Key Points in Summary

What Chapter 4 has shown is that control/denial of visibility is useful in several regards. Part of the rationale for having such a principle, as established by 450 _{Indian Navy, Freedom to use the Seas, p. 72.}

Chapters 2 and 3, was because existing principles of maritime strategy only accounted for visibility to certain extents. Furthermore, most of the traditional principles (with the exception of fleet-in-being) were first and foremost concerned with physical/material impacts.

Sea, and later battlespace control arguably only really accounted for the information aspect of the visibility triad – and even then this was not their primary focus. Controlling maritime areas, in fact, remains their primary focus. Even battlespace control, which in contemporary times takes the information domain into account to a greater extent, merely focuses on a very particular aspect of the visibility triad - the information element. Little is said about how this links with the perception- interpretation sides of the triad.

Power projection and forward positioning, whilst sometimes used in efforts to control visibility, are broad principles that are also primarily concerned with the physical/material. In power projection’s case, this encompassed the use of navies to deliver physical effects; in the case of forward positioning, it encompassed the physical positioning of naval forces in distant areas in order to facilitate further sea control and/or power projection. Both of these approaches could be used as a means of influencing visibility, but visibility is never always their primary rationale. Having a principle of control/denial of visibility could thus fill something of a gap, since its primary focus is upon the non-physical and the cognitive.

Fleet-in-being was the only principle where, arguably, visibility was a primary focus – however, even then, the principle was limited by how it was defined. Fleet-in- being concerns itself with engendering a perception of threat, for purposes of deterrence. This, of course, is just one narrow form that visibility control can take in practice.

Chapter 4 has built upon these arguments by looking at a new principle of control/denial of visibility and its relationship with the traditional principles, and by asking to whom this new principle would be useful. First and foremost, it defined the nature and scope of the new principle, which enabled an assessment of the principle's usefulness.

In ascertaining the relationship between control/denial of visibility and the traditional principles, it was necessary to examine two points. Firstly, it was necessary to be reminded of the overlapping nature of the principles. This reiterates the reciprocal nature of the principles, and is important to bear in mind when attempting

to represent the relationship between them. Secondly, it was necessary to consider how previous scholars undertook a process of ‘ordering’ the principles of maritime strategy into a form of sequential hierarchy (whilst, at the same time, being careful not to conflate ‘principles’ with ‘missions’). Doing so provided an understanding of how the relationship between the principles is traditionally understood, and acted as a useful point of reference from which to fit control/denial of visibility into the hierarchy.

With an idea of what control/denial of visibility is and where it sits in relation to the traditional principles, the question of its usefulness was then tackled further – this time from the angle of audiences. This discussion considered three audiences (the academic, the policymaker/naval strategist and the operational naval officer) to whom the principle would be useful, and explained in what way it was of use to these audiences.

For an academic audience, control/denial of visibility is useful as a conceptual tool, given that it can be a broad category for all those naval activities which, in seeking cognitive goals, do not fall cleanly under the umbrella of any other maritime strategic principle.

For policymakers and naval officers involved in the formulation of strategy, it is also useful as a means of categorising a variety of options available to them (especially options where the technical and cognitive sides of visibility are seen in unison); the control of visibility in particular can then help in terms of providing strategic flexibility. The Horn of Africa case illustrated that the unity of the technical and the cognitive could provide greater flexibility in the pursuit of other maritime strategic principles (in this particular case, sea control and forward positioning).

For naval officers at the operational level, the usefulness of control/denial of visibility centres around the ability to link operational realities/experiences with higher strategic objectives. By linking the technical (operational concerns such as information dominance) with cognitive strategic outcomes (such as naval diplomatic outcomes), operational officers have a tool with which to understand that visibility is more than just a technological imperative/enabler born out of a contemporary context marked by advances in information/communication technologies. Instead, the principle is intended to help them understand that visibility can have a strategic impact.