What does it mean to say that truth is plural?

LEABHARLANN CHOLAISTE NA TRIONOIDE, BAILE ATHA CLIATH TRINITY COLLEGE LIBRARY DUBLIN

OUscoil Atha Cliath

The University of Dublin

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W h at Does it M ean

to Say th a t T ru th is Plural?

P aal A n to n s e n

A thesis to b e s u b m itte d to

T rinity C o lleg e o f D u b lin

fo r th e d e g re e o f

D o c to r o f P h ilo so p h y

D e p a r tm e n t o f P h ilo so p h y

S c h o o l o f Social S cien ce a n d P h ilo so p h y

T rin ity C o lleg e D u b lin

TRINITY COLLEGE^

1

k

MAY 2015

D eclaratio n

I, P aal .\n to n s e n , h e re b y certify th a t th is thesis has b e e n w ritte n by m e, th a t it is th e re c o rd

o f w o rk c a rrie d o u t by m e a n d th a t it has n o t b e e n s u b m itte d in any p rev io u s a p p lic a tio n

fo r p u b lic a tio n o r a h ig h e r d e g re e .

A bstract

This essay is an a tte m p t to m ake sense o f id ea th a t tru th is plural. I b egin with p re se n tin g

som e m otivations fo r pluralism a b o u t tru th . I th e n m ove on to discuss th e sta n d a rd ob ­

je c tio n s, a n d give som e arg u m e n ts fo r why th ey ’ve n o t b e e n ad eq u ately m et so far. T h e

version o f pluralism I d e fe n d can be su m m arized by th e follow ing claims;

• I'h ere is a m o n ad ic tru th p re d ic ate “tru e ” used in everyday speech, a n d this p re d ­

icate expresses th e p ro p e rty

being tnie(simpliciter)

at every co n tex t. P ro positions

in stan tia te this property.

• T h e p ro p e rty

being true

has a fancy in te n sio n , it is a fim ctio n from circum stances

th a t in c lu d e a d o m ain p a ra m e te r to sets o f p ro p o sitio n s (th e p ro p o sitio n s th a t in­

stantiates

being true M

those circu m stan ces).

• T h e tech n ical tru th p re d ic ate used in co m p o sitio n a l sem antics is relativized to d o ­

m ains, in a d d itio n to o th e r p o te n tia l relativizations such as contexts, w orlds, tim es

a n d assignm ents.

• T h e n o tio n o f tru th relevant fo r assertoric p ractice is tru e at a c o n te x t in th e usual

sense, w h ere th e p a ra m e te rs are fixed by th e context.

Acknowledgements

T h e r e ’s o n e good th in g a b o u t having b e e n th e o n e w ho w rote this essay: I d o n ’t have to

read it. B ut I am n o t the only o n e re sp o n sib le for the th in g in fro n t o f yon. S tudents

a n d staff m em bers from Trinity C ollege D ublin, T h e University C ollege D ublin, T h e U ni­

versity o f B ergen, an d T h e University o f O slo, as well as p eo p le from o th e r places, have

helj)ed m e along the way. M odesty forbids n a m in g everyone. I w ould have to show who

I w ould leave out. But th e re are som e I owe special thanks to.

Life c a n n o t have b ee n easy for my su p erv iso r Jim Levine (a.ka. the L ev in ath an ). My

n e a r p e rfe c t ig n o ran c e o f Russell sch o larsh ip m ust have b een a heavy b u rd e n to bear.

Even so, with stoic com pulsion, he has h e lp e d an d e n c o u ra g e d m e at every step in my

various adventures. Jim is the very m odel o f a m o d e rn m ajor philosopher.

T h an k s to O le H Jortland, A ndreas Stokke a n d Paul S im on Svanberg fo r n u m e ro u s

discussions. T hey did th e ir best in trying to save my th o u g h ts from myself. Blam e th em

for all th e m istakes in h ere, if you like. You c a n ’t blam e m e, as I d id n ’t know any better.

H ats o ff for E rlen d W angsholm w ho actually saved my life w hen I m an ag e d to g et myself

in to a d ire situation. To Chris M urphy, with a d m ira tio n , for show ing w hat m atters, living

a n d le a d in g by exam ple.

For O le Hjortland

Contents

D eclaration iii

A bstract v

A ck n ow led gem en ts vii

C on ten ts xi

1 Introduction i

2 M otivating Pluralism 7

2.1 D e f l a t i o n i s m ...

10

2.1.1

T m th as an Expressive D e v ic e ...

10

2.1.2 T m th as R edvindant in E x p l a n a ti o n s ...

13

2.1.3 N o rm a tiv ity ...

16

2.1.4 T m th C o n d itio n al S e m a n t i c s ...

18

2.2 M o n i s m ...

21

2.2.1

M etaphysical D e te rm in a tio n

...

21

2.2.2 P ro b lem o f O v e r g e n e r a liz a tio n ...

24

2.2.3 E x p re s s iv is m ...

25

2.2.4 E rro r T h e o r y ...

27

2.3 P l u r a l i s m ...

28

3

Stating the O bjections

39

3.1 Logical C o n n e c t i v e s ...

40

3.1.1

T ruth P r e d i c a t e s ...

42

3.1.2

T ru th P r o p e r t y ...

43

3.1.3

Two N otions o f V a l u e ...

45

3.2 Logical C o n s e q u e n c e ...

51

3.3 Expressive D e v ic e ...

54

3.4 VNTiat Does it Mean?

...

55

4

Truth Value Pluralism

57

4.1 M an y -v alu es...

57

4.2 S e q u e n c e s ...

61

5

Truth as Multiply Realized

65

5.1 D is ju n c tiv is in ...

66

5.2 F u n c tio n a lis m ...

71

6

Semantic Framework

77

6.1 Truth Conditional Semantics ...

77

6.2 P o s ts e m a n tic s ...

83

7

Making Sense o f Pluralism

89

7.1 C o n tex t D e p e n d e n c e ...

89

7.1.1

Indexical C o n te x tu a lis m ...

90

7.1.2

N onindexical C o n t e x t u a l i s m ...

91

7.1.3

Pluralism a n d D om ain D e p e n d e n c e ...

94

7.2 M eeting the C h a l le n g e s ...

96

7.2.1

C om positional S e m a n t i c s ...

97

7.2.2

Postsem antics

...

99

7.2.3

D om ain Relative T ruth P roperties

... 101

7.3 C o n clu d in g R e m a r k s ... 103

R eferences

105

Introduction

T his essay is ab o u t the id ea th a t tru th is p h u a l, an d Jiow we iniglit go ab o u t using this

id ea to ch aracterize local m etaphysical d isp u tes betw een realism a n d antirealism . Since

its in tro d u c tio n by C rispin W right (in

Truth

Objectivity

(1 9 9 2 )) pluralism a b o u t tru th

has b een a

cause celelne.

B efore we can d ec id e w h e th e r tru th is ])lural, we n e e d to know

w hat it

means

to say that it is. A lthough th e re is a grow ing lite ra tu re o n th e topic, little

a tte n tio n has b een given to th e task o f m ak in g sense o f pluralism a b o u t tru th w ithin a

plausible sem antic fram ew ork. T h e a p p ro a c h h e re will be to provide a clea r ac c o u n t o f

th e idea an d th en show th at, w hen p ro p erly u n d e rsto o d , pluralism is a g e n u in e alternative

to its m ain rivals: deflationism an d m onism . A lth o u g h I aim to establish pluralism as a

g e n u in e possibility, I sh o u ld n o te th a t th e focus o f this essay is n o t so m u ch

arguing fo r

the

id ea th a t tru th is p lu ral as p re sen tin g a C a rn a p ia n ex p licatio n o f th e n o tio n “p lu ral tr u th ”.

