Power Projection

The fifth principle of maritime strategy that previous writers have discussed is the notion of power projection190_{. This is a concept which, in a similar manner to what}

has been discussed so far, closely links with other principles yet is distinct enough to be treated as a principle in its own right. This is not to say that its definition has not been subject to debate, however. By itself, the term power projection is quite vague. In a manner of speaking, many naval missions could be termed as operations in which military power is 'projected' towards an enemy or objective. One might describe 188 _{Wertheim, E., The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 16th edn (Annapolis, MD:} Naval Institute Press, 2013), p. 109.

189 _{Corbett, J. S., Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 214-5.}

190 _{Alternately referred to as force projection, though for this thesis we will use the term power rather} than force, since force can imply war and/or means of violent coercion. Power, on the other hand, is more fluid in terms of meaning and can refer to any number of capabilities.

sending warships out onto the high seas to protect merchant vessels and sea lanes as a form of power projection. By this particular example’s logic, power projection becomes indistinct from other principles (in this instance, sea control) and thus conceptually meaningless. However, power projection can be a meaningful term if used in a particular sense.

To get a sense of what exactly the term power projection has been used to describe, one ought to peruse maritime strategic literature, where a clearer line of thought can be discerned. Earlier writers such as Corbett discussed the notion of expeditionary warfare and the role navies played in this. Namely, the function of maritime forces was to enable (and support) attacks on distant enemy territories191_.

Bacon and McMurtrie refer to 'amphibious warfare'192_{; something which more recent}

writers, such as Hammond, continue to imply is of vital importance to the essence of the traditional concept of power projection193_{. Gorshkov discussed a similar concept:}

operations of 'fleet against shore', which involved navies assisting in missions directed against enemy territories through the landing of troops or the targeting of land objectives with various armaments194_.

This is power projection reduced to its most basic, traditional definition: some form of direct physical action taken against a territory. In this respect, the projection of forces across the sea and into distant lands could be interpreted as a wartime principle of maritime strategy. At the same time, it is also useful to note here that the ability to land forces on distant territories does depend on a degree of sea control - amphibious operations (one form of power projection) are, according to Bacon and McMurtrie, an advantage "conferred by the command of the sea"195_{. This does indicate}

that the two concepts are closely linked, but we should not make the mistake of regarding them as indistinct from each other. Power projection is distinct from sea control in that it directly influences matters ashore, whereas sea control tends to influence affairs on land in a less direct manner. Furthermore, sea control by itself does not win wars (with the exception of wars fought by blockade, where economic strangulation might force a decision); power projection is required if victory is to be attained. One thus could be said to flow from the other. At the same time, one can also 191 _{Ibid., p. 285.}

192 _{Bacon, R. and McMurtrie, F. E., Modern Naval Strategy, p. 119.}

193 _{Hammond, J. W., 'A Fleet out of Balance', Proceedings Magazine of the US Naval Institute Vol.} 139/2/1,320, (February 2013), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-02/fleet-out-balance. 194 _{Gorshkov, S. G., The Sea Power of the State, p. 213 and p. 219.}

draw a connection between power projection and forward positioning, the latter often being desirable if the former is to work effectively196_.

Indeed, one of the biggest examples of power projection in history illustrates these points. D-Day in 1944 depended on a degree of sea control in two theatres (the Atlantic and the English Channel) in order for vital troops and materiel to be moved from the US to forward operating bases in Britain and in turn to the battlefields on the Normandy beaches. The U-Boats presented a threat to the ability of the Allies to achieve this, making it necessary for American and British naval commanders to find ways to mitigate the dangers of German submarines197_.

As mentioned previously, an examination of certain writings might lead one to assume that power projection is very much a wartime military role, and that it refers specifically to the projection of hard power (coercive means) against rival shores to achieve strategic ends. Yet, as with many maritime strategic principles, this too can be subject to debate. Balanced against hard power is Nye’s concept of soft power – the power to attract and co-opt actors and exert influence through non-coercive means198_.

The question, of course, is whether naval power projection can encompass soft as well as hard power approaches, in peace as well as wartime. The conceptual ground here is shakier, as one particular naval 'soft' power activity, the goodwill port visit, is potentially problematic. The outstanding problem is the risk of a conceptual blurring with forward positioning.

If power projection simply involves any form of naval activity directed onto another actor's shore, then certain writings from the Cold War period raise the possibility (not necessarily intentionally) that power projection can be 'soft' as well as 'hard'. Booth, for example, refers to examples such as Soviet naval visits to Egyptian ports, intended (among other goals) to build influence with Egypt after the June War of 1967199_{. Whilst Booth does not use the term 'power projection' in reference to these}

examples, from one angle it can be seen as a type of soft power projection since it 196 _{The necessity of forward positions can depend on the situation in question. Power projection} missions have been undertaken before without use of forward bases - consider the Allied Western Task Force during the Operation Torch amphibious landings in 1942 as an example. Here, a US amphibious force was carried all the way across the Atlantic from the US to Morocco. Despite both the lack of a forward base and some tactical errors upon reaching enemy shores, the Task Force did nevertheless manage to achieve success. See Gordon, J., 'Joint Power Projection: Operation Torch', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994), 60-9, p. 64.

