NATO as an increasingly institutionalized alliance

When the FRG joined NATO, the alliance assumed the task of controlling it, thus becom-ing, beyond an alliance coping with an external threat, a security management institution trying to keep security risks from emerging among its members⁶⁰. NATO (and the WEU) became responsible for reducing the chances of especially the FRG developing into a po-tential threat to its allies. Riecke and Tuschhoff point out that NATO assumed also an in-ternal nonproliferation function as the FRG forwent a national nuclear force in return for US maintenance of its extended nuclear deterrent⁶¹.

The new tasks contributed to the institutionalization of NATO that had started as the Soviet threat heightened after the start of the Korean War⁶². Various measures were introduced that promoted effective organization of NATO defense. These included an integrated mili-tary structure based on forces assigned to NATO and largely stationed in continental Europe and on multinational, integrated command; an integrated military planning system that implied sharing of much information among NATO states about national military, in-dustrial, and economic resources, capabilities, and execution of plans; centralized air sur-veillance and defence in Central Europe; various kinds of military and political consulta-tions and formal and informal working groups for information exchange and search of con-sensus on strategy.⁶³

But it is of course debatable what exactly constitutes a fundamental, unforeseen change of circumstances. A key criticism towards the rebus sic stantibus -principle is that it makes obligations less clear. Ibid. p. 624.

60 Haftendorn 1997 p. 17; Wallander & Keohane 1999 p. 42.

61 Riecke 1997 pp. 201, 204; Tuschhoff 1999 p. 153.

62 Wallander & Keohane 1999 pp. 41-2.

63 See Theiler 1997 pp. 112-22 on the measures in general, Tuschhoff 1999 pp. 146-7, 151-2 on the planning system.

At the same time, these measures institutionalized NATO states’ promises of cooperation by tying them together and creating transparency about actions and plans among them⁶⁴. Thus the measures were suited for reducing risks involved in security cooperation and reso-lution of various cooperation problems that created hindrances and disincentives to coop-eration: 1) the risk (and collaboration problem) existed that some ally, most importantly the US, would not react if the USSR attacked a NATO state; 2) the security dilemma implied the risk that the FRG would abandon the cooperative course, de-align, and even become a military threat to its (former) allies through military capabilities it was now allowed to build up; 3) chances to defect from the nonproliferation bargain led to another collabora-tion problem, i.e., that the US would fail to offer sufficient proteccollabora-tion to its allies or that these would acquire own nuclear forces⁶⁵; 4) a risk existed that some ally would unilater-ally take action that would entrap others in unwanted warfare; 5) a coordination problem existed as NATO states had to agree on one joint strategy against the Soviet threat; 6) in-centives to cut down own defense expenditures if free-riding on others’ (especially US) de-fense efforts was possible created a suasion problem; 7) an assurance problem existed about convincing allies about one’s determination to stand firm against the USSR and co-operate on this.

The integrated military structure made abandonment (1) in practice harder: joint command and plans and stationing of foreign NATO forces especially on the Eastern border of the FRG in, moreover, layers of different nationalities, helped ensure all allies’ participation in any warfare. Also especially the existence of US nuclear weapons in Europe was suited to increasing European confidence on the US deterrent. Also various formal and informal working groups and consultations where the allies exchanged information about capabili-ties and aims could help alleviate concern about abandonment.

The security dilemma (2) issue was already alleviated through the production restrictions on the FRG, monitored through the verification activities of the WEU. One way for the FRG to convince its allies about benign intentions was simply to conscientiously cooperate with them⁶⁶. Also NATO’s planning system alleviated the dilemma by creating transpar-ency about its industrial and military capabilities and by giving the others chances to guide its military efforts to a safe direction. Moreover, others’ troops stationed in the FRG and the subjection of the to-be-created Bundeswehr troops to NATO command were mecha-nisms to control the country.

64 As a basis for this discussion, I rely on 1) Theiler 1997 who considers mechanisms that promoted coopera-tion in NATO based on whether they reduced the risk of abandonment, entrapment, or free-riding, and 2) Tuschhoff 1999 who studies NATO structures for information exchange, monitoring, and enforcement from the perspective of how they affected alliance cohesion (pp. 151-9).

Wallander & Keohane 1999 note also that as maintenance of US (and British) troops in Europe was a central part of the 1954 package on German rearmament, NATO created structures to make these sustainable in face of evolving domestic pressures, and that faced with the task of controlling the FRG, it increasingly devel-oped also measures to strengthen democracy in member states (p. 42).