O n c e pluralism has b ee n carefully fo rm u la te d th e sta n d a rd o b jectio n s simply dissipate.

Free from any qualifications, h e re is th e essay’s m ain claim:

The idea that truth is plural is coherent and comprehensible. We can provide an intel­

ligible formulation o f what it is fo r truth to be plural, one that allows fo r propositions

to be true in different ways in different domains, independently o f whether or not this

possibility is actually realized.

m o r e th a n e lo q u e n t e n o u g h , a n d th ey c e rtain ly d o n ’t n e e d me (h e a v e n know s) to h e lp th e m . Also, so little h as b e e n w ritte n o n th e se m a n tic issues r e la te d to p lu ra lism th a t w e ’re p re tty m u c h le ft to o u r ow n devices. I will b e p r e s e n tin g a n ew way to e x p lic a te p lu ra lism . M o re p recisely; a n ew twist o n a n o ld id ea. My e x p lic a tio n will b e m o d e le d o n a strateg y o f m a k in g se n se o f tr u th d e v e lo p e d by M ic h a e l D u m m e tt. H is strateg y was to give a n a c c o u n t o f tr u th th r o u g h th e ro le it plays w ith in a w id e r th e o ry o f m e a n in g , as o p p o s e d to fo c u s in g o n th e m o re n a rro w q u e s tio n o f w h a t tr u th consists in in d e p e n d e n tly o f h o w it is c o n n e c te d w ith se m a n tic s a n d p rag m atics.

It will b e c o m e c le a r as I p r o c e e d , b u t I m ig h t as well m a k e it e x p lic it fro m th e start: th e r e a re th r e e m a in p h ilo s o p h ic a l th e m e s r u n n in g th r o u g h this essay. E ach in fo rm s h o w I th in k we c a n b e st m a k e se n se o f p lu ra lism , especially in te rm s o f w h o th e y in te ra c t.

T h e first th e m e is th a t th e o rie s o f trvith sh o u ld s ta rt w ith try in g to esta b lish counter- factually su p p ortin g gen eralization s r a th e r th a n th e tra d itio n a l a p p r o a c h o f p ro v id in g a n A risto te lia n (i.e. re al) d e fin itio n o f tn ith , o r a c h a ra c te i iz atio n o f t r u t h ’s n a tu r e o r e sse n c e . I th in k o f a theory o f tr u th m u c h in th e sam e way I th in k o f th e o rie s in th e s p e ­ cial scien ces: th e aim is to p ro v id e e x p la n a tio n th a t a re a p p e a lin g to g e n e ra liz a tio n s th a t hav e c o u n te r f a c tu a l im p o rt. W ith re s p e c t to tr u th th e r e a re several p o te n tia l g e n e r a l­ iz a tio n s o n e m ig h t try to e sta b lish . F irst, tru th m ay b e re liab ly c o n n e c te d w ith acc u ra cy o r c o rre c tn e s s o f a sse rtio n . S e c o n d , tr u th m ay be re liab ly c o n n e c te d w ith o t h e r s e m a n ­ tic p ro p e rtie s . T h ir d , tr u th m ay b e reliab ly c o n n e c te d w ith so m e m eta p h y sic a lly re le v a n t p ro p e rty , su c h as c o r r e s p e n d e n c e o r su p erassertib ility . S u c h c o n n e c tio n s a re in p a r t sp e c ­ ified th r o u g h g e n e ra liz a tio n s w ith c o u n te rfa c tu a l s tre n g th . T h e c o n c e p t o f tr u th , as I see it, lies a t in te rs e c tio n : b e tw e e n p ra g m a tic s, se m a n tic s a n d m etap h y sics. A fu ll-fled g ed th e o ry o f tr u th is o n e th a t p ro v id e s a n a d e q u a te e x p la n a tio n o f w h at k in d o f p h e n o m e n a tr u th is by sh o w in g th e a p p r o p r ia te c o n n e c tio n s . T h e stra te g y o f illu m in a tin g a f u n d a ­ m e n ta l c o n c e p t by sh o w in g how it c o n n e c ts w ith o th e r c e n tr a l c o n c e p ts is th e on ly way I c a n th in k of. N o t b e in g re d u c ib le to , o r e x p la in e d away by, m o re p rim itiv e te rm s is w h at it m e a n s to b e f u n d a m e n ta l.

T h e s e c o n d th e m e is a b o u t in d iv id u a tin g p ro p e rtie s in te rm s o f in ten sio n a l profiles. By th e in te n s io n a l p ro file o f a p ro p e rty I m e a n a n a sso c ia te d fu n c tio n th a t m a p s se q u e n c e s o f p a ra m e te rs (to b e c a lle d circumstances o f evaluation) u n to e x te n sio n s. O f c o u rs e , i t ’s n o t th a t p ro p e rtie s are in te n s io n s . B u t two p ro p e rtie s a re d is tin c t j u s t in case th e y a re

ciated with d iffe re n t intensions. In m ost co n tex ts we use worlds as th e only p aram eter,

so th a t p ro p e rtie s are in d iv id u ated by th e ir m o d al profiles, a fu n c tio n from worlds to ex ­

tensions. W lie th e r th e re are any c o u n te rfa c tu a l su p p o rtin g generalizatio n s c o n n e c tin g

tru th to som e o th e r p ro p e rty (e.g. c o rre sp o n d e n c e ) d e p e n d s o n th e in ten sio n al profiles

o f those p ro p e rtie s. Now a p o te n tia l w orry is ah e ad . In o rd e r fo r th e re to be a stro n g

e n o u g h c o n n e c tio n betw een tru th a n d c o rre sp o n d e n c e they probably have to be neces­

sarily co-extensional. B ut if in ten sio n s ju s t are fu n c tio n s from worlds to extensions, they

w ould be identical. T ru th w ould th e n

ipso facto

n o t be plural. We n e e d to individuate

p ro p e rtie s in a m o re fine-grained way. Two o p tio n s seem available. E ith e r we can in ­

dividuate th e m by th e ir

hyperintensional

profiles (a h y p erin te n sio n a l profile is o n e th a t

d istinguishes c o in ten sio n al p ro p e rtie s), o r we can individuate th e m by a “fancy” in te n ­

sion, an in te n sio n th a t co n tain s a n o n -sta n d a rd p a ra m e te r as p a rt o f th e source. I d o n ’t

believe th e re are h y p e rin te n sio n a l processes o r co n tex ts unless th e re is a m in d involved.

