The Cabinet decided not to give in to the pressure of the advisers since this could not be defended in Parliament. Because of the administrative dislocation that
1. Allenby to Curzon, January 25, 1922, Tel. No. 31, FO/371/7730. There were in dications that some in the Cabinet, especially Churchill and his supporters, would not regret Allenby's resignation. T.E. Lawrence, commenting on Lord Lloyd's Egypt Since Cromer, wrote that 'Winston tried to get my consent to take Allenby's place and to accept his resignation at this moment.' T.E. Lawrence to G[eorgej. L^loydj. , September 30, 1934. David Garnett (ed.), The Letters of T.E. Lawrence (London, 1938), pp.819-20. Vansittart at the Foreign Office de nied that there was any substance in Lawrence's claim: 'The appointment lay with Curzon. If Winston had ever foolishly proposed Lawrence I should have heard, for Curzon would have laughed him out of court, and the laughter would not have been ki n d . 1 Vansittart, op.cit., p.
2. Amos now cabled Murray that 'We feel you should have advance information of in tended action of advisers.1 This referred to their resignation. Allenby to Curzon, January 26, 1922, Tel. No.^— , FO/371/7730.
3. Ibid. , and Duff Cooper, diary entry for January 22, 1922: 'He [selby]| showed me a telegram he had got from Allenby at Marseilles saying, all the advisers would resign too.' Duff Cooper, op.cit,. , p. 106. Apparently Duff Cooper heard too late to inform Curzon before the Cabinet.met, or Curzon knew and did not inform the Cabinet until the 26th of January.
4. Curzon's statement to the Cabinet. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet. 4(22), January 016, 1922. CAB/23/29.
would attend their resignations, it was decided to bring pressure to bear upon the advisers, nominally members of the Egyptian civil service, to remain at their posts. This call was to be made in the name of and for the sake of the welfare of the
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British Empire.
The situation regarding Allenby's resignation was different. Because Allenby could no longer effectively represent British policy, he was to be recalled to report upon the situation, at which time his resignation could be accepted. The discussion that continued in the Cabinet on the following day, January 27, moved in the same direction, with anger clearly expressed 'at the manner in which they jthe Cabinet^had been kept in the dark as to his proceedings in the past six weeks, with
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the result that they were suddenly confronted with what amounted to an ultimatum.' There was great bitterness at the presumption of Allenby and his advisers, and the decision to recall him and to issue a communique announcing this step was confirmed at this meeting. Allenby's resignation would not be accepted until he returned home.
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The telegram of recall was sent on January 28. Allenby was taken to task on the grounds that although the original government policy had been formulated in consultation with him, after a long and uninformed lapse he had presented the Cabi net with an ultimatum that would mean the total surrender of the existing position. In addition he had rigidly refused to consider the government's liberal proposals but simply repeated his ultimatum. Surprise was expressed at the sudden and extreme change in Egypt's political climate, a change which precluded any settlement save through the concession of independence. Since Allenby refused to send Clayton and Amos to London, he now was asked to return to England to report to the Cabinet before they could accept his resignation. There is little doubt that this telegram was
meant to chastise and humiliate Allenby for his stubborn refusal to comply with the 4
Cabinet's wishes. Furthermore, with one eye cast on the inevitable papers to be laid before Parliament explaining recent events in Egypt, it was a rather clever
1. Ibid., and Murray to Amos (drafted by Curzonj, in Curzon to Allenby, January 28, 1922, Tel. No. 34, FO/371/7730.
2. Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet 5(22), January 27, 1922, CAB/23/29.
3. Curzon to Allenby, January 28, 1922, Tel. No. 32, C.P.3647, CAB/24/132.
4. Duff Cooper's entry in his diary, January 28: 'We have sent a very insulting telegram to Allenby, refusing to accept his resignation and telling him to come home. He has been ill-treated.' Duff Cooper, loc.cit.
attempt to contrast the Cabinet's reasonableness with Allenby's intransigence.
Allenby's Return and the Struggle in London
Allenby now prepared for his return to England convinced that he would be re placed. He told Lord Northcliffe, his guest at the Residency, 'that he was probably not coming back to E g y p t . A few days before Allenby left Egypt he spoke inform ally at a dinner in Northcliffe's honour. He explained his sentiments that had animated him since his return to Egypt and which would guide-him in his future association with that country. On that occasion he said,
...it was absurd to think that after 40 years we should scuttle out of the country at the bidding of the extremists. That it was fool ish to try and make a treaty - the value of treaties had been shown in the case of Persia. Gr. Britain was too big to condescend to treaties with the Egyptians. His policy was concessions without bargains. The B[ritishj. Gjovernmen^. had made certain promises (he had never made any) which it had got to fulfill. But they should be carried out without any quid pro quo. If you find a man down at your feet, you didn't say 'now let us make a bargain,' you allowed him to get up, with a threat that if he didn't behave him self, you would down him again.2
In Britain Allenby's recall was announced to the press on January 29. Accord ing to the Foreign Office communiqu^, Allenby was summoned home ostensibly 'to give full information and advice' on the situation in Egypt and to report on the commu-
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nications that had passed between him and the Egyptian leaders. The language and content of the communique was, however, equivocal and confusing. On the one hand it sought to refute the impression that the government 'has abandoned or is about to abandon her liberal attitude towards Egyptian aspir-ations,' while on the other it reaffirmed Britain's refusal to grant independence to Egypt, without prior agree-
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