1 the minimum of interference at home and disturbance abroad.'

In this atmosphere, Curzon and the Foreign Office appear to have enjoyed a relatively free hand in Egyptian affairs. This was especially true under Bonar Law. According to James Davidson, Bonar Law's Parliamentary Private Secretary, in 1922-23, the Prime Minister thought 'Curzon a mountebank', but had 'to appoint him his deputy because he had more experience than anyone else. He was a great expert on foreign affairs, even if he was often very indecisive.'"*’

Nevertheless there was little Foreign Office direction over Egypt during the period following independence. Beyond the general crisis atmosphere, pressure on the coalition government in the last months of its life, and then the uncertain

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tenure of the ailing Bonar Law, Curzon was ill. From the end of May until the middle of July 1922, the Foreign Secretary was confined to his bed with a chronic­

ally weak back and leg as well as with an attack of phlebitis. Curzon was tempor­ arily replaced at the Foreign Office by Balfour. Thomas Jones described in his diary on June 13, 1922 what ensued:

Grigg does the P.M.'s Foreign Office work and the P.M.'s activities in this direction are widely resented in and out of the F.O. Curzon is away ill. Eyre Crowe's instructions from his chief are to carry down the Curzon policy. Balfour goes to the F.O. He is in much closer accord with the P.M. than Curzon is.^

It is little wonder that he began to fear that his replacement would become perma­ nent and quickly returned to the Foreign Office.

The Foreign Office approach to policy for Egypt was one of disengagement and reflected the general atmosphere of the day. Nearly a year after Egypt's indepen­ dence Murray wrote in retrospect that British policy 'was one of disentanglement. That is to say, it was designed to shift on to Egyptian shoulders the responsibility

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for the conduct of Egyptian affairs.' With respect to the Residency, this meant

1. Robert Rhodes James, Memoirs of a Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson's Memoirs and Papers, 1910-1937 (London, 1969), pp.147-8.

2. The temporary nature of the Bonar Law government may be seen from the fact that the Prime Minister was dissuaded only with difficulty from declaring at the out­ set that he would hold office for only one year. Blake, op.cit. , p.464.

3. Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 201. Although obviously prejudiced, Austin Chamber- lain made similar comments about Curzon's ill-health and weakness during the Bonar Law government. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography

(London, 1968), p.126.

a great degree of freedom in policy formulation in Cairo. Owen Tweedy, the

liaison officer at the Residency, noted after a conversation with Murray and Ingram at the Foreign Office on December 23, 1922, that 'what it came to he[Murray! said JwaU that it was easier if policy were outlined in Cairo and communicated to the

Foreign Office for approval.''*" Thus initiative over developments remained with the Residency in Cairo.

The basic context of policy formulation in the Residency was the preservation of the status quo on the four reserved points and the maintenance of public order in Egypt. The need to preserve the status quo stemmed from the conditional nature of the February declaration and would remain so until there was a permanent Anglo-

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Egyptian settlement. Public order was especially important since it affected the welfare of foreign interests and residents in Egypt and its absence was one of the reasons for the original British involvement in the region. The continuing British responsibility for the protection of foreign interests meant that public

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order remained a vital British concern. In addition, progress towards a final settlement was predicated upon stability and order in Egypt.

Within this framework, the aim of the Residency was to retire from an active 'ministering' role in Egyptian affairs and instead to become a watchful arbiter between factions such as the Palace, the Ministry and, at a later date, the Wafd opposition. This was translated into two areas of activity: disengagement from local affairs as quickly as possible; and, assuring adoption of such measures and laws that would remove the final obstacles standing in the way of negotiations. It was necessary to complete in Cairo the work begun in London.

Consequences of Independence

The introduction of the symbolic aspects of Egypt's new status, the trappings

1. This conversation began on the topic of Foreign Office difficulties with Par­ liamentary Questions because of insufficient information and then moved to more general issues. Tweedy, Memorandum, 9/1/23, FO/141/484(278).

2. The importance of the status quo was the reason for the pre-independence Scott-Tharwat PROCES VERBAL, January 20, 1921, FO/141/515(14382 Pt.I). 3. For an analysis of British responsibility for public order developing from

occupation, the protectorate, and the new doctrine of responsibility, see: Amos to Kerr, April

2%

130

of independence, was the first and most obvious step to be taken to demonstrate the new approach adopted by the British. Ahmad Fuad was finally permitted on March 15 to assume the title of King instead of Sultan. Henceforth he would be styled 'His

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