.\s far as I know, th e re are n o n o n -m e n ta l processes th a t can re sp o n d selectively betw een

co-intensional p ro p e rtie s. T h a t’s controversial, I know, since som e im p o rta n t trad itio n s

in m etaphysics are assum ing th a t we can distinguish esseiuial from non-es.sential p ro p ­

erties, intrinsic from extrinsic p ro p e rtie s, a n d g ro u n d in g from g ro u n d e d , in term s o f

h y p erin te n sio n a l differences. N evertheless, I will be arg u in g for fancy in ten sio n al p ro ­

files, a n d say th a t tru th is only

locally

co-in ten sio n al with c o rre sp o n d e n c e . Two p ro p e rtie s

are locally co -intensional, with re sp e c t to som e p a ra m e te r tt, ju s t in case they are co-

co e x te n sio n al n o m a tte r how we vary any p a ra m e te r o th e r th an

T h a t is, as long as

is

co n stan t. T h e crucial p a ra m e te r fo r th e plu ralist is a

domain

p aram eter. T h e in ten sio n al

pro file o f tru th is o n e th a t allows it to be locally co-intensional with d iffe re n t p ro p e rtie s

relative to d iffe re n t dom ains. T his gives us in te n sio n a l profiles th a t perm its th e re to be

co u n terfac tu a lly s u p p o rtin g g en e raliza tio n s th a t c o n n e c ts tru th with d iffe re n t p ro p e rtie s

in d iffe re n t dom ains.

prag-m atic iprag-m port. A case in p o in t w ould be a seprag-m antics for a language th a t contains aleth ic

m odalities. T h e crucial n o tio n h e re is

true relative to a world.

T his is re q u ire d fo r th e se­

m antic th eo ry to be co m p o sitio n al, b u t tru e relative to a world plays n o pragm atic role.

i\ll th at m atters for p ra g m a tic purp o ses is tru e relative to the world o f u ttera n ce. It falls to

th e postsem antics to m ed iate betw eeen com p o sitio n al sem antics a n d pragm atics. O n c e a

com positional sem antic th eo ry is co n stru c te d we m ust provide th e ad d itio n al postsem an-

tic d escription. O fte n com p o sitio n al sem antics a n d postsem antics are lu m p ed to g eth er,

b u t this only g e n e ra te s confusion. I t’s im p o rta n t to realize th at th e com po sitio n al an d

postsem antic tasks are distinct. A nything n o t re q u ire d fo r the com p o sitio n al assig n m en t

o f sem antic values falls w ithin postsem antics. P rop erties, propositions, tm th at a co n tex t,

an d even logical co n se q u e n c e , are n o t

proper

sem antic notions, b u t postsem antic ones.

H e re ’s how I’ve o rg an ized th e discussion:

B efore we start g e ttin g clear ab o u t w hat m ean by pluralism , we sh o u ld ask ourselves

th e questio n why it w ould be w orth g ettin g clear a b o u t [jiuralism in th e first place. T h a t’s

w hat

Chapter 2 Motivating Pluralism

is abo u t. I'h is c h a p te r spells o u t som e challenges

for deflationism a n d m onism . T h e case against dellationism is fam iliar, b u t well w orth

rehearsing. First, d eflatio n ism seem s to lack th e resources to a c co u n t for the norm ative

dim en sio n o f tru th . By the “n orm ative d im e n sio n ” 1 m ean that tru th seem s to be involved

in generalizations a b o u t w hat statem en ts what we

should

assert, deny, re tract, believe an d

disbelieve. T h e sec o n d challen g e com es from th e initial observation th a t tm th its p a rt o f

the m ost p ro m isin g line in sem antic theorizing. However, if d eflationism is co rrec t, th e n

it seems like th a t e n te rp rise is o n the w rong track. T h a t’s n o t a knock-dow n a rg u m e n t

by any o n e ’s way o f c o u n tin g , bu t it should m ake us re co n sid er w h e th e r we are willing

to give u p o u r best sem antic th eo ries in favour o f a theory o f tm th th at we s h o u ld n ’t

have too m u ch c o n fid e n ce in to begin with. T h e case against m onism is m o re subtle. It

starts by c o n sid e rin g th e link betw een m etaphysical positions - realism a n d an tirealism -

a n d various tru th th e o re tic candidates. Traditionally, realism has b e e n c o n n e c te d w ith a

c o rre sp o n d e n c e th eo ry o f tru th , while an tirealism has b een c o n n e c te d with som e th eo ry

th at in co rp o rates an episternic c o m p o n en t. If m onism is correct, th e n we have to choose

o n e p artic u la r a c c o u n t th a t covers all cases w here we legitim ately em ploy th e tm th p re d ­

icate. We th e n seem to be c o m m itte d to e ith e r global realism o r global an tirealism , bu t

n e ith e r is very attractive. T h e re is certainly ro o m fo r the m onist to m an eu v e r o u t o f that.

b u t I p re s e n t so m e reasons fo r d o u b tin g th e obvious steps they co u ld m ake. Given th at

b a c k g ro u n d , we sh o u ld have som e in te re st in co n sid e rin g pluralism .

C h a p te r 3 S tating th e O b jec tio n s tu rn s from th e challenges to d eflatio n ism a n d m onism

to th e o n es pluralism has to face. T h e re are th re e specific challenges th a t k eep pester­

in g th e p ro sp e cts o f a w orkable pluralism : (i) H ow d o we ac c o u n t fo r logically com plex

sen tences? (ii) H ow d o we ac co iu it fo r logical co n seq u en ce? (iii) H ow d o we ac co u n t

fo r th e expressive role o f tru th ? I th in k th e objections are ba.sed o n a m istake. Many

p h ilo so p h e rs discussing pluralism ab o u t tn ith have h ad a too sim plistic c o n c e p tio n o f

th e d e b a te ig n o rin g im p o rta n t co n c ep tu al distinctions. T his c h a p te r a ttem p ts to provide

so m e elbow ro o m fo r th e pluralist by arg u in g th a t the objections rests o n an oversim pli­

fied view a b o u t p lu ra l tru th . O n c e we have lo o k ed m ore carefully at w hat n o tio n s are in

play, a strategy fo r m ak in g sense o f pluralism suggests itself, h i p articular, in o rd e r to

a c c o iu it fo r (i), (ii) a n d (iii) we first have to recognize that th e re isn ’t one n o tio n o f tru th

at play. W’e have to distinguish betw een th e technical n o tio n o f a

truth value relative to a

point used in co m p o sitio n a l sem antics, th e [pragmatically im p o rtab le n o tio n o f

truth at a

context pro v id ed by th e post.sem antics, a n d finally, a m o n ad ic p re d ic ate “tru e ” th a t we use

fo r expressive pu rp o ses. T h e c h a p te r en d s with a suggestion o f a strategy fo r how the

p lu ralist co u ld ac c o m m o d a te those th re e notions.

T h e re has b e e n som e discussion a b o u t w hat kind o f sem antic th eo ry th a t is pluralis­

tically ac cep tab le , h i C h a p te r 4 T ru th Value P luralism , I tu rn to two plu ralist attem p ts to

revise o u r s ta n d a rd (p re p o sitio n a l) sem antics. W liat they have in c o m m o n is th a t they ar­

g u e fo r a sem an tic th eo ry th a t in te rp re ts th e

truth values th a t sen ten ces are m a p p e d u n to

in pluralistic term s. T h e m ain p o in t o f this c h a p te r is to arg u e th a t this is a cul-de-sac. T h e

m ain re aso n is th a t they n m in to pro b lem s because they h a v e n ’t p ro p erly d istin g u ish ed

b etw een w hat is re q u ire d for evaluating sen ten ces as co n stitu en ts o f o th e r sen ten c es an d

e v a lu a tin g sen ten c es as stand -alo n e u tteran ces.

a n d superassertibililty. B ut o n ce we also take in to ac co u n t th a t tru th is co n n e c te d with

b o th sem antic a n d pragm atic p ro p e rtie s, I th in k it becom es a p p a re n t th at the “m ultiple

realization strategy” is taking us dow n a g ard en path.

