Knowledge-That Norm of Action

If Intellectualism about knowledge-how is correct then we might expect that the properties of knowledge-that — including its normative properties — would carry across to knowledge-how. This means that the Intellectualist who is committed to a knowledge- that norm on action might think that they can explain the epistemic norms concerning knowledge-how by appealing to the knowledge that norm of action. In this section, I will show that the combination of Intellectualism knowledge-that norm of action does not entail the knowledge-how norm.

McGlynn points out that there are two versions of the knowledge norm of action, depending on whether one is required to know only the propositions which one treats as reasons, or all of the premises of practical reasoning (McGlynn, 2015, p. 132). This distinction gives us the knowledge norm on treating as a reason for action (KNRA), and the knowledge norm on premises of practical reasoning (KNPR):

KNRA: One must: treat p as a reason for action, only if one knows that p.193

KNPR: One must: employ p as a premise in practical reasoning, only if one knows that p.194

The importance of this distinction becomes clear when we notice that practical reasoning includes not just reasons which favour performing the action in the conclusion, but also means-ends propositions, as well as propositions which modify reasons without themselves being reasons, such as enablers, intensifiers and attenuators (Dancy, 2004, Chapter 3). KNRA does not require knowledge of means-ends premises, enablers, intensifiers, and attenuators, whereas KNPR does.

The question is whether we can derive some version of KNI from either KNRA or KNPR. There are two ways to connect KNI to these norms: i) by appealing to the fact that means-ends premises figure as premises in practical reasoning and ii) by appealing to the idea that knowledge-how is a enabler. It’s worth noting that because both connections rely on premises of practical reasoning that are not reasons, they only go through under

KNPR. Let’s consider the two connections in turn.

If Intellectualism about knowledge-how is true, then knowledge-how is knowledge of a certain kind of proposition: plausibly a means-end proposition, or a proposition about a way of performing some act. One way to derive a requirement for knowledge-how from a propositional knowledge norm is if the relevant kind of proposition figures as a premise in practical reasoning. Consider the following piece of practical reasoning:

P1: I need to be in Hoxton for a meeting P2: I am in Bloomsbury

P3: To get to Hoxton, from Bloomsbury, one needs to take the number 35 bus C: I’ll take the number 35 bus

193 _{(Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008)}

If KNPR is correct, then in order to be epistemically appropriate, this piece of reasoning requires that I know that taking the number 35 is a way to get from Hoxton to

Bloomsbury. And, if Intellectualism is true then knowing the proposition expressed by P3 is sufficient for knowing how to get to Hoxtonfrom Bloomsbury.195 _{Putting the two claims}

together means that this piece of practical reasoning is appropriate only if I know how to get from Hoxton to Bloomsbury. Generalising, we can say that whenever there is a means-ends premise in practical reasoning, KNPR predicts that this means-ends premise must be

known for the reasoning to be epistemically appropriate, and that assuming Intellectualism, we can identify this means-end knowledge with knowledge of how to achieve the end.

Although KNPR predicts that practical reasoning requires some knowledge-how, it does not mean that KNPR entail KNI. For one thing, in order to get a general know-how requirement on all pieces of practical reasoning, we would need an argument that all pieces of practical reasoning involve a means-end premise. This is a substantial commitment in the theory of practical reasoning. A more serious problem is that the requirement to know means-ends premises of practical reasoning yields a requirement for different knowledge- how to KNI. Applied to the piece of practical reasoning above, KNI claims that in order to pursue this piece of practical reasoning, I better know how to take the number 35 bus. By contrast, KNPR predicts that I better know how to get from Bloomsbury to Hoxton. One way to put the point is to say that KNI requires knowledge-how relating to how to perform the conclusion of practical reasoning, whereas the requirement to know means ends premises gets us to a requirement for knowledge-how concerning the premises of practical

reasoning.

The second way to get a knowledge-how requirement out of KNPR is to appeal to the idea that knowledge-how plays an enabling role in practical reasoning. The idea of an enabler picks out conditions which do not themselves speak in favour of a certain action (meaning that they are not reasons), but without which other considerations could not

speak in favour of that action (Dancy, 2004, pp. 38–43). To get a grip on enablers,

consider promising. Marcella has promised to make Mohammed dinner. The fact of having promised is a reason for Marcella to make Mohammed dinner. By contrast, the fact that her promise was not coerced is not a reason for her to make Mohammed dinner. It does

not speak in favour of making dinner. Rather, the fact that the promise was unconcerned

enables the fact of having promised to function as a reason for Marcella. One might think that knowledge how to V plays a similar role, enabling reasons to count in favour of V-ing without itself actually favouring V-ing.

