MEDIEVAL THINKING

Having turned from Christianity, to look back at antecedent principles of kenosis in the philosophy and theology of antiquity, this survey now turns to look in the direction of an ultimately contemporary context. But, before progressing to modern developments in kenotic thinking, it is important to acknowledge and briefly consider those of the Middle Ages. Such contributions are once again found in both Christianity and Judaism (as well as in other traditions, as discussed later in this chapter). Although consummately religious and Christian, the scholastic Thomas of Aquino, known as Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-1274), and the mystic Johannes Eckhart, known as Meister Eckhart (ca. 1260-1327/8), explore concepts of Being and being in such a way that both find their

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The verb skenóō means, literally, to pitch a tent. See ibid., 1816.

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work officially censured.84 Aquinas, however, goes on to become canonised, and both become recognised for their advancement of ‘philosophical theology’ (a kind of philosophy within theology, if that is actually philosophy). More important to this discussion, each opens-up insightful aspects of kenosis, even if not intentionally or explicitly. Judaic mysticism, particularly the sixteenth century strain known as Kabbalah, does the same with more directness. Of particular interest, arising during the transition from Middle Ages to Early Modernity, is the Kabbalistic notion of zimzum, a distinctly kenotic concept posited by Rabbi Isaac Luria (1534-1572), which eventually provides impetus to the Late Modern revival and development of kenotic thought.

Thomas Aquinas and the “Five Ways”

Although his writings are far more prolific and profound, it is his relatively brief ‘proofs’ of God’s existence – known as the “Five Ways” – by which Thomas Aquinas is perhaps best known. Appearing early in his Summa Theologiæ,85 and clearly influenced by Aristotle’s arguments concerning the existence of a ‘First Unmoved Mover’, each Way deploys a different argument in an attempt to reach one common conclusion; namely, that some ultimately causal something exists, a something that, according to Aquinas, “everyone understands to be God” or “everyone gives the name of God.” The qualified nature of his conclusion – never quite saying that the causal something is God – invites debate as to exactly what Aquinas intended to prove. It also renders his arguments susceptible to those critics who assert that they do not prove, at all, the existence of God (at least not the Christian God, or a God of religion), and, even if it were otherwise, that they do not necessarily lead to the same God and may only lead to a concept of God.86 Whatever they prove, or fail to prove, I suggest an alternative reading of the Five Ways; one in which they are seen to efficaciously demonstrate the reality of kenosis, or kenotic phenomena. It is that reading which warrants further exploration here. Aquinas’ arguments rely on sensibly perceived effects, caused by something indiscernible.

84

J.D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 276.

85

T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Summa Theologiæ), trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., (ca. 1274) 1947), First Part, Question 2, Article 3, response. This is the source of all subsequent quotations from the “Five Ways.”

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For example, Timothy Pawl (Thomist scholar and Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Thomas in Minnesota, USA) argues that Aquinas “does not take himself to have already shown that the God of the Christian creed exists.” On the other hand, after acknowledging major criticisms of the Five Ways, Leo Elders (Roman Catholic priest, Thomist scholar, and Fellow of the Pontifical Academy of St Thomas Aquinas) concludes that while Aquinas leaves room for a reasoned or philosophical interpretation, the ultimately theological setting of this work means that the final subject of Aquinas’ arguments can only be the God “revealed” by “Christian faith.” He writes: “Aquinas by no means reduces the God of the Christian faith to philosophy. Rather philosophy serves as a preparation for the faith.” The latter, of course, calls into question whether philosophy at the service of theology is actually philosophy. See T.J. Pawl, "The Five Ways," in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. B. Davies and E. Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 115; and L.J. Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, ed. A. Zimmerman, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 130-131.

Therefore, the cause ‘proven’ by each is self-evidently hidden, something self-withdrawn, or self-contracted, but nonetheless powerful as a result. Such attributes are already revealing of kenotic ontology.

