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Introduction

2.2 What is multiculturalism?

Symptomatic of the early stages of multiculturalism were high hopes and expectations presuming it could bring solutions to our increasingly diverse world. Indeed, in comparison to the previously popular paradigm of homogenous populations, multiculturalism embodies ethnic and cultural diversity. The multicultural ideal was short lived and gradually the parameters it set in place proved seemingly unsustainable in the current age of the nation states. In fact, it is paradoxical that in the world where the vast majority of the nation states consist of heterogeneous populations,

multiculturalism is being charged with hindrance to community cohesion. What is striking, albeit perhaps is to be expected, is the national rhetoric surrounding state’s recognition of its own

50 multicultural population. A state and its society do not become multiculturalist by simply generating a narrative of multiculturalism whilst retaining ‘monocultural’ norms (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2005).

This distortion of multiculturalism has far reaching consequences for its governance. Perhaps, it is the lack of clarity attributed to multiculturalism or its extensive use by competing actors, which contribute to its perceived downfall. The multicultural discourse has been simultaneously adopted by the media, politicians, and community leaders, all claiming their stake in multicultural politics. In response, researchers and scholars

attempted to define and demystify multiculturalism and its policies within and beyond the social sciences. The following synopsis offered by Vertovec and Wessendorf (2005) provides a good starting point for a more in-depth analysis of the multiple facets of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism can variously be understood as i) a way of describing the actual makeup of a society; ii) a general vision of the way government and society should orient itself; iii) a specific set of policy tools for accommodating minority cultural practices; iv) specially created frameworks of governance allowing for the representation of immigrant and ethnic minority interests; and v) a variety of support mechanisms and funds for assisting ethnic minority communities to celebrate and reproduce their traditions (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2005: 5).

Deriving from the outline provided by Vertovec and Wessendorf, it is evident that the uniform, one fits all approach is not pertinent as the concept of multiculturalism is too broad to be curbed by neatly arranged theories and definitions. Therefore the remainder of this chapter outlines some of the most frequently adopted practices of multicultural governance predominantly framed on Parekh’s work, whilst preparing ground for the subsequent chapters by elucidating multicultural policies of the case study nation states.

Analysis of multiculturalism as a political theory or a philosophical approach often discards its multifaceted character, referring predominantly to relations between diverse cultures. In response Parekh, one of the leading theorists on multiculturalism, points to multiple layers that need to be taken into consideration in order to grasp the complexity and meaning of the concept. It is essential to distinguish between the distinct cultural components which structure individual identities and shape the inward and outward facing perceptions of the world and other cultures. As such, Parekh is critical of certain aspects of liberalism which in his view discards significant values and concepts such

51 as family, community cohesion and solidarity which Parekh believes are embedded within the premise of multiculturalism. Thus, unlike the hypothesis suggested by the proponents of assimilation policies, founded on homogeneity and uniform culture, advocates of multiculturalism build their argument on the basis of open dialog with diverse cultures and the acceptance of cultural

differences. This multiculturalist discourse, as proposed by Parekh (2000), contains three key areas which delineate its main characteristics and aims:

Human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they grow up and live within a culturally structured world, organize their lives and social relations in terms of its system of meaning and significance, and place considerable value on their cultural identity (Parekh, 2000: 336).

a) Parekh implies that culture situates and frames parameters through which individuals perceive the world around them, and as such it is paramount to individuals’ existence and identity formation. This is not to suggest that identities and perceptions acquired through the native culture must be taken at a face value. On the contrary, Parekh insists that individuals ought to be encouraged to critically evaluate their cultural heritage and develop understanding of other cultures.

b) Distinct cultures have multiple interpretations, values, beliefs and practices. Each culture has something to offer but essentially each culture also has its limitations. Consequently, cultures should learn from each other as means to improve and expand their principles and ideals.

c) All societies are fluid and porous, open to different cultures and practices in a sense that they adopt and rewrite specific elements from outside traditions and cultures, and interpret them as their own (Parekh, 2000).

The researcher acknowledges that multiculturalism extends well beyond Parekh’s analysis (Fleras, 2009; Malik, 2009; Meer and Modood, 2008; Modood, 2005a, 2010; Nagle, 2009; Pitcher, 2009; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2005, 2010; West, 2004), but not only is it not possible to deal with multiculturalism in all its dimensions fully here, the focus of this thesis lies on Muslims’ perception of multicultural reality rather than in the analysis of it. Thus, multiculturalist framework presented by Parekh, which is often seen as the multiculturalist ideal, will be drawn upon throughout. It is

essential, however, to provide a more in depth analysis, depicting the politics of multiculturalism and its governance to illustrate the imprint it has on identity developments and formations. Reflecting on Parekh’s efforts, scholars of politics of multiculturalism developed a comparative analysis and

52 paradigms of the doctrine further, some of which reinforce Parekh’s argument and thus are relevant to this thesis. Fleras (2009), for example, produced an excellent overview of multicultural

governance in comparative perspective, where he defines different forms of multiculturalism, its policies and applications outside the formally approved structures. In comparison, typology designed by Parekh comes across as somewhat overly normative.

