One of the problems the RLM failed to solve before the arrival of the Jägerstab was the lack of standardization and the multitude of aircraft types and subtypes in production. This problem was closely related to the deficiencies in the RLM’s procurement policies.
Udet and his staff failed to streamline production programs to just a few standard types, and thus concentrate available industrial capacity in the production of the most important aircraft. As historian Richard Overy wrote, poor management, disproportionate influence of the Luftwaffe on design changes, and inter-firm rivalry were the main reasons for this failure.90
The general institutional chaos prevailing in the Nazi polycracy was also evident in the aviation industry at that time. It contributed to turning potentially mild failures such as the Me 210 and the He 177 into major procurement catastrophes. Designers, who were also in many cases the general directors or chairmen of their firms, had their own agenda and seem to have invested more in development of new types and their variants than in solving problems associated with serial production.91The Me 209, which was supposed to replace
the veteran Me 109 fighter, was a good example for this state of affairs in the aviation indus- try. Although at the time it was proposed in early 1943, Messerschmitt was already contracted to produce the next-generation Me 262 jet fighter, the firm kept meddling around with the piston-engine Me 209. It tried to convince the RLM to purchase it as a backup to the Me 262. Willy Messerschmitt managed to influence Hitler in early August 1943 to order the purchase of this aircraft in spite of Milch’s decision three months earlier to cancel the project altogether.92Messerschmitt’s efforts went on for at least one year until the aircraft was finally
stricken from the production plans. In the meantime, however, Messerschmitt wasted resources badly needed elsewhere in designing this aircraft and preparing it for production.93
Messerschmitt’s campaigning for the Me 209 was part of his effort to restore his status after the Me 210 debacle. This campaigning formed part of an initiative to standardize the Luftwaffe’s aircraft. He first advised Hitler in September 1943 to reduce the number of types produced at that time from 36 to 2 jet types and 4 or 5 conventional types — most of them of his design, of course. These aircraft were supposed to fulfill all tactical require- ments through modular construction (called Baukastenflugzeug), which Messerschmitt had proposed since the end of 1942. Such design was supposed to enable interchangeability of components and easy incorporation of specific conversion packages (Rüstsätze). Modular construction was also supposed to make these planes easier to produce on modern production lines in smaller factories, therefore neatly fitting the overall rationalization drive of that time.94
Serious attempts to streamline production and to adapt it to Germany’s deteriorating war situation were made in the production plans prepared under the impression of increased strategic bombing on 8 August 1943 (no. 223/1) and 1 October 1943 (no. 224/1). In these plans the focal point shifted heavily towards increased fighter production, while bomber production rate was kept at its current level. This shift was advocated by Milch, who was well aware of the status of Germany’s battered air defenses and of the need to regain air superiority in order to avert military defeat. At that time Hitler also pressed for type reduc- tion. In September 1943, probably following the aforementioned meeting with Messer- schmitt, he asked Speer to convince Göring and Milch that fewer aircraft types should be produced.95Production plan 224/1, submitted after Hitler’s meeting with Speer, projected
a monthly output of 3,327 single-engine fighters and 577 twin-engine fighters by July 1944.96 This plan set the goals for the 1944 production rate, but production plan 225/1,
published in December 1943, was less ambitious and more balanced. Upon Hitler’s request the production figures of fighters were somewhat reduced in order to enable production of
the massive He 177 bomber.97Göring also pressed for increased bomber production in order
to strengthen his bomber arm for the expected resumption of the night bombing campaign against England.98 This campaign started on the night of 21–22 January 1944 under the
codename “Steinbock,” when 447 bombers attacked London. The attacks continued with an ever-decreasing force until May. Not much was achieved, because the attacks were not concentrated and the attackers suffered grave losses. This so-called Little Blitz practically finished off the Luftwaffe’s long-range bomber force and thus wasted most of the increased bomber output demanded by Hitler.