65 Riecke 1997 points out this problem (p. 204).

66 See Keohane et al 1999 p. 331.

The same measures that helped to reduce the risk of abandonment by the US and allowed verification of Bonn’s non-nuclear pledge helped also to solve the nonproliferation collabo-ration problem (3) by preventing defection by either side⁶⁷. Some measures to reduce risks of entrapment (4) were in turn already written down in the NAT, including the restricted geographic coverage of the alliance commitment, the non-automatic procedure for action in case of an attack, a commitment to peaceful conflict resolution according to the UN Charta, and stressing of the defensive nature of NATO. Moreover, also this risk was alleviated through consultations and information exchange that gave indications about allies’ long-term aims and a chance to try to guide them to a safe direction. By enabling early detection of defection, the planning system even constrained member states’ actions. The subjection of Bundeswehr troops to NATO command and planning and allies’ troops in the FRG made it hard for Bonn to secretly plan or realize also such military adventures that could entrap its allies into warfare on its side.

The planning system and consultations in NATO also provided fora for searching agree-ment on strategy, harmonizing assessagree-ments of the threat situation, and thus solving the co-ordination problem (5). The hegemony of the US in NATO further facilitated agreement as the US was in a position to more or less subtly press its preferred strategy on its allies.

The suasion problem (6) was alleviated through mechanisms that made free-riding both harder and less lucrative. Joint planning and continuous sharing of information about capa-bilities and execution of agreed-upon plans helped ensure all allies’ fair contribution to de-fense efforts. A principle of consensual decision-making in NATO implied that states that felt abused could to turn down requirements on them. An unwritten rule that important po-litical and military positions and influence were distributed in relation to financial contribu-tions provided incentives for contribucontribu-tions. Moreover, since NATO states cooperated also on non-military fields, they had incentives to contribute fairly to the defense effort if that promoted beneficial cooperation in other areas. NATO as such was in turn a solution to the assurance problem (7).

In case of security institutions, possibilities to promote cooperation by sanctioning defec-tion afterwards tend to be limited (if allies do not help an attacked state, this can lose its po-litical independence). Thus also in NATO, cooperation was promoted with institutional measures that made defection harder and easily recognizable.

7.2.2 Tactical nuclear weapons and the credibility of the extended US deterrent The key threat scenario for the West in Europe was a conventional Soviet attack, though with time, an all-out attack started seeming unlikely and local attacks with limited but po-litically important goals became the primary fear. Especially during the early Cold War, but also still in the 1960s, NATO states saw their conventional strength as insufficient to

67 On solutions to this problem, see also Riecke 1997 p. 205.

deter or allow successful defense against a Soviet attack, and the backbone of NATO strategy was a threat of nuclear retaliation by the US. But especially in anticipation of achievement by the USSR of a secure second-strike capability against the US, many ques-tioned the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrent. Ensuring its credibility thus be-came a key issue for the West, whereas the doubts and the risk of local attacks made also the creation of strong defense forces in Europe important.⁶⁸

NATO’s strategy was first based on strategic US nuclear forces aimed at goals valuable for the USSR and conventional defense. But conventional defense required large forces, and implied high costs, especially because of the high need for manpower, which was ex-pensive as such and due to its opportunity costs (men in armed forces were absent from the labor force). In part because of economic concerns and as a part of Eisenhower’s “New Look”, a change of strategy appeared around 1953: the US started putting emphasis on

“tactical”, relatively small-range and/or -size nuclear weapons, which were being devel-oped for use at war theaters⁶⁹. These were expected to increase the military power of battle forces and thus reduce manpower needs. Strategic nuclear forces retained their role as a deterrent; in early 1954, Dulles introduced the term massive retaliation for the US strategy that aimed to deter large-scale Soviet aggression with a threat of all-out nuclear war. As a result of differences in national capabilities, the strategy implied a division of work and thus certain functional differentiation in NATO: The Europeans were to be primarily re-sponsible for ground defense forces in Europe, the US to provide reserve forces and stra-tegic retaliation – its troops in Europe were above all to symbolize its commitment.⁷⁰

The strategy implied stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. As Theiler points out, the measure was from US allies’ perspective also suited for reducing the risk of aban-donment by the US, whereas it at the same time ensured that also they (not just the US) would be targets of any nuclear first strike by Moscow⁷¹.

But the 1946 AEA largely prevented allies’ involvement in such stationing arrangements.

