Multicultural societies

The tragic events of the Second World War resulted in the creation of new states, cross-border movement of people and subsequently the rise of anti-colonial movements and ideological divisions, leading to the growing economic and political migration, whereby the nation states were becoming increasingly multinational and/or multiethnic. In the midst of these events, new forms of governance were devised across the Western world as mechanisms coping with this growing phenomenon which is in many respects deemed unnatural for the traditional nation state. It was in this context of increasingly mixed societies that multiculturalism was born. For multicultural and political theorists, to understand the complexity of the multinational and multiethnic nation states, it is essential that individual minority groups are accurately classified, as it is precisely their status that should determine their rights. Clearly, there is a distinction between ethnic and national minorities; irrespective of their differences both groups share minority status which also makes them culturally or socially different from the majority or the dominant group within the state. Harris (2009) provides a useful framework distinguishing between the two categories.

National minority is usually reserved for an established minority that claims minority rights in order to preserve their status (the language rights, other collective rights, territorial autonomy, and so on) such as the Hungarians in Romania or the Catalans in Spain, whilst an ethnic minority could also subsume migrants (Harris, 2009: 121).

Indeed, ethnic minorities are often transformed over an extended period of time into national minorities, for instance Turks in Germany; hence, states may comprise either ethnic and/or national minorities with most nation states containing a mix of both. In fact, majority of the nation states today are not only multinational and multiethnic but fundamentally also multicultural. A

multicultural state, as the name suggests, compromises multiple cultures within one shared territory, as Roy explains, ‘in most societies there is a dominant, even hegemonic culture and a cluster of minority groups’ (Roy, 1999: 56). The archetypal multicultural states have traditionally been settler and immigrant societies such as Australia, United States or Canada, in addition to states with colonial history such as France, Great Britain or Portugal which attracted many former subjects after the break-up of their empire or independence of their colonies. At present, economic and historical developments as well as forces of globalisation play pivotal role shifting the traditional homogeneous composition of the nation states.

55 The analysis of multicultural diversity introduced by Parekh (1999) illustrates a triadic model of cultural dissimilitude with the majority of multicultural societies containing all three elements identified in his study. Parekh opens his argument on cultural diversity with the least problematic of the groups, often characteristic for members of the dominant culture who to a degree challenge established norms and traditions of their own society, such as homosexuals or transvestites. The second group also signifies members of the dominant society, who however, are strongly opposed to some of its cultural aspects or values and seek to correct and regulate them, for instance, Parekh illustrates this with the example of feminists. Last of the categories constructed in Parekh’s framework includes cultural minorities which are the most volatile and problematic for the dominant culture. Indeed, it is this last category of Parekh’s analysis that is the focal point of this thesis. These cultural minorities include ethnic and national minorities, who are often defined by their cultural or ethnic differences, however, are irrespectively of their internal diversity identified by Parekh as one group. Active organisation of this group revolves around its distinctive character, intending to preserve and secure its unique culture including the rituals, traditions and language. As a result of their multicultural character, it is increasingly more complicated for the nation states to accommodate and manage their diversity without compromising their unity. The initial impulse leading to the birth of the nation states was solidified by the ideal of one state for one nation where belonging and national identity were easily definable. In multicultural setting, however, the

mechanisms of belonging and national identity are construed and conditioned by other factors which significantly alter the traditional nation states’ paradigm. Reflecting on Parekh’s (1999) in- depth investigation of contemporary national identity in multicultural nation states, he identifies three principal components that ought to be embedded into the political and community structures to endorse national identity. These components reinforce Parekh’s understanding of national identity in civic terms:

1. The first component is primarily focused on political community and its bodies.

2. The second element centres on the conduct in which the political community reflects on itself and is perceived by its members which is also known in words of Anderson as ‘imagined community’ (1991). Parekh asserts that ‘political communities are highly complex entities, involving millions of people the individual member has never seen, but for whom he or she is expected to pay taxes, make sacrifices, and even die’ (Parekh, 1999: 67).

