We have already seen some of the complex relationship between music and language, while examining integration between the dual codes of language and mental imagery in chapter 2, and arguing in chapter 3 that timbral and prosodic articulation share a grounding in movement. e Chomskian linguistic notion of semantics as it is generally understood excludes any notion of
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musical meaning. e hierarchical structure of music holds some similarity to linguistic syntax, but the lack of reference to a real or imagined world makes a semantics of music untenable (Wiggins, 1998). As a result, discussion of meaning in music oen lacks a formal underpinning, resulting in a broad spectrum of parallel discussions in the literature, each under its own terms (for a broad review see Cross and Tolbert, 2008). However the alternative view ofconceptual semanticsprovided by the theory of Conceptual Spaces (§2.2.5) puts things in a rather different light. In the following we show that unlike Chomskian semantics, G¨ardenforsian conceptual semantics is applicable to music as well as language, by summarising its main tenets in relation to music.
“Semantic elements are constructed from geometrical or topological structures (not sym- bols that can be composed according to some system of rules).” In other words, semantic meaning is primary to the conceptual, analogue level, and not the discrete level as with Chom- skian semantics. e common view in music theory characterises musical structure as being discrete and syntactic (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983), however conceptual semantics allow us to consider music structure as spatial and geometric in addition. In the case of music of timbre (§3.3.3), we claim that conceptual semantics is the primary structure.
“Semantic meaning is a conceptual structure in a cognitive system.” Meaning does not ex- ist through links to the world (or a possible world), but in the body (and in particular, the brain), of an individual. However the conceptual structures of a group of individuals may reach ac- cordance through communication. We can consider a musical improvisation in terms of such a process of communication, where two or more improvisers begin with individual concep- tual structures at the beginning of a piece, which are manipulated towards accordance and discordance during a performance. Of course while situated in an individual, the conceptual structures are informed by previous performances and higher cultural effects such as musi- cal genre. It is also possible, through aberration or inference, that new conceptual structure is created during an improvisation that did not exist at the beginning (Wiggins, 2006b). Such conceptual structure could be deemed valuable and kept for reuse in future improvisations. In such a case we can say that an improvisation created new meaning, and was therefore a par- ticularlycreativeperformance. is manner of creative search is discussed in greater detail in §6.3.
“Conceptual structures are embodied (meaning is not independent of perception or of bodily experience).” is tenet connects cognitive semantics to its roots in theories of embodied cognition. Instruments and the voice require movements of the body in order to make sound,
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and the constraints and vagaries of motor action within the tight feedback loop of action and reaction are an important component of musical improvisation (Pressing, 1984, 1987). However the influence of bodily experience goes beyond actual motor action to suggest that semantic meaning is dependent on motor and perceptual circuits in the brain.
“Cognitive models are primarily image-sematic (not propositional). Image-semas are transformed by metaphoric and metonymic operations (whi are treated as exceptional features on the traditional view).” Image schemata are abstract diagrams of spatial re- lationships and actions, representing notions such as ‘over’, ‘containment’ and ‘araction’ (Lakoff, 1997). A metaphorical operation is where two concepts are related via common image schemata, most commonly relative to orientations such as ‘UP’ (§2.2.6). It is through metaphor- ical structure that a conceptual system can be grounded in perception and action, yet represent meaning abstract from it.
“Semantics is primary to syntax and partly determines it (syntax cannot be described in- dependently of semantics).” is is another tenet in opposition to the widely held view of Chomskian linguistics, where syntax is primary and independent of semantics. It implies that when composing a piece of music, the cognitive semantic structure is more important than grammatical rules. at is, any grammatical rules underlying a piece of music are placed in support of the geometry of the semantic structure, rather than a precursor for it (Forth et al., 2010).
“Concepts show prototype effects (instead of following the Aristotelian paradigm based on necessary and sufficient conditions).” e Aristotelian paradigm has not been taken seri- ously for several decades and current theories of concepts do not depend upon it (Murphy, 2002, p.16). e subscript to this tenet therefore is weakened by not showing consideration for theories competing with the prototype view such as those of the exemplar view and knowl- edge approach (Murphy, 2002, pp. 41–71). However prototype effects, such as a robin being judged a more typical bird than a penguin, are indeed easily accounted for within the theory of conceptual spaces. G¨ardenfors does so using the Voronoi diagram (Okabe et al., 2000), where a conceptual prototype is a Voronoi generator for the geometrical regions of conceptual proper- ties. Prototype effects are observed in music, for example where pieces are judged as greater or less typical examples of a musical genre. In the Voronoi diagram of genres, a typical piece would be near to the region’s generator, and a difficult to define or ‘crossover’ piece would be near a boundary between two or more genres. In practice, musical genres are impossible to define universally, which points again to the relativist position stated in the first tenet.
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In summary, in Chomskian terms music cannot be understood in terms of semantics, only syntax. However if one is prepared to take a G¨ardenforsian view, a discussion of musical meaning can proceed with a formal underpinning, where meaning exists within individuals’ conceptual structures of music, within the structures shared by the members of a music culture, and within the grounding relationships between musical structure and universals of human perception and movement.