Eisenhower wanted a radical change to the Act so that nuclear weapons would “be treated like other weapons⁷²”. In 1954, he asked the Congress to amend the Act both to enable the Atoms for Peace -program and to provide authority “to exchange with nations participat-ing in defensive arrangements with the United States such tactical information as is

68 On NATO’s defense dilemmas and the development of its strategy, see Osgood 1962; Freedman 1989.

69 Freedman 1989 criticizes the terms “strategic” and “tactical” nuclear weapons: they do no justice to the concepts of strategy, “the overall relationship between military means and the ends of policy”, and tactics,

“the specific application of military means for direct military ends”. All war is strategic and all weapons are tactical (pp. 117-8). Still, I use the widespread terms for the sake of convenience.

70 See McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 16; Freedman 1989 pp. 77-81, 90; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 151-2, 158-65, 187. The strategy of massive retaliation applied only to Soviet aggression that indicated the coming of gen-eral war – not against any war as often mistakenly argued (see Freedman 1989 pp. 83, 86) – i.e., to situa-tions where vital US interests were at stake and nuclear deterrence is expected to work. In a Nov 1954 speech, Dulles also stressed that local war did not automatically lead to general war but potential attackers had to be made see aggression as not worthwhile (World Peace Foundation 1954 p. 18).

71 Theiler 1997 p. 113.

72 Cutler to NSC Executive Secretary (NSCES), 21 Oct 53, DNSA NP00130.

tial to the development of defense plans and to the training of personnel for atomic war-fare”, with the goal of improving US “atomic effectiveness”⁷³. Though it allowed the pro-vision of nuclear technologies and materials in the Atoms for Peace -program, the Con-gress did not want to relax the Act radically regarding nuclear weapons. But owing to per-ceptions of a growing Soviet nuclear capability, it authorized limited sharing of weapon data (on, e.g., their external characteristics) to allies who significantly contributed to com-mon security in order to enable joint planning and training activities.⁷⁴

Turning the new strategy into operational capabilities happened slowly and only US and British forces were receiving the training and the tactical nuclear weapons it called for.

The US started preparing deployment of such weapons to its forces in the FRG in 1953, and in 1955, also Matador missiles of a range of 1100 km (enough to reach, e.g., Minsk) became operational.⁷⁵ But deployments to German forces had to wait.

Being in the front line of Western defense, a likely battle-field in case of any attack from the East, and target of special Soviet hostility, the FRG had the most precarious position among NATO states. Moreover, the Western position in West Berlin was vulnerable. Un-derstandably, the credibility of the NATO deterrent was a great concern to West Germans.

NATO’s June 1955 Carte Blanche exercise that simulated nuclear warfare in turn caused fears of entrapment and doubts about whether the NATO strategy could protect German interests among them: its much publicized conclusion was that any nuclear war would lead to wide destruction of Germany. A year later, press reports that JCS Chairman A. Radford had suggested greater emphasis on strategic US forces, significant cuts in conventional US forces abroad, and replacing them with mobile reserve forces stationed in the US caused much concern in the FRG. This “Radford Plan” seemed to make a division of work be-tween nuclear and non-nuclear allies clearer, which West German leaders tended to see as discrimination, and in practice to weaken ties between European defense and US forces and so remove obstacles to abandonment by the US. Radford and the USG denied any such move was actually planned, but the idea of troop withdrawals was popular among the US electorate (which explains that it was discussed in a congressional election year) and the USG was not opposed to the idea as such.⁷⁶

73 Eisenhower to the Congress on amending the Act, 17 Feb 54, PPE 38.

74 US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 p. 76 fn 149; Loper (assistant to SOD on atomic energy) on nuclear shar-ing to NSC Plannshar-ing Board (san.), 26 Apr 60, DDRS; Kohler 1972 p. 51.

75 At Adenauer’s request, the USG started preparing the deployments only after German elections in Sep 1953. The first Matador missiles came to the FRG in March 1954 and became operational in 1955. See DOD report “History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons Appendix B) Deployments by Country 1951-77”, Feb 78, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/04-01.htm (19 Aug 07); Fischer 1994 pp.

121-4; Norris et al 1999; NSA 2006; Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website http://www.fas.org/

nuke/guide/usa/theater/matador.htm (19 Aug 07).

76 See “Radford Seeking 800,000-man cut”, NYT, 13 July 56, and, on the crises and West German reactions, Richardson 1966 pp. 40-2; Morgan 1974 pp. 634; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 34-59; Haftendorn 1986 p.

160; Cioc 1988 pp. 29-36; Fischer 1994 pp. 193-7. On Adenauer’s worries about the “Radford plan” and US reassurances, see also Adenauer-DepUSOS mtg, 4 Oct 56, DNSA BC00023; Adenauer 1967 pp. 197-214.

