However, we should keep in mind that his systematic commentary is lost, while his

(2) Plotinus on acting and being affected

Eight whole chapters (15 to 22) of the present tract are devoted to the discussion of the two Aristotelian categories, ποιειν and πάσχειν, which Aristotle passed over in the Categories. The reason for this special treat­ ment is that Plotinus does not want simply to reject the categories of action and passion on the ground that they do not constitute authentic "genera of Being.'' Nor does he believe that these two categories are unnecessary in the sense that they are reducible to other more fundamen­ tal Aristotelian categories, as was the case regarding when and where. Rather, it is because he introduces a new category which, he thinks, can substitute for these two categories, that he gives such disproportionate space to the treatment of this pair of categories. Κινησις (motion, move­ ment) is the new category. Κινησις is to be found in the list of the

4'primary genera" of the intelligible realm and in the list of the categories

of the sensible world. Of all Aristotelian categories only ούσια has been given such a privileged position. For substance, like motion, is both a genus with regard to the upper level of Being and a category or "pseudo- genus" with regard to the lower level of becoming, though the term is used not synonymously but homonymously as Plotinus never forgets to emphasize in order to avoid misunderstandings.66 In the next chapter I

will consider the fundamental role which κινησις plays in Plotinus' philos­ ophy in its relation to both δύναμις (potency, potentiality) and ένέργεια (act, actuality). In this section it would be pertinent to examine closely Plotinus' criticism of the two categories, ποιεΐν and πάσχειν, and the presuppositions of his criticism.

To begin with, Plotinus' first observation in this connection is that acting or action, like quantity and quality, is regarded by Aristotle as "another genus" on the ground that it is an attribute of substance. Now, if this is the case, then Plotinus cannot see why motion, which is also an accompaniment of substance, should not constitute "another genus." He argues as follows:

But in what is called ''acting'' [or doing and making] these are the points which one would enquire into. For it is said that, since after substance there were the accompaniments of substance, quantity and number, the quantum was another genus, and because quality accompanies substance the quale was another genus; so, since there is activity, acting is another genus. . . . For why is quality one single accompaniment of substance, and quantity one, and the relative one because of the state of relatedness of one thing to another, but, when movement is an accompaniment of substance, will movement also not be a single genus? (VI. 1. 15, 1-16)

PLOTINUS' CRITICISM OF ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES 119

Accordingly, it would seem that κίνησις, which Aristotle defined as άτελής ένέργεια (incomplete or imperfect act), is here elevated by Plotinus above ένέργεια or, at least, it is put on the same level. On this basis Plotinus attempts a criticism of Aristotle's conception of κίνησις in the next three chapters (16 to 18). It should be noted, however, that κίνησις was restricted by Aristotle to the sensible world of physical existents and had many names depending on the particular category to which it was referred. Thus, it may be called generation, corruption, alteration, augmentatation, diminution, and locomotion as the case may be.

However, in Plotinus' philosophy κίνησις is considered (1) as a category of mere becoming; (2) as a genus of real Being; and (3) as com­ plete as ένέργεια in at least one sense.67 Small wonder, then, if the issue

of the nature of κίνησις and its categorial status became very controversial for later commentators. For example, lamblichus defended Aristotle's position and advanced a major criticism against Plotinus' doctrine of motion. In his arguments lamblichus goes so far as to accuse Plotinus of following the Stoics on this issue. A summary of these arguments has been preserved in Simplicius.68

In what follows, I will try to summarize Plotinus' criticism of Aristo­ tle's notion of motion. Every effort will be made to present his arguments as clearly as possible, though they admittedly are difficult and com­ plicated. A detailed analysis would perhaps be inappropriate, since Aristotle did not consider κινησις as one of his categories, though it is part of the post-praedicamenta. I will begin with certain objections which, Plotinus thinks, can be raised against his own proposal that κίνησις as a category can substitute for Aristotle's ποιεΐν and πάσχειν.

First of all, Plotinus is aware that one may object to his proposal of elevating κινησις to the state of a genus because such a move would seem to contradict Aristotle's conception of it as άτελής ένέργεκκ. If so, Plotinus is ready to accept ένέργεια as the "genus" and κινησις as its ''species." The specific difference, in this case, will be "incomplete" (άτελής). But this "incompleteness," Plotinus warns, should not be misunderstood as implying that κινησις lacks actuality. On the contrary, κίνησις is actual, but it differs from ένέργέΐα in the following ways:

But if someone were to say that movement was an incomplete active actuality, nothing would prevent us from giving active actuality the priority and subordinating movement to it as a species as being incomplete, making its category active actuality, but adding the "incomplete." For the ''incomplete'' is said about it, not because it is not also active actuality, but

67 The kind of κίνησις, which is as complete as ένέργεκχ, Plotinus calls "άπλή κίνησις"

(VI. 1. 16, 17).

it is altogether active actuality, but has also the "over and over again,'' not that it may arrive at active actuality—it is that already—but it may do something, which is another thing subsequent to itself. And then [when it does do it] it is not itself brought to completion, but the business which was its object: walking, for instance, was walking from the beginning. But if one had to complete a lap, and had not yet arrived at the point of having com­ pleted it, what was lacking would not belong to walking or movement, but to walking a certain distance: but it was already walking, however short the walk was, and movement: for certainly the man who is in motion has already moved, and the man who is cutting, cut already. And just as what is called active actuality does not need time, so neither does movement, but [only] movement to a certain extent: and if active actuality is in timelessness, so is movement in that it is in a general way movement.69 (VI.

1. 16, 1-17)

The distinction between ένέργεια, which is characterized by

4'timelessness," and κίνησις, which is supposedly "in time," is

Peripatetic in its origin.70 Plotinus introduced it here as a possible objec­

tion to his proposal that κινησις should be considered as a "genus" on the same basis as the other Aristotelian so-called "genera." Initially, Plotinus seems to accept this distinction. But by distinguishing between κινησις as such and κίνησις which is "quantitatively determined" (τοσήνδε), he is able to argue that only the latter requires time for its com­ pletion, while the former, like ένέργεια, requires no time (αχρονος). "Therefore," he concludes, "just as active actuality is in timelessness, so nothing prevents movement from originating in timelessness, but time has come by its becoming of a certain length" {Ibid. 31-33).

Plotinus' thesis, that κίνησις "pure and simple," to use MacKenna's expression, is achronic and non-temporal, is manifestly contrary to Aristotle's doctrine. According to the latter, time and motion are so closely connected that "Not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by movement, because they define each other."71

And again, "Since time is continuous, movement must be continuous, in as much as there can be no time without movement."7 2 Plotinus seems

to refer to this close connection between time and movement when he draws attention to the following absurdity (άλογία) which results from such a connection:

There is evidence for this in the stupid statement which says that it is always possible to take a piece of any movement whatsoever, and there is no begin­ ning of the time in which and from which it began, nor a beginning of the

69 Physics 201a 11.