The First Way argues on the basis of motion, using Aristotelian principles from Physics and Metaphysics. Aquinas describes motion as “nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality,” and posits that “whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.” As in all of the Ways, the first invokes the principle of causality, concluding that there must have been an original ‘cause’; in this case, a cause of effected original motion. Here, and in the discussion of all subsequent Ways, I leave the veracity of that conclusion, and the constitution of that ‘cause’, to those theologians, philosophers, and scientists who continue to consider it. Of greater interest is the argument’s opening- up of a kenotic scenario. Motion is said to be a “reduction”; that is, some sort of contraction or diminution. Not only that, it is a reduction of potentiality in favour of actualisation. Hence this argument suggests that whatever constitutes the original cause, such constitution must be seen as the sole source of potentiality for motion. Therefore, the actualisation of initial motion in an initial object requires some self-reduction, or self- emptying, of the potentiality for motion – that held solely by the original cause – until the originating moment. It is thus kenosis, which requires and is itself motion, that initially enables motion. It follows, then, that such initial motion is also a kenosis of the affected object – an emptying that makes-room for the receipt of, and filling by, the potentiality for motion that is given up by the original cause, and with which the object becomes enabled to actualise movement. But what becomes of the self-emptied portion of the potentiality for motion in the original cause? It draws-in, and is filled by, that portion of the affected object now also holding like potentiality for motion (albeit already partially-emptied to actualise this motion by which it partially becomes the original cause). Thus, in this double kenosis87 – an originating act of kenosis responded to reciprocally – both original cause and affected object are transformed, and, despite the onset of complexity (which will only increase), a unitary primordial structure is maintained.

Indeed, the First Way is fundamentally about coming-into-being, or becoming; that which kenosis animates. Not only does the affected object partially become the originating cause (its ‘other’), the originating cause also partially becomes the affected object (its ‘other’), both doing so by virtue of their emptying and making-room for such happenings. Since it is about becoming, the First Way is also about continuousness; the unending nature of kenosis. The Thomist view of continuous movement (via Aristotle) finds that “as long as a movement lasts, the actualization is incomplete and continues

87 _{It is worth considering this notion of ‘double kenosis’, as I present it here, juxtaposed with its counterpart in}

toward further fulfilment.”88 _{It follows that kenosis, as long as it elicits reciprocal kenotic}

response (the essence of its ‘movement’), continues unendingly, not unlike the perpetual motion of Plato’s chora.89 _{And because kenosis is potentiality without teleological ends –}

that is, without the purpose or strategy of fulfilment – it is always incomplete, never fully actualised. Viewed in the context of the First Way, kenosis can be seen not only as that which enables originating movement and animates ongoing movement but also as that which thereby maintains potentiality.

In a sense, the remaining Ways are subsidiary to the First. Well before Aquinas, the Islamic philosopher Averroës (Ibn Rušd, 1126-1198) had viewed Aristotle’s argument from motion to be the “only decisive proof” (of first movers),90 _{and Aquinas commences}

his First Way by calling it “the first and more manifest way.” Nonetheless, the others build the case, and, just as importantly, they continue to reveal the Ways’ kenotic bases. The Second Way shifts the focus from the becoming of effects (like motion) to their being. It emphasises the seriality of the causes producing such effects, whereby each effect in a series of effects is dependent on the causality of the one prior, which Aquinas sees as ‘proof’ of a first cause. Viewed through a kenotic lens, the Second Way turns its attention from the notion of reciprocal response to that of an “efficient” (used in the Aquinian sense) kenotic act. In that act, the responding something transforms and becomes, so as to cause, or enable, the transformation and becoming of something else (even as the enabling something is consequently transformed). Thus the being of kenosis – its onward extension – can be portrayed as a series of efficient acts. In unending continuance, each kenotic act produces both reciprocal response and propulsive extension, such that becoming is being, being is becoming. But, as it turns out, what appears to be neat seriality is actually complex and entangled relationality. What then might be said of the necessity of being? Aquinas turns to that subject in his Third Way, and therein raises the issue of being’s corruptibility, or its possibility not to be. The argument is used to posit a ‘first necessity’, something “having of itself its own necessity,” (much like the chora, or matrix, which Plato also named ‘necessity’). This too is not without implications concerning kenosis. Insofar as kenosis is essential to an original happening (the enablement of motion, animation of becoming, and maintenance of being), it is its own necessity, the ontology of creativity. And, even though it is continuous and unending, it is not incorruptible amongst that which it creates. That is particularly so amongst humanity, which, being corruptible, can fail to reciprocally respond to kenosis

88

The Aristotelian principle of continuous movement, as appropriated by Aquinas, is posited in Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St Thomas Aquinas: 91.

