Physics 201a 11 70 SAC, pp 308ff.

71 Physics 220b 25. 72 Ibid. 219a 1.

PLOTINUS' CRITICISM OF ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES 121

movement itself, but it is always possible to divide it up and back: so that it would result that the movement which has just begun has been in motion from infinite time, and that movement is infinite in respect to its beginning. This results because of separating of active actuality from movement and asserting that active actuality occurs in timelessness, but saying that move­ ment needs time, not movement of a certain length only; but they are com­ pelled to say that its nature is quantitative; and yet they admit that the quantum is incidentally present to it, if it is a day long or of any time you like. (VI. 1. 16, 19-31)

Plotinus' view, then, is that just as ένέργεια is not in time, so is κίνησις as such, but not as a measured movement. Evidently this view dissociates motion from time, so that we can speak of it as taking place "all at once," at least in the sense in which μεταβολή (change) is said to take place c' all at once."7 3 If the Aristotelian view about instantaneous change

is correct, and if μεταβολή is identified with κίνησις,74 then Plotinus can

argue in the following way:

Since changes also are admitted to take place in timelessness, in the remark "as if there was not a change which takes place all at once;" if then change, why not also motion? But change has here been taken, not in the sense of completed change: for there was no need to change in completion of the process of change. {Ibid. 33-37)

There is another possible objection to Plotinus' proposal that motion should be considered as a " genus" which is capable of substituting for the two Aristotelian genera, action and passion. This objection may by formulated as follows: Instead of postulating a distinct genus, why not treat both motion and act (or active actuality as Armstrong renders ένέργεκχ) as a case of relatives? Plotinus is aware that Aristotle speaks of κίνησις and ποιησις as pertaining respectively to that "which is potentially motive"75 and to that ''which is potentially active."76 Now, for Aristotle 4'that which is capable of acting" and "that which is capable of moving"

are both cases of relatives, like the knowable and the perceptible.77 If so,

then the implication would seem to be that motion and action, like knowledge and perception, should be included in the previously dis­ cussed category of relation and, therefore, there is no need for a new category. T o this possible objection Plotinus replies as follows:

But if someone were to say that neither active actuality nor movement need a genus in and by themselves, but they are to be referred to the relative in that active actuality belongs to that which is potentially active and actual,

73 Ibid. 136a 15-18. 74 Ibid. 218b 20. 75 Ibid. 202a 23. 76 Ibid. 201a 11.

and movement to that which is potentially moving or moved, one must answer that it is the very state of relatedness which produces relatives, and they are not produced by the mere statement that a thing is related to another. But when there is some substantial reality, even if it belongs to something else or is related to something else, it certainly possesses its nature prior to the relativity. This active actuality, then, and movement, and state, though belonging to another do not lose their priority to the relative and being thought in and by themselves: otherwise in this way everything will be relative: for absolutely everything has a relation to some­ thing, as in the case of the soul. (VI. 1. 17, 1-11)

Plotinus is correct in his assertion that not all types of relations can produce relatives in the technical Aristotelian sense of πρός τι. For "in this way everything will be relative" which evidently is not the case. Aristotle's stipulative definition of relatives applies only to a few well specified cases of relatives, as we saw in our discussion of this category. Plotinus' argument continues thus:

But if they are going to refer activity to the relative, but make one genus of acting, why will they not refer movement to the relative, but posit being in motion as one genus, and divide being in motion, as one genus into two, into the species of acting and being acted upon, instead of, as they do now, saying acting is one genus and being acted upon another? {Ibid. 14-19) What Plotinus wants to convey here is that the above objection, that is, that motion belongs to the category of relatives, can be equally applied to Aristotle's category of acting. In other words, if from the fact that there are activities and passions in this world Aristotle is able to derive the categories of ποιειν and πάσχειν, then it would be possible to derive the category of κινεισθαι from the fact that there is motion in this world too. Why, then, do we not consider the latter as a genus with the other two as its species, so that one category may do the work assigned to the two of them? Arguing in this way in favor of the newly issued category, Plotinus suggests that the two Aristotelian categories may be subsumed under it without loss. He concludes: "So that both are to be called move­ ments, and movement is one thing and one genus, as we observe besides the quantum in the substance the quale as well, and a movement which appertains to the substance" (VI. 1. 19, 5-8).

Plotinus deals briefly with the questions which refer to Aristotelian distinctions: (1) Does the category of acting cover both κινήσεις and ένέργειαι with the qualification that the latter occur *'all at once," while the former take time? (2) Do all activities entail passivity (e.g. cutting, burning etc.) or are some of them independent (e.g. walking, talking etc.)? (3) Can independent activities (άπόλυτοι) be clearly identified with ένέργειαι and activities related to passions with κινήσεις? (4) How is the