4. The soul, as a thinking substance, is distinct from objects of external sense, including the body
3.5 Objective-Internal Material Practical Principles
While, as Kant indicated in his Lectures on Ethics, rational principles could conceivably be based on either unity, truth, or perfection, Kant only attacks objective-internal material practical principles based on perfection in the second Critique. Since the table of heteronomy is
499 Ibid B114-115 (217).
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meant to be a comprehensive system of possible ethical theories based on material grounds, this omission is perplexing. However, if the objective-internal/objective-external divide is looked at symmetrically, then the omission makes more sense. Let us return to the passage in question in the Critique of Practical Reason: “But those in the second group are based on reason (for, perfection as a characteristic of things, and the supreme perfection represented in substance, i.e.
God, are both to be thought only be means of rational concepts).”500 Presumably, if 1) there is only one objective-external material practical principle – Divine Command theory – and it is predicated on perfection, and 2) both objective-internal and objective-external run parallel and are based on the same concept (perfection), then there is no systemic place for objective-internal material practical principles based on unity and truth. Or, perhaps in some way, unity and truth fold into either the aforementioned theories, or in some way can be attributed to a formal
practical principle, like the one Kant formulates. Therefore, either Kant’s table of heteronomy is 1) complete, and truth and unity are either 1a) ‘formal’ practical principles, or 1b) morally irrelevant, or 2) the table of heteronomy is incomplete, unity and truth actually provide the ground for material practical principles, and Kant has either 2a) forgotten to add them, or 2b) deliberately omitted them to maintain the symmetry of his system.
The Stoic Perfection-based Moral Theory Stoicism
In the Critique of Practical Reason, we can recall that Kant describes perfection “as a characteristic of the human being” that is “nothing other than talent and what strengthens or completes this, skill.”501 Talent and skill is determined and thus proportionate to how efficiently
500 Kant Critique of Practical Reason 172 [5:41].
501 Kant Critique of Practical Reason 173. [5:41]
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a rational being achieves a particular end. Since any end is prior to and external to the will as a standard that it must empirically measure itself up against, the principle itself is empirical.502
Nonetheless, it is still unclear which specific form this objective internal object
(‘perfection as a characteristic of the human being’) takes in Stoicism. In the Lectures on Ethics, we are provided with this suggestive fragment: “[The Stoic] sage [was] ranked above the gods, for not much pertained to their gods, since divinity had no temptations or obstacles to overcome;
but a sage of that kind would have attained to such perfection by his strength in overcoming obstacles.”503 By no means is Kant suggesting that a sage thinks he has surpassed the gods in physical skill or breadth of knowledge (nor is Epicurus suggesting something like this when he claims that the prudent man lives like a god504). A sage is not physically or intellectually superior to the gods, but superior in another manner. Is Stoic perfection a certain standard of character then? If so, how would a principle that legislates the will (i.e. determines a will to be of a certain character) be any different from a formal practical principle that passes Kant’s moral test, which is only concerned with the will? Is not the will an internal object? By turning to the primary texts of Stoicism, I hope to fill in this nebulous type with something more concrete.
Early Stoicism: Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus
Stoicism was founded by Zeno of Citium in the 4th century B.C., and was further developed by his successors Cleanthes of Assos (c. 300-232 B.C.) and Chrysippus of Soli (c.
282-201 B.C.)505 Since few early Stoic texts have survived, most accounts of their respective positions are found in secondary sources, such as Diogenes Laertius’ Lives, the works of critics,
502 Ibid 172-173. [5:41]
503 Collins “Moral Philosophy” 46. [27:250]
504 Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” in Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, ed. Jason Saunders (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 52.
505 Saunders, Jason L., “Stoicism,” in Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, ed. Jason Saunders (New York:
The Free Press, 1994), 59.
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like Cicero and Sextus Empiricus, and the works of later Stoics, like Seneca.506 We have already observed that Kant subsumes the Stoic tradition under the moniker of its founder, ‘Zeno.’
