Introduction
There are many theories focusing on land operations. This is a natural consequence of the historical importance of land warfare in deciding the outcome of wars. Both Fuller and Lid-dell Hart, for example, argued that while air and naval forces were important to the war as a whole, they were still ultimately dependent on success on land (Holden Reid 1998: 209).
Even the seapower theorist Corbett (1988: 15–16) recognized that since people lived on land, wars would be settled on land rather than at sea. Similarly, airpower theorist, Robert Pape (2004: 119), agrees that while air power is an important factor in war-fighting, wars are still settled on land. Propositions like these have given land operations a unique position in military theory. This position is not unproblematic, however, since theories concerning land operations are often equated with, or are treated as if they were, general theories of warfare.
In the previous chapter (on joint operations), we saw that many theorists have considered sea and air power primarily as supporting elements to the land campaign. This is also indicative of the weight allotted to land operations by military theorists, consciously or subconsciously, in their studies of warfare.
In the last 20 years, warfare on land has manifested itself in large mechanized conflicts such as Iraq 1991 and 2003, as well as in low-intensity and guerrilla wars such as Somalia 1994 and Afghanistan 2001. What makes land warfare distinct in character, unlike air and naval warfare, is its intimate interaction with the terrain and the fact that such wars often take place amongst the people. This environment sets limits but also provides opportunities for those who can use it effectively. Closely related to this issue is the emphasis on time and movement as seen, for example, in maneuver warfare theories, and how this is to be com-bined with fire and protection. Theories of land warfare can thus be seen as different ways of relating to time, space, fire, movement, and protection (cf. Fuller 1931: 2–4; Kiras 2002;
Leonhard 1994; Biddle 2004). What are the causal relationships between these elements?
How and why, for example, can time be traded with space, and movement balanced against fire, etc.?
This chapter aims to introduce modern theories of land warfare. Since the military theory of land operations is so vast, it is important to note that the chapter will not capture every theory concerning the inherent challenge of finding the right balance between time, space, fire, movement, and protection. The chapter consists of three parts. The first part introduces the concept of ground operations and includes a comprehensive discussion about means and ends in land operations. It also introduces the conflict between the five basic aspects (or elements) just mentioned. The second part deals with theories of land operations in a state-to-state context. This part compares maneuver warfare and war of attrition as two
different logical constructs, and introduces two practical applications of the maneuver war-fare concept – the German and Soviet/Russian maneuver warwar-fare schools of thought. One should note that the two practical concepts are applications and together they give an insight into the nuances of how maneuver warfare has been conducted. The third part of the chapter introduces theories of small wars and insurgencies. This part covers theories dealing with three different constellations of actors: national liberation movements and colonial powers, rebels and governments, and civil wars and international intervening forces.
Land operations: concepts, ends, and means
Land operations are designed to hold and control the terrain or possibly to take and defend terrain with the aim of defeating an opponent. The latter can be achieved either by attack-ing the enemy’s will in a psychological sense, or his armed forces in a more physical sense.
Controlling territory is of obvious importance. This is where a country’s population lives and it is also where the majority of the infrastructure and capacity that supply and feed this population are found. Furthermore, the forces that operate in other arenas (e.g. navies and air forces) regularly depend on the land domain for basing and supply. Hence, control over a territory aims to protect one’s own forces, critical infrastructure, or the civilian population.
Control over a territory can also be said to be a prerequisite to ensure future successful land operations, since land forces are dependent on base areas for support. The means with which to establish land operational control are mainly land forces, i.e. the armed units that oper-ate on land (Evans 2004: 3–6). It should be pointed out that there is a dearth of research on these problems and related concepts. This may seem odd, given the importance that has been attached to land warfare throughout history. A partial explanation for this may be that many who study war do so in general terms only and view land operations as an implicit part of general warfare. This view has resulted in little examination on a conceptual level of specific questions relating to land warfare. There is, however, a wealth of historical analysis on land war and its development throughout history (e.g. Tuck 2008; Bellamy 1990; Browning 2002;
Chandler 2000).