89

See note 53 and surrounding discussion.

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(either by ignorance or wilful choice) and thereby provisionally defer, alter, or otherwise violate its ongoing-ness – indeterminate as that already is.

The Fourth Way argues that the potential of something’s being lies in that something’s grounding, and that ultimate grounding is to be found in that which first causes “being, goodness, and every other perfection” (meaning maximum potential development). Once again, inasmuch as kenosis permeates an original creative event, it is a fundamental grounding, a primary source of potentiality. In other words, kenosis can be seen to permeate the grounding of all things, such that all things have the potential to be kenotic. Indeed, the potential of such things’ being – which is finally their potential to be somehow creative or re-creative – lies paradoxically in their potential to be kenotic, to be self-emptying. The notion that such potential leads to an inevitable “end” forms the basis of the Fifth Way. In the last of Aquinas’ arguments, he suggests that “things which lack knowledge … act for an end … so as to obtain the best result … not fortuitously, but designedly.” With that, he makes a case that “some being endowed with knowledge” must therefore exist to direct (designedly) the movement of such things “toward their end.” Not surprisingly, its use of creationist and teleological propositions has been duly criticised. From the Atomists and Epicureans (notwithstanding intervening defences by Plato and Aristotle), through to modernity and contemporary science, the notion of ‘design’ in nature has been challenged and debated,91 _{and cannot be resolved here.}

Nonetheless, it is at this juncture that the notion of a supreme creator/director can be seen to contradict the notion that creation is enabled, animated, and maintained by kenosis. For if created things (knowledgeable or not) are purposefully ‘designed’, and thereby controlled and directed to inevitable and therefore preconceived ‘good’ ends (even by way of destruction and ‘evil’), then kenosis – an emptying and opening-up that ongoingly effects indeterminate creation and transformation of that created – is superfluous, or worse, a tool of divine deceit and gamesmanship vis-à-vis the divine’s creation.

Notwithstanding such difficulties, the Fifth Way goes on to reveal more of kenosis, even if not exactly as Aquinas may have intended. Its proposition that action “always or nearly always” moves toward the “best result” can be seen to support the notion that ongoing kenosis – kenotic response and extension – inevitably moves toward that which ‘needs’ to happen, rather than toward an already designed outcome. Furthermore, the kenotic happening may not result in what is ‘best’, at least not in the Aquinian sense of something perfect or perfectly good. Instead it results in what is ‘necessary’ to a given

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Elders discusses the debate and claims that his analysis offers sufficient answers to those who would object to the creationist and teleological arguments, ironically lamenting that he nonetheless expects them to “be of little help against prejudice,” as if his own answers do not suffer the prejudice of a strictly Christian viewpoint. See ibid., 125-127.

situation. It is also not an ‘end’ in the sense of finality, because even the necessary result in a given situation already presents an altered situation, in need of its own next ‘end’ or ‘best result’. Becoming and being, permeated by kenosis, can only lead to interim and fleeting ends. The being and end of so-called ordered things is to be constantly dis- ordered and re-ordered, even in unordered ways. Moreover, although Aquinas views his Fifth Way only through unknowledgeable things, such as “natural bodies,” it offers equally important insight into humanity and its ends. Since humanity’s cognition is always volitional – at least in part – its awareness and embrace of kenosis is likewise. Kenosis is susceptible to human resistance and therefore never a certainty in every situation. But the being of humanity, and the interim ends thereby reached, are already indeterminate when left to kenotic unfolding, and such indeterminacy is unaltered (even if temporary situational responses are) by the ignorance of or resistance to such unfolding. The latter may even be seen as part of what some particular situation ‘needs’ – at some particular moment. Paradoxically, then, whether produced by choosing or denying kenosis, the ‘ends’ of human being – that is, the effects of being rather than being’s demise – are of human design and ultimately pursuant to kenosis, even when tortuously so. Choosing kenosis is neither mandatory nor prescriptive, and offers no certain outcome. It simply – but importantly – offers the potential for heightened awareness and, thereby, enhanced creativity.