If we w ant to m ake sense o f pluralism we n ee d to go ab o u t in a m o re careful m an ­

ner. T h a t’s why I devote C h a p te r 6 Sem antic Fram ew ork to laying o u t the stru ctu re o f a

fram ew ork I will b e em ploying. I expect th at m ost o f w hat I ’ll say in th a t c h a p te r will be

fam iliar to everyone, ex cep t how I draw the line betw een com positional sem antics an d

postsem antics. As I see th e re la tio n sh ip a com positional sem antics is only a b o u t providing

a n ac co u n t o f how to c o n n e c t sem antic values to g e th e r with th e g ra m m a ria n ’s linguistic

categories in a systematic an d rule-governed way. O n top o f th a t we provide a postsem an ­

tics th a t I arg u e we can use to superimpose n o tio n s such as th e p ro p o sitio n expressed by a

sen ten c e a n d the p ro p e rty expressed by a pred icate. In ad d itio n to that, the p ostsem an­

tics will have to provide a an a c c o u n t o f how the com positional sem antics is relevant for

the practices o f using the language, in p articu lar assertion an d inference.

C h a p te r 7 M aking S ense o f P luralism provides the explication o f “plural tr u th ” th a t

I think is c o h e re n t a n d co m p re h en sib le. It brings to g e th e r som e them es from th e previ­

ous c h ap ters, but in a way th at accom m odates the possibility th a t w hat m akes jjropositions

tru e is d o m ain variant. H e re ’s the sh o rt version: the claim th at tn ith is plural is best u n ­

d ersto o d as th e claim th a t the exten sio n o f the p ro p erty expressed by th e m o n ad ic tru th

p red icate

(being true simpliciter) varies across dom ains. A d o m ain is re p re se n te d in th e se­

m antic theoiT as a p aram eter, alongside o th e r ones, e.g. w orld, tim e a n d location. This

m akes pluralism a b o u t tru th , from a sem antic p o in t o f view, an instance o f nonindexical

contextualism fo r the m onadic tru th p redicate. T his p erm its the pluralist to ac cep t b o th

a m onadic tru th p re d icate a n d a gen eric tru th p ro p e rty expressed by th a t p re d icate. It

also allows us to a c co u n t fo r th e logical connectives, assertion an d in feren ce in th e sam e

way as the m onist. O n ce dom ain s are p a rt o f th e in ten sio n al profile o f being true, it ’s

perfectly possible th a t th e re are d iffe ren t p ro p e rtie s th a t are locally co-intensional with

being true. A nd th a t o p en s u p the possibility th a t th e re are co u n terfactu ally s u p p o rtin g

generalizations c o n n e c tin g

being true with d iffe ren t p ro p e rtie s in d iffe ren t dom ains.

2

Motivating Pluralism

W hen we assess the accuracy o f o u r statem en ts a n d beliefs we norm ally ch arac te rize th em

as tru e o r false. T h e m ost n atu ra l way to u n d e rs ta n d w hat we are d o in g is to say th a t we

are attrib u tin g p redicates o f triu h a n d falsity. But w hat p re d ic ates are really in play, an d

w hat is th e targ et o f p redication? VMiere p re d ic ates go, jjro p erties te n d to follow. If we

are em ploying som e tru th p re d icate, th e n p rim a facie th e re is som e tru th p ro p e rty too

that com es alo n g for the ride. VMiat p ro p e rty is that? VN'hy do so m e things in stan tiate it

a n d o th ers not? V\'hat, if anything, explains why so m e th in g is true?

IVaditionally, p h ilo so p h ers have focused o n answ ers alo n g two c o m p e tin g lines:

D eflationism

T h e re is n o th in g th a t all tru e statem en ts a n d beliefs have in c o m m o n th a t explains

why they are true. S tatem ents a n d beliefs with d iffe re n t subject m atters are tru e for

d iffe re n t reasons, an d those are p a rtic u la r to th e individual statem en ts a n d beliefs.

T h e p red icate “tru e ” does n o t express a p ro p e rty th a t is theo retically in te re stin g in

the sense th a t we can develop a g en e ral e x p la n a tio n fo r why so m e th in g in stan tia te

this property.

M onism

they are tru e. T h e p re d ic ate “trvie” expresses a p ro p e rty th a t is theoredcally interest­

in g in the sense th a t we can, a t least in prin cip le, provide a g en e ral ex p lan a tio n for

why so m e th in g instan tiate this property.

I th in k th e re is m uch to be said in favour o f both o f these answers. N evertheless, I

also th in k th a t n e ith e r is lead in g us dow n the rig h t p ath . T h e m ain virtue o f m onism is

its reco g n itio n th a t th ere is m o re to tru th th an m ere surface. T h e p ro p e rty expressed by

the tru th p re d ic ate is o n e th a t re q u ires m o re o f an ex p lan a tio n th an m erely p o in tin g to

its role as an expressive device. In term s th at I prefer, tn ith is involved in generalizations

th a t co n n e c t it with o th e r concepts. T his m eans th a t tru th is ex planatorily m uch ric h e r

th an the im pression o n e gets by looking at its surface characteristics. T h e m ain flaw with

m onism is th a t it overgeneralizes with respect to w hat m etaphysically relevant prop erty

(o r p ro p e rtie s) tru th is c o n n e c te d with. V\liile th e re is m o re to be .said a b o u t tru th th an

what can be ex tra cted from its surface characteristics, th e re are im plausible m etaphysi­

cal co n seq u en ces o f th in k in g th a t th e re is only

one e x p lan a tio n th a t accounts for ever}'

tru e statem en t an d belief. T u rn in g to deflationism the situation is reversed. D eflationism

d o e s n ’t com m it us to any im plausible m etaphysical co n seq u en ces an d does well in focus­

ing o n the expressive role as th e co rre c t

conceptual analysis o f th e t n u h p redicate. T h e

draw back is th a t it avoids th e issue o f o v ergeneralization at the ex p en se o f denying th at

th e re are any ex planatory an d non-trivial g en eralizations to be m ade a t all. T h e result is

th at deflationism lacks th e resources to accoiuit for tr u th ’s m ore substantial place in se­

m antics a n d pragm atics. T his is in d e p e n d e n t o f w h e th e r deflationism is right in claim ing

th at th e re are no m etaphysically in tere stin g g eneralizations w here tru th plays a role. O r

so I aim to convince you presently.

Pluralism

N ot all tru e statem en ts an d beliefs have so m eth in g in co m m o n th a t ex p lain why they

are true. However, fo r tru e statem en ts a n d beliefs th at c o n c e rn a distinct sub ject m at­

ter, th e re is som e g en e ral fe atu re th a t they m ig h t have in c o m m o n th a t acco u n ts fo r

th e ir b eing so. T h e p red icate “tru e ” expresses a p ro p e rty th at is locally theoretically

in tere stin g in th e sense th a t we can, a t least in p rin cip le, provide local ex p lan atio n s

for w hat m akes so m eth in g instan tiate this property.

