Subjective-Internal Material Practical Principles

Let us now turn to a different kind of material practical principle (the subjective-internal), with the expectation that a different kind of ethical subject will be revealed that is no more autonomous than the cultural subject: the sensible subject. While the subjective-external register could be considered ‘ideal’ (since it concerns ideal precepts) the subjective-internal register could be considered ‘sensible,’ determined not by external conditions but ‘pathological’

conditions. What this means will become clear as each subjective-internal material practical principle is explored.

Since all heteronomous theories are fundamentally based on a principle of self-love,⁴¹³ Kant’s account of subjective-internal principles based on inner states such as happiness, may, in a certain respect, be the most important general heteronomous position to examine. Kant identifies two kind of subjective-internal principles: those that affirm a specific physical feeling – in this case, Epicurus’ valorization of pleasure, and those that affirm a specific moral feeling, like Francis Hutcheson.’⁴¹⁴ If both are distinct from subjective-external principles, they cannot be ultimately grounded on societal values (although this is not to say that societal values do not play a role in determining what is pleasurable or conscionable, since it would be patently absurd to do so). They must in some way be natural.

But why this division? Let us return to the passage in the Lectures on Ethics which distinguishes the two from each other:

413 Because, as we recall, happiness is nothing but the consciousness of having the right object, and any principle based on pursuing personal happiness is a principle of self-love Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason 156 [5:22].

414 Ibid 172 [5:40].

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If a system of ethics is based on empirical grounds, it rests either on inner or outer grounds, drawn from the objects of inner and outer sense. If morality rests on the inner grounds, then this is the first part of the empirical system; if it rests on outer grounds, then it is the second part of that system. Those that derive morality from the inner grounds of the empirical principle, postulate a feeling, a physical and moral feeling. The physical feeling consists in self-love, which takes two forms, vanity and self-interest. It aims at one’s own advantage, and is a self-seeking principle, whereby our senses are satisfied. It is a principle of prudence. The authors who uphold the principle of self-love include, among the ancients, Epicurus, in that he employed, in general, a principle of sensuality…The second principle of the inner ground of the empirical system arises if the ground is posited in the moral feeling whereby we can discriminate what is good or bad. The leading authors are Shaftsbury and Hutcheson.⁴¹⁵

Principles based on physical feeling seem to be ‘principles of prudence.’ Kant does not explicitly refer to principles of moral feeling in the same way, even though, as we know, all heteronomous theories are ultimately principles of prudence.⁴¹⁶ More importantly, Kant notes that principles based on physical feeling are ultimately self-serving, while he does not say the same for moral theories based on what Francis Hutcheson calls a ‘moral sense.’ While most would equate an internal sense of morality with a conscience, we’d be wrong to do so. A moral sense is an internal sense which perceives the good, just as external senses perceive external objects, like eyes perceive light. For Kant, or at the very least the Kant of the Lectures, the problem with basing ethical decisions on a moral sense is ultimately that such judgments are still based on taste, which is contingent.⁴¹⁷ Later, when Hutcheson’s ‘moral sense’ is discussed more in-depth, I will show that Kant implicitly suggests in the Critique of Practical Reason, that Hutcheson’s misrecognizes what is meritorious about his own theory, and that it may actually be duty-based.⁴¹⁸ I will return to that argument after I have outlined both subjective-internal moral positions.

415 Kant, Immanuel, “Moral Philosophy: Collin’s Lecture Notes,” in Lectures on Ethics, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and ed. J.B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 48-49 (27:253).

416 Since all heteronomous theories are hypothetical imperatives, which cannot command but merely advise us on how to attain a conditional end. Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 69 [4:416].

417 Kant, Immanuel, “Moral Philosophy: Collin’s Lecture Notes,” in Lectures on Ethics, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and ed. J.B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 49 (27:253-4).

418 Kant, Immanuel, “Critique of Practical Reason,” in Practical Philosophy 167 [5:34-5].

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What we must recognize is that a subjective-internal principle no more secures our autonomy than does a subjective-external principle. An imperative obligating us to maximize an internal state (like pleasure) or to comply with a moral feeling is as heteronomous as one that obligates us to comply with custom. This may seem paradoxical since the former are ‘internal’

motors. But Kant would have us consider these two different determining grounds – the former an actual good to be sought, the latter the faculty which determines the good to be sought - as distinct from the (autonomous) will. Both pleasure and a moral feeling would pertain not to reason but the faculty of sensibility, since both are feelings. Pleasure is a state that is produced only when the faculty of sensibility encounters a beneficial object which is nonetheless

contingent, external to us, and thus outside of our control to acquire. A moral feeling, and the subsequent feeling of pleasure that results from encountering or practicing benevolence

(maximizing societal happiness), while based on a principle, is similarly problematic, since it is dependent on actualizing a certain state of affairs. And while it might seem like acting from a principle, such as benevolence, as Hutcheson will describe, is a rational decision, concerned mostly with motives rather than consequences, and thus a free one, “the interests on which the reasons for choice are based” are determined by and explicable from a ‘naturalistic causal explanation.’ Reason, if it is to be genuinely free, cannot be determined by empirical interests, only rational ones.⁴¹⁹ I will start my exposition of subjective-internal material practical principles with the exemplar Kant provides for physical feeling based moral positions: Epicureanism.