Based on one of the themes presented in Chapter 1, land operations can be described as an exercise of military power related to the land domain (cf. Johnsen 2004: 5–9). It may include brute force, i.e. the physical capture or destruction of the enemy, or include coercion, i.e.
forcing an opponent to vacate an area of land or to give up important military capabilities.
It may also include deterrence, i.e. compelling the enemy to abstain from land operations aimed against one’s own territory. Peacekeeping operations, for example, can be described as an attempt to discourage the parties involved in a conflict from occupying or violating a territorial area (e.g. Bellamy 1997; Parsons 1995; Crocker et al. 1996).
The importance of the elements of land warfare – time, space, fire, movement, and protection – can be further illustrated by a brief discussion of the relationship between offensive and defensive operations. Clausewitz (1993: 357–69; cf. Aron 1985: 146–53;
Heuser 2002: 90–102), for example, notes that there is an interaction between offense and defense, where one man’s attack becomes the other man’s defense. He also claimed, con-troversially at the time and still in contrast to several other military theorists, that attack is the weaker form and defense the stronger form of war (Sumida 2008). The interaction between offense and defense is often dependent on technology and other factors such as better and faster means of transport (movement), more manageable and more efficient weapons (fire), better communications equipment (time), and stronger fortifications or thicker armor (protection).
The offensive has the advantage due to the morale of the attacker often thought to be posi-tively affected by seizing the initiative and attacking. The attacker also has the discretion to choose the time and place of the battle. The defender, in turn, benefits from the fact that it is usually easier to maintain something than to conquer it. The defender can also take advantage of the terrain and fortifications. An indication that, historically, defense has been considered the stronger strategy is that to be successful, an attacker is said to require a superior force ratio of 3:1 or more. Furthermore, armies fight in an environment where topography, infra-structure, and climate conditions are important factors and create friction. Finally, movement and the maneuvering of armies and units also mean that time is an important factor. Clause-witz (1993: 528) pointed out that the attack has an inherent weakness in that its momentum starts to wane once the attack has commenced, i.e. the attack has a point of culmination after which its power wanes, and the attacking party becomes vulnerable to counter-attack.
There are also trade-offs between the elements of land warfare in offense and defense. For example, it is possible to forego the advantage of covered terrain to benefit from the possibil-ity of choosing the time and place of attack. Furthermore, firepower is generally greater in fixed positions than during movement. Maneuvers on the battlefield are thus an attempt to compensate for reduced firepower by concentration of force and increased movement. An attacking commander can thus hypothetically make the assessment, based on the mission, that space and fire are elements worth trading for time and movement in order to achieve a better effect at a point where the enemy is more vulnerable.
The analysis of land operations based on the five elements can also be compared with some of Jomini’s (1987) military thought. His main thesis, which was presented at the begin-ning of the nineteenth century, was that warfare’s overriding principle was to concentrate the bulk of the force against an enemy’s flank, i.e. muster the troops against a weaker point.
He further described a number of operational concepts, the most important one being the relationship between interior and exterior lines of operations. To get one’s own army to oper-ate on interior lines and to force the enemy to operoper-ate on their exterior lines was perhaps a commander’s most important task, said Jomini. The advantage of operating on interior lines was that this (as opposed to the exterior lines) avoided a fragmentation of one’s own forces.
It also improved the ability to maintain and support these forces, increased speed of move-ment and achieved concentration of force at the decisive point. As a result, one could use a greater number of one’s troops against an opponent’s smaller and dispersed forces. Jomini (1987: 473) thus advocated a method that was diametrically opposed to the double envelop-ment of the enemy and that, instead, the commander, using clever strategic moves and with as little disruption as possible, would achieve local tactical superiority at the decisive point (or points), which often consisted of a flank. In other words, he argued that movement and time were worth more than space, firepower, and protection. Admittedly, this concentra-tion of force against an enemy’s weak point was also a way to compensate for the reduced firepower in the attacking units and the reduced protection of the terrain. These examples from Clausewitz and Jomini’s military thought serve as an illustration of the function of the five elements in land operations. Hence, they are worth keeping in mind as we embark on theories of maneuver and attritional warfare, as well as theories of guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency.
