(Vpi) N ecessarily (pj is tru e —>■ Pi is tn ie because pi is Tj)
T ogether, D isjunctive tru th an d Local disjunctive ex p lan a tio n s do es provide a way to state
th e d o m ain variance of th e tru th projierty. But th e re is, 1 th in k , a very basic p ro b lem
with disjiinctivisin: it c a n ’t ac c o u n t fo r any o th e r e x p lan a to ry g en eralizatio n s th a t involve
tru th . T h e sim ple reason it c a n ’t is th a t o n th e disjunctivist view th e re is n o such th in g
as being true as such. Again the analogy with ja d e is illum inating. T h e re are n o non-trivial
g en eralizatio n s th a t involve ja d e (e x cep t D isjunctive ja d e ) . If x is ja d e th e n everything
th a t is tn ie o f x is tru e o f x in v irtue o f x b e in g ja d e ite o r in virtue o f x b ein g n e p h rite . F or
exam p le, it’s tn ie th a t ja d e s are green . But, ja d e s are g re e n b ecause ja d e ite s are g re en
a n d n e p h rite s are g re en . N o t b ein g a n om ic kind, th e re is no relevant geological p ro p e rty
th a t w ould cause things to a p p e a r g reen. H ere is F o d o r again, p u ttin g it b e tte r th a n I can:
It’s n o t h a rd to see why it’s so plausible th a t th e re c a n ’t be laws ab o u t closed
disjunctions. By assu m p tio n , if P is the closed d isju n ctio n F \/ G, th e n it
is m e tap h y sically n e cessary th a t th e p r o p e r tie s a th in g has qua P a re e ith e r p ro p e rtie s it h as qua F o r p r o p e r tie s it has qua G \ a n d , o f c o u rse , th is in c lu d e s p ro je c tib le p r o p e r tie s in te r alia. T h a t ’s why, if b e in g j a d e really is a clo se d d isju n c tiv e p ro p e rty (if b e in g j a d e is j u s t b e in g ja d e ite o r n e p h r ite ) th e n o f course th e r e a re n o laws a b o u t b e in g j a d e “as s u c h ”; all th e j a d e laws a re ip so facto e ith e r ja d e ite laws o r n e p h r ite laws. (F o d o r, 1995, 18)
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iy s h o u ld th is w orry s o m e o n e w h o b elieves th a t tr u th is d isju n ctiv e? R ecall th a t local c o u n te rfa c tu a lly s u p p o r tin g g e n e ra liz a tio n s c o n n e c tin g tr u th w ith d o m a in relativ e tru th p ro p e rtie s d o e s n ’t co v er e v e ry th in g we w an t fro m tr u th . C o n s id e r fo r e x a m p le th e id e a th a t tn i t h is n o rm a tiv e ly g u id in g a sse rtio n s. T h e n o rm a tiv e ro le o f tr u th is s o m e th in g th a t it has have in v irtu e o f b e in g tru e as such, n o t in v irtu e o f o n e o f th e re a liz e r p ro p e rtie s. T h is ru le is ju s tifie d in th e lig h t th a t it is a g e n e ra liz a tio n o v er p ro p o s itio n s (o r se n te n c e s) th a t h as to d o w ith th e n o rm a tiv e c h a r a c te r o f being true as such:(1) (Vp) (o n e o u g h t to a sse rt p o n ly if p is tru e )
T h e disju n ctiv ist m ay w a n t to re p la c e this ru le w ith
(2) (V p j)(o n e o u g h t to asse rt p i o n ly i f p is Tj )
Now, (1 ) a n d th e in sta n c e s o f (2) tu rn o u t b e e x te n sio n a lly e q u iv a le n t, b u t th a t ’s n o t w h a t is a t stake. W liat e n s u re s th e validity o f (1 ) is th a t s o m e th in g is p e rm issib le (o r im p e rm is sible) to a ssert because it is tru e , a n d because is sen sitiv e to n o n -e x te n s io n a l d iffe re n c e s. I th in k th a t (1) is ju s tifie d in th e lig h t o f tr u th b e in g th e aim o f asse rtio n s. If th a t’s th e case th e n it really m a tte rs th a t we a re ta lk in g a b o u t tr u th as su c h , a n d n o t T \ o r ...o r T^. C o n sid e r: ev en if all th e fluffy c re a tu re s in th e w o o d s a re p in k c re a tu re s , a n d vice versa, I c a n a im a t c a tc h in g a fluffy o n e w ith o u t a im in g to c a tc h a p in k o n e . I m ay ev en s p e n d all w in te r in my c e lla r a im in g a t m a k in g ja d e w ith o u t a im in g to m ak e ja d e ite o r n e p h r ite (p h ilis tin e as I a m ). A n d to w h at is im p o r ta n t h e r e , I m ay aim a t say in g s o m e th in g tru e w ith o u t a im in g to say s o m e th in g th a t is s u p e ra s s e rtib le o r c o r r e s p o n d in g o r an y o th e r p ro p e rty th a t su p p o se d ly realizes tru th . As it h a p p e n s , t h a t ’s w h a t I u sually d o . ‘A im in g a t ’ is a n intentional re la tio n in w h ich we c a n n o t su b s titu te c o e x te n s io n a l e x p re ssio n s (ev en n ecessarily c o e x te n s io n a l o n e s ). A fortiori we c a n n o t s u b s titu te being true w ith b e in g T \ V