Governments (or states) around the world have capitalised on the principles of multiculturalism (however they may be defined) to construct official frameworks for advancing the social and the cultural without imperilling the national. Whereas an everyday or lived multiculturalism entails the mixing and merging (hybridizing) of cultural forms, an official multiculturalism (as state policy) often endorses a mosaic of fixed identities and identifiable ethnicities (Fleras, 2009: 5). Central to this premise is the notion of multicultural multiplicity which varies to a great degree, particularly in areas of official-state multiculturalism and ideological multiculturalism. By and large, official or state multiculturalism aims to utilise procedures of ideological multiculturalism while also endorsing policies of the individual nation state. This process solidifies developments of a manifold multicultural prototype which differs from state to state. Consequently, central to multiculturalism’s existence is its capacity to deliver a peculiar arrangement whereby what may seem to be opposing aims and objectives, meet. Indeed, as outlined in preceding chapter theorising the nation states and in the proposed hypotheses on multicultural politics, it is precisely the multiple character of

multicultural governance that makes it challenging for the nation states to adopt. Schlesinger, for instance, describes the multicultural conundrum as ‘managing difference by making society safe from diversity politics and the politics of difference while making society safe for diversity and difference’ ( Schlesinger, 1991: 279). Schlesinger’s analogy suggests that the nation states employ state multiculturalism as a normative instrument for implementation of policies and regulations essential for the management of inter- ethnic relations.

This means that the official or state multiculturalism serves as a connecting device or a bridge between the ideal that ought to be achieved to accommodate and manage different cultures, as described by Parekh, and interests of the dominant nation, as represented by the state’s

homogenising tendencies described in the previous chapter. In other words, official multiculturalism is often a crossing post or a half way house between the theory and practice. Fleras maintains this pragmatic view by proclaiming that ‘national and vested interests are counterbalanced by a commitment to social equality and cultural recognition, although, paradoxically, the attainment of

53 these commitments may consolidate patterns of control’ (Fleras, 2009: 7). In their study of

Australian multiculturalism and the majority – minority relations, Vasta and Castles (1996) arrived to a rather sceptical conclusion observing that multiculturalism as a form of governance often acts as an instrument of authority and serves to enhance power of majority over the minorities.

As public policy, multiculturalism is concerned with the management of cultural differences. It is this apparently innocuous objective that all the ambivalence of multiculturalism arises; it is simultaneously a discourse of pacification and emancipation, of control and participation, of the legitimation of the existing order and of innovation (Vasta and Castles, 1996: 48).

Subscribing to arguments put forward by Parekh, Fleras or Vasta and Castles, the major drawbacks of multiculturalism derive not only from its complexity but also from the multiplicity of its policies, with striking cross country differences all falling under the multicultural rubric. What is less prevalent in these arguments, perhaps with the exception of Parekh, is the unison with the nation state as a political actor. Fleras and Vasta and Castles recognise multiculturalism as a double edged sort because of its vulnerability to exploitation by the state. To this end, the nation state uses multiculturalism as an agent to control and manage its minorities. What this argument does not address, are the conditions leading to this particular process or other forms of relationship between the two actors, as for instance in the case of Great Britain. This, as argued throughout the thesis, is the ultimate debate of contemporary nation states moving between diversity and unity. Solution to this conundrum is perhaps best answered by the traditional approach of the nation states to the ‘other’ which as described in previous chapter is still prevalent among most nation states. More negative approach towards the ‘other’ is often associated with the ethnic nation states, however, the civic nation states are no exception to this trend. It is here that Parekh’s ‘ideal’ multiculturalism falls short. Parekh understands and develops his multicultural typology along the civic lines as his definition of national identity is a civic one, or akin to the civic identity, whereas national identity is by nature limited to the ‘owner of the state’ – the dominant group. Settler societies and states with history of incoming migration, such as Canada, Great Britain or the United States are more resistant to ethnic tendencies and usually develop a more inclusive and civic multicultural policies, but by no means are they immune to the ethnic concept of national identity. Analysis and taxonomy of multicultural societies can facilitate a better understanding of the nation states’ choices leading to particular form of multicultural governance. Hence, before proceeding to the typology of

multicultural governance, the following section will aim to evaluate and categorise multicultural societies.

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