This line o f answ ering the m ain questions is attractive because it can avoid th e p ro b ­

lem s associated w ith m onism a n d cleflationism while re ta in in g som e o f th e ir respective

virtues. In particular, it can aid us in u n d e rsta n d in g how to ch a racterize local m etaphys­

ical disputes betw een realism an d antirealism , for ex am p le ab o u t m athem atics, m orality

a n d physics. T h a t’s n o t to say that pluralism d o e sn ’t have its own set o f problem s. It sure

does, an d 1 will re tu rn to the m ost pressing o nes in th e follow ing chapter. 1 d o th in k

that i)luralism is in a b e tte r sh ap e th an deH ationism a n d m onism overall, th o u g h . It is

a cen tral aim o f this essay to show you that, w hen properly u n d e rsto o d , pluralism can

overcom e the stan d ard objections.

re q u ire a good deal o f co n c ep t-m o n g erin g , an d I w ant to get th e re gradually. But before

we start g ettin g clear ab o u t w hat it m eans to say th a t tru th is p lu ral we sh o u ld begin by

co n sid erin g the reasons for why we would w ant to get clear a b o u t pluralism in th e first

place. T h a t’s w hat this c h a p te r is all about.

2.1

D efla tio n ism

T h e startin g observations tliat su p p o rt deflationism , as I see it, is th at (i) tru th is used as

an

expressive device —

h en ce it has a practical ap p licatio n - b u t (ii) it’s h a rd to w hat fu rth e r

c o n trib u tio n it m akes to a statem en t if we add th a t w hat w e’ve claim ed is tru e. A nd even

h a r d e r to see how th ere could b e a

general ex p la n a tio n for why so m eth in g is tru e. W liat

d eflationism am o u n ts to is the claim th a t th ere c a n n o t be any

theory (strictly speaking)

o f tru th at all. T ru th is n o t a co n c e p t th a t plays a role in any explanatorily relevant - i.e.

non-trivial - generalizations.

2.1.1

T r u th as a n E xpre.ssive D ev ice

h i n atu ra l languages tru th plays an im p o rta n t role as an expressive device. If th a t’s no t

p a rt o f the story, it seem s w e’re targ e tin g som e o th e r c o n c e p t th a n tru th . VVTiat sets d e ­

flationism a p a rt from m onism a n d pluralism is th at it m akes th e claim th a t the expressive

ro le o f tn ith is th e

entire story. O n c e we have b e e n given an a d e q u a te a c c o u n t o f its

expressive role th e re is no room fo r fu rth e r q u estio n a b o u t tru th

as such (see Mackie

(1 9 7 3 ), Field (1 9 8 6 ), Williams (1 9 8 8 ), Q u in e (1 9 9 2 ), H orw ich (1 9 9 5 ), (1 9 9 8 ), (2005)

for d iffe re n t versions o f deflationism ).

B efore we m ove on, I should m ake so m eth in g clear. VVlien talking a b o u t statem en ts

a n d beliefs, w hat I have in m ind are th e ir co n ten ts - propositions -

a n d n o t o u r acts o f u t­

te rin g declarative sentences or o u r m en tal states. As I am using th e term , p ro p o sitio n s are

th e things we assert a n d believe, m aking them the objects o f illocutionary acts a n d propo-

sitional attitudes. For the purposes o f this essay, I will largely re m a in n e u tra l o n what

p ro p o sitio n s really are an d what they ultim ately su p erv en e o n . Maybe th e re are n o inex­

pressible o r unbelievable p ropositions o r m aybe they com e twenty to th e d o ze n . Maybe

only h u m an s can believe them o r m aybe cats can too. Maybe they are stru c tu re d to the

p o in t o f isom orphism with sen ten tial stru ctu re o r m aybe they are u n stru c tu re d . Maybe

they are abstractio n s over lan g u ag e use o r m aybe they are realized th ro u g h a causal p ro ­

cess in the brain. T h e d e b a te betw een deflationism , m onism a n d pluralism d o e sn ’t tu rn

o n these questions. A lth o u g h d e fe n d e rs o f these various strategies have view's on such

m atters, we sh o u ld sep a rate w hat they th in k ab o u t p ro p o sitio n s from o u r targ e t debate.

Actually, th e re is n o a g re e m e n t in th e lite ra tu re as to w hat th e tru th b earers are. Even

a m o n g th e d e fe n d e rs o f pluralism th e term inology is unstable. S om etim es it is co u c h ed

in term s o f sen ten ces (W right, 1992), an d o th e r times in term s o f p ro p o sitio n s (W right,

2 0 0 3 b ), (Lynch, 2 009). Less h elp fu l n o tio n s, such as

thoughts,

have also b e e n invoked

(S her, 2 004). Even if my focus is o n p ro p o sitio n al tru th I will o ften shift to talk ab o u t

tn ith o f sen ten c es too. T h e re aso n is th a t while th e e n d goal is p ro p o sitio n al tru th , we

d o n ’t get th e re unless we have a sem an tic fram ew ork established. .And fo r th e purposes

o f sem antics, I p re fe r to talk a b o u t sen ten ces. However, in o u r o rd in ary assessm ents state­

m en ts an d beliefs, th e targ e t o f p re d ic a tio n is m ostly aptly ch a rac te rized as propositions.

C o n sid e r fo r exam ple:

W hat B e rn h a rd believes is true.

liianca said so m e th in g tru e yesterday.

If we were to say this, we w o u ld n ’t be saying th a t B e rn h a rd ’s

mental state

is tru e, o r th a t h e is

in a tn ie m en tal state. N o r w ould we be saying that B ianca’s

act

was tn ie , o r th a t h e r

saying

was tru e. R ather, “w h a t” a n d “so m e th in g ” is picking o u t the c o n te n ts o f B e rn a rd ’s m ental

state a n d B ianca’s statem en t. B eing th e o b ject o f pro p o sitio n al a ttitu d e an d illocutionary

acts is th e trad itio n ally m ost im p o rta n t role assigned to propositions.

So w hat d o we m ean by th e expressive role o f truth? W e’ve already seen two exam ples.

By u tte rin g “W liat B e rn h a rd believes is tru e ” I can express a g re e m e n t with th e pro p o si­

tional c o n te n t o f B e rn h a rd ’s b e lie f w ith o u t artic u la tin g th a t co n te n t. If I w ere to say

“B ianca said so m e th in g tru e yesterday” this can be re ad in the sam e way: “so m e th in g ”

picks o u t a p a rtic u la r p ro p o sitio n a n d I am expressing a g re e m e n t with it. B ut “som e­

th in g ” co u ld also be re a d as a n existential p ro p o sitio n al quantifier. In w hich case my

claim c o u ld be re p re s e n te d as

(3/)) Yesterday (B ianca said

p

a n d

p

is tru e)

still I may u tte r “B ianca said s o m e th in g tru e yesterday” to claim th a t w hatever p ropositions

she expressed yesterday, at least o n e o f th em is tru e. I could also m ake th e stro n g e r claim

th a t “everything B ianca said yesterday is tr u e ”, re p re s e n te d as

(Wp)

Yesterday (if B ianca said

p

th e n

p

is tru e)

T h e re is a differen ce betw een th e existential a n d th e im iversal case. T h e tru th p red icate

allows us to express things in E nglish th a t we c o u ld n ’t express w ith o u t it. O n e m ig h t think

th a t in the universal case we co u ld d ispense with th e tru th p re d ic a te (even if we could n o t

d o so in th e existential c a se). At least, in principle. I could assert every p ro p o sitio n Bianca

asserted yesterday. T his w ould be a ra th e r c u m b erso m e way to go ab o u t, a n d th a t m eth o d

has lim itations even as a m a tte r o f p rin cip le. As W illard Q u in e p o in te d out:

We may affirm [a] single se n te n c e by ju s t u tte rin g it, im a id e d by q u o ta tio n or

by the tru th p red icate; b u t if we w ant to affirm som e infinite lot o f sentences

th a t we can d e m a rc a te only by talking a b o u t th e sen ten ces, th e n the tru th

p re d icate has its use. (Q u in e , 1970, 12)

If we quantify over an infinite set o f p ro p o sitio n s th e n we c a n n o t, even in prin cip le, re­

place the claim that involves the tru th pred icate. F or ex am p le, because th e re is an infinite

n u m b e r o f axiom s o f P ean o arith m e tic , I c a n n o t sim ply replace

Eveiy axiom o f P ean o a rith m e tic is tru e

with som e o th e r claim s th a t d o e s n ’t involve the tru th p re d icate. As a p red icate in n atu ral

language, tru th is n o t only a useful expressive device, it is indisp en sab le. It c a n n o t be

elim in a ted from English w ith o u t seriously re d u c in g its expressive powers.