Meister Eckhart and Gelassenheit

A fellow Dominican who follows and draws on the work of Aquinas, but also differentiates himself, Meister Eckhart posits exactly such kenotic potential, albeit without deploying the term kenosis. He speaks first of “detachment,” referring to a liberation “from your own self-will” and declaring that “undetached people” are “full of self-will.”92

His view of self- will includes not only that which might compromise the body but also that which might restrict the mind (cognition).93 Philosopher and Eckhartian analyst John Caputo (1940-) observes:

Eckhart associates the mystical-ascetical notion of purifying oneself … with Aristotle’s tabula rasa, which is the ‘emptiness’ or receptivity necessary for cognition. In both the ‘detached heart’ and the ‘passive reason’ there is the same necessity of the subject to purify itself of its subjectivity.94

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See "The Talks of Instruction" (particularly no. 3) in J. Eckhart, Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings, trans. O. Davies (London: Penguin Books, 1994).

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Ibid., lvii.

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Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought: 148. Caputo attributes the said association to Eckhart’s treatise, On Detachment, but Oliver Davies suggests that “it is by no means clear that this [treatise]

is by the hand of Eckhart.” See Eckhart, Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings: xxxix; and, for the full text of "On Detachment", see Eckhart, Meister Eckhart: Selections from His Essential Writings: 103-118. Nonetheless,

Clearly, the subject’s purification of itself is a self-emptying, a kenosis that grants heightened awareness of that which is other than self; in other words, potentiality beyond self. But it is not only the desired outcome of detachment that concerns Eckhart. He is also interested in the means by which such detachment might be effected, and coins a word to identify his concept – Gelassenheit – a word which describes existential notions of ‘letting-go’ and ‘letting-be’, or, in its most common translation, ‘releasement’.95 _It

follows, then, that kenosis can be seen as the emptying of self-will, realised as detachment and effected through releasement.

To his notion of detachment, Eckhart ironically appends an attachment. Inherent in his “releasement-from” (self-will), there is a “releasement-to – a deferral or leaving [of] matters and one’s own motivations up to – the will of God.”96 _{From that, it might appear}

that releasement is conditional and not quite fully kenotic. But Eckhart’s view of God, perhaps even more so than Aquinas’, is that of a withdrawn and hidden mystery: “the divine abyss, the divine nothingness … the divine ‘wasteland’.”97 _{Any releasement-to this}

“truly divine God (der göttlich Gott),” which Eckhart contrasts with “the purely thought-up God (der gedachte Gott),” is itself a releasement to emptiness; that is, a self-emptying which makes-room to be filled by emptiness. Caputo summarises the Eckhartian argument, stating that “it is not Being, but what knows Being, an openness to Being which is divested of Being in order to be taken over by Being.”98 _{Such openness and}

willingness to be taken over is clearly passive, but actively so. It is not the posture or act of a bystander simply observing the situation. It is an engagement with the situation, without the goal of dominating it. It thereby invites the approach and appearance of what the situation itself needs; a situation already including anyone and anything engaged with it, and hence including their needs as well. Such a kenotic event – incorporating detachment and releasement – obviates willed imposition and prioritises creativity. It does so not through the seeking of novelty but through novelty’s divestiture. In that, the ultimate novelty – unique appositeness – is paradoxically enabled to appear. It is ‘created’. Insofar as Caputo argues that “the fully radicalized meaning of intellectus in

the themes that underlie such association can be amply seen in other Eckhart writings. See, for example,