CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH CONTEXT
2.5 C URRENT A LCOHOL D EBATE AND I NDUSTRY P OSITION
2.5.1 Recent Changes and Developments in the Scottish Alcohol Industry
The shift towards a whole-population approach by the Scottish Government after 2007represents a sea of change in the UK alcohol debate (Hawkins and Holden, 2013), with an end result of cleavages amongst and between the alcohol stakeholders. These cleavages were more pronounced within the industry with spirits producers, some brewers and the majority of the off-trade retail sector strongly opposed to any form of price-based measure (Hawkins and Holden, 2013). Most of the alcohol producers that participated in the MUP debates have been in business for many years. Most of them have undergone a series of mergers and acquisitions. They are classed as MNC as they operate in more than one country and employ 250 workers or more (Aggarwal, et al., 2011). The off-trade retailers are classed as big companies as they have traded for many years with multiple retail outlets. A summary of the key characteristics of the industry actors that participated in the Scottish alcohol MUP debate is presented in Appendix 1. Information provided by all the industry actors involved in the MUP debates on their websites presents the businesses as successful and that they contribute to the economic development of their resident countries. The industry actors
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that participated in the MUP debates are signatories to the UK Public Health Responsibility Deal (PHRD15) and they engage in numerous corporate reputation management activities as well as in schemes aimed towards reducing alcohol misuse and harm.
As part of the UK PHRD pledge A7(a), alcohol industry actors pledged to “provide support for schemes appropriate for local areas that wish to use them to address issues around social and health harms, and act together to improve co-operation among such schemes operating in local areas” (Department of Health (DoH), 2011b; Hadfield and Measham, 2014; Knai et al., 2015). Examples of schemes alcohol industry actors participate in, include Best Bar None (BBN16), Business Improvement Districts (BID17), Community Alcohol Partnerships (CAP18), PASS19, Pubwatch20 and Purple Flag21 and Challenge 21. Most of these activities are also part of the existing Scottish Government Alcohol Industry Partnership (SGAIP22). The PHRD was not without consequence as it shaped the alcohol policy landscape in England with
15 The PHRD is a government scheme introduced by the UK coalition government in 2010. The involves businesses signing up voluntarily to set pledges. The scheme was established on the premise that businesses understand their customers better and working alongside public health practitioners, it is assumed that they would find solutions to resolve problems associated with business practices at a lesser cost than legislation (DOH, 2011a).
16 BBN is a national award supported by the Home Office and the drinks industry. It aims to promote responsible management and operation of licensed premises and reducing crime in the night-time economy (BBN website).
17 BIDs are business led partnerships created to deliver additional services to local businesses. They encourage local businesses to get involved in local activities, enables business community and local
authorities to work together to improve the commercial environment and embody several key dimensions of contemporary policing (Cook, 2010).
18 The CAP scheme supports local partnership working to address issues such as under-age alcohol sales, proxy purchase and reducing alcohol-related anti-social behaviour (Tesco Plc, 2016). WSTA helps coordinate CAPs. Their actions include co-operating and liaising between retailers and the trading standard, police, schools, local authority licensing teams and health networks.
19 PASS is a UK’s national guarantee scheme for proof-of-age cards. This scheme is supported by the Government; the Association of Chief Police Officers; the trading standards institute and the trade
associations connected with those selling age-restricted products. Acceptance of PASS cards is furthermore promoted as part of the Challenge 21 and Challenge 25 scheme (BBPA, 2012).
20 Pubwatch is a voluntary organisation set up to promote best practices and aims to achieve a safer drinking environment in licensed premises.
21 Purple flag is an award scheme aimed at making city centers and business districts safe, consumer friendly and appealing within the night-time economy.
22 The SGAIP is a forum created in 2007 by the devolved Scottish government with the aim of bringing together government and the alcohol industry members to deliver joint initiatives to promote responsible drinking and address alcohol related issues (Scottish Government Website, 2013).
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implications for wider alcohol strategy and MUP when it was being considered by the Westminster Government (Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019).
