T
HE ESSENTIALS OF THEKurdish problem can be reduced to four key elements in any search for a solution. First, while there are multiple aspects to the Kurdish problem, it is essential to recognize that the prob- lem is fundamentally an ethnic one, thereby requiring an ethnic solution. The emergence of ethnic politics among the Kurds, as we described earlier, comes as a reaction to the official Turkish nationalism of the modern Turk- ish state and reflects a wider growth of ethnic consciousness on a global basis. The emergence of different ethnicities within one state does not, of course, imply automatic conflict. But historically, conflict has periodically arisen between Turks and Kurds.The internal violence and virtual civil war or ‘‘anarchy’’ of the 1970s in Turkey mobilized many left-wing Kurds (as well as Turks) into ideological movements struggling to dismantle the existing state structure. It was out of this milieu that the PKK emerged, bringing by far the most serious Kurdish armed struggle into Turkish politics since the founding of the state. State violence in response against the PKK and the suffering this military campaign has visited upon the Kurds in the southeast have clearly exacerbated the problem and served to polarize the conflict. It is conceiv-
able that the Kurdish search for official recognition of the Kurdish identity might not have taken military form if the PKK had not emerged when it did, and if, in response, the state had not taken such a hard line against Kurdish political and cultural aspirations.
While this kind of ‘‘what if ’’ analysis is rather hypothetical, it does sug- gest that armed conflict between Turks and Kurds in Turkey was not pre- destined, even if rising Kurdish demands were. It also suggests that a political solution may yet be found if the quest for a polarizing military solution is abandoned. We do not believe that the Kurdish identity is likely to fade, since few other larger and unfulfilled nationalist movements else- where in the world are fading; furthermore, the political identity of the Kurds in Turkey is strengthened by the Kurdish struggle in both Iraq and Iran.
Major economic improvements and increased democratization in the southeast will help alleviate some symptoms of the crisis, but in the end a solution that addresses the ethnic character of the problem is required. At a minimum that means clear recognition of the existence of the Kurds as a culturally distinct identity, and recognition of the rights of Kurds to ex- press their culture fully under a system of cultural autonomy. This would imply some degree of regional responsibility that permits Kurds to run many of their own local affairs—obviously excluding major national issues such as defense, currency, overall security, national economic policy, and foreign affairs.
It would be inappropriate, however, for this study to specify exact for- mulas; those can only come through a political process over time. In this context, Turks need to be aware that their problems are not unique; large numbers of other states in the world have faced and still face similar prob- lems. The international community has accumulated much experience and developed a wide variety of formulas and mechanisms in other countries that might prove relevant to an eventual Turkish-Kurdish solution.
Second, the onus of responsibility for a solution lies with the Turkish state rather than with the Kurds as people. In Turkey the conflict is not, as it often is in other countries, between two mobilized and competing communities; here it is between a weak community attempting to mobi- lize and the state. The state is fundamentally responsible for the creation of the problem by its fateful decision in the 1920s to create a nation-state defined as consisting of Turks alone, compounded by several decades of enforced assimilation of Kurds—a decision that can no longer be sus-
tained, imposed, or implemented. Continuing attempts to impose such a solution without formal acknowledgment of the existence of the Kurds will only lead to continued and perhaps even increased bloodshed and will only strengthen the possibility that the Kurds will indeed eventually insist on total independence.
Furthermore, the state holds virtually all the cards: The Kurds them- selves have almost nothing to concede in negotiations, for they have noth- ing that the state wants except retreat from their demands. If a compromise is to be reached, the most the Kurds can offer is eventual peace, loyalty, and nonviolence. Even these Kurdish ‘‘concessions’’ will still entail demands upon the state that the state does not welcome, but they can come in the context of a retreat from some of the initially maximalist demands of the PKK for separatism and the establishment of a pan-Kurd- ish state.