Theories of maneuver and attrition warfare
This section presents a number of modern theories on land operations and it begins with a discussion of maneuver and attrition warfare as ideal types, i.e. as logical constructs rather
than reflections of reality. After this, we present two applications of maneuver theory – the German and Soviet/Russian maneuver warfare schools of thought – to demonstrate that there are differences in nuance within the theory.
Maneuver and attrition warfare as ideal types
Influenced by the divide between indirect and direct method (see Chapter 4), the second half of the 1970s and onwards saw an analogous distinction made between maneuver warfare and attrition warfare (e.g. Mearsheimer 1983; Lind 1985; Luttwak 1987; Leonhard 1991; Hooker Jr. 1993). As with the indirect and direct methods, maneuver warfare and attrition warfare should be understood as logical constructs as most battles, campaigns, and wars contain elements of both, though in a varying degree dependent on space and time. Furthermore, attritional warfare, sometimes referred to as “industrial warfare,” was invented by supporters of maneuver warfare in the 1980s in order to create a counterpart to define their own theories.
Attrition warfare thus has few, if any, self-proclaimed followers and is in many respects a caricature. This being said, German military historian Hans Delbrück’s (1848–1929) Ermat-tungsstrategie (strategy of exhaustion) demonstrates that there are advocates of attrition (Craig 1986: 341–3) and so is the more current former US colonel Ralph Peters (e.g. Peters 2004). Nevertheless, the concepts have a value in aiding understanding of the aspirations of modern land warfare.
Attrition warfare is, in Luttwak’s (1987: 92) words, “waged by industrial methods.” The opponent is regarded primarily as a series of targets and success is achieved by “the cumula-tive effect of superior firepower and material strength.” This ultimately leads to the elimina-tion of the opponent’s overall fighting capability, or the retreat or surrender of the opponent.
The greater the element of attritional warfare, Luttwak maintains, the more routinized will be the techniques for identification of targets, fire, mobility, and supply. Furthermore, an attri-tional mindset tends to produce tactical decisions which are repetitive and mechanical, and the need for operational thinking becomes limited. Victory is certain if superior firepower can be placed within range of targets such as the opponent’s defensive positions and cities, if the firepower possesses the necessary qualitative and quantitative properties, if the enemy is forced to concentrate his forces in order to achieve his objectives (which rarely occurs in, for example, guerrilla warfare), and if material superiority can be maintained. Implicit in this war-fighting concept is that the opponent’s countermeasures are to be absorbed rather than avoided. Superior capacity for causing attrition of the opponent, Luttwak (1987: 92) suggests, is thus a condition for victory, and this method of warfare rarely results in easy victories in terms of loss of life and material, in relation to the adversary’s strength.
Luttwak maintains that there has never been any pure form of attritional warfare which completely lacked elements of cunning or deception. Warfare has, therefore, never been reduced to a purely industrial process. However, there are examples of war, he argues, which are largely characterized by attrition. Here Luttwak (1987: 92–3) points mainly to the trench wars on the Western Front during World War I, where warfare was often dominated by rela-tively symmetrical concentrations of artillery. He also mentions the German Air Force, the Luftwaffe, which tried to gradually decimate the Royal Air Force (RAF), in the summer of 1940, by constantly seeking aerial combat. This showed a misjudgment by the German High Command concerning their material superiority and capability to reduce the RAF’s fighting ability.
Luttwak also describes the anti-thesis of attritional warfare, a concept he calls “relational maneuver,” more commonly known as maneuver warfare. In this type of warfare the actions
are related to the target’s character. Instead of destroying the enemy physically, the aim is to reduce the enemy’s combat effectiveness by “systemic disruption.” By understanding the adversary’s war-fighting system as consisting of command structures, doctrine and training, force structure, troop dispositions, and technical aids, it becomes possible to conceive of war-fighting in other ways than decimating the opponent’s armed forces. Instead of seeking out and attacking the opponent’s strengths, a party using maneuver warfare seeks to avoid them and match its own strengths with the enemy’s weaknesses, be they physical, psycho-logical, technical, or organizational in nature (Luttwak 1987: 93–4).