T his is all a m a tte r o f w hat I called tr u th ’s surface characteristics. A ccording to Paul

H orw ich (1998, 5 ), th e re is a very straig h tfo rw ard ex p la n a tio n fo r how “tru e ” gets to play

th e role as an expressive device. A co n c ep tu al analysis o f tru th is provided by the

Equivalence schem a

T h e p ro p o sitio n

th a t p

is tru e iff

p.

B eing a c o m m itte d deflationist, H orw ich goes o n to claim th a t th e re is n o th in g illu­

m in a tin g to be said ab o u t tru th bey o n d th e

Equivalence schem a.

A c o n c e p tu a l analysis

o f the tru th p re d ic ate suffices to c a p tu re everytliing th a t need s to ex p la in e d as far as

p h ilo so p h ers are c o n c e rn e d . T hings a r e n ’t th at sim ple, as th e d efla tio n ist will adm it.

T h e Equivalence schem a

plays a c e n tra l role in sem an tic p arad o x es, in p artic u la r the

liar

paradox (Tarski, 1933). If (i) we re ad

Equivalence schem a im restrictedly, an d (ii) o u r

language is go v ern ed by classical logic, a n d (iii) o u r lan g u ag e is able to express its own

syntax, th e n we are m ired in p arad o x . F or th e p u rp o ses o f this essay, th o u g h , I will ignore

th e sem antic paradoxes. P luralism d o e s n ’t d e p e n d o n any p a rtic u la r so lu tio n to th e p ara­

doxes, so I w ant to re m a in co m pletely n e u tra l. N o th in g th a t I will go o n to say c a n n o t be

c h a n g e d to ac co m m o d ate th e sta n d a rd solutions to th e parad o x es, w h e th e r they d e m a n d

a revision o f classical logic o r in tro d u c in g restrictions o n

Equivalence schema.

2 .1 .2

T r u th as R e d u n d a n t in E x p la n a d o n s

As a co n c ep tu al analysis o f the tru th p re d ic a te in everyday speech, an accouiU o f its ex­

pressive role m ig h t be exhaustive. W hat gives d eflationism its bite is th a t its fu rth e r claim

th a t th e re is n o th in g to tru th bey o n d playing the expressive role. To see why this m ight

be ap p ealin g , co n sid e r th e two sentences:

1 sm ell th e scen t o f violets.

It is tru e th a t I sm ell th e scen t o f violets.

Is th e re any notew o rth y d iffe ren c e b etw een them ? O f course, o n e co n tain s “it is tru e

th a t” an d th e o th e r d o e s n ’t. B ut w h e th e r B e rn h a rd asserted th e first o r th e second, would

th e re be any d iffe ren c e in w hat h e said o r in th e significance o f his sp ee ch act? If th e re

is a d ifferen ce th e re , it’s n o t o n e th a t’s easy to detect. H aving n o tic e d this, G ottlob Frege

says th at th e two sen ten c es express th e sam e proposition;

If th e re is n o significant d iffe ren c e betw een asserting “I smell the scent o f violets” an d “It

is tru e th a t I sm ell th e sce n t o f violets”, it m ight b e te m p tin g to say th a t “tru e ” d o e sn ’t

express a property. B ut, as p o in te d o u t by W right (2001, 7 5 3 ), deflationism d o e s n ’t have

to m ake th e controversial claim th a t th e re is n o tru th property. O n c e we have accepted

th a t th e re is a p re d ic a te “tr u e ” we sh o u ld allow it to express the p ro p e rty

being true.

T h ere

is n o th in g syntactically o d d a b o u t “tru e ” , n o r is it g e rry m a n d e re d o r recovered via som e

lam bda abstraction. I t’s a straig h tfo rw ard m onadic p re d icate, an d it seem s difficult to find

a p rin cip led reason fo r deny in g th a t it expresses a p ro p e rty (o r a co n c e p t w hich again

expresses a p ro p e rty ). All th a t is re q u ire d by d eflationism is to h o ld th a t this pro p erty

is re d u n d a n t o r ex p lan ato rily vacuous. T h e real distin ctio n betw een a deflationary an d

a n on-deflationary ac co im t (m onism an d plu ralism ), acco rd in g to W right, is th at the

fo rm e r assum es th a t an a d e q u a te ex p lan a tio n o f th e tru th p ro p e rty is “tra n sp a re n t from

the analysis o f th e c o n c e p t.”

T h a t seem s right, b u t

1

th in k it’s m ore h elpful to th in k o f the issue in term s o f inform a­

tive generalizations. If d eflationism is cc^rrect th en th e re are n o in te re stin g o r non-trivial

generalizations w here tru th plays a role. C onsequently, we d o n ’t n e e d to u n d e rsta n d

tru th in term s o f its re la tio n to o th e r concepts (o r p ro jjerties) n o r is o u r u n d e rsta n d in g of

o th e r philosophically in tere stin g co n cep ts e n h a n c e d by talking a b o u t th e ir coiuiections

with tru th . Most im portantly, d eflationism denies th at th e re is any g en e ral ex p lan atio n

we can provide for why a p ro p o sitio n instantiates

being true.

All th at we have recourse

to is the E quivalence schem a. A nd from that, all we can give by way o f explan atio n s are

trivialities:

That the earth orbits the sun

is tru e because th e e a rth orbits the sun.

That cows eat grass

is tru e because cows eat grass.

A nd so we could go o n fo r every tru e pro p o sitio n . W liat explains th e tru th o f th e p ro p o ­

sition

that the earth orbits the sun

an d w hat explains th e tru th o f th e p ro p o sitio n

that cows

eat grass

are as dissim ilar as th e e a r th ’s m ovem ents an d cows gastro n o m ical habits. Triv­

ialities o f this k in d are th e only th in g we will find if we looking fo r ex p lan a tio n s fo r why

so m eth in g in stantiates

being true

as such. T h e re is an initial ap p e a l to this view, if we think

o f the task o f d ev elo p in g a th eo ry o f tru th alo n g th e lines o f d ev elo p in g a th eo ry in the

sciences. N atu ral kinds are few a n d far betw een. A good ex a m p le we sh o u ld learn from

is th a t o f th e b eh a v io u rist’s a tte m p t to provide a th eo ry a b o u t le a rn in g

as such in term s

o p e ra n t c o n d itio n in g .