Industry actors take pride in and publicise their activities on their websites and in their strategy reports. Arguably, this could be a way of reducing regulative pressures on the industry (Yoon and Lam, 2012) and enhancing its reputation (see Guthrie et al., 2007;
Deegan et al., 2002), instead of addressing the health impacts and risks inherent in alcoholic products (Yoon and Lam, 2012; Hill, 2008). The activities mentioned above are said to keep customers safe (or at least provide a sense of safety) in the night-time economy, but not necessarily impact on their drinking levels or consumption pattern. Babor et al. (2010) argue that these schemes were created out of desperation or are circumstantial to avert attention from “evaluated multi-component programmes that might demonstrably support legislative intentions” and from strict legislation (Bond et al., 2009; Martineau et al., 2014). In addition, the effectiveness of these schemes is questionable, especially in relation to ‘hard’ measures such as local crime and disorder statistics (Hadfield and Measham, 2014). For example, an evaluation of the BBN scheme in Croydon found no “credible evidence to suggest that the implementation […] had an impact on the reduction of crime and disorder in the town centre on its own”. The authors cautioned that indicators to measure successes should be designed before the scheme is rolled out across the UK (Ackerman and Rogers, 2007). Hadfield and Measham (2014) found the BBN and Purple Flags awarded to licensees were used as a bargaining chip with the public licensing and enforcement agents to avoid tough sanctions/legislation. Critics of industry actors’ responsibility programmes Barry and Goodson (2010) asserted that the amount spent on alcohol advertising in a year outweighs that spent on alcohol education, awareness, and consumer responsibility campaigns over an eighteen-year period (for example, $320 million on advertising in 1999 versus $300 million on responsible drinking campaign between 1982 - 2000). In addition, 2397 responsible drinking adverts were placed compared to 208,909 alcohol promotion adverts in the year 2001 (Barry and Goodson, 2010). This places doubts on the industry actors’ commitments to alcohol harm reduction and their self-acclaimed identity as a responsible industry. The effectiveness of the PHRD pledges has been questioned by Petticrew et al. (2013) and Knai
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et al. (2015). Knai et al. (2015) in their review found that alcohol labelling is likely to have limited effect on consumption and labels promoting drinking guidelines and pregnancy warning are unlikely to influence drinking behaviour. The authors also stated that
“responsible drinking messages [were] ambiguous”, and that “industry-funded alcohol prevention campaigns can promote drinking instead of dissuading consumption” (Knai et al., 2015: 3). It is not surprising that industry actors should favour self-regulatory or co-regulatory measures such as those within the remit of the PHRD.
Hawkins et al. (2012) identified that organisations who front their CSR activities do so to promote self-regulation as an alternative to legislation. These activities are often regarded as delay tactics, as they lack evidence to substantiate their effectiveness (see Hadfield and Measham, 2014; Ackerman and Rogers, 2007). As Hawkins and Holden (2013) put it, partnerships formed by alcohol industry actors involve lots of compromise and favour the status-quo, leaving little or no room for effective policy interventions to be deliberated.
Moreover, the CSR activities championed by industry actors and their involvement in the policy process have been rationalised and justified amongst industry actors against stringent government legislature (Hawkins and Holden, 2013: 61, see quote from the Portman Group;
see also Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019).
Despite the critics, social responsibility activities are said to have positive outcomes – for example, adherence to the pledge to remove 2 billion units of alcohol from the market, which has been achieved (see Health Improvement Analytical Team, 2014). Nevertheless, studies by Knai et al. (2015) and Holmes et al. (2015), based on the methods adopted in the HMRC’s calculations of alcohol units sold, suggest that the industry 2-billion-unit pledge is yet to be achieved. The question remains, are alcohol industry social responsibility activities a mirage? (Bond et al., 2009; Baumberg, 2009).
Unfortunately, CSR and industry self-regulation cannot be trusted to address the challenges of alcohol in society. Hence, the need for government intervention especially through regulation. As earlier discussed, regulation comes with its challenges and it is often resisted by the industry to protect and pursue their interest. How these interests are framed and
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pursued can lead to cleavages, which in turn might influence or impact negatively on the legitimacy of an industry. An example can be drawn from the legal challenge to the MUP by the SWA and the reputational impact this had on the industry following their defeat in the courts (see Hawkins and McCambridge, 2020a) and the potential legitimacy implication on the sector for opposing a governments legislation with potential impact of reducing alcohol harms at a population level.