Since production plan 225/1 (December 1943) was the last formal production program published until July 1944, it was supposed to represent aircraft production for most of 1944, including a fairly large number of bombers, which proved to be completely ineffective during the “Little Blitz.” However, events unfolding in the following months dictated a sharp deviation from this plan towards vastly increased fighter production. This shift of policy happened in spite of Hitler’s repeated demands to continue bomber production. Yielding somewhat to this pressure, the Jägerstab approved in early March 1944 reduced bomber production regardless of the decision to concentrate all efforts on fighter production. It also decided to equip 30 percent of the He 177 bombers with modern guided bombs and aerial torpedoes in order to improve their operational capabilities.99 Even in April 1944,
when Saur submitted a revised production plan that included no bombers, Hitler demanded to continue production of the same troubled He 177. The German navy also expressed inter- est in the aircraft as a long-range maritime reconnaissance platform to support the new sub- marine offensive it hoped to start in 1944–45 with its revolutionary new submarines.100In
late May and early June, plans were made to produce the aircraft in a new forest factory in Eger, Czechoslovakia, in order to free German capacity for fighter production. All these meddling explains why quite large numbers of this costly and ineffective aircraft were pro- duced in 1944.101Hitler finally declared the He 177 “vollkommen uninteressant” (completely
uninteresting) in mid–June 1944, but its production continued at a low rate for several more weeks, mainly for the maritime reconnaissance role.102The ax finally fall on this bomber
at the beginning of July 1944 after a key discussion chaired by Göring, aimed at terminating or limiting the production of less important aircraft types. It was decided, among other matters, to terminate all conventional bomber production. Even afterwards it took a couple of months until the production lines came to a complete stop.103After the He 177 was finally
terminated in autumn 1944, the only strategic offensive weapon left to the Luftwaffe was the V-1 (which was never included in the aircraft production programs).
Not everything was done wrong in the streamlining process. Postwar Allied analysts noted that although a large number of aircraft types were mentioned in the production pro- grams, at least until the last three programs, the overwhelming proportion of aircraft pro- duced were of a relatively small number of types. It even stated that in this regard, Germany was probably in a better position than the United States, where a considerable number of second- and third-line types were produced in large numbers.104This conclusion appears
true when looking at the proportions of aircraft produced in 1943 and 1944: Of the 25,527 aircraft produced in 1943, some 20,327 (79.6 percent) were combat types. Of the 39,807 aircraft produced in 1944, 28,926 (72.7 percent) were fighters.105The German industry was
therefore able to use large portions of its capacity to produce the main combat types included in the production programs as early as 1943.
Type 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Fighters 1 eng. 1541 18.8 1870 17.3 2852 24.2 4542 29.2 9626 37.7 25860 65.0 Fighters 2 eng. 315 3.9 1236 11.4 880 7.5 671 4.3 2112 8.3 3066 7.7 Bombers 2 eng. 2314 28.2 3348 30.9 3816 32.4 5371 34.6 6254 24.5 5041 12.7 Bombers 1 eng. 557 6.8 611 5.6 476 4.0 917 5.9 1844 7.2 909 2.3 Bombers 4 eng. 6 0.1 38 0.4 58 0.5 251 1.6 491 1.9 518 1.3 Total combat 4733 57.8 7103 65.6 8087 68.6 11752 75.6 20327 79.6 35394 89.0 Others 3462 42.2 3723 34.4 3694 31.4 3804 24.4 5200 20.4 4413 11.0 Grand total 8195 100.0 10826 100.0 11776 100.0 15556 100.0 25527 100.0 39807 100.0 German Aircraft production by type and by year, 1939–1944106
Type January February
Fighters — all types 2,552 1,971
Bombers and long-range reconnaissance 82 36
Ground-support and seaplanes 369 372
Transporters 0 0
Liaison and trainers 182 100
Total 3,185 2,479
German aircraft production in the first two months of 1945107
Close examination of individual production figures clearly shows that less important types were indeed produced in negligible numbers from 1943. For instance, in 1943 only
The end of the bombers. Gun camera photograph taken during a strafing run by an American fighter on grounded He 177 bombers in 1944. By the time the He 177 production was terminated, most of these aircraft were grounded due to fuel shortage and operational constraints (U.S. Air Force via National Air and Space Museum, USAF-51947AC).
104 Ar 196 seaplanes were produced, and in 1944 only 80 (and these were largely produced in French or Dutch factories). In 1943 only 76 FW 200 long-range maritime patrol planes were produced, and in 1944 only 7. These two aircraft were well-established types that had been produced since the outbreak of the war. Their replacements were produced in even smaller numbers, if at all.108Obviously, production lines that continued to produce even
small numbers of second- and third-line types wasted much-needed capacity, but by out- sourcing the production of most of these types to firms outside Germany, the Germans were able to effectively use the capacity of their own industry at time of crisis.
As the number of less important types constantly decreased, some minor production programs were completely stopped. Thus in October 1943 the RLM ordered to stop all hel- icopter production. As a consequence the main helicopter producer, Focke-Achgelis, was ordered to transfer a large proportion of its workforce to Messerschmitt’s Leipheim factory, where the Me 163 rocket fighter was produced. The firm was allowed, however, to continue development work with a much reduced staff. The Jägerstab finally terminated development work of helicopters with Hitler’s consent at the beginning of March 1944.109
Therefore, under Milch, by the end of 1943 aircraft production was already quite rationalized and streamlined. Although waste of time and resources existed in far-fetched development projects and in several unsuccessful production programs, generally the German aviation industry produced just what Germany needed at that time.
Germany’s Wooden Wonder. A Ta 154 prototype roars over an FW 190A fighter in one of Focke- Wulf ’s factory airfields (courtesy National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, SI 82-11774).
While production of conventional aircraft types and aircraft already in series production was indeed becoming more effective in 1943, there were several repeats of the Me 210/He 177 debacles. One of the most wasteful projects of that time of increasing rationalization was the Ta 154 twin-engine multi-role aircraft project. This aircraft, designed by Focke- Wulf ’s chief designer and general director Kurt Tank, was supposed to replace most twin- engine fighters in 1944 — especially in the night-fighting role. It was constructed largely of wood (54.2 percent), and therefore was supposed to be easier and cheaper to produce than metal aircraft. Most of its production was expected to take place outside the mainstream aviation industry — a feature viewed by Milch in February 1943 as a “most pleasant relief.”110
In May 1943, Special Committee F4, responsible for Focke-Wulf and therefore for the new plane, estimated that it would take only 7,376 man hours to produce a single plane and that 3,866 workers — 880 of them cabinetmakers — would be required to produce 100 units per month. Because of its wood construction the RLM planned to manufacture the plane in three separate and independent “production rings” (Fertigungsringen). Each consisted of a central final assembly factory and a host of smaller cabinetmaking workshops and factories in its region. These regionally clustered “production rings” were initially largely determined by the availability of a large wood industry and by being located in the relatively safe Eastern parts of the Reich. They included rings in Thuringia (around Erfurt), Silesia (around Freiburg and Breslau) and around Posen (capital of the annexed Polish Wartheland region). A fourth “ring” was later conceived around Detmold in western Germany, based on the capacity of the Teutoberger sawmills of this region. The “rings” were supposed to form a largely autarkic production network, independent of the existing aviation industry.111Only
the Posen “ring” was connected to an existing Focke-Wulf factory. The production line at Posen was a model of modern mechanized production. Separate production lines manufac- tured main components and performed final assembly. Final assembly was done on two parallel production lines, which were divided into 17 stations. Four workers manned each station and the production line moved at a rate of 6.05 cm per minute. Focke-Wulf ’s man- agement expected to operate these two final assembly lines on a two-daily-shifts basis with a combined output of 200 aircraft per month — or 1 aircraft every 4 hours.112 Collectively
the “rings” were supposed to produce a total of 500 aircraft monthly.