Epicurus’ ‘Physical Feeling’ based Moral Theory

While Epicurus is known to have written over 300 works, all but the Letter to Herodotus, Letter to Pythocles, Letter to Menoeceus, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and a collection

419 Reath, Andrews, “Formal Principles and the Form of Law,” in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, eds. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmerman (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2010), 52-53.

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of fragments have been lost to time.⁴²⁰ The Epicurean position is well-known, and best

summarized in the Letter to Menoeceus. The common characterization of Epicurean doctrine is that pleasure is good and pain is bad. However, many critics assume that this preliminary judgment of what is good and bad is sufficient for determining which actions are choiceworthy to perform and which are not. This uncharitable and shallow reading often leads critics to label Epicurus a reckless hedonist and libertine who sanctions any act as long as it produces pleasure in the agent. While it is true that Epicureanism does not consider the pleasures or pains felt by anyone besides the agent of the act when determining whether or not an act is choiceworthy (which is admittedly a problem), this does not necessarily translate into the sanctioning of

actions common opinion often regards as immoral (such as libertinage and crime). It is clear that insofar as Epicurus distinguishes between the good and the choiceworthy, he does not believe that the rightness of an act is the same as the good psychological state afforded by performing an act. Although not explicitly framed in such a manner, Epicurus seems to be distinguishing between the notions of the Good and the Right. As long as a reader of Epicurus keeps this distinction in mind, neither confusion, nor contradiction will follow from Epicurus’ moral prescriptions.

The appropriateness of each action is decided by whether or not more pleasure than pain results in the long-run. Those desires that always lead to more pleasure than pain in the long-run Epicurus tends to consider ‘natural and necessary,’ those that seem natural but don’t alleviate pain he refers to as ‘natural and unnecessary,’ and those that cause more pain than pleasure in the

420 Epicurus, The Essential Epicurus: Letters, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and Fragment,.ed. and trans.

Eugene O’Connor (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1993), 12.

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long-run he calls ‘unnatural.’⁴²¹ This nuance accents a more pertinent feature than the immediate intensity of a pleasure, and can even allow for short-term pain:

Since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, it is for this reason also that we do not choose every pleasure; instead, there are times when we pass over many pleasures, whenever greater difficulty follows from them. Also, we regard many pains as better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure will attend us after we have endured pain for a long time. Every pleasure, therefore, because of its natural relationship to us, is good, but not every pleasure is to be chosen. Likewise, every pain is an evil, but not every pain is of a nature always to be avoided. Yet it is proper to judge all these things by a comparison and a consideration of both their advantages and disadvantages. For on certain occasions we treat the good as bad, and, conversely, the bad as good.⁴²²

Perhaps surprising to one who thinks that virtuous behavior requires a selfless attitude, the kinds of actions, or indulged desires, which pass the Epicurean test are those that align with the

virtuous life:

Prudence teaches us how impossible it is to live pleasantly without living wisely, virtuously, and justly, just as we cannot live wisely, virtuously, and justly without living pleasantly. For the virtues arise naturally with the pleasant life; indeed, the pleasant life cannot be separated from them.⁴²³

The claim may at first seem hard to believe, especially since virtue often seems to imply self-sacrifice. Yet it is in the personal self-interest of the Epicurean to live a moderate and just life, since immoderation leads to insatiable desires and injustice to either swift punishment or an anxious life full of fear of capture.

In contrast to the moralist who conflates pleasure with excess and indulgence, Epicurus does not usually define pleasure positively, but rather, more often negatively:

When we say that pleasure is the goal, we are not talking about the pleasure of profligates or that which lies in sensuality, as some ignorant persons think, or else those who do not agree with us or have followed our argument badly; rather, it is freedom from bodily pain and mental anguish. For it is not continuous drinking and revels, nor the enjoyment of women and young boys, nor of fish and other viands that a luxurious table holds, which make for a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, which examines the motives for every choice and avoidance, and which drives away those opinions resulting in the greatest disturbance of the soul.⁴²⁴ (italics mine)

421 Epicurus, Principal Doctrines 56.

422 Epicurus,“Letter to Menoeceus,” in The Essential Epicurus: Letters, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and Fragments, trans. Eugene O’Connor (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1993), 65.