197 _{Parker, R. A. C., The Second World War: A Short History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),} p. 96; Purdue, A. W., The Second World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 135.

198 _{Nye, J. S., ‘The Decline of America’s Soft Power’, Foreign Affairs, last modified May/June 2004,} http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-americas-soft-power. 199 _{Booth, K., Navies and Foreign Policy, pp. 27-8.}

involves the use of naval forces to affect events ashore. Unlike wartime instances, however, this form of power projection is not coercive; it is cooperative. Turner's writings also hint at the use of soft power projection in 1974, though not explicitly; when discussing the idea of 'naval presence', part of his definition encompassed the use of naval assets to 'encourage' actions on the part of one state that are in the interest of the naval force's own respective state200_{. Again, specific terms such as 'soft power}

projection' are not used (where he uses the term power projection, Turner uses it in reference to hard, coercive power), but certain cooperative actions can certainly be regarded as a form of power projection if they involve naval assets directing power and influence ashore - via humanitarian assistance, goodwill port visits or joint amphibious exercises.

If it is correct that power projection can include instances of naval activity where actions directed ashore are cooperative rather than coercive, then plenty of practical instances of soft, cooperative power projection can be seemingly identified when one examines the traditional and Cold War periods of maritime strategy. Taking the UK Royal Navy as an example, goodwill port visits were made by British vessels in 1947 and 1957 (to the Soviet Union, the US, India and Pakistan); British vessels assisted with the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Netherlands in 1953, Libya in 1959, Kenya in 1961 and Borneo in 1963; and finally, they conducted instances of friendly combined amphibious exercises with the US in Borneo, 1961201_.

Yet balanced against the viability of a notion of 'soft' power projection, however, is the blurring with the principle of forward positioning. For example, the act of a goodwill port visit designed to reassure an ally or partner could be seen as either a form of power projection or forward positioning. The question is whether the act of putting into an actor's port as part of a diplomatic effort constitutes a form of action (of a cooperative nature) being taken on a foreign shore. Yet if this is undertaken at a great distance from one's homeland, then one could also be said to be forward positioned. From the late Cold War, as previously mentioned in Subsection 2.2.2, writers were beginning to show early signs of appreciating the link between forward positioning and diplomacy, but this risks a massive conceptual overlap with the notion of 'soft' power projection, which is also linked to naval diplomatic functions. A further question this raises is whether power projection should therefore 200 _{Turner, S., 'Missions of the US Navy', p. 14.}

have a 'soft' dimension at all, or whether it is better to stick to its traditional definition oriented around 'hard' power for the sake of conceptual clarity.

Indeed, this author prefers to see power projection defined in material terms (rather than through the 'hard' and 'soft' distinction) to avoid the risk of unnecessary overlap with forward positioning and its links to naval diplomacy. By this definition, certain activities that one might class under 'soft' power projection, such as humanitarian assistance, are valid forms of power projection as they seek a material impact ashore. Other forms of power projection, such as goodwill port visits and combined amphibious exercises, should be considered under the umbrella of forward positioning as their impact is often more diplomatic than material. However, this does still leave some outstanding points: 1) humanitarian assistance can still have non- material, diplomatic implications; and 2) the principle of forward positioning does have its own limitations, which will be covered in Chapter 3.

To summarise, then, power projection as a maritime strategic principle refers to the use of naval forces to directly influence and engage with circumstances ashore through coercive means. This can include landing ground troops or targeting inland objectives with long-range armaments during war or conflict scenarios. This does not make power projection a strictly wartime principle, though; military operations other than war might also involve power projection ashore, such as humanitarian assistance. The important point to note is that power projection specifically seeks a material impact on the shores of another actor's territory. This material impact can be cooperative or coercive. Power projection is being defined in this way to avoid an overlap with forward positioning - an overlap which, if not addressed, can lead to confusion over the distinction between the two principles.

Power projection is distinct from sea control in two ways. Firstly, sea control takes place in the maritime domain itself, and though capable of affecting affairs on land, it does so in a more indirect way. This is in contrast to power projection, where operations take place in those locations where the land and maritime theatres converge. Secondly, power projection tends to follow from a degree of sea control; the ability to access the wider maritime theatre enables the projection of power to foreign shores. In that respect, the relationship between the two principles is somewhat hierarchical.