Normalisation for Undermining (i.e. Normalise and Undermine)

Normalisation is a way of conferring legitimacy by reference to normal or natural behaviours (Vaara et al., 2006). My findings show that policymakers, in response to industry actors’

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frames and linguistic cleavages, try to normalise the emergent cleavages as a normal characteristic of both intra-industry competition and the policymaking process. The HSC acknowledged that industry actors can afford to take different perspectives and that competition is an integral part of life and business. Cleavages are thus, an expression of competition and “it is only natural” as noted by MSP 2.

they did take different views; those that export was against, and those that were in support, like Tennent Caledonian⁴⁶, I think that was logical. For some Scottish business with a high-end product if the cheaper products are forced to be more expensive that would probably help the better-quality products (MSP 2).

When asked if the division affected the committee’s deliberations, MSP 1 replied, “No, I don’t think so” and went on to say that the presence of cleavage is a …

strength rather than a weakness. The committee system that we operate in Scotland is very good for accommodating and allowing people to voice their opinion. It is not a case of divide and rule (MSP 1).

The extracts above recognise the role of competition and healthy debate within the market and political systems in Scotland.

[It was] just a natural consequence of the nature of the change that is being made and the fact that they were tackling problems being created by one part of the industry, which would have a benefit for the other side of the industry (MSP 3).

Positioning cleavages as core to market competition normalises them and protects the legitimacy of the alcohol industry. Apart from the normalisation of cleavages, as an essential element of market competition, they also manifest in the policymaking process itself, where different actors formed different alliances. The findings suggest that the government also sought to normalise the discursive contestations between industry and other actors, as a

46 Tennent Caledonian’s is predominantly a Scottish based business with limited or no export business side at the time (i.e. prior to its takeover by the C&C group).

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way to maintain the legitimacy of the industry. For instance, the MSPs interviewed agreed that all the subjects discussed at committee stage never always had a consensus: “there is always a division amongst witnesses on the evidence” (MSP 2). This view was also shared by a representative of a trade association: “[T]he government understands that some will agree with them and others won't. They are used to it” (Participant 2). This is a normalisation strategy because it references a normal or natural functioning or behaviour” (Vaara et al., 2006: 797).

However, the normalisation of cleavages and competition in the policymaking process, in this instance, worked in favour of the Scottish Government. In the case of the MUP debates, the committee and the government took advantage of the industry cleavages and the differences in the opinions of the witnesses, in order to discursively undermine the position of the industry. For example, the government ministers used the comments of industry actors who supported MUP to undermine the position of those who did not support it as illustrated in the snippet in Box 1 below on the consumption patterns of young people.

Box 1: Extract from HSC report, (2012) pg. 21 paragraphs 105 to 107.

As one of the MSPs acknowledged during the interview, the division amongst industry actors,

“… strengthened the government's position that some alcohol industry members did support

105. Young people‘s attitude to drink was of particular concern to some witnesses. Dr Gillan told the Committee—

“We adults have not yet grasped how the drinking culture among young people has changed, even compared with the culture when we were young.”⁹⁰

106. The drinks industry also recognised a change in the behaviour of the younger generation, particularly when it came to “pre-loading”. Michael Patten of Diageo suggested they were less responsive to pricing than policymakers may wish. He said—

“We have seen shifts in the culture around alcohol consumption that need to be addressed, but we are not going to succeed in doing that using the pricing mechanism.”⁹¹

107. Paul Waterson of the Scottish Licensed Trade Association took a contrasting view, putting pricing firmly in the centre of the discussion. He told the Committee—

“A change is taking place that is being driven by price, which is taking people out of the controlled environment and allowing them to drink at home. It is quite an easy equation to do. There is no doubt that young people are strategic when it comes to planning their drinking on the basis of price.”⁹²

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the minimum pricing” (MSP 2). The interviewee went on to say that “if the whole industry were [SIC] united against it [i.e. the MUP Bill], I suppose it would have had some effect” (MSP 2, emphasis added). By effect, the MSP meant “… the opponents in parliament would have been in a stronger position if there had been nobody from the alcohol industry supporting it and giving evidence to that effect” (MSP 2). Some industry actors corroborated this view:

It would have been much easier particularly if the SLTA had opposed the MUP; and if the whole industry had been opposed, then, indeed, the political argument would have been easier to engage with; and I think there would have been hesitation from the Scottish Government, in going ahead.

Just as there is hesitation in the UK Government about going ahead with the MUP (Participant 4 – trade association).

In other words, the way a government frames a policy and the evidence it presents to support its position can fuel cleavages amongst the different actors, and at the same time normalise these cleavages, as a form of competition or as part of the normal policy process.

In line with Sturdy et al. (2012), the SNP government’s health-focused manifesto can be said to have used the MUP consultation process to gather support and to recruit industry actors to “help in the implementation” of the policy (MSP 1). One way to make sense of this contradictory position of normalising for undermining is to argue that while the government sees competition as normal, it does its best to pander to the excesses of competition in line with societal expectations. The balance here between normal competition and abnormal competition (i.e. the excesses of competition) is an expression of moral legitimacy. In that regard, normalisation for undermining, as a legitimating strategy, protects industry actors’

moral legitimacy by realigning the industry to accepted societal norms. Cleavages characterised as part of the policy process, in this instance, may undermine the industry but also support the recruitment of industry actors to help implement the will of the government as explained next.