Focke-Wulf was the main contractor of the program, responsible for the design and for the supply of parts and raw materials, but other firms also took part in the program. The decision to pick Focke-Wulf as the main contractor was based, among others, on the firm’s experience in operating widely dispersed production centers. Focke-Wulf was respon- sible for the Posen ring, but the other rings were placed under the firms Reperaturwerk Erfurt and ATG. Special Committee F4 supervised the entire operation on behalf of the RLM and also coordinated the supply of the Jumo engines for the aircraft. Plans were made with Jumo to disperse the production of the engine in accordance with the dispersal of the airframe production.113Special effort was made to prepare the wood industry to produce the
wooden parts of the aircraft. The wood and furniture industry sent selected cabinetmakers to Focke-Wulf, where they were trained in the fine techniques of aircraft wooden parts manufacture. This retraining proved to be a difficult task that caused some delays.114
Despite the warning of some experts from the Technical Office, the RLM ignored the fact that the German aviation industry had little experience with high-performance aircraft made of wood, and that the traditional wood industry had no experience at all with aviation
production.115Designer Kurt Tank successfully convinced the RLM using the argument that the
British had been able to construct such an aircraft: the famous Mosquito multi-role plane.116
Although it was first flown in July 1943, troubles with the power plant, the fragility of the landing gear, and problems with the basic structure of the aircraft severely delayed the Ta 154 program. It was also found out that quality control of the prototype’s manufacture was sloppy — an extraordinary deficiency in the manufacture of prototypes. These problems led to several accidents and to further delays. In the meantime Heinkel’s competitor, the He 219, entered initial operational service and even became the Luftwaffe’s preferred con- tender for the night fighting role. However, due to Milch’s insistence, its production was restricted while the Ta 154 stayed the RLM’s favorite candidate. The main reason for Milch’s stance was the elaborate production plan of Focke-Wulf ’s contender. The situation became more complicated after Allied bombing in early 1944 destroyed the Goldmann factory in Wuppertal, where a special adhesive used to bond the aircraft’s wooden parts was produced. The Dynamit AG firm produced replacement glue called Kaurit, which turned out to be too weak. Since it was insufficiently acid-neutralized it actually ate away at the wood it was supposed to join, weakening the structure and causing several crashes. Amazingly, Milch stuck to this unfortunate aircraft and refused to give it up as late as May 1944, although by that time he was aware of the fact that Allied air superiority over Germany limited it only to night operations.117
By that time a large amount of effort was invested in preparing for the series production of the aircraft. Two completely new factories dedicated to the Ta 154 production were con- structed in Posen-Kreising by around 2,000 Jewish slave workers (who were deported to Auschwitz after the work was done in September 1943).118An important factor influencing
the decision to construct the factories in Posen-Kreising was the availability of a Polish workforce in this area.119
In 1944 the production scheme was broadened and more firms became involved. Another production line was later constructed in an underground factory of the Gothaer Waggonfabrik firm, located in a salt mine. Volkswagen’s Fallersleben factory also became involved in the project and was contracted to provide some components for the engine mounts. Volkswagen and the RLM even hoped to produce complete aircraft in some free space left at Fallersleben, and from May 1944 in free space available in a V-1 underground factory at Tiercelet.120Typically, Focke-Wulf also tried to outsource some of the design work
as well as the production of some components to French firms. Some 57 French draftsmen and designers under French direction were employed in September 1943 in Focke-Wulf ’s main design office in Bad-Eilsen and many of them worked on the Ta 154.121At about the
same time Focke-Wulf and Volkswagen, which by now had become an important subcon- tractor, sent a number of technicians and draftsmen to a Peugeot factory in Alsace in order to make the required preparations for the production of different parts and components there and to instruct French workers.122The cooperation with Volkswagen and Peugeot con-
tinued well into 1944.
As the development of the aircraft dragged on with no meaningful improvement in sight, Kurt Tank joined the line of German aircraft designers ordered to explain their failures to higher authority. He was summoned to an inquiry in front of the furious Göring in Nürnberg — reportedly after an overzealous worker reported he was sabotaging his own cre- ation — and was asked to explain this costly failure.123The Ta 154 project continued until
the cold-headed Saur and his technocrats finally axed it on 27 June 1944. It was estimated that at least 10,000 workers wasted an entire year on this project and that at least 1,027 sup- pliers wasted time and resources on it at one time or another.124Even in October and Novem-
ber 1944 the Rüstungsstab still reallocated to other places workers that were supposed to be engaged in the Ta 154 production.125All the factories engaged in the Ta 154 production
either received other tasks or lost most of their skilled workers to other firms engaged in fighter production. Some of the wooden parts producers continued working for Focke-Wulf and started to produce parts for the Ta 152 conventional single-engine fighter.126
Another case of a severely protracted and faulty procurement program was the V-1 flying bomb/cruise missile. The weapon was an evolution of an earlier pilotless bomb-car- rying aircraft design. An early suggestion to develop an unmanned flying bomb was sub- mitted collectively by the firms Argus, Siemens/Askania and Fieseler in April 1942. In June 1942 the firms submitted concrete and detailed plans for the weapon, which the RLM approved on 19 June.127Since this project was viewed as the Luftwaffe’s answer to the army’s
A-4/V-2 missile, development of the missile was rushed and corners were cut in an effort to save time. Ignoring the revolutionary nature of this weapon system, the RLM decided