56 3. The third aspect of Parekh’s structure relates to the individual’s affiliation with his/her own community which is reinforced and fabricated by national symbols, myths, traditions and culture. The role of national identity is of paramount importance to any nation state where it is frequently recognised not only as the guardian of the nation, but crucially also as an identity measurement distinguishing members of one nation from another. For Parekh, the function of national identity has, however, an additional and a more complex layer within the multicultural context which is inherently civic and connected to an all embracive political community. The political community must be not only inclusive but in effect must reflect interests of the collective and public as a whole without preferential conduct for the majority culture. This argument is largely based on Parekh’s assumption that minority cultures are imperil by the dominant society. This is certainly the case in some circumstances, but it should not be merely dismissed as the norm. Increasingly, there are initiatives aimed at protection of cultural minorities which in some instances, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, head in contra-direction to Parekh’s observations whereby a selected minority culture becomes accommodated at the expense of other perhaps less organised minorities such as Hungarians in Slovakia who are well organised and have strong representation unlike Roma minority groups who are often ignored by the state. Secondly, Parekh argues that while recognising that multicultural society is a mosaic of different cultures, it is essential that the society as a whole understands its multicultural character and that it values all communities and its members regardless their cultural background. The society and the state are obliged to embrace members’ multiple identities and loyalties, and under no circumstances should these members be forced to choose one form of identity over another. Therefore national identity incorporates all of its citizens regardless of their cultural background, implying that the definition of national identity is all inclusive - civic. As examples from Europe demonstrate, this poses a substantial challenge for the nation states. Croatia for instance clearly stipulates in its constitution that the Croat nation state is for Croat people whereby explicitly excluding any non-Croats from membership. Yet, Croat legislation is largely multicultural and thus brings into question the overly civic national identity incorporated into Parekh’s analysis.

Moreover, the investigation of religious affiliation in Europe illustrates that for most part Europe discarded religious dominance in public sphere with the state extensively detached from any religious affairs. Nonetheless, Christian values and principles left a long-lasting imprint and are deeply embedded within the cultural and social realm of European society as exemplified with national traditions and holidays. The relationship with religion is still somewhat muffled and often buried within the nation state’s secular rhetoric. There is an element of unease or limitation should

57 the state be publicly involved in religious affairs, hence the European fixation on the religion / state separation. In other words, as part of the liberal democracy politics, European democracies have always tried to separate the church from the state. A shift towards more inclusive approach has been detected in recent past and the division between the state and the church is in some cases becoming less profound, for instance in Slovakia, Poland or Croatia. In spite of this closing gap, Europe differs from the non-Western nation states where the religion and the state have a more symbiotic relationship. The emergence of European nation states, following the French revolution acted as a stimulus for Europe’s largely secular profile, establishing a normative division which has not been officially challenged. In contrast, as Burrell explains, the state/religion relationship in predominantly Muslim states is based on the premise that ‘the purpose of government is to implement the teachings of the faith’ (1989: 9). Parekh recognises these religious differences, however, he argues that individuals should be permitted to maintain their cultural and religious heritage without any threat to their civic national identity.

Achieving an all-inclusive national identity within the multicultural society is evidently challenging, nonetheless, it is an even more daunting task to accomplish the emotive bond which is expressed in a shared sense of belonging. Undoubtedly, cultural differences may result in community tensions where some members disapprove of the cultural traditions practiced by fellow citizens which might indeed undermine community relations. In Parekh’s view to fabricate a sense of belonging, it is pivotal that the nation states abandon the traditional concept of ethnic relations and instead cultivate a form of belonging formulated along the civic lines, parallel to integration and loyalty to the state. Ideally, it is the loyalty to political community, fellow citizens, and the state as a whole, rather than the sentiment of kinship and blood relations, that maintain the sense of belonging in multicultural societies. Yet, so far no one state has actually achieved it fully. Factors conditioning this shared attachment or belonging stem from the civic and cultural acceptance whereby members of the state pledge loyalty to the civic community and in return the community accepts them

irrespective of their cultural or ethnic background. This mutual recognition is essential in forging relations and by the same token is the most problematic for contemporary multicultural societies to achieve.

