Lexical pragmatics, metarepresentations, conceptual-procedural encoding and

Sperber and Wilson have maintained since early on in their explication of Relevance theory that “verbal communication typically conveys much more than is linguistically encoded” (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1997b: 3). Since there are far more concepts than there are words to represent them, linguistic expressions must be seen as contextually flexible and at the mercy of those using and interpreting them. Only when the encoded word is presented in context can the intended conceptual meaning be realised (Sperber & Wilson, 1997a). For this reason, Relevance theory assumes that all linguistic items are underspecified and thus semantically incomplete. Lexical pragmatics attempts to explain how the encoded meaning is pragmatically adjusted (modified, refined) during interpretation (e.g., Wilson & Carston, 2007; Clark, 2016: 145–146; Wilson, 2016b: 13 ff.). Relevance theorists propose that these adjustments are made by accessing an item’s

conceptual and procedural contributions and pragmatically narrowing them, broadening them or both in order to satisfy expectations of relevance. These modifications in meaning, which are constrained by the search for optimal relevance, are made by the speaker during use and the hearer during interpretation. Such adjustments are claimed to occur during all communicative events and rely heavily on contextual assumptions (Wilson & Sperber, 2002a; Carston, 2016a). As Carston (2016a: 19) succinctly explains, “[w]hat makes it possible to use a word to communicate a concept that is different from its encoded meaning is the coordinated interaction of two human minds, speaker and hearer.” Intended meaning that must be inferentially worked out in context goes beyond disambiguating referents such as pronouns. The relevance-theoretic view of lexical pragmatics assumes that no item is semantically complete; only when it is contextually and pragmatically enriched does its encoded meaning begin to represent the speaker’s intention. Prior to use, items represent a kind of generic form (e.g., tree), a potential concept with conceptual- procedural encoding serving as a place-holder for a full-fledged concept (i.e., pro-concept106_{) and} waiting to be pragmatically adjusted in context to represent a speaker’s thought (e.g., a tree-lined street; a bonsai tree; Avatar’s tree of life; the Gauché family tree). In this way, all communication requires pragmatically meaningful adjustments. Reflecting on contextual assumptions and conceptual-procedural encoding, it has been proposed that, while a few items (e.g., but, so) have only procedural encoding, all conceptual expressions have a component of procedural encoding (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1997a). In part, it is this procedural encoding that allows communicators to use expressions flexibly and innovatively when (meta)representing intentions, some of which may deviate from their conventionalised encoded meaning.

Following this line of thinking, since context (according to its relevance-theoretic definition) is never precisely the same, the linguistic-concept relation of all lexical items is semantically flexible so that no item is ever interpreted precisely the same in different utterance constructions or contexts. In this way, language innovation, however gradual, inevitably occurs during communication (Ariel, 2008: 114). Wilson and Carston (2007: 231) find that “almost every word” requires inferentially tweaking the meaning. This process of linguistic adjustment is done by both communicators and involves a cluster of reasoning and inferencing skills that are based on contextual factors and guide the hearer toward optimal relevance and understanding (Wilson, 2004: 353). These adjustments are made possible, in part, because of the inclusion of procedural meaning that is present in all linguistic expressions; this inclusion benefits communication by reducing

106 _{In relevance theoretic terms, a pro-concept is a kind of linguistically encoded generic concept with meaning}

that falls somewhere on the conceptual-procedural continuum and that requires context to determine its intended meaning (Sperber & Wilson, 1997a: 3; cf. Padilla Cruz, 2009: 258).

processing effort during interpretation. Because communication is only successful when it is relevant to the hearer (that is, it offers greater cognitive effects for the least processing effort), this adjustment process “is the central feature of relevance-theoretic pragmatics” (Wilson, 2004: 353). Consider example (5) provided by Clark (2013: 246)

(5)

He plays well.

As mentioned, the mutual adjustment process involves the processing of conceptual-procedural information (e.g., Carston, 2002: 60). Each linguistic item in (5) is procedurally and conceptually encoded. Given the context, the speaker relies on the hearer’s ability to access and integrate the linguistically represented concepts by using the procedural features to guide the hearer toward a pragmatically derived conclusion. Only when the pronoun he, the verb plays and the indexical well have been disambiguated (i.e., adjusted) can their intended referents be meaningful. This consideration provides an example for how single lexical items can express both conceptual and procedural meaning.