A cco rd in g to B. F. S k in n e r’s (1 9 7 6 ), we can trea t the psychology o f an individual at a

p artic u la r tim e as co llectio n o f psychological traits

t\, . . . tn, w h ere each

ti is a p artic u la r

stim ulus-response association. T h e stim ulus-response associations can be read probabilis­

tically. We can in te rp re t the psychological profile o f K aidan at a p articu lar tim e as the

d istrib u tio n o f p robabilities over his set o f stim idus-response associations. E xternal fac­

tors - in p a rtic u la r the affirm atio n o f his actions, such as J o h n giving Kaidan a pat o n the

h e a d - will increase th e probability o f the operative stim ulus-response association th at

is b ein g d o m in a n t with re sp ect to K aidan’s b eh a v io u r at th a t tim e. For K aidan to learn

so m e th in g is fo r K aidan to ch a n g e the d istrib u tio n o f probabilities over his psychologi­

cal profile such th a t th e relev an t stim ulus-response associations increase in d o m in a n c e

relative to o thers.

T h e re are all sorts o f reasons why this tu rn e d o u t to be w rong, b u t o n e o f th e things

we realized was this: th e re w asn’t any theoretically in te re stin g c o n c e p t o r p ro p e rty picked

o u t by “le a rn in g as su c h ”. T h e re are all kinds o f things that K aidan u n d e rg o th ro u g h o u t

his life th a t we call learn in g ; le a rn in g how to speak English, le a rn in g how to d an ce the fox­

tro t, le a rn in g how to m ake J o h n laugh, learn in g how to play th e video gam es. But th e re

is n o th in g substantial in c o m m o n across all cases, o r som e g e n e ra l fe atu re th a t explains

w hat m akes it th a t case th a t K aidan has le a rn e d so m eth in g . W hen we abstract over the

p h e n o m e n a to the p o in t w here all cases o f le a rn in g have so m e th in g in co m m o n , th e so-

called “th e o ry ” o f le a rn in g w ould be vacuous. We co u ld find co u n terfactu ally su p p o rtin g

generalizatio n s, if tho se g en eralizatio n s w ere tautological (o r close to b ein g ones).

L ea rn in g as such is sim ilar to tru th

as such, a c co rd in g to d eflationism . In b o th cases

we have a h e te ro g e n e o u s p h e n o m e n o n (individuals learn so m eth in g , so m eth in g in stan ­

tiates

being true) th a t converge o n th e d ata in a ce rtain kind o f way. W liat we d o n ’t have is

so m eth in g th a t ac co u n ts fo r th e d a ta in the sam e way in each case. A theory m ust be p ro ­

vide a u n ifo rm ex p la n a tio n o f why the relevant p ro p e rty is in stan tia ted , n o t a co llection

o f anecdotes. A nd in th e case o f tru th , an e cd o tes is all w e’ll ever get.

inuddv because it h a d ra in e d heavily th e w hole week, a n d so on. For each battle (w here

so m eo n e actually w on), th e re is a causal story fo r why they won. But th e re is n o g en eral

ex p la n a tio n a b o u t w hat m akes it the case th a t so m eo n e wins a battle. Well, n o t a n o n

trivial o n e anyway. W ide g eneralizations ab o u t battles w ould probably a m o u n t to a m ost

uninfo rm ativ e tautology. Likewise, th e idea goes, th a t is what we e n d u p with if we w ant an

ex p lan a tio n o f w hat all tru th s have in co m m o n . We e n d u p with the Equivalence schema.

2. 1. 3

Normativity

T h e first p ro b lem fo r d eflationism is norm ativity. If a co n c ep tu al analysis o f “tru e ” p ro ­

vided by th e Equivalence schem a suffices th e n tru th c a n n o t be norm ative. However, many

p h ilo so p h ers have th o u g h t th at tm th has som e in h e re n t norm ative ch a rac te r too. If so,

tru th plays a

normative role in ad d itio n to the expressive role. A nd consequently, tru th

plays an ex p lan ato ry role beyond w hat we cou ld g a th e r from the co n c ep tu al analysis.

T his in tro d u ce s a first potentially in tere stin g g en eralization over p rojiositions that

c o n n e c t tru th with a n o th e r con cep t. For o u r purposes, le t’s focus on the co n n e c tio n

betw een th e pragm atic co n c e p t o f ought to assert a n d truth:

(V p)(one o u g h t to assert p only if p

is true)

I d o n ’t th in k th a t this is precisely the co rre c t way to fo rm id ate it, but the details d o n ’t

m atter at the m o m en t. VNliat the deflationist w ould have to h o ld is th a t this g en eralizatio n

is accid en tal, so they w ould deny th a t we sh o u ld in fer that

(V p)(if

p

is tru e, it is perm issible to assert p

because p

is true)

T h e d eflatio n ist has to say tru th is com pletely non-norinative an d that th e first g en e ral­

ization is m erely accidental, o r th at th e re is so m eth in g else in the b a c k g ro u n d th a t is d o ­

ing the e x p la n a tio n fo r w hat m akes its perm issible o r im perm issible to assert som ething.

W liat is nonnatively g u id in g assertions m ight be som e o th e r co n c ep t th a t is extensionally

quite close to tru th in th e relevant circum stances. It th a t were the case th e n tru th

as such

w o u ld n ’t have to be an in h eren tly norm ative no tio n .

I th in k it’s a m istake to deny th a t tm th is norm ative. T h e reason was m ad e clea r by

M ichael D u m m ett (1 9 5 9 ), (1981). Assum e th a t th e co n c ep tu al analysis o f th e

Equiva­

lence schem a

p ro v id ed th e co n c ep tu al analysis o f tru th . If deflationism is c o rre c t th en

so m e o n e w ho grasp ed this schem a w ould have grasped all th e re is to know a b o u t tru th .

S o m e o n e w ho h ad know ledge o f th e Equivalence schem a w ould have th e ability to use

t n u h as an expressive device an d say things like “w hat B e rn h a rd says is tru e ”. W liat they

w ould lack, however, w ould be the

point

o f saying that so m e th in g tru e. T h e g eneraliza­

tion th a t co n n e cts w hat p eo p le ju d g e s to be perm issible to assert a n d w hat they ju d g e

to be tru e

ca n ’t

be an accident. A ccording to D iim m ett, if so m eo n e did n o t co n sid er it

a (defeasible) goal in conversations to say things th a t are tru e, a n d d id n ’t ex p ect o th e r

p e o p le to d o th e sam e, they w ould n o t have a grasp o f th e c o n c e p t o f tru th .

T h e d eflatio n ist can reply th a t w hatever n orm ative fe atu re th a t is associated with tru th

is m erely in stru m en tal. W liat th e deflatio n ist need s to arg u e is th a t th e re is som e o th e r

c o n c e p t th a t has a norm ative ch aracter, an d tru th only seem s norm ative by virtue o f this

o th e r co n cep t. L e t’s first co n sid er som e co n cep ts th a t are usually a g re e d to be in h ere n tly

norm ativ e, e.g. good, bad, rig h t a n d w rong. If tru th is n orm ative it w ould play a sim ilar

ro le with re sp ect to speech acts (and perha])s also beliefs) as g o o d does for actions in

g en e ral. I say “sim ilar” an d not “th e sam e”, because the kind o f norm ativity th a t tru th

m ig h t possess d o e s n ’t seem to be c o n n e c te d directly with m oral value. It may be that

sp ea k in g truthfully o n som e occasion, o r even most occasions, is th e m orally rig h t th in g

to d o , but th a t seem s secondary in the sense th a t tn u h itself w ould be norm ative. VV'e can

easily im agine a situation w here w hat is m orally rig h t would be to say so m e th in g th a t is

false. For ex am p le, Kitidan knows th at his p a r tn e r jo h n is h id in g in th e storage, b u t greedy

m erc en arie s are looking for J o h n b en t o n killing him . An assertion o f

John is hiding in

the storage

w ould be co rrect, b u t all things equal it w o id d n ’t be very m oral to g uide the

m erc en arie s t o j o h n ’s location.

