USG tactic for dealing with the issue: its primary goal was to keep other states from think-ing that Israel aimed to produce nuclear weapons. Its arguments also towards Israel con-cerned especially Arab reactions: a DOS official noted to an Israeli Embassy official that especially worrying was the effect in the region of “an apparent Israeli commitment to work toward nuclear weapons”; even if many Americans understood why Israel might want such weapons, pursuing them was not in its interest because it was possible that Ar-abs would then also get them and any nuclear attack would destroy the small Israel.³¹ Israel’s factual and perceived, existing and expected, security situation was important for the prospects of proliferation, but despite Arab hostility, the USG did not see Israel’s situation as very grave. In fall 1961, the DOS/NEA argued that for the time being, Israel would remain fairly secure, even though its neighbors were becoming stronger. Since 1948, the Arabs had refrained from large-scale aggression against Israel, and though many Arabs hoped Israel’s destruction, no signs existed of an early effort or ability to cause that.

Israeli forces were clearly superior to Arab forces and though the Arabs in sum had greater resources, Israel had other advantages: “mobilization capability, massive financial and ma-terial support from abroad, a modern industrial base, scientific know how, skilled man-power, and a reasonably satisfied population”. The chance of real joint military action by all Eastern Arabs was “too remote to discuss seriously”, and the UAR alone could not win against Israel.³² An early 1963 NIE similarly expected Israel to remain military stronger than the Arabs for several years to come and added that Arab action in nuclear and

29 D/95 JCS on effects of an Israeli nuclear capability (san.), Aug 61, FRUS 61-3:17; NIE 35-61 “The Out-look for Israel”, 5 Oct, LBJL I:I; D/179 CIA Board of National Estimates “Consequences of Israeli Acquisi-tion of Nuclear Capability”, 6 March 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

30 D/10 on US-UK talks, 13 Feb 61, FRUS 61-3:17; Bb for Ben-Gurion visit II A-3 Israel’s nuclear program, May 61, JFKL POF Israel B/119a security; NEA-Ball disc., 16 May 63, JFKL BT B/5 Israel; Komer to Ken-nedy, 31 May, with memo to arms limitation emissary, 29 May, JFKL SAC.

31 DOS/AE-Gazit mtg, 16 May 61, USNA IR 2.

32 D/143 Talbot to Rusk, 22 Nov 61, FRUS 61-3:17.

face-to-surface missile (SSM) fields had little prospect of becoming militarily significant any time soon.³³

The NEA saw that since Arabs admitted that large-scale aggression against Israel would lead to Western intervention, Israel was safe as long as the West had a capability and the will to promptly intervene in the area if needed. Other consequences of the regional mili-tary situation for US policy were that the US 1) had to support Israel enough economically and politically to prevent perceptions of political isolation and serious military threat, and thus a pre-emptive attack on Arabs; 2) needed to “assure ourselves and others” about Is-rael’s nuclear efforts to avoid desperate military moves by Arabs; and 3) was not to relax its arms supply restrictions as Israel had other sources for arms.³⁴ Because of the expected effects of Israel acquiring a nuclear weapon capability, the JCS moreover thought that the US was to do all it could to make Israel and France see it as undesirable. Also SOD R.

McNamara came to argue that if Israel tried to get nuclear weapons, the USG was to try to stop it.³⁵

8.1.2 The short-term solution: US visit to Dimona

Ben-Gurion had indicated that an early visit to Dimona could be possible, and Reid in-formed Kennedy that the US could secretly visit the site when it wanted and even public inspections, though harder to arrange, were possible. But despite constant DOS pressure, also in Kennedy’s name (but not in public), a visit was hard to achieve. The Israelis cited domestic political turbulence and the Passover as reasons for delay. But Ben-Gurion con-tinued to make promises about a visit and the DOS expected him to honor them. The Is-raelis told the USG also of plans to invite a journalist to Dimona.³⁶