Relevance theorists claim that adjustments like these are made to some degree during every communicative event. Most of what is accepted as literal language is not; actual literal language is quite rare, if it exists at all, since determining the intended meaning of an utterance always entails a degree of pragmatic inference, and therefore utterance interpretation always entails meaningful adjustments. This notion is supportive of the relevance-theoretic assumption that pragmatic meaning may be more heavily weighted than semantic meaning during the communicative process; this is exemplified even more strongly in figurative language use. Take for example the following. (6)

He’s not the sharpest tool in the shed. (7)

A: You going?

B: When hell freezes over. (8)

You’re on fire!

Examples (6) – (8) are examples of figurative language, or tropes, that are probably familiar enough to comprehend but require a degree of context to fully understand the speaker’s intention. It is unlikely that (6) and (7) would be taken literally, and the same is true for (8), recognising the rare

occasion that would make it literally appropriate. Although these utterances can be used to describe a state of affairs, their meanings would be adjusted during inferential interpretation to fit the context and meet the hearer’s expectations of relevance. Thus, (6) might mean that the speaker thinks the male referent is not clever, (7) that B will absolutely not be going somewhere specific, and (8) that the person referred to is either feverish or doing very well at something. Relevance theorists point out that lexical expressions are not concepts but only representations of concepts used to trigger resembling concepts in others. Examples (6) – (8) demonstrate that concepts are not fixed to lexical meaning, and because of this, the words used to represent them are both dynamic (i.e., flexible and susceptible to language change) and context dependent.

Relevance theory has mostly been used for synchronic analysis of language use, but such linguistic flexibility lends itself to diachronic analysis as well. Three interrelated relevance-theoretic notions discussed above – conceptual-procedural meaning, lexical pragmatics and metarepresentation – can also be used to describe language change (Clark, 2016). These three notions, though quite distinct, can be thought of as interconnected when assessing language change. In a nutshell, the pragmatic adjustment made to an item’s conceptual-procedural encoding during inferential interpretation is used to explain how expressions are used in novel ways to (meta)represent intentions (Wilson, 2016b: 14–15). The diachronic portions of the relevance-theoretic analyses of the three SAfE PMs presented here will touch upon aspects of one or more of these three notions to explain the distinctive changes in the respective PMs.

Examples (6) – (8) are recognisable as tropes because they have either been heard before or are linked closely enough to other familiar expressions or encyclopaedic background that their intended meaning can be worked out. However, language is often used in unexpectedly novel ways. Sometimes this is intentional; sometimes it is not (e.g., a malapropism). In both situations, a hearer (at least a sympathetic one) will attempt to make sense of the speaker’s utterance by making meaningful adjustments based on the hearer’s expectation of relevance.

Since communication is constrained by the availability, accessibility and individual’s preference for language use, some linguistic items may be innovatively extended into roles that can only be comprehended in the context they occur. Relevance theorists claim that novel language use of this kind may automatically trigger ad hoc concepts.107 _{Ad hoc concepts are developments of meaning that}

107 Barsalou (1983) is usually credited with introducing the idea of ad hoc categories, suggesting that during

utterance formation and comprehension, individuals tend to develop concepts for a category by incorporating background (encyclopaedic) knowledge and lexical information to suit the communicative context (Wilson & Carston, 2007). For example, there is no single lexical item that conveys the notion of

have been pragmatically adjusted by the hearer during utterance interpretation. These adjustments to explicit and implicit meaning occur by narrowing, broadening or extending the conventional meanings associated with the presented lexical expression (such as in figurative expressions) to make sense out of an utterance given its context and the perceived speaker intent (Clark, 2016: 147).108 _{Such use may lead to language change or simply have a “once off” meaning in a specific} context (Carston, 2002: 322, 2016a: 8–14). Take the following constructed example:

(9)

Here comes Breakfast at Tiffany’s.

