Level of assessment

The technical soundness of screening, scoping and impact identification in the EIA process is

considered the key element for its effectiveness. Weaknesses in scoping and poor attention towards disaster risk in scoping were reported earlier. This section reports: (10) screening of actions for disaster risks, and (11) whether hazard and vulnerability assessments are conducted as a part of impact identification.

Attention to disaster risk in screening of project proposal

The process for screening of proposals in the Sri Lankan EIA process is not clear and is considered vague. The legal expert stated that: “There is no clear guidance in the law describing what are the projects to be considered under an EIA or IEE”. Screening of proposals happens at two stages. Project proposals are screened based on the prescribed project list provided in the Gazette extra-ordinary No. 722/22 of 1993. Deciding whether an IEE or EIA is required is left to the discretion of the appointed PAA and it is done during the scoping process. The guidance for implementing the EIA process, which was published by the CEA in 2006 states: “…as part of the scoping process the

110 appropriate PAA should: … determine whether PP should be asked to prepare an IEE or EIA, unless an adequate IEE has already been presented” (CEA, 2006, p. 9).

There is no legal requirement in the NEA 1980 or any of its later amendments to conduct a risk assessment or any other assessment to assess risk involved with projects. As discussed in the previous section, the CEA planner believes that “…a description of the avoidable and unavoidable adverse environmental effects of the proposed prescribed project” is sufficient to cover the disaster risks of the project and it is being done in the current EIA process. The CEA planner explained:

Yes, we address the requirement of risk assessments. But here we do it within EIA process. Recently, a project proposal was submitted for approval called the Advance Surfactant Manufacturing Industry at Mathugama. They produce sulphuric acid as well. We told him [the developer] to assess risk for sudden chemical emissions and asked for a preparedness plan. That is the reason for rejecting the proposal; he gave mitigatory measures for environmental impacts. He said this is the emission and I take these measures to control the emission. So, he can mitigate the impacts of his industry. But he cannot mitigate the disaster. He has done a risk assessment and his findings were listed in the EIAR. He has told [us] in the EIA report that in an accidental sulphuric emission, it can disperse to a range of 5 km and this is lethal. So, that has been enough for us to reject the proposal.

It is evident that the CEA identifies the risk of chemical industries and gaseous plants in the screening and scoping process and gives more attention to preparedness plans in the EIA report. However, such a requirement is not seen in other infrastructure development projects such as dams and highways. For instance, neither an early warning system nor flood preparedness plan was requested in the EIA report of the UKHP. In this context, the UKHP’s environmental management documents such as the watershed and environmental management plans, do not contain any reference to the risk involved with dam failure or emergency spillway opening. According to the first EIA expert, an early warning system is yet to be established for the UKHP to alert downstream communities in the event of a spillway opening, even two years after the commissioning of power generation.

Hazard and vulnerability assessment in impact identification

Neither hazard nor vulnerability assessments are conducted in the Sri Lankan EIA process to assess the probable development-induced disaster risk of a proposed project. Nevertheless, specific hazards such as landslide risk or flood risk are assessed to some extent in the two case studies. Close scrutiny of EIA reports from the UKHP and the STDP reveals that such assessments are also not sufficiently detailed to provide a clear picture of the disaster risk of a project. Vulnerability assessments are not conducted, even in their simplest form, in the process of impact identification.

For instance, in the EIA report of the STDP, it was identified that flood risk was the major concern of the project since over 40 percent of the proposed road lay over known flood plains. The EIA report of

111 the STDP provided detailed maps and an assessment of existing drainage canals, irrigation and flood protection structures, retention areas and water bodies along the proposed expressway project area. The EIA team also conducted a flood survey to obtain data at identified control points on the

maximum flood experienced, the most frequent flood, the inundation levels and the period of inundation. However, these data were not converted to a flood hazard map or to a projected flood hazard map for a 25-year return period flood (for which the expressway had been designed) in the EIA report to understand the extent of the flood risk in the upstream area of the expressway project.