T h e co n c e p tu a l distin ctio n betw een an assertion b ein g c o rre c t a n d an action b ein g

g o o d is in telligible even if we w ere to accep t th e ICantian view th a t speak in g truthfully is

always

th e m orally good th in g to do. In th a t case we w o u ld n ’t get th e g en eralizatio n th at

s o m e th in g is perm issible to assert only if it is true. We w ould get th e generalization:

(V p)(one o u g h t to assert

p

only if

p

is believed)

so m eth in g has episteinic vahie, b u t the g en eral idea is perh ap s go o d e n o u g h to get iis

started. This o p en s u p th e possibility for deflationisin th a t the in stru m en tal value o f tru th

com es from o th e r n o tio n s in n eig h b o u rh o o d : evidence, ju stificatio n , a n d w arrant. But

this seem s to get the ex p lan a tio n by the w rong en d o f the stick. It m ight be a reliable

e n o u g h co n n e c tio n betw een tru th a n d w arrant, a n d th at could explain the exten sio n al

relatio n betw een w hat is p e rm itte d to assert an d what is true. VMiat it d o e s n ’t explain,

th o u g h , is the

intensional

re la d o n . Since only the first o f these coiinterfactu als are tm e

If it w ere the case th a t

p

was tru e b u t n o t w arran ted it w ould be c o rre c t to assert

p.

If it were the case th a t

p

was false b u t w arran ted it w ould be c o rre c t to assert

p.

it seem s like th a t the norm ativity o f assertions is tracking tru th ra th e r th an w arrant. O n e

could brid g e th e gap by iiu ro d u c in g som e s tre n g th e n e d notio n o f w arran t (e.g. c o n ­

clusive w arrant) th a t always en su res tru th . It would still miss D u n m ie tt’s jjoint, w hich is

th at o n e d o e s n ’t grasp the co n c e p t o f tn ith unless o n e u n d ersta n d s th at it is so m eth in g

we

aim

at w hen we m ake assertions. A nd aim ing is an in te n tio n a l relatio n th a t can even

distinguish betw eene necessarily co-extensional properties.

It also seem s th at t n i th ’s expressive role itself really goes beyond th e Equivalence

schem a. If I use “w hat B e rn h a rd says is tru e ” to express a g re e m e n t with B ern h a rd , th en

the significance o f d o in g so is n o t c a p tu re d by the schem a. It m erely tells us th a t if we

do so we can use it to disq u o te, b u t w hat I have d o n e by saying that in a conversation is

left mysterious. T h e mystery c a n n o t be chalked u p to a w ider issue a b o u t language. T h e

only q u estio n w ould be

why

I said it was true. (See also W right (1992, 17 - 29), (2001,

■

759

in d e p e n d e n t a rg u m e n t th at Equivalence schem a co n tain s an im plicit

in d e p e n d e n t no rm . I o m it this a rg u m e n t becau.se I’m n o t entirely convinced by it).

2 .1 .4

T r u th C o n d itio n a l S e m a n tic s

is p o s s ib le ) o r t h a t c le fla tio n is m is m is s in g a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f th e s to i y w e n e e d to te ll a b o u t t r u t h .

T h e te n s i o n b e tw e e n d e f la tio n is m a n d t r u t h c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n tic s w as p o i n t e d o u t by D u m m e t t ( 19 5 9 ) , ( D u m m e t t, 1 9 9 1 , 3 3 1 - 3 3 2 ) . T h e r e a r e tw o r e l a t e d c o n s id e r a t io n s t h a t g o e s in th is d i r e c t i o n . F irs t, as w e ’ve s e e n t h e d e f l a t i o n i s t la c k s th e r e s o u r c e s to p r o v id e a n a c c o u n t o f th e s ig n if ic a n c e o f u s in g t h e t r u t h p r e d ic a te . O n c e t r u t h is ta k e n to b e fu lly a c c o v m te d f o r in te r m s o f its e x p r e s s iv e r o le w e lo s e th e a b ility to g iv e it a n y r o le as p a r t o f e x p l a i n i n g p r o p r i e r t i e s o f u s e , in p a r t i c u l a r w ith r e s p e c t to a s s e r tio n . S e c o n d , if th e E q u iv a le n c e s c h e m a is u s e d to give u s th e m e a n i n g o f “t r u e ” w e c a n n o t a t t h e s a m e tim e u s e it to g iv e u s a n a c c o u n t o f th e m e a n i n g o f s e n te n c e s . I n o u r f o r m u l a t i o n w e e m p lo y e d th e c o n c e p t o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , s o if w e n e e d to s ta te th e r o le o f t r u t h in te r m s p r o p o s i t i o n s w e m u s t ta k e th is n o t i o n f o r g r a n t e d . W e c a n ’t t h e n u s e t h e t r u t h c o n d i tio n s o f s e n te n c e s to g iv e a n a c c o u n t o f p r o p o s itio n s .

T h e m a jo r ity o f d e f la tio n is ts h a v e a c c e p t e d t h a t th e y c a n n o t h e l p th e m s e lv e s to a t r u t h c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t ic s , a n d h a v e b e e n p u r s u i n g s o m e k in d o f in ferevtialist ( o r assertihility cond itio n a l) s e m a n t ic th e o r y in s te a d ; e .g . ( B r a n d o m , 1 9 9 4 ) , (F ie ld , 1 9 9 4 ) , ( H o r w ic h , 1 9 9 8 ). P e rlu i[)s t h e m o s t d e v e lo [ )e d a l te r n a t iv e to t r u t h c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t ic s coiTies f r o m B r a n d o m , in p a r t i c u l a r as j) r e s e n te d in h is b o o k ( 2 0 0 8 ) Betiueen S a y in g a n d Doing. I lis s u g g e s tio n is t h a t w e c o n s t r u c t o u r s e m a n t ic th e o r y a r o i m d in c o m p a t ib ili ty a n d in ­ f e r e n c e r a t h e r t h a n t r u t h a n d r e f e r e n c e . T h e n o t i o n o f in c o m p a t ib ili ty is d e f i n e d in p r a g m a tic te rm s :

I n c o m p a tib il ity

A s e n t e n c e (j) is in c o m p a t ib le w ith a s e n t e n c e '0 iff u n d e r t a k i n g c o m m i t m e n t s to (j) p r e c l u d e s o n e f r o m ( a n e n t i t l e m e n t to ) u n d e r t a k i n g c o m m i t m e n t s to

( B r a n d o m , 1 9 9 4 , 1 6 9 ), ( B r a n d o m , 2 0 0 0 , 4 4 ) , ( B r a n d o m , 2 0 0 8 , 1 1 2 )

L e t ’s say t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e £ is a s e t o f s e n te n c e s , a n d v is a f u n c t i o n t h a t m a p s se ts o f s e n te n c e s to s e ts o f se ts o f s e n te n c e s {v : ipC —> In tu itiv e ly , u ( r ) d e n o t e s th e s e t o f s e ts o f s e n t e n c e s t h a t a r e in c o m p a t ib le w ith t h e s e t o f s e n te n c e s F , so ‘A € i ’( r ) ’ r e a d s as s a y in g t h a t A is in c o m p a t i b l e w ith F . W e a s s u m e tw o g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s a b o u t in c o m p a tib ility ;

S y m m e tr y