Utterance (9) is an example of metonymy that would likely have no meaning to someone who is not at least minimally familiar with the novella or movie titled “Breakfast at Tiffany’s”.109 _Such background knowledge is essential in the formation of an ad hoc concept. Context is also essential. Perhaps it refers to a woman who resembles the main character, Holly Golightly, or a type of raucous party described in the story. Whatever the case, the speaker of such an utterance makes the assumption that the expression will trigger presumed mutual knowledge and the hearer will make the needed adjustments (i.e., narrowing and/or broadening, metaphorical attributions) to arrive at a meaning that closely resembles the speaker’s intention. Relevance theorists assert that communicators use pragmatic processes in this way with regularity during communication, pushing and pulling lexical items into new territory in the course of expressing as well as interpreting thoughts (Wilson, 2004).

One of the key points made by Relevance theory in its description of how communication is understood is that there is an essential human need to off-set effort with greater effects (as described in the extent conditions). Since there is no one-to-one correlation between meaning and a linguistic item, spontaneous and meaningful adjustments are required during communication. If a speaker can use a single linguistic item in context to communicate a host of complex concepts

“stylish, female main characters in books and movies”, yet individuals are able to pragmatically construct such a category to fit the context. Carston (2002: 323) further explores the idea of ad hoc concepts and defines

them as “pragmatically derived concepts”. Although usually attributed to hearers during utterance interpretation, it would appear that speakers also make use of ad hoc concepts in the course of utterance formation.

108 _{Blakemore (2002: 66–67) describes ad hoc concepts as developing from “a proposition which includes}

a concept that is derived by narrowing and/or loosening a concept encoded by a lexical item”, and Carston (2002: 322) defines them as “concepts that are constructed pragmatically by a hearer in the process of utterance comprehension.”

109 The novella, “Breakfast at Tiffany’s”, was written by Truman Capote in 1958. The movie adaptation was

and assume that the hearer will appropriately adjust its meaning during inferential interpretation with little effort, it stands to reason this item will be put to use. Furthermore, it is clear that a hearer’s pragmatic adjustments, interpretations and reactions or responses to language use play a role in semantic-pragmatic reproduction. The ability to form metarepresentations is fundamental to human communication and is part of the online, ad hoc process that is described in the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure (i.e., a hearer will infer an interpretation of the speaker’s output that entails the least processing effort, and unless he perceives further cues that could result in additional positive cognitive effects, he will stop when his expectations of relevance have been met).

Metarepresentational ability, a form of pragmatics, is independent of language; you don’t need language to form metarepresentations, but you do need metarepresentational ability for language acquisition and interpersonal communication (Sperber, 2000). This ability is necessary during both expressive and receptive communication because the metarepresentations the hearer forms during inferential interpretation of an unfamiliar item in context will determine what meaning the hearer assumes it to encode when he later uses it as a speaker to (meta)represent his own thoughts. As mentioned, a precursor to grammaticalisation is (inter)subjectivity, which involves the ability to not only make assumptions about others but about language use, and thus the ability to form metarepresentations during the interpretive process. When individuals pragmatically interpret utterances, the evidence provided by the encoded utterance combined with contextual assumptions leads to the formation of metarepresentations during interpretation. The contextual cues that the hearer considers salient (i.e., useful, accessible, most relevant) in order to reach his conclusion are again based on the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure. The hearer’s inferential conclusions are also based on what he thinks the speaker could have reasonably intended (given expectations, situational context, relationship with the speaker and previous conversations, paralinguistic cues used, etc.). Thus, from the evidence provided in context, the hearer uses his ability to metarepresent the speaker’s intentions to form conclusions.

Since the meanings attached to linguistic items are determined by human use, our understanding of how language is used is guided in part by the metarepresentations we create during this expressive and interpretive process. Casasanto and Lupyan (2015: 543) state that “[t]hinking depends on brains, and brains are always changing; therefore thoughts are always changing.” Essentially this means that an individual’s reasoning and mind-reading skills, conceptual associations, encyclopaedic background, reflection and interpretation of past experiences, and ways of using and interpreting language (pragmatics) are also always changing. This provides

further evidence that all lexical items are semantically unstable, or flexible, to some degree. In this way, language change may occur following the metarepresentations individuals create when presented with innovative uses in context.