Based on the above assessment, the EIA report of the STDP proposed to make the road design flood proof. The EIA report states: “…in fact, the proposed traces [proposed road sketch] cover

approximately 40 [percent] of its length over retention areas. This would create the necessity to raise the road surfaces to substantial levels as the road being designed for a particular return period” (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 6-18). The report further pointed out that:

The raising of earth embankment would cause interference to the natural balance of flood flows across the road thus leading to increased flood threats at the upstream sides of the road. The choking of flood openings would cause delays in the passage through the proposed road embankment thus creating increased duration of the inundation period.

A major part of the proposed project trace will lie on the low flood plains of the major rivers and hence create blockage of streamflow to a greater extent especially at major rivers due to the mildness of the slopes encountered in the flood plains. A significant proportion of streamflows would be moving to and fro [sic] from the road centreline at the flood plains of the major rivers in the project area due to the large network of branches merging at the flood plains. As such, a very significant impact on

streamflow movement would take place due to the road embankment of the proposed project and hence the construction of bridges and culverts along the trace (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 6-18).

Further, the EIA report did not sufficiently attempt to calculate the increased severity and frequency of the flood hazard due to the road construction except for saying that:

In regions where the proposed Expressway crosses flood plains, the encroachment of flood level into new regions would be greater than 10 [percent] of the initial retention depth unless the proposed new Expressway cross section width is less than one tenth of the cross sectional width of the detention area(University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 6-18)

.

However, the EIA report of the STDP has no reference to the existing and future vulnerabilities of the people due to flood hazard. The unavailability of a proper flood hazard map and the failure of the EIA team to identify the existing flood vulnerability of the people has led to an underestimate of the flood disaster risk along the expressway.

112 The EIA report indicates that the population in the divisional secretariat divisions, in which the proposed project is located, is growing. It says the average annual growth rate in the project area was 3.0 percent during the period 1970 to 1996, while the national population growth rate was around 1.2 percent (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 5-46). This means there will be more pressure for housing and other developments. The EIA report did not attempt to examine the relationship between increased population pressure and the vulnerability of the marginalized groups in the project area, which is characterised as a flood plain.

The report also indicates that nearly 15 percent of the houses in the project area are less than 50 square metres, and 47.1 percent of houses are between 50-100 square metre floor area (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 5-49). Visits to the project area reveal that these houses are mostly poorly engineered and belonged to low-income groups. Such houses are incapable of withstanding prolonged floods. Nevertheless, the EIA report does not look at either the number of vulnerable houses within the existing flood zones or the increased percentage of such houses in the new flood zones due to increased flood levels.

The EIA report also states that nearly 31 percent of the project area comprises paddy fields and marshy lands. It has been estimated that approximately 403 ha of paddy lands will be crossed by the expressway (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 5-35). In some areas, these paddy lands are small blocks of lands, less than 20 ha, but in some areas they are larger blocks or ‘yaya’ with 20-80 ha of land. The report has looked only at the paddy lands directly affected by the expressway due to filling; it overlooked the vast area of paddy lands that will be uncultivable due to increased flood risk.

The flood risk is getting worse for some marginalized communities with limited access to the main townships. Panape, a small village with 80 households in Bandaragama DS division, is located within 500 m of the expressway. A woman, who has cultivated leafy vegetables for many years to support her family, described the new threats to its livelihood as:

There are about five people in this village who engage in leafy vegetable cultivation. We have been doing this cultivation for the last 15-20 years. It takes about one month to harvest the leafy vegetables. When the area gets flooded at that time, the entire crop gets destroyed. Earlier our parents used to say that there is Christmas flood in December and New Year flood in April. But now it is not like earlier. This area gets always flooded when there is some rain. Last year on many occasions we got floods.

There is another person who is cultivating banana and his lands also get affected - water logged for about two to three weeks. So we fear to put up a crop. You do not know what will happen to the crop till you get it into the house.

113 The EIA report does not provide any information regarding the frequency of floods in the project area. A community member from Dodangoda Divisional secretariat division explained her experience of flood frequency during the data collection of this study. She stated:

Flood is a common event for us. I remember in 1966 about 10-15 houses in our village were destroyed due to flood. Then in 1967 we got a flood even one foot higher than previous year. We usually get floods when Rathnapura [a town in upstream] is flooded. Then 1972, 1978 and 1982 all these were large floods, then again in 1989, where my aunt’s house was also destroyed. Thereafter, in 1992, which is not a very big flood. Water came only up to my doorstep. Then in 1998. My house was two feet underwater due to 2002 flood. Thereafter in 2007. After 2007 there are no large floods because there were not any heavy rains reported in upstream areas.

