The German Army led the way in the mid–1930s with its A-series surface-to-surface missiles developed at Peenemünde and elsewhere by a group of scientists led by Wernher von Braun. This work culminated in the V-2/A-4 ballistic missile, which was produced for the army and later for the SS by firms outside the aviation industry. The Luftwaffe as well as the aviation industry launched during the war a multitude of missile and guided weapons development programs. Research and development activity in this field proliferated immensely during the war, as evident from several bulky reports prepared by Allied intel- ligence after the war.38Among these weapons were air-to-surface missiles, air-to-air missiles,
surface-to-air missiles and all sorts of precision guided munitions.
As Rolf Schabel pointed out, politics and faulty decision-making regarding some of the advanced technology projects, attributed primarily to Hitler in postwar German memoirs literature, were overshadowed by technological difficulties in delaying their introduction to operational service. These difficulties were inherent to such advanced technological developments
and simply could not have been solved overnight. The protracted development work required in order to make these new technologies ripe for operational use was the main reason jet and rocket aircraft entered operational service only in 1944.39 The main problem with jet
aircraft was the low reliability of their engines. Only in summer 1944 did German jet engines become reliable enough for operational use, even though their development had begun in late 1939. The same problem plagued rocket fighters. Prototypes of the Me 163 rocket inter- ceptor began powerless flight testing already in 1941, but entered limited operational service only at the end of May 1944. This long delay was caused by the difficulties involved in making a rocket-propelled aircraft ready for operational service. These problems were never fully solved and rocket-propelled aircraft were somewhat sidelined after initial enthusiasm. Guided missiles and “smart” weapons were an even tougher technological nut to crack with contemporary technologies. The revolutionary rocket engines used on most missiles were problematic enough, but complicated guidance systems posed an even bigger techno- logical challenge, which the Germans were unable to solve before the end of the war. Some guidance systems the Germans experimented with, like TV guidance and anti-radiation systems (homing in on enemy radar emitters)40matured only in the mid–1960s. It is worth
noting that American developers encountered the same difficulties with similar guided weapons they designed and tested during the war. Thus the few guided weapons that entered
Waiting for engines. The second prototype of the Me 262, constructed in April 1942, sits on the factory airfield tarmac at Augsburg waiting for its engines, probably in mid–1942 (courtesy U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
operational service were imperfect weapon systems, which suffered from many “childhood diseases.” All these exotic weapons, including the V-missiles, were of limited military value due to their technological immaturity.
Some of the new jets figured prominently in production plans submitted from mid– 1943. The RLM planned a massive procurement of some of the more developed types and the aviation industry geared up to produce them en masse. They subsequently appeared in increasing numbers on the production lines in 1944–45. These modern aircraft entered series production just as the aviation industry went through the greatest transformation in its history. Here is a short description of the most important advanced aerial weapons that entered series production before war’s end.
Me 262
This fighter was arguably the most important jet aircraft of World War II and the one on which the Germans hung their highest hopes. It was a twin-engine, single-seat, heavily armed fighter. The basic airframe was ready before its projected BMW 003 and Jumo 004 engines. After its first jet-propelled flight on 25 March 1942 (during which both BMW P.3302 engines failed), it took more than 2 years before the revolutionary jet engines became ready for operational service. Even as series production of the Me 262 started, its engines were still plagued with problems. The Germans viewed the Me 262 as a preliminary basic design, which could have been constantly upgraded with new technical developments. Pro- jected future developments of the basic airframe included strongly swept-back wings, more refined aerodynamic shapes, mixed propulsion (jet/rocket), radar and air-to-air missiles.
Great hopes. An Me 262 A-1a fighter of operational conversion squadron III/EJG2 is being pre- pared for flight. This specific aircraft served previously with Kommando Nowotny. It survived the unit’s short and mostly unsuccessful combat debut with the type in October–November 1944 (courtesy National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, SI 79-4069).
The production plans of the Me 262 became a hotly debated topic in top-level dis- cussions. Principally, the RLM decided in 1943 to produce the Me 262 as a replacement of all other fighter types. Hitler intervened and demanded to produce it as a fast bomber to combat the expected Allied invasion of western Europe. The debate concerning the preferred role of the aircraft raged for several months and caused some spectacular conflicts within the German leadership. Messerschmitt was expected to be the main producer of the Me 262 and deliver thousands of these aircraft to the Luftwaffe. Its Regensburg plant was to be the main production center.41Large parts of the story of the German aviation industry
in World War II are related in one way or another to the production of this aircraft.
Ar 234
A twin-engine, single-seat jet bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. Its design was first proposed in late 1941. It flew for the first time on 30 July 1943, but its development was protracted, mainly by a major redesign, which replaced its initial droppable takeoff trolley and landing skid with a conventional landing gear. Just as the Me 262, it entered series pro- duction only when its engine, the BMW 003, became ready for operational use in summer 1944. The RLM gave Arado an initial production contract for 100 aircraft in November 1943. Further orders increased the number to 200 aircraft scheduled for delivery by the end of 1944 and Arado planned to deliver 1,930 aircraft by September 1945. The main production centers of the aircraft were Arado’s plants in Brandenburg, Wittenberg and Freiberg.42Like
the Me 262, the Ar 234 was a basic design, which could be further developed in various ways and incorporate emerging new technologies as they became available.