Unfortunately he is not particular as to which Stoic thinkers he has read or has in mind when he provides his account of objective-internal material practical principles. Since Zeno’s works are largely missing, it seems unlikely that he is the primary source from which Kant is drawing. It is unlikely that a more nuanced analysis of Stoicism would suit Kant’s purposes, since what seems to matter most for Kant is the meta-system of ethical theories rather than the component theories themselves. Nonetheless, if we are to better understand what an objective-internal material practical principle (or object) is and how it specifically undermines freedom, such a nuanced analysis seems necessary.
The moral principle that Zeno adopts which fundamentally defines Stoicism as a moral philosophy is the command to live a “life in agreement with nature.”507 But such a principle, appearing on the surface to be no different that its Cynic progenitor, has in Zeno’s formulation mutated in connotation to mean something other than the subtraction of social conventions.
Unlike the Cynic, the Stoic does not take for granted an originary momentum of human nature overcome and corrupted by the artificial counterforce of society. Instead, the Stoic seeks to realize humanity’s full potential within society, since society is not at odds with human nature;
rather it is humanity’s proper niche.
But what exactly is human nature according to the Stoics? What is humanity’s specific natural potential? For one who has read Plato and Aristotle, the answer should come as no surprise:
506 Ibid 111-132.
507 Laertius, Diogenes, “The Chief End,” in Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, ed. Jason Saunders (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 111.
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The peculiar potentiality of man as distinct from the rest of natural creation is reason, which subsumes all the traditional virtues; a man can be brave and continent and just only if he understands the folly of their opposites. Man’s goal is therefore the achievement of perfect reason, but nothing less than perfection will do…508
Already we can see in this passage an emphasis on the very imperative towards perfection that Kant highlights under the objective-internal register. That perfection is, in turn, tied to both human nature and virtue. For Zeno, the natural life is no different than the virtuous life.509 This claim might at first seem counter-intuitive since typically most people today take it as a given that nature is amoral. Without Reason acting as a mediating term, the Stoic inference between nature and virtue seems baseless.
But the notion of ‘nature’ as a standard-bearer was not born fully-formed. As Diogenes Laertius recounts, Cleanthes assumes only a common nature while Chrysippus develops this notion further to include not only common nature but also the nature of man.510 Ultimately, humanity is but a part of a larger Universal whole, and each of us is slated a part to play in that dynamic whole. Vice results when one goes against what we are naturally predisposed to do.
This is not to say that we are naturally virtuous, but that we must work to fall in line with human nature. Interestingly enough, it seems that Man’s very nature, rationality, can only be revealed and thus made a standard for actions by means of Reason itself.511 Those points aside, we can see how Stoicism is trying to reconcile the two connotations of nature, since ‘human nature’ is
508 Hadas, Moses, “Introduction,” in The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca: Essays and Letters of Seneca,,trans.Moses Hadas (trans.), (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1958), 23.
509 Ibid 111.
510 Laertius, Diogenes, “Early Stoic Ethics,” in Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, ed. Jason Saunders (New York: The Free Press, 1994),112 [SVF, 555]
511The reader may, perhaps presumptuously, even hear echoes of Plato’s definition of Justice in these conceptions of virtue and vice, since we are ultimately being commanded to ‘mind our own business.’ Plato Republic trans.
C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 119 [433]
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concluded to be a part of ‘Nature as such,’ just as a hand is part of the body.512 To act in accordance with human nature (reason) is thus to act in accordance with Nature.513
In nature, we find three kinds of things: good things, bad things, and things that are neither, namely, indifferent. Stoics would disagree on the status of indifferent things, some arguing that many of the things commonly thought to be good, such as health and wealth, although technically indifferent, are nonetheless preferred indifferents. Unlike virtue, such indifferents can be used for both good or ill, so they cannot be specifically either.514 This
delineation mirrors Kant’s own discussion of what is “considered good without limitation” in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.515
According to the Stoics, virtue is both a means to an end and an end in itself: “On the one hand, insofar as [virtues] cause happiness, they are means, and on the other hand, insofar as they make it complete, and so are themselves part of it, they are ends.”516 The Stoic attempts a precarious balancing act between happiness and virtue. He calls happiness (or peace of mind) the highest good while simultaneously attributing the same status to virtue. The Kantian depiction of Stoicism, as we will see in the next section, will suppose that virtue and happiness are the same while Diogenes Laertius’ account underscores virtue’s dual role as both means and end.
