TsKB-18 also was exploring ballistic missile subma-rine designs. In 1957–1958 the bureau briefly TABLE7-1
Soviet Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
R-11FM R-13 R-21
NATO NATO NATO
SS-1b Scud-A SS-N-4 Sark SS-N-5 Serb
Operational 1959 1961 1963
Weight 12,050 lb 30,322 lb 36,600 lb
(5,466 kg) (13,745 kg) (16,600 kg)
Length 34 ft 1 in 38 ft 8 in 42 ft 4 in
(10.4 m) (11.8 m) (12.9 m)
Diameter 342⁄3in 51 in 55 in
(0.88 m) (1.3 m) (1.4 m)
Propulsion liquid- liquid-
liquid-propellant propellant propellant
1 stage 1 stage 1 stage
Range 80 n.miles 350 n.miles 755 n.miles*
(150 km) (650 km) (1,400 km)
Guidance inertial inertial inertial
Warhead** 1 RV 1 RV 1 RV
conventional nuclear nuclear
or nuclear 1 MT 1 MT
10 KT
Notes: There were several variants of each missile.
* A later version of R-21 carried an 800-kiloton warhead to a range of 1,600 km.
** RV = Reentry Vehicle.
looked at a closed-cycle propulsion plant using superoxide-sodium (Project 660). This design, with a submerged displacement of about 3,150 tons, was to carry three R-13 missiles. It was not pursued because of the substantial development and testing effort required for the power plant.
Rather, the next Soviet ballistic missile submarine would have nuclear propulsion (SSBN). Design work began in 1956 at TsKB-18, first under chief designer P. Z. Golosovsky, then I. B. Mikhilov, and finally Sergei N. Kovalev. This submarine would be Project 658 (NATO Hotel). The submarine had a surface dis-placement of 4,080 tons and an overall length of 374 feet (114 m). The submarine initially was armed with three R-13/SS-N-4 missiles. In addition to four 21-inch (533-mm) bow torpedo tubes, four 15.75-21-inch (400-mm) stern torpedo tubes were provided for defense against pursuing
destroy-ers, as in the Project 675/Echo II submarine.
The nuclear power plant was similar to the installation in the Project 627A/November SSNs and Project 659/675/Echo SSGNs with two VM-A reactors—the HEN installation. And, as did those submarines, the SSBNs suffered major engineering problems. The keel for the lead ship, the K-19, was laid down at Severodvinsk on 17 October 1958. She was placed in commis-sion on 12 November 1960.
From the outset the K-19 and her sister ships were plagued with engineering problems.
Less than a year later, while operating in Arctic waters off the southern coast of Greenland on 4
July 1961, the K-19 suffered a serious accident when a primary coolant pipe burst. The submarine was at a depth of 660 feet (200 m). The entire crew suffered excessive radiation exposure before the submarine was able to reach the surface. Her crew was evacuat-ed with the help of two diesel-electric submarines, and she was taken in tow. Of 139 men in the K-19 at the time, 8 men died almost immediately from radi-ation poisoning and several more succumbed over the next few years—a total of 14 fatalities. The reac-tor compartment was replaced at Severodvinsk from 1962 to 1964, and the original compartment was dumped into the Kara Sea. The cause of the casualty was traced to improper welding.
During 1968–1969 the K-19 was rearmed with the underwater-launch RSM-40 missile (NATO SS-N-8). Returning to sea, on 15 November 1969 the
Production of the Project 658/Hotel SSBN was halted because of the Soviet defense reorganization. Design was already under way on the far more capable Project 667A/Yankee SSBN. This is the problem-plagued K-19, disabled in the North Atlantic on 29 February 1972.(U.S. Navy)
Project 658/Hotel I SSBN. LOA 373 ft 11 in (114.0 m) (©A.D. Baker, III)
K-19 was in a collision with the U.S. nuclear sub-marine Gato (SSN 615), which was observing Sovi-et submarine operations in the Barents Sea. Both submarines were damaged, but neither was in dan-ger of sinking.
On 24 February 1972 the K-19 suffered a fire while operating submerged some 600 n.miles (1,110 km) northeast of Newfoundland. The sub-marine was able to surface. There were fires in com-partments 5, 8, and 9. The fires were extinguished, but 28 of her crew died, and the ship was left with-out propulsion. She was towed across the Atlantic to the Kola Peninsula, a 23-day tow. Twelve sur-vivors were trapped in isolated K-19 compart-ments, in darkness, and with cold rations. They were initially forced to drink alcohol from torpe-does. Later rations and water were passed down to them through an opening from the open deck.
There was no radiation leakage.
After investigations the Soviet government decided to use the K-19 to test the mobilization possibilities of the ship repair industry—the ability to repair a warship in a short amount of time. On 15 June 1972 the K-19 was towed to the Zvezdochka yard at Severodvinsk; with the yard workers labor-ing at maximum effort, on 5 November the subma-rine was returned to the fleet.
The surviving crewmen were sent back to the ship. This was done for the “morale and psycholog-ical well-being” of the crew. The K-19 continued in service until 1990. The submarine K-19—the first Soviet SSBN—was known in the fleet as the
“Hiroshima.”27
Other Project 658 submarines also suffered problems, some having to be towed back to Soviet ports. As accident after accident occurred, designer Kovalev recalled, “It was literally a disaster—steam generators leaked, condensers leaked and, practical-ly, the military readiness of these submarines was questionable.”28The problems that plagued these and the other submarines of the HEN-series pri-marily were caused by poor workmanship and lack of quality control at the shipyards and by compo-nent suppliers. Personnel errors, however, also were a factor in these accidents. From 1960 to 1962 eight ships of the Project 658/Hotel design were built at Severodvinsk. Additional SSBNs of this class were planned, but construction was halted by the late
1959 establishment of the Strategic Rocket Forces and cancellation of sea-based strategic strike pro-grams. (See Chapter 11.)