Me 163
An aerodynamically advanced tiny rocket fighter, designed as a point defense inter- ceptor. It was the only World War II aircraft that regularly reached speeds close to the speed of sound, but its military value was limited. Its greatest tactical disadvantage was the limited endurance of its engine. Unlike the previous projects described here, due to its limitations the Germans never intended to produce it in large numbers. Therefore, only limited pro- curement of this aircraft was planned.43By the end of 1944 the limited production of the
Me 163 was further reduced due to difficulties in the supply of its unique fuels.44
V-1
A jet-propelled cruise missile, which was developed from summer 1942 by the Luftwaffe in parallel to the army’s A-4 (later known as the V-2) missile and as its competitor. The V-1 was developed by Fieseler and its initial production run was carried out in Fieseler’s Kassel main factory. Later another production line was established in a separate and highly secret part of Volkswagen’s giant factory complex at Fallersleben. Other V-1 production lines were constructed in the Mittelwerk underground factory, originally used for the V-2 production, and in several smaller underground facilities. The V-1 was a cheap and simple weapon system using a primitive form of jet engine called a pulse-jet, which was suitable only for a one-way flight. The engine was developed by the Argus aero-engine firm from 1939 and was ready for production at the end of 1941.45It took only 250 work hours to produce each
missile and it was largely constructed from cheap metal and not from expensive aviation- grade aluminum. Similarly to other development programs supervised by the RLM, over-
optimism was also a dominant feature in the V-1 program. Full production plans were drawn up and then had to be canceled and redrawn as development of the weapon dragged on due to different technical issues. The projected entry into operational service at the end of 1943 proved to be completely illusory, and the first operational launch against England took place only a week after the D-Day landings. In 1944, as bomber production declined and then completely stopped, the V-1 became the Luftwaffe’s principal offensive weapon and its only weapon system capable of regularly penetrating Great Britain’s air defenses. Although it was very inaccurate, it caused heavy damage and loss of life when fired indiscriminately at big cities.46
He 162
A last-resort jet fighter, conceived, developed and first flown by Heinkel within 3 months. It was a single-engine, single-seat compact fighter of mixed metal-wood construc- tion, which made it suitable for mass production under relatively primitive conditions. Its unique production history will be dealt with in detail later on.
All these advanced weapons can be considered as fully developed weapon systems that entered series production in different rates before the end of World War II. However, their introduction into operational service was far from smooth, and the elimination of their teething technical problems took time and demanded continues development work. As a result, jets never even came close to fully replacing piston engine aircraft in production or in operational service. Even in 1945 conventional designs continued to form the main bulk of German aircraft production. A short description of the main conventional types produced at that time is the following.47
Me 109
48This single-seat, single-engine fighter was designed by Willy Messerschmitt and entered
The Me 163 Komet rocket fighter was also viewed as a promising concept, but it failed because of short endurance, protracted development and the difficult nature of its novel power plant (courtesy National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, SI 93-4859).
operational service with the Luftwaffe before the outbreak of the war. It was even used in the Spanish Civil War. It was the most produced fighter ever, with around 35,000 units built before and during World War II. Some 13,942 Me 109s were produced in 1944 alone.49
It was supposed to be replaced as the main Luftwaffe fighter in 1942, but delays with the introduction of a replacement, and subsequently the decision to produce the Me 262 as its replacement, meant that it was never replaced. Mass production of its modified versions continued right until the end of the war, even though by 1944 it was inferior to both Western and Eastern fighters in many respects. It was considered difficult to fly and the masses of young and inexperienced late-war German fighter pilots mostly lacked the skills needed in order to fly it effectively in combat.
FW 190
Another single-seat, single-engine fighter that was somewhat outdated by 1944. It was developed and purchased as a more advanced complement to the Me 109. It entered oper- ational service with the Luftwaffe in autumn 1941, but suffered continuous problems with its BMW engine. Advanced and much improved versions of this fighter were supposed to enter series production in mid–1944. These were the re-engined and redesigned FW 190D and the Ta 152. The latter was designed primarily as a high-altitude fighter. These fighters were considered to be more than equal to modern Allied fighters. Severe delays in their pro- duction meant that the older models soldiered on and remained the most dominant types.
The old warhorse. A Me 109G-5 of 7./JG27 in flight over the Adriatic, January 1944. Although somewhat outdated at that time, constant updates kept this fighter in mass production until the end of the war (courtesy National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, SI 73- 1989).
The FW 190 was also used as a fighter-bomber and as ground support aircraft.
Ju 88, Ju 188, Ju 388
The initial model was the Junkers 88, which was developed before World War II as the Luftwaffe’s “wonder bomber.” The production of this aircraft formed one of the largest contracts in the history of the German aviation history and turned state-owned Junkers into one of the giants of German industry. This twin-engine aircraft was later converted into an efficient night fighter, and in this role it stayed in series production almost until the end of the war. Its wartime development was the improved Ju 188, which entered service in early 1943. The completely different Ju 388 bomber-reconnaissance aircraft came too late to enter service in meaningful numbers. The production of these three Junkers aircraft was terminated in February 1945.50
Other less important types were produced in ever-decreasing numbers during 1944, but all of them were stricken from the production plans before the end of that year. In any case, of all the 20 types produced in significant numbers in 1944, the piston-engine types described above constituted 74 percent of total aircraft production for the year.51Taking
into account that other planes included in the 20 types were also propelled by piston engine, the dominance of “traditional” aircraft over jets on the production lines is obvious.
Paradoxically, at the time Germany commenced production of some of the most advanced aerial weapon systems of their time, there was a marked drop in the production
The next generation. FW 190V29/U1— a development prototype of the Ta 152 high-altitude fighter, in which the BMW 801 engine was replaced with a more powerful Daimler-Benz 603 equipped with a turbocharger (courtesy National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Insti- tution, SI 82-11848).
quality of German aviation products. Hermann Göring generally confirmed the deterioration of quality after the war and attributed it to the dispersal of the aviation industry in 1944.52
Adolf Galland, former influential General of the Fighters, gave the following explanation when asked by American interrogators why dispersal caused deterioration of quality: “Because the assembly lines were interrupted. The planes no longer were in assembly halls, but somewhere the control surfaces were manufactured, in another plant fuselages were made, construction took place in destroyed halls and construction took place in the open air instead of under roofs.”53
The explanations offered by these two wartime leaders provide only a partial explanation for this phenomenon. It appears that particularly the high-priority modern jets and other new aircraft types suffered from these declining production standards.54Following a com-
parison flight test of an Me 262 against an Ar 234 prototype in June 1944, Messerschmitt’s main development office at Oberammergau complained about the quality of production Me 262s: “Workmanship— The workmanship carried out on production Me 262s leaves much to be desired. Armament hatch covers, sheet steel cockpit, engine cowlings, etc., were all poor as were those of most production machines. The surface finish is also coarse.”55
Problems with series Me 262 continued and became even worse. In February 1945 Messer- schmitt’s chief test pilot Fritz Wendel reported severe technical problems originating from poor quality control after visiting operational units flying the plane.56
Conventional types also suffered from this deterioration. Poor quality of the initial production runs of the Ta 152 fighters led to a brief production halt in order to enable the engineers to locate all the defects and to fix them. The main problem appeared to be faulty welding of the aileron pushrods. Further technical problems and other sticky production difficulties finally led to the cancellation of this aircraft at the end of March 1945, when its production capacity was allocated to the production of older proven types.57
Unit commanders and pilots receiving the new aircraft experienced severe problems with their new mounts, caused by poor workmanship and slack quality control. Erich Som- mer, flying Ar 234 reconnaissance aircraft since the summer of 1944, reported that “spare engines and accessories had to be stripped before use as quality control in the factory became less and less reliable.”58
It seems that production standards of series Ar 234s was particularly low. Captain Dieter Lukesch, who commanded the first operational Ar 234 squadron, remarked about the production quality of the brand-new aircraft his unit received in July 1944: “Hardly any aircraft arrived without defects which covered all systems and were caused by hasty completion and shortage of skilled labor at the factories. The same applied to the Arado’s equipment.”59
These problems were well-known and higher authorities tried to solve them in different ways. Among others, the Germans tried to use Allied standards in order to restore their own standards of quality. In this framework the Airframe Main Committee arranged to have wing sections of shot-down American aircraft sent around to aircraft factories to show the relative superiority of American workmanship in this regard, and serve as an incentive to do as well.60At the end of September 1944 Ernst Heinkel pointed at the excellent polish of
the wings of the American Mustang fighters and at the way such finish could improve the performance of German planes. He blamed the inferior German finish on a poorly trained workforce and demanded better training in order to achieve better workmanship.61
The main solution was to improve quality control. Quality control was normally preformed on the final products upon leaving the production line. From 1944 it became generally slacker and less efficient.62The dispersal of most factories in 1944 made it much more difficult
to perform proper quality control because quality control departments usually stayed at the main factory and could not satisfactorily perform their tasks in the dispersed facilities. Fur- thermore, while efforts were invested in expanding production, much less effort was invested in expanding quality control departments to cope with the new situation.63
The countermeasures failed in most cases to improve the quality of the end products and the production standards of German aviation products kept deteriorating until the end of the war. Arguably, the main reason for this failure, and for the worsening quality, was the composition of the workforce the Germans used at that time for aviation production. This huge army of foreigners, POWs, and concentration camp inmates lacked the motivation that prevailed in the German aviation industry before the war. With such manpower it was extremely difficult to preserve the prewar standards.