Liddell Hart’s discussion of the indirect approach (see Chapter 4) is thus an important basis for modern thinking on maneuver warfare. He argued that strikes in the enemy’s rear and the indirect method could achieve dislocation or disruption of the opponent’s mental preparation for upcoming operations. Thus the decisive battle has already been won before it has begun (Holden Reid 1998: 47). Luttwak (1987: 93–4) argues that war of attrition is essentially a physical process that guarantees results that are proportionate to the nature and quantity of the effort. Such operations will not yield results unless there is material superior-ity. Maneuver warfare relies instead (for successful results) on the accuracy by which the enemy’s weaknesses have been identified, on the degree of surprise that is achieved, and the precision of the action.
It follows that maneuver warfare can give results that are proportionately greater than the resources deployed and that a nominally inferior party can retire with a win against a nominally stronger adversary. It also means that maneuver warfare can completely fail if the numerically weaker side does not behave in an appropriate manner or faces stronger resistance than anticipated. Hence, war of attrition tends to fail slowly, while success is cumulative. Failures of maneuver warfare, on the other hand, are quick and dramatic, as is the success that can be achieved with relatively limited means. A single mistake, however, can jeopardize the entire operation. Luttwak (1987: 94–5) notes, therefore, that the war of attrition is characterized by high costs and low risks, while maneuver warfare is character-ized by low costs and high risks.
One consequence of this reasoning is that for maneuver warfare to succeed it requires accuracy in the identification of enemy’s weaknesses, high tempo, and a high level of ini-tiative and precision of action to exploit these weaknesses. Such warfare concepts cannot replace quality with quantity and an increase in troop levels can only be utilized if troops are well trained and combat effective. A significantly larger force would also infringe on the ability to achieve surprise and speed. At such places where contact is made with the enemy, and the accumulated force is applied, it is likely that the direct method will be applied at the tactical level, even if the opponent’s strengths usually can be avoided at the operational level (Luttwak 1987: 94–5.) Just as is the case with attritional warfare, Luttwak argues that there is no such thing as pure maneuver warfare, as they both exist on a spectrum and the balance will shift from one to the other on a case by case basis. The more maneuver warfare is applied, he states, the more important becomes the operational level. Luttwak (1987: 95–6) provides some examples of war with a high degree of maneuver warfare and mentions the German Blitzkrieg operations against Poland, Norway, Denmark, France, and the Soviet Union (until 1942). The American General Douglas MacArthur’s counter-offensive at Inchon in 1950, which cut off the invading North Korean troops, is also an example of such warfare.
Luttwak claims that countries that consider themselves – objectively or subjectively – materially stronger than their enemies tend to stick to attritional warfare. Those who, rightly or wrongly, believe themselves to be materially weaker will instead seek to focus on the enemy’s weaknesses, i.e. maneuver warfare. There are exceptions, however, and it
some-times depends on individual personalities or circumstances, such as General George Patton in the summer of 1944 or General MacArthur in Korea 1950. Perceptions of relative strength, moreover, are contextual, since it partly depends on the opponent and the perception of the opponent’s strength. Israel, for example, used maneuver warfare in the 1967 Six-Day War, but changed orientation after its success due to its perceived material superiority. The 1973 war is instead, at least initially, better characterized as attritional warfare (Luttwak 1987:
97–8; cf. Kesseli 2001). Choice of operational concept is therefore neither predetermined, nor constant. Even within the same army, it can vary.
Attrition and maneuver warfare, it should be pointed out, do not belong solely at the opera-tional level. Luttwak (1987: 98–9, 108–9), on the one hand, considers the concepts most important at the operational level, because maneuver has the most significant impact on the operational level. This does not imply that attritional warfare is an inferior form of
Attrition and maneuver warfare, it should be pointed out, do not belong solely at the opera-tional level. Luttwak (1987: 98–9, 108–9), on the one hand, considers the concepts most important at the operational level, because maneuver has the most significant impact on the operational level. This does not imply that attritional warfare is an inferior form of