512 The hand-to-body analogy is from Empiricus, Sextus, “Early Stoic Ethics,” in Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, ed. Jason Saunders (New York: The Free Press, 1994),116. [SVF III, 75]
513 Laertius, Diogenes, “Early Stoic Ethics,” in Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, ed. Jason Saunders (New York: The Free Press, 1994),112. [SVF, 4]
514 Ibid 118. [SVF III, 117]
515 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 49-50 [4:393-4:395]
516 Laertius, Diogenes, “Early Stoic Ethics,” in Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, ed. Jason Saunders (New York: The Free Press, 1994),117. [SVF III, 107]
154 Later Stoicism: Seneca and Epictetus
Seneca
Seneca developed the Stoic position even further. The works of his history has preserved (which are many) are often letters specifically addressing the concerns of a struggling Stoic, friend, or relative. For example, in On Providence, Seneca addresses the classic problem of theodicy: Why do the gods let bad things happen to good people? Seneca responds by
challenging the presuppositions of the very question. Bad things never happen to good people.
Herein lies a subtle ethical doctrine that fleshes out what is good and what is bad. If we presume, like Seneca does, that the universe is governed by a just providence, then all the negative afflictions that good people often bear, such as poverty, persecution, violence, and death, can’t actually be bad but instead in some way must benefit the virtuous and society as a whole.
Seneca most vividly illustrates how what appears to be bad in actuality benefits the afflicted in a letter he wrote to his mother during his temporary exile, called The Consolation of Helvia. In it, he attempts to convince her that his exile, which appears bad, is really for his benefit, which should allay her grief. To a modern reader, the claim that poverty could be preferable to affluence seems like an act of rationalization in the face of misfortune rather than an honest assessment. However, this notion was already implicit in Epicureanism when it distinguished between natural and necessary desires and unnatural desires (aspects of affluence aligning more with the latter than the former). Similar to Epicurus, affluence, according to Seneca, can lead to vice, since it creates unnatural desires which cannot be sated. Vice leads to misery since it places us squarely in Fate’s province: What has been given by Fate will inevitably be taken away, like an immaculate rug pulled out from under us. It is better to not stand on such
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a rug at all. That is why the poor man is actually more likely to be content than the wealthy man since he is neither burdened with these bottomless desires, distracted by the acquisition of luxuries, nor worried about their imminent loss.517
A man who keeps himself within the bounds of nature, therefore, will not feel poverty; but one who exceeds those bounds will be pursued by poverty; but one who exceeds those bounds will be pursued by poverty even in the greatest opulence. For necessities even exile is sufficient, for superfluities not even kingdoms are. It is the mind that which makes men rich; the mind accompanies us into exile, and when it has found adequate sustenance for the body even in the most desolate wilderness its own resources provide an abundance which it can enjoy.518
Poverty is akin to a medicine hard to swallow, since it cures by removing the very luxuries that lead to vice.519 Once again, the Stoic emphasis on the affective costs of vice (misery) seems to highlight Kant’s own characterization of this moral imperative as ultimately aiming at pleasure.
At minimum, the benefits proffered by apparent evils can be reduced to one: we can only grow stronger if we are tested. The gods do not show disapproval but stern love for those they test through hardship. ‘Strength’ in this context is two-fold. Physically, our bodies grow stronger when they are put to work.520 But physical strength is secondary to what may be called either mental strength, or virtue. “By suffering misfortune the mind grows able to belittle suffering.”521 Mental endurance is but one aspect of virtue as such. Only through hardship can we determine the caliber of our virtue, or lack thereof. “You do not shine outwardly because all your goods are turned inward.”522 Those who live an easy life only attain a superficial happiness
517 Seneca, “Consolation of Helvia,” in The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca: Essays and Letters, trans. Moses Hadas (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1958), 124.
518518 Seneca, “Consolation of Helvia,” in The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca: Essays and Letters. Trans. Moses Hadas (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1958), 123.
519 Ibid 120.
520 The most robust part of the body is that which is most frequently put to active use. We must offer ourselves to Fortune so that we may be inured against her through her own agency; gradually she will make us her peers, and constant exposure to peril will beget contempt for danger. So sailors’ bodies are hardened by enduring the sea, and farmers have calloused hands, and soldiers’ biceps are powerful for hurling missiles, and runners have nimble legs;
the member each exercises is the most robust. Seneca, ‘On Providence’ in The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca: Essays and Letters. trans. Moses Hadas (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1958), 39.
521 Ibid 39.
522 Ibid 44.
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that wavers at the slightest misfortune.523 To these people Seneca says, “I account you
unfortunate because you have never been unfortunate. You have passed through life without an adversary; no one can know your potentiality, not even you.”524 With prosperity comes
temptation to vice: “Death by starvation comes gently, gluttony makes men explode.”525 For Seneca, the duty of a good man ultimately amounts to “offer[ing] himself to Fate,”526 since “nothing can be wrested from a man if he does not cling to it.”527 In a sense, this is nothing more than a reframing of Zeno’s position that we ought to act in accordance with Nature.
Seneca, pre-empting Epictetus’ own words, seems to suggest that what is properly mine cannot be taken from me, but what can be taken from me belongs to the gods and can fairly be
repossessed at any time.528 The measure of our virtue is proportional to how little the loss of externals bothers us, or even occasions joy in us. Another way of saying this is that proper virtue immunizes the Stoic against the whims of Fortune, leaving the state of mind of the Stoic
unaffected by externals.
Epictetus
The Enchiridion may be one of the most concise and yet comprehensive of Stoic ethical texts. The text itself is more of a collection of adages meant to guide the Stoic initiate than a streamlined essay. Epictetus grounds his interpretation of ‘living in harmony with nature’
through delineating between what is in our power and what is not. The list of things in our power include thought, impulse, will to get (desire), and will to avoid (aversion); while things
523 Ibid 44.
524 Ibid 36.
525 Ibid 38-39.
526 Ibid 42.
527 Ibid 41.
528 Ibid 41.
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such as the body, property, reputation, office, and loved ones are not in our control.529 It is undeniable that the former are ‘internal’ objects, so Kant’s categorization seems so far apt.
Remaining ‘in harmony with nature’ means to focus on what we can control and to accept that it is in the nature of things outside of our control to inevitably be taken from us. For example, it is in the nature of mortal beings to perish, so we would be at odds with nature if we expected them to transcend death. To dread the passing of the mortal is to invite discontent since it will
inevitably happen, while to accept it as inevitable is to remain unfazed regardless of
circumstances.530 Many critics may read this as a cold reaction to the passing of someone dear.
The modern assumption is that emotional distress should be proportional to the love felt for the departed. But to a Stoic, things not in our control should be thought of as on loan to us from the Divine. Likewise, it makes little sense to feel indignant rather than grateful when something is reclaimed by its proper owner, since one was never owed use of the reclaimed item to begin with.531
Epictetus uses a theatrical example to illustrate what our duty is:
Remember that you are an actor in a play, and the Playwright chooses the manner of it: if he wants it short, it is short; if long, it is long. If he wants you to act a poor man you must act the part with all your powers; and so if your part be a cripple or a magistrate or a plain man. For your business is to act the character that is given you and act it well; the choice of the cast is Another’s.532
Of course this analogy spawns several provocative questions. Does this mean that the so-called cripple should decline opportunities to improve his condition? Furthermore, while we may be born into some roles, such as Marcus Aurelius was, neither career, talent, health, nor social standing are static from birth. Each is determined by our choices. Aptitudes may manifest, but only after significant practice determined by an initial decision that may have been arbitrary.
529 Epictetus, “The Manual of Epictetus,” in Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, ed. Jason Saunders (New York: The Free Press, 1994) 133.
530 Ibid 134.
531 Ibid 135.
532 Ibid 137.
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And even granted that there are innate aptitudes, an aptitude could dispose someone towards a myriad of roles. And what of conflicting roles? A man may be born into an imperial lineage,
And even granted that there are innate aptitudes, an aptitude could dispose someone towards a myriad of roles. And what of conflicting roles? A man may be born into an imperial lineage,