The anxiety surfaces from within the deeply entrenched attribute of the nation states - the claim for ultimate loyalty and cultural uniformity of its members. In other words, there is a suspicion of anyone who does not belong or conform to the dominant culture. As long as the nation states do not reflect their multicultural composition with governance, policies, legislation and social provisions,

58 manufacturing of shared belonging will be severely hindered. In the absence of these provisions, it is questionable to what degree can the simple categorisation of citizenship forge shared belonging.

Addressing the issue of belonging and acceptance, the EU has transcended the nation states on some levels and adopted a number of internationally agreed legal provisions protecting its citizens and their freedoms including the right to freedom of religion which is of primary concern for this thesis. These provisions comprise the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief;

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights including its preambles to the Substantive Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, and the Right to Freedom of Association and the Non-

discrimination on the Basis of Religion or Belief. In addition to this extensive list, the European Union implemented two principal documents which have been, in their own right, revolutionary in the provision for religion and religious affiliation in the EU: The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms and The Treaty of Lisbon.

The European convention is one of the most important legally binding documents in the history of the European Union. It guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion within the framework of liberal democratic principles and prohibits any form of sexual, racial or religious discrimination. As stipulated under the Article 9:

Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Council of Europe, 2010)

Article 9 is complemented by Article 11 which refers to freedom of association and assembly. Building upon the reference to religious freedom within the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is Declaration on the Status of Churches and Non- confessional Organizations in Declaration Number 11 to the last act of Treaty of Amsterdam.

Notwithstanding its comprehensive character, Article 9 and Article 11 of the European Convention as well as the Declaration Number 11 of the Treaty of Amsterdam have been criticized for their

normative references to legislation of the member nation states. In this instance, the national legislation provides a precedent to be complemented rather than challenged by the EU’s legislation,

59 thus protecting the sovereignty of individual nation states. This implies that the faith communities are to be primarily managed by the nation states whilst role of the European Union remains neutral, respecting national sovereignty.

On the other hand, Treaty of Lisbon has from its early stages assumed a somewhat controversial position. Deemed by most member states as reducing sovereign powers of the nation states, the treaty entered into force after what can be described as a hesitant ratification on 1st December 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon approached and grasped the significance of faith organisations in a bold and innovative manner whereby as stated in its preamble, it stresses the importance of ‘the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe’ (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). Indeed, references to God or specifically to Christianity were endorsed by some of the member states during drafting of the treaty, with final consensus on preserving religious and cultural neutrality of the preamble. The European Union adopted a universal approach by encouraging participation of organised faith communities, hence publicly managing and recognising their importance whilst regulating the realm of religious influence and protecting the boundaries between the state and the church.

Attempts by the EU to develop a common legal framework towards religion have been investigated in detail by Doe (2010) who maintains that the Lisbon Treaty is remarkably inclusive in relation to faith groups and religious representation. According to this analysis, Lisbon Treaty acknowledges and supports the contribution of churches and other religious organisations to Europe. The novelty of the Lisbon Treaty is embedded in this largely unbiased approach towards different religions,

whereby as stated in its documentation ‘the Union must respect religious diversity’ (European Union Reform Treaty, 2007: Article 22), and in particular in article 15b.1 which states ‘the Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the member states’ (Doe, 2010:143). It is under these provisions that the EU acknowledges diverse cultural and religious identity of the European civil society, and thus the importance of maintaining an open dialog with representative faith communities and organisations. In fact, the treaty reaches beyond the anticipated level of the EU’s commitment by actively

promoting and facilitating dialog with the faith groups.

The EU’s largely neutral approach enables growth of diverse religious organisations and grants them a comparatively salient position within the secular European Union. However, references to

60 whilst associations with minority religions, and Muslim organisations and Islam in particular are somewhat problematic.

Reflecting on these dimensions, the following section investigates the role of religion in multicultural societies and within the EU as a whole, and the multiple forms of multicultural governance in Europe with the emphasis on republican, liberal and plural forms of governance. This taxonomy also

provides useful reference point for further research into the selected case studies of Great Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic.