Introduction
Around 600 BC, the Chinese thinker Lao Tze said that “there was nothing in the world more soft and weak than water, yet for attacking things that are firm and strong, nothing surpasses it.” Some hundred years later, Greek general Themistocles stated that “he who commands the sea, has command of everything,” and in 1597 the English Renaissance philosopher Sir Francis Bacon concluded that “he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will” (Tangredi 2002: 117; cf. Rodgers 1967; Harding 1999; Sond-haus 2001; cf. Heinl 1966: 288). Modern thinkers on the subject have not significantly revised these positions, but continue to emphasize the importance of sea power. About 70 percent of the earth’s surface consists of water and over 90 percent of the world’s international trade, in both volume and weight, is transported by sea. Moreover, a majority of the world’s cities and population centers are located at or near the coast. The resources and communications that the sea makes possible are simply essential to the prosperity of mankind and life on earth.
But what is seapower and how is it related to other forms of military power? What are the ends and means? How can naval forces be employed and how can wars at sea be won? The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the theories of seapower and to describe how naval forces are used in sea operations in times of war and peace (cf. Till 2013; Lambert 2010; Tan-gredi 2002; Speller 2008). As with other chapters in this book, the guiding theme is the dual-istic character of military theory – its normative and explanatory qualities. What explanatory power has seapower theory and what normative statements are provided for ways to win such wars? The chapter begins with a discussion of how seapower can be defined, what its ends and means are, and briefly how seapower differs from other forms of military power. Since war is commonly understood as a political instrument, the chapter continues with a discus-sion of the use of naval forces in peacetime and for political purposes, something usually referred to as naval diplomacy. In this section we place the use of seapower into its political context. We then move on to a discussion of the military uses of naval forces in war. This is facilitated through the introduction of a central concept in classical seapower theory, namely
“command of the sea,” or “sea control” as it is often called in modern parlance. While the concept may be viewed as the primary objective in naval operations, it is also an important means in order to realize the ultimate strategic purpose, that is, to win wars. In the sections that follow we discuss methods for securing, exercising, and disputing command of the sea.
Here we present the problems involved concerning decisive battles and blockades as meth-ods to secure command of the sea, maritime power projection and use of sea-lines of com-munications as methods for exercising command of the sea, and finally, fleet-in-being, war on commerce, and coastal defense as methods for disputing command of the sea.
Seapower
In general terms, seapower can be defined in two ways – a broad definition that encompasses political, economic, commercial, and military aspects, and a narrower one, which primarily focuses on its military use in war. Alfred Thayer Mahan famously argued in his classical treatise of seapower that the concept included not only the naval forces controlling the sea by force of arms, “but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests” (Mahan 1890: 28).
Here, the economic and commercial aspects are clearly visible. Sam Tangredi (2002: 114) also employs a broader definition:
[T]he combination of a nation-state’s capacity for international maritime commerce and utilization of oceanic resources, with its ability to project military power into the sea, for the purposes of sea and area control, and from the sea, in order to influence events on land by means of naval forces.
In this latter definition, the concept describes an ability not only to use naval forces in war but also to control international trade, its maritime communications, and the exploitation of naval forces as a political/diplomatic instrument in peacetime. Civilian and commercial aspects of seapower include guarding and policing the coast, law-enforcement, commerce and trade, activities in ports, natural resources under water such as oil and gas, and fishing.
A narrower definition of seapower is provided by British scholar Eric Grove (1990: 3), who describes it as “a military concept, [and] the form of military power that is deployed at or from the sea.” Here, seapower is something to be employed and no distinction is made whether such forces are used in peacetime or war. Nor are any of the economic and civil aspects of seapower included. In this chapter, seapower shall be understood as the political and military use of naval forces in war and peace. Seapower thus becomes a resource or capability that is employed in war and peace for political and military ends. Seapower may also represent a state or state-like entity where the sea will significantly affect its existence and political ambition. Naval forces, in turn, means armed platforms and troops operating at and from the sea (naval ships and marine infantry, etc.), below the surface (submarines, etc.), and in the air above the sea and the shoreline (naval aviation).
In order to exercise seapower we first need an idea of what it will be used for and how, i.e. an idea of the ends and means involved. In short, we need an idea concerning strategy.
Mahan (1991: 24) argued that naval strategy has “for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the seapower of a country.” For him, naval strategy was a means to support a state’s seapower, which in turn worked to ensure national security and prosper-ity. In his classic book Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (originally published in 1911), Julian Corbett distinguished between maritime strategy and naval strategy. For him, mari-time strategy was the principles that guided the conduct of a war where the sea played an important part. It also determined the role the navy had to play in the overall strategy and in relation to forces from other armed services. Naval strategy, on the other hand, was only that part of the maritime strategy which determined the employment of the naval forces (Corbett 1988: 15; cf. Widen 2012: 85–7). Maritime strategy, therefore, was according to Corbett, a more general concept relating to the overall use of a state’s forces in war, a war in which the sea played a major role. Naval strategy, on the other hand, related to the sole use of naval forces in the context of this overall strategy. As apparent, Corbett was mainly interested in the role of seapower in the war, rather than as a political instrument in peace.
Seapower provides a range of strategic options. It represents the part of military power that takes place at sea, from the sea, or in connection with the sea. The employment of brute force in the naval context consists of using naval forces to destroy or block opposing forces by violent means. Naval coercion involves using threats of violence to force the opponent to do things that favor one’s interests, while naval deterrence involves the utilization of naval forces to convince the opponent to refrain from actions that threaten one’s interests. The Swedish naval thinker, Captain Daniel Landquist (1891–1962), argued that naval warfare in a strategic sense, unlike war on land, was mainly carried out in an area that lacked ownership, which, according to international law, could not be permanently and completely claimed by any one actor (Landquist 1935: 20). In these waters, also, neutral countries operated com-mercial ships and naval forces. The principle of an ownerless sea applies in both peace and war and constitutes the foundation for the idea of the “freedom of the seas.” Mahan (1991:
27) has described this domain in somewhat more poetical terms:
[A] wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the history of the world.
Although there is an increasing trend towards “territorialization” of the seas, as evident, for example, by new techniques to exploit natural resources from the seabed, the idea of the freedom of the seas is still dominant.
The theatre of naval operations often has characteristics similar to a flat surface and does not offer opportunities (at least not on the high seas) for defensive positions and obstacles, to the same extent as is common on land. In the littorals, in narrow waters, and archipelagos, there are choke-points, islands, and shoals that affect the possibilities for maneuver and passage.
This difference between the naval and land theatres of war has contributed to some thoughts on the pros and cons of offensive versus defensive types of warfare. Furthermore, naval war-fare can take place over wide areas rather than along narrow frontlines, as is often the case in ground warfare, although naval bases may be viewed as a natural starting point for operations and an aim for a possible retreat (Landquist 1935: 124; cf. Lindberg & Todd 2002).
Naval diplomacy
Although naval diplomacy – or “gunboat diplomacy” as some prefer to call it – has been used widely by rulers throughout history, it has only rarely been treated by the classical theo-rists of seapower (Widen 2011: 717–21). Mahan and Corbett, for example, were primarily interested in the use of seapower in war rather than as a diplomatic instrument in peacetime.
These “gaps” have been partly remedied by some modern thinkers active in the nuclear era, who saw the value of more limited naval operations. The threat of nuclear retaliation and possible escalation tended to increase the utility for limited operations short of war.
Gorshkov (1979: 247–8), for example, claimed that:
[D]emonstrative actions by the fleet in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with one’s own potential might and threatening to start military operations. Thus, the fleet has always been an instrument of the policy of the states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.
The scope and need for naval diplomacy can be said to have increased even more after the Cold War and thoughts in this regard have been formalized in British and American maritime doctrines. In the US Navy and Marine Corps jointly developed doctrine, Forward . . . From the Sea, from the mid-1990s, it was found that:
[N]aval forces are an indispensable and exceptional instrument of American foreign policy. From conducting routine port visits to nations and regions that are of special interest, to sustaining larger demonstrations of support to long-standing regional secu-rity interests . . . U.S. naval forces underscore U.S. diplomatic initiatives overseas.
Changes in the international environment during the last decade and a half have not altered the relevance of this statement. What about the theories of naval diplomacy? Following seminal works on deterrence and coercion (e.g. Schelling 1966; George & Smoke 1974) during the Cold War, research on naval diplomacy blossomed under a new generation of seapower theorists (e.g. Martin 1967; Cable 1971; Luttwak 1975; Booth 1977). Perhaps the most widely read of these is British diplomat James Cable. He (1994: 14) defined “gunboat diplomacy” as
the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.
According to Cable, the concept thus implies a use of, or threat of using, restricted naval force in situations not involving an act of war, and in order to secure and prevent loss of certain values. These forces are thus means employed in international disputes with foreign powers on their territory. Gunboat diplomacy is therefore an activity occurring in the gray zone between war and peace. It serves political purposes short of war with naval forces as the means. Cable’s argument clearly echoes Clausewitz’s thoughts about war as a political instrument. Cable distinguishes between four different types of gunboat diplomacy:
• “definitive force,” which attempts to create a fait accompli by depriving the opponent of parts of his resources. This corresponds closest to brute force. A well-known example of the definitive type, which Cable highlights, is the North Korean capture of the intel-ligence vessel, USS Pueblo in 1968. In this case the U.S. government was presented with a fait accompli, forcing them to choose between war (or threat of war), to negotiate with North Korea, or simply to yield (Cable 1994: 15–33).
• “purposeful force,” which explicitly attempts to persuade an opponent to change its policy (Cable 1994: 33). The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 is a clear example of an operation in which one party tried to force a change in behavior through threats and the use of naval forces. This crisis arguably highlights aspects of military power that can be likened to coercion and persuasion.
• “catalytic force,” which aims to influence an opponent through naval presence, rather than to induce him to perform a particular action (Cable 1994: 42). Here we can observe a more subtle form of deterrence. The US Navy’s presence in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–88 was not only a means to protect shipping in the area, but also an operation aimed at limiting hostilities and to protect US allies in the region.
• “expressive force,” which aims to reinforce the impressions of one’s own policy, but without specifically stating what is envisaged by the operation. This type differs from
the “purposeful” by its larger element of ambiguity in terms of objectives and the stated mission (Cable 1994: 15–64). Here, one can neither speak of brute force, coercion, or persuasion, but possibly a subtle form of deterrence. A US aircraft carrier battle group that leaves harbor a day after a military coup has taken place in a South America country, steering south, could well serve as an example of such a subtle signal of American policy and interests in the region.
Cable’s categorization has merits but also shortcomings. For one, he clearly distinguishes between the different objectives of naval diplomacy. No doubt a single operation is likely to contain phases where several of these types exist or even co-exist. But Cable’s conceptual framework also has problems. First, the model only cites the different objectives that exist in naval diplomacy, and not the means to be employed. For example, to what extent do the ends in such operations determine the means and vice versa? Second, the model is somewhat one-dimensional since it simply describes a subject-object situation which does not take into account the possible counter-moves by the opposite party and the interaction that this entails.
What components is naval diplomacy made up of and how do these differ? According to British scholar Geoffrey Till, naval diplomacy is a phenomenon located somewhere in the spectrum of expeditionary operations, where the aim is often to conquer or occupy a terri-tory, and humanitarian operations, where the goal is to help states and civilians affected by natural disasters, such as famine, drought, and diseases. Naval diplomacy is therefore differ-ent, he suggests, from expeditionary operations with their higher degree of threat and deter-rence and full-scale military operations with military strategic purposes. It is also different from humanitarian operations which aim to help a state or its people in need, rather than to force them to do something (Till 2013: 225–8).
Naval diplomacy is largely based on the idea of naval presence in those areas where impor-tant interests are at stake. The value of naval presence consists of the potential it creates for those in power. Naval forces have a number of competitive advantages, according to Till, which other military instruments of power lack, partially or wholly. Because they can travel in international waters, they are often perceived as less provocation for the local population than ground or air combat units. Furthermore, naval forces have strategic reach, mobility, and flexibility that makes them effective as an instrument of political power. He therefore argues that
maintaining a maritime presence in an area increases national readiness, contributes to the capacity to signal strategic interest, offers a means by which the strategic environ-ment may be shaped to national advantage and facilitates the activities that may need to follow.
(Till 2013: 229) According to Till, the presence of naval ships on the seas creates the conditions for three things: coalition building, which includes naval visits and contacts in foreign countries; pic-ture-building (or intelligence gathering) concerning foreign activities both at sea and ashore;
and finally coercion, which is a phenomenon already discussed above. Often enough, a naval force can perform many of these types of tasks simultaneously or in sequence (Till 2013:
221–51). Added to these three are also operations that aim to assert the right of free passage through different maritime zones covered by international maritime law.
As described above, naval diplomacy serves as an effective means to influence the behavior of other actors. But there are also practical and theoretical problems connected
with employing such means. Till argues, for example, that it is often difficult to prove empirically to what extent naval diplomacy has been “successful” in a particular case, since it represents only one of many diplomatic activities that a state or state-like entity does to influence an opponent. Moreover, naval diplomacy cannot be assessed in isola-tion, Till claims, but must be viewed in relation to the objective one tries to achieve. Also, operations can be successful at the operational level but a failure at the political level, and vice versa. This requires a certain balance between ends and means. Finally, Till argues, a conflict often arises between the demands set by naval operations in a diplomatic context and the requirements of naval combat between opposing fleets. Since the tasks are inher-ently different, and this is reflected in the design and organization of the naval platforms, the optimal allocation between “battleships” and “patrol vessels” are often difficult to make. The struggle for scarce resources is timeless and it is therefore important to have a strategy that coordinates political and military objectives with the naval means available (Till 2013: 247–51).
Command of the sea
While command of the sea (or sea control) is often an important means to fulfill the ultimate purposes of seapower in the overall war, it is also considered to be the main goal of naval operations (cf. Landquist 1935: 28). Corbett is clear on this point and concludes that “the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of
While command of the sea (or sea control) is often an important means to fulfill the ultimate purposes of seapower in the overall war, it is also considered to be the main goal of naval operations (cf. Landquist 1935: 28). Corbett is clear on this point and concludes that “the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of