There are two ways to appeal to enablers to get the claim that fully appropriate reasoning requires knowledge-how: i) one might think that knowledge how to V is an enabler for reasons to count in favour of V-ing, or ii) one might think that the content of knowledge how to V is an enabler for reasons to count in favour of V-ing. In both cases, there are plausible routes from the claims about enablers to the knowledge-how norm of intending, but the underlying claims about enablers are implausible.

Let’s start with option i). If know-how is an enabler, then someone who does not know how to V cannot have any reasons to V. This claim does not by itself establish a norm which is broken if one forms an intention without knowledge-how; rather it tells us that if one engages in practical reasoning to a conclusion which one does not know how to do, one will have no reasons supporting the intention which the conclusion of that

practical reasoning. In order to get a knowledge norm we need to appeal to KNPR. If KNPR holds, then we must know all of the premises of practical reasoning, including enabling conditions. This combination of claims does not get us directly to KNI, but rather to the claim that we must know that we have knowledge-how in order to have appropriate intentions (KKNI for short):

KKNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows that one knows how to V.

By contrast to KNI, which claims that appropriate intentions requires first-order knowledge, KKNI claims that appropriate intentions require second-order knowledge. However, the fact that a given epistemic norm entails a set of weaker norms, concerning the conditions entailed by the condition in the original norm (so that a knowledge norm on assertion entails a truth norm on assertion, and so on), together with the factivity of

knowledge, means that KKNI entails KNI.

Although the suggestion that knowledge-how is an enabler provides a neat route from KNPR to KNI, the suggestion that in general knowing how to V is an enabler for

reasons to favour V-ing is implausible. Consider the Tango case. Kieran does not know how to dance the Tango, but he nonetheless forms an intention to dance the Tango. If knowledge how to V were an enabler for reasons to count in favour of V-ing, then Kieran’s intention to dance the Tango would be unsupported by reasons. But Kieran’s intention to dance the Tango might be extremely well supported by reasons, despite his lack of

knowledge-how. Cases of intending to do something by learning it as one go along provide us with counterexamples to the claim that knowledge how to V is an enabler for reasons to count in favour of V-ing.

Given the failure of option i) let’s consider option ii), which appeals to the idea that the propositions which figure in knowledge how to V are an enablers. Unlike appealing to means-ends premises in practical reasoning, this proposal concerns propositions about how to engage in the conclusion of practical reasoning. In our above example of practical reasoning, the idea would be that the some fact about how to take the 35 bus functions as an enabler for reasons to count in favour of catching the number 35 bus. Given KNPR, appropriate practical reasoning requires knowing that all enablers obtain, getting us the claim that appropriate practical reasoning to the conclusion to V requires knowing that some means-ends proposition about how to V holds. Given Intellectualism, we can identify knowledge of this means-ends proposition about how to V with knowledge how to V.

The problem with option ii) lies in the suggestion that a particular means end premise is an enabler. It is plausible that being able to V is an enabler for V-ing (Dancy 2004: 40). If there were no way to get to the bus stop, then one would not be able to get to the bus stop, and I would have no reasons to get to the bus stop. However, with most practical tasks, the means-ends premises that we know are not unique, so that a particular means-ends proposition can be false, without it being the case the one is unable to perform the relevant action. Suppose that walking to the stop on Tottenham court road is a way to catch the number 35 bus. Is that fact an enabler for me taking the 35? A plausible test for an enabler is to consider whether if the fact failed to obtain whether I would have any reason to perform the relevant action. If Tottenham court road was the only stop for the number 35, then if walking to that stop was not a way to catch the bus, that would mean that I was unable to catch the 35, which would stand in the way of my having reasons to take the bus. However, in a more ordinary case, there will be many ways to catch the 35,

catch the 35, or my having reasons to catch it. In this ordinary kind of case, any particular means-end proposition does not function as an enabler. This means that option ii) faces the same problem as option i), being based on an implausible general claim about enablers.