In 1955, FRG-US relations cooled and Adenauer started pursuing more independent de-fense policies. He also expressed doubts about the reliability of the US regarding, e.g., its willingness to keep forces in Europe and respond promptly to any Soviet attack and the risk of the USG dealing with Moscow behind Bonn’s back. Trachtenberg suggests that with such comments and talks about a rebus sic stantibus -clause, Adenauer sought a justi-fication for a national nuclear force.⁷⁷

From early on, Adenauer officially welcomed the stationing in the FRG of tactical nuclear weapons, but Bonn first generally stuck to stressing earlier NATO targets for conventional build-up. This was a way for Bonn to try to strengthen its position in NATO: unlike on nuclear weapons, the German role in NATO strategy was in this respect significant. Anauer first gave an impression of ignorance about nuclear weapons and strategy; it is de-bated whether he really was that. Especially until the FRG formally joined NATO, Bonn anyway got very little information about US nuclear forces. But in fall 1956, as the US was after all making no troop withdrawals and emphasis on conventional forces threatened to reduce Bonn’s influence in NATO, Adenauer started to accept the centrality of nuclear weapons for NATO and the New Look -strategy for the Bundeswehr. But Bonn continued to strongly oppose any reductions in US and British troops in Europe.⁷⁸

After the Radford crisis, Bonn indeed started to demand most modern (i.e., tactical nu-clear) weapons also for the Bundeswehr; Western Europeans saw these weapons as a way to link their defense to US nuclear forces. But no clarity emerged on how tactical nuclear weapons could actually be used in warfare as they would have caused large collateral damage. Adenauer argued that if such weapons became feasible, they needed to be made available to all NATO troops: the FRG had to be an equal partner and have access to same weapons as its allies. Otherwise its troops would be the weakest link in Western defense, most likely to be attacked, and cannon fodder for the enemy. Bonn stressed further that these weapons were simply in line with technological development, needed for making West German forces effective under NATO strategy, and a way to reduce manpower needs. It saw the deployments also as a way to gain access to US nuclear decision-making and promote equality with the UK and France. The loudest demands for the weapons were made by CSU politician F. Strauss, who was Minister of Atomic Affairs in 1955-6 and Defense Minister since fall 1956 and is often said to have had national nuclear weapon ambitions. Soon after becoming Defense Minister, he scaled down the Bundeswehr man-power target and in late 1956, he and four NATO colleagues demanded at the NAC tacti-cal nuclear weapons for European NATO forces. This demand he came to often repeat. To domestic audiences, Adenauer argued that if NATO strategy required a West German role

77 Adenauer-DepUSOS mtg (fn 76); Schwarz, H.-P. 1991 pp. 178, 205-6, 218, 299, 306, 385; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 231-4.

78 DOS Intelligence report 7533 “West German Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons”, 2 July 57, USNA AG weapons; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 47; Schwartz 1983 pp. 42-4; Schwarz, H.-P. 1989 pp. 569, 573-4;

Boutwell 1990 pp. 18-20; Fischer 1994 pp. 117, 121, 287.

on nuclear weapons and missiles, rejecting that would mean cutting oneself out of NATO, and that if a key NATO state did not own as strong weapons as those that threatened it, it would become meaningless⁷⁹ – indicating desire to get nuclear weapons under West Ger-man control.

Over time, many NATO states came to host US nuclear weapons, but others questioned especially Bonn’s intentions. Despite control mechanisms provided by the WEU and NATO, the European public remained suspicious of the Germans, especially when faced with West Germany’s strong post-war recovery. Broad public opposition emerged both in the East and the West (in the UK in particular) to stationing of nuclear weapons in the FRG, especially with Bundeswehr troops. But Bonn’s demands did not contradict NATO strategy and were moreover centred on delivery systems, though it often made no clear dis-tinction between these and nuclear warheads in its statements.⁸⁰

Over time, many NATO states came to host US nuclear weapons, but others questioned especially Bonn’s intentions. Despite control mechanisms provided by the WEU and NATO, the European public remained suspicious of the Germans, especially when faced with West Germany’s strong post-war recovery. Broad public opposition emerged both in the East and the West (in the UK in particular) to stationing of nuclear weapons in the FRG, especially with Bundeswehr troops. But Bonn’s demands did not contradict NATO strategy and were moreover centred on delivery systems, though it often made no clear dis-tinction between these and nuclear warheads in its statements.⁸⁰