In April 1961, Harman finally presented an invitation for a mid-May visit. To a US ques-tion whether visits by other states were planned, Harman noted that this invitaques-tion was a special case. Israel hoped the visit to be kept secret, but the wide-spread interest in the plant in Washington made the NEA doubt whether that was possible.³⁷

In return for the visit, Feldman and A. Feinberg, an influential Jewish fund-raiser for the Democrats (who according to Karpin organized the private funding for the Dimona

33 D/139 NIE 30-63 “The Arab-Israeli Problem” (san.), 23 Jan 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

34 D/143 (fn 32) FRUS 61-3:17.

35 D/95 (fn 29) FRUS 61-3:17; McNamara to Kennedy (san.), 16 June 62, JFKL 8Q.

36 NEA “Israel’s Atomic…” (fn 18); D/6 Reid-Kennedy disc., 31 Jan 61; D/7 Harman-Jones disc. also fn 3, 3 Feb, both FRUS 61-3:17; DOS/AE to NEA, 1 Feb, USNA IAEP; DOS to Bundy, 15 Feb, with T/605 DOS to E/TA on 13 Feb Rusk-Harman mtg, JFKL N/I; NEA-Kollek (Ben-Gurion’s office chef) mtg, 26 Feb, USNA ND B/5 Tel Aviv; USOS to Kennedy with “History of United States Interest in Israel’s Atomic Energy Ac-tivities” (san.), 30 March, JFKL N/I; and with Jones-Harman mtg, 28 March; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 103-4.

37 D/31 Jones-Harman mtg, 10 Apr 61, FRUS 61-3:17; Jones to Rusk on Rusk-Harman mtg, 11 Apr; NEA-Gazit mtg, 1 May, both USNA SAEM.

ity), persuaded Kennedy to agree to meet Ben-Gurion privately to discuss, e.g., security is-sues and the nuclear program. The meeting was set for 30 May.³⁸

Kennedy wanted a scientist from a neutral country to accompany the US visitors in order to make the findings more credible in the eyes of the world, especially the Arabs. The Israelis turned down such USG requests, saying that the US alone was invited because it had pub-licly supported Israeli statements about the reactor and deserved assurances. Since the DOS wanted the US visit to take place before Kennedy met Ben-Gurion, it came to prefer press-ing for a neutral visit only in that meetpress-ing.³⁹

In the meanwhile, the Israelis (and their American friends) made requests for a US security guarantee for or a defense pact with Israel and a clearer US or multilateral statement against aggression in the area. Arguing that they needed a deterrent, the Israelis moreover again showed interest in the Hawk system. Also Reid suggested Kennedy to consider giv-ing Israel stronger security assurances, or ballistic missiles, to promote stability in the area.

But when Rusk probed into the idea of even just a US reactivation of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, Kamel said that this would appear as interference on Israel’s behalf, not ease Arab fears of Israel.⁴⁰ Thus, as the new ASOS/NEA, P. Talbot, told Harman in May, the USG questioned the usefulness of both a guarantee and a statement. It saw its clear opposi-tion to aggression, its relaopposi-tionship with Israel, and Israel’s own military power as enough to deter the Arabs. Neither the Western Europeans nor the Soviets were expected to join the US in any statement; the Arabs were expected to see one as “an attempt to coerce them into making peace with Israel and as an abandonment of an impartial attitude on the part of the United States”. The USG also saw moves toward becoming Israel’s principal arms supplier as harmful to regional stability and a reason for Moscow to increase arms supply to the UAR. Israel was to acquire advanced and heavy arms from Europe; the US supported its military effort in other ways.⁴¹ Another DOS/NEA memo noted that the USG did not want to give security guarantees also to avoid entrapment in Israeli-provoked hostilities⁴².

In document Makreeta Lahti PhD dissertation University of Potsdam Department of Economics and Social Science Submitted 19 Dec 2007 Accepted 4 Jul 2008 (Page 161-176)

Kennedy and the Israeli nuclear issue – the first years