The design of a larger nuclear-propelled submarine—to carry a larger missile—had been started at SKB-143 in 1956.29Project 639 was to have a surface displacement of about 6,000 tons and nuclear propulsion with four propeller shafts, and was to be armed with three R-15 missiles.
Reactor plants with both pressurized water and liquid-metal coolants were considered. The R-15, designed at OKB-586, which was headed by Mikhail K. Yangel, was a liquid-propellant missile with a range of 540 n.miles (1,000 km). It would have been surface launched.
TsKB-16 also was working on a diesel-electric SSB, Project V629, a variant of the Golf design, that would carry one of the large R-15 missiles. But this was a surface-launch missile, and its performance was overtaken by other weapons in development;
consequently, the decision to halt work on the mis-sile was made in December 1958, and both subma-rine designs were cancelled.30
The seven Project 658 submarines that were rearmed with the R-21 missile (658M/Hotel II) served until 1991 in the SSBN role. The problem-plagued K-19 was one of the last to be retired. In 1979 she was converted to a communications relay ship (renamed KS-19). Other units subsequently were employed as research and missile test sub-marines after being retired from first-line SSBN service.31
However, according to the semiofficial history of Soviet shipbuilding, “the characteristics of the Soviet oceanic missile installations and submarines, the carriers of the first generation [missiles], were significantly behind the American submarines and missile installations. Therefore, during the begin-ning of the 1960s work began on constructing a more modern system for the next generation.”32 The next generation Soviet SSBN would go to sea in the late 1960s.
The Soviet Union pioneered the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and ballis-tic missile submarines. However, the capabilities of these submarines—both diesel-electric and
nuclear propelled—were limited, and the latter submarines were plagued with the engineering problems common to first-generation Soviet nuclear submarines. Still, early Soviet SSB/SSBNs provided some compensation for the initial shortfall in Soviet ICBM performance and pro-duction. Early planning for more capable ballistic missile submarines was halted because of the preference for ICBMs that followed establishment
of the Strategic Rocket Forces.
Further, the Soviets initiated a highly innova-tive program of developing submarine-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles. While the develop-ment of a specific missile for this purpose was successful—with some speculation in the West that an anti-submarine version would follow—
that weapon ultimately was abandoned because of arms control considerations. (See Chapter 11.)
TABLE7-2
Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines
Soviet Soviet Soviet
Project AV611 Project 629 Project 658
Zulu V Golf I Hotel I
Operational 1957 1959 1960
Displacement
surface 1,890 tons 2,850 tons 4,080 tons
submerged 2,450 tons 3,610 tons 5,240 tons
Length 296 ft 10 in 324 ft 5 in 373 ft 11 in
(90.5 m) (98.9 m) (114.0 m)
Beam 24 ft 7 in 26 ft 11 in 30 ft 2 in
(7.5 m) (8.2 m) (9.2 m)
Draft 16 ft 9 in 26 ft 7 in 25 ft 3 in
(5.15 m) (8.1 m) (7.68 m)
Reactors — — 2 VM-A
Turbines — — 2
horsepower — — 35,000
Diesel engines 3 3 —
horsepower 6,000 6,000 —
Electric motors 3 3 —
horsepower 5,400 5,400 —
Shafts 3 3 2
Speed
surface 16.5 knots 14.5 knots 18 knots
submerged 12.5 knots 12.5 knots 26 knots
Test depth 655 ft 985 ft 985 ft
(200 m) (300 m) (300 m)
Missiles 2 R-11FM 3 R-13/SS-N-4 3 R-13/SS-N-4
Torpedo tubes* 6 533-mm B 4 533-mm B 4 533-mm B
4 533-mm S 2 533-mm S 2 400-mm B
2 400-mm S Torpedoes
Complement 72 83 104
Notes: *Bow; Stern.
F
ollowing the dramatic launching of a V-2 from the aircraft carrier Midway in 1947, the U.S. Navy gave relatively little attention to ballistic missiles, in part because of other priorities for new weapons, especially those related to air-craft carriers. The ubiquitous Submarine Officers Conference in 1946, while considering a “super-bombardment submarine,” reported that it “might be desirable to make exploratory studies of a sub-marine capable of carrying a V-2 type missile,” but there was no follow-up effort.1In 1950 Commander Francis D. Boyle, a World War II submarine commander, proposed a “guided missile” submarine based on the wartime fleet boat. Boyle’s proposal provided a “rocket room”
and single launch tube aft of the forward torpedo, living, and battery spaces—and forward of the control spaces. Innovative features in the craft included a vertical launcher and a pump-jet, or ducted, propulsion device in place of propellers.
But neither the missile nor interest in a ballistic missile program existed in the U.S. Navy at the time.
The proposals to place ballistic missiles in sub-marines received impetus in the aftermath of the Soviet detonation of a thermo-nuclear (hydrogen) device on 12 August 1953. The fear of Soviet advances in strategic missiles led the U.S. Depart-ment of Defense to direct the Navy to join the Army in development of an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) that could be launched from sur-face ships.2
The Navy’s leadership had objected strenuously to the joint program, because the Army was develop-ing the liquid-propellant Jupiter missile. The Navy considered liquid propellants too dangerous to han-dle at sea, and a 60-foot (18.3-m) missile would be troublesome even on board surface ships. In addi-tion, there was general opposition to ballistic missiles at sea within the Navy from the “cultural” viewpoint for two reasons. First, from the late 1940s both the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Ordnance were (separately) developing cruise missiles that could be launched from submarines against land tar-gets; neither bureau wished to divert scarce resources to a new ballistic missile program.