Certainly, alternative Kurdish political parties inside Turkey can be more sensitive to Turkish public opinion so as not to exacerbate existing ten- sions, but with the state wielding most of the power, compromise depends more on the state than on any other factor. Only the PKK has offered the Kurds a genuine element of power vis-a`-vis the state through military resistance and the costs it can impose on the state. Actual initiatives in negotiations can come only from the parties that hold the power. This does not mean that the PKK can be the only spokesman for the Kurds; the Kurds in fact have not yet had an opportunity to freely demonstrate just whom it is they do want to represent them.
Third, a critical part of the problem lies in the need to reformulate the very concept of the Turkish state as perceived by its citizens. Is the state a monolithic instrument, charged with the mission of forging a nation, preserving the state as it is known, and retaining a paternalistic hold over its development? Or is the state the instrument of its combined citizenry to attain the goals they seek? The former, statist concept, which emerges from nation-building concepts of an earlier era, was indeed relevant to Turkey in the Atatu¨rkist period, when entirely new concepts were required to replace those of the collapsed imperial, multinational, and authoritarian Ottoman Empire. But today, it has become evident to all that the state has partially failed in its mission to homogenize the population: After more than seventy years, while some groups have been successfully integrated, the Kurdish question has not disappeared and indeed is growing. Thus, until the vision changes—in which the state is no longer the master but
the servant of the people—it is unlikely that Turkey will be able to progress toward a solution to the Kurdish problem. This transformation of the role of the state does not pose a threat to the sovereignty of the state per se, but rather only to the role of the state over all of its citizens—Turk, Kurd, and others. The good news is that this transition is quite feasible for Turkey to manage, given its major progress toward democratization, liberaliza- tion, and the emergence of a strong civil society over the past decades. Other states facing such ethnic challenges are not so well off.
Fourth, there is a factor of time that cannot be ignored. Whatever mili- tary gains or losses are taking place on the ground, Kurdish self-awareness is expanding and will not go away. Changing global conditions—greater acceptance of nationalist movements in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the break-up of Yugoslavia, and any new political balances that might emerge in the Middle East following successful Israeli-PLO negotiations—will increasingly make it difficult for Turkey to ignore its own domestic diversity and pluralism. Thus the Turkish state does not have an indefinite amount of time to seek an equitable solution; the longer it takes to find resolution, the more radicalized the Kurds may become and the higher the cost of a settlement grows. The state deliberates over the issue as if time did not matter, but the clock is ticking, and certain realities are being created domestically and internationally that are not fully under the state’s control.
The Kurdish factor in Iraq, for example, is also developing rapidly; Iraq cannot go back to the status quo ante of the 1960s, when the Iraqi Kurds had few political demands. Eventually, Iraq must move in the direction of some kind of federal state if the Iraqi state is ever to stay together. As argued earlier, Turkey would be wise to have settled its own Kurdish prob- lem to the satisfaction of its Kurds by that time; Iraqi Kurds possessing a fair degree of autonomy will otherwise be a destabilizing model to Turkey’s Kurds.
Conversely, satisfied Turkish Kurds can have major influence upon northern Iraq, possibly making Turkey the dominant free Kurdish voice in the region—the largest and freest body of Kurds in the Middle East. Tur- key’s Kurds, together with Turkey’s own power, skills, and resources, can then become the leader and partner of all regional Kurds on many issues. At that point, Diyarbakir becomes a huge potential entrepoˆt for regional trade and communications, instead of an isolated city in a distant region near closed and militarized borders. If Turkey fails to satisfy the cultural
aspirations of its own Kurds, it not only becomes permanent hostage to its own Kurds but also to events in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Iran, and Syria—whose own internal political situations are very repressive, unsta- ble, and doomed to face major upheaval. Nor can Ankara achieve its goals by pretending to ignore the Kurdish reality in Iraq, especially because it may not be able to influence it in the long run. Turkey’s choices would thus seem to be clear—but that does not mean that the process of getting there is easy.