The above comment shows that the area is getting a significant flood every 4-6 years. However, the EIA report for the STDP completely ignored the frequency of the flood hazard. Even though people in the area are used to these large floods, the new situation created by the expressway project is beyond the accepted level for most of them. A self-employed man from Panape village stated:

Now the village roads get flooded every time. If there is rain for two days roads get flooded. There were floods in this area earlier too. But definitely the level is high now. Earlier water used to drain from about 3 km stretch of paddy lands. Now it does not drain like previously. They have put only three eight feet culverts along the entire 3 km stretch. So, water does not drain for days. Water level is also high and takes four to five days to recede. This village get isolated as all three access roads get flooded. We do not have even a cooperative shop [government run village boutiques] in this village.

The increased flood risk around the expressway has already started disturbing the routine work of people in the area. School children find it difficult to attend school on many days. A once-in-5 year event in the past has become a routine experience. A mother of two from Panape stated:

Students in the village have to go to Bandaragama [closest town] for a school. They used to travel by boats during the flood time. There had been an accident about five years ago and one person was killed after his boat capsized. After that, parents are concerned of sending students to school during flood time. So, kids lost two to three weeks of studies every year.

A RDA planner, who had played a key role in the STDP, accepted the communities’ concern and stated that:

We kept bridge openings [of the expressway] based on the existing Colombo –Galle Road [the expressway constructed in parallel to the existing highway, but towards the inland]. Exact assessments were not done. We got the openings of the old Galle road and some were kept for this. But in these areas, water flows very fast. So, there can be even higher flows under the bridges [these are the access points for the community roads]. During a high flood time, several houses closer to the bridges can be washed away.

114 Farmers in the area are facing a new threat because of prolonged water inundation of their paddy fields. Leptospirosis has become a common risk for many farmers. People in Kimmanthudawa and Panape villages in Bandaragama DS division and most places in Dodangoda DS division complain about the spread of Leptospirosis and dengue in close proximity to the expressway. Local health officials from the Medical Office of Health (MOH) office in Dodangoda also suspect close linkage between the spread of Leptospirosis and the expressway project. However, district health officials rejected such claims saying the data available to them do not prove such a relationship. They also claim that increased dengue cases in the area reflect the upward trend of dengue cases throughout the country. District Leptospirosis data show a downward trend in the number of patients over the years since 2008. The district authorities were not able to provide a breakdown of such data to village level, but local level data collected from the MOH Office in Dodangoda show a completely different picture. Of 16 Leptospirosis patients reported in the Dodangoda area since 2012, eight cases were reported from villages close to the expressway. Before 2012, disaggregated data to the village level are not available with local health officials for further analysis of this issue. Even though the chances of waterlogging in the project area had been predicted in the EIA report, further analysis on the probable environmental impacts of the waterlogging, such as the above, were not identified in the report.

Summary

Both criteria (i.e., 10 and 11) used to evaluate the level of assessment of the EIA process are met to a ‘limited’ extent in Sri Lanka. Screening of projects is based on the prescribed project list provided in NER 1993. The list is not explicitly based on disaster risks. In addition, even though hazard

assessment is being done to some extent, vulnerability assessments are not conducted. Hazard assessments lack the depth and breadth required for DRR. Table 5.4 summarises the criteria findings for the level of assessment of the EIA process in Sri Lanka.

Table 5.4 A summary of the criteria findings for the level of assessment

Criterion Evaluation Justifications

(10) Screening of actions for disaster risks is taking place.

Limited

Screening of project proposals is based on the prescribed project list in NER 1993. Screening of proposals to decide whether an IEE/EIA is necessary is an opaque process and is done at the discretion of the PAA.

(11) Hazard and

vulnerability assessments are conducted as a part of impact identification.

Limited

Hazard assessments for more obvious visible hazards are done to some extent, but such assessments are not detailed enough to assess the frequency and magnitude of the hazard risks. Vulnerability assessments are not done.

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