423 Ibid 67.

424 Ibid 66.

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Rather than picture intense pleasure ore joy, the appropriate reading of pleasure is closer to peace of mind or a lack of mental disturbance. Both physical pain and mental pain must be minimized.

Physical pain may result from pursuing the wrong pleasures, but mental anguish (or fear) has a different source: superstitious thinking.

It is interesting to note the parallel between Epicurean superstition and Kantian dialectical illusion, since the first Epicurean superstition concerns the soul, the second natural phenomena, and the third the gods, just as rational psychology concerns the soul, rational cosmology the universe, and rational theology God. Perhaps this parallel suggests that Kant may be right when he argues that Reason necessarily invents these Transcendental Ideas and that they are a source of confusion. While Epicurus does not refute these errors by means of critique, nor cordon Reason off from engaging with such metaphysical concerns, but instead encourages the theoretical investigation of these phenomena, it is in the spirit of highlighting the parallel between superstition and dialectical illusion that I include a brief discussion of these superstitions below.⁴²⁵

As noted, philosophy’s proper agenda is two-fold and involves both practical and theoretical aims: it advises us on how best to avoid physical pains (prudence)⁴²⁶ and it

demonstrates why superstitious beliefs should be abandoned. There are three⁴²⁷ superstitions that grip humanity with fear. The first superstition is that the gods are personally invested in human affairs and will punish or reward us in accordance with Divine judgment or caprice. The second superstition is that death is bad, and thus something we ought to fear. According to this

superstition, death either brings with it divine judgment or oblivion, both of which are judged to

425 This parallel likely deserves much more scholarly attention than I will provide.

426 Technically Epicurus seems to distinguish prudence from philosophy: “The beginning and the greatest good of all these is prudence. For this reason prudence is more valuable even than philosophy: from it derive all the other virtues.” (Ibid 67). A larger question would seem to be “Does prudence merely concern the avoidance of pain or does it also play a theoretical role?” I am assuming the former rather than the latter.

427 The Letter to Menoeceus does not mention the third, which concerns celestial phenomena.

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be matters of concern. ⁴²⁸ As is obvious, both superstitions implicate each other. Thus when Epicurus disproves the first superstition, he is already halfway towards dispelling the second.

The third is that celestial phenomena affect human affairs:

…[The] chief disturbance in the minds of humankind arises when they think that…heavenly bodies are blessed and immortal but have at the same time wills, actions, and motives that are opposed to these divine attributes; and when they are constantly expecting and fearing some everlasting pain, as happens in myths.⁴²⁹

As is clear from the language Epicurus uses when describing heavenly bodies, the third superstition is likewise implicated by the first and second.

According to Epicurus, a careful philosophical investigation of each reveals these fears to be groundless. The gods, being immortal and blessed, cannot be angered by our actions, since we cannot harm them. Nor can we please them since they are already happy. Thus, the gods are indifferent to human affairs, and do not interfere in the course of our lives, nor in any

hypothetical afterlife. Life’s misfortunes and blessings are due to the contingencies of an atomistic world, not the gods’ intercession. Pleasure and pain are typically the immanent

worldly consequences of one’s actions, not externally imposed. Once this truth is acknowledged, the sole reason motivating our fear of the gods is removed. Thus, even if the soul survives death (which Epicurus denies), we ought not to fret about the gods’ judgment.

That would leave us with only one other possible reason to fear death: the possibility of oblivion. It is not Epicurus’ intention to demonstrate that we ought not to fear death because everyone is guaranteed a pleasant afterlife. That would make death good, which Epicurus denies. Instead, Epicurus fully embraces the mortality of the soul but provides a reason as to why oblivion is not something we should fear. In the Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus establishes that the soul must be made of atoms to account for why it can influence the body, which is

428 Ibid 61-64.

429Epicurus Letter to Herodotus 40-41.

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definitively known to be made of atoms. If the soul were incorporeal, it would have to be empty space, since Epicurean metaphysics only allows for the existence of atoms and void. But empty space cannot affect anything, so by process of elimination, the soul must be made of atoms.⁴³⁰ Since the soul nonetheless does not seem visible or tangible in the same way our bodies and most other physical bodies are, it must be akin to natural phenomena that also border on intangibility, like wind and fire, whose atoms are very fine.⁴³¹ Sensations, such as pleasure and pain, only manifest when the soul and the body are united. But the soul’s atomic composition implies its destructibility, since things with parts can be and inevitably are dispersed. We call the

destruction of the soul ‘death.’ Since sensations, such as pleasure and pain, can only be felt by an entity that exists, and pain is the only thing deemed bad, oblivion is nothing to be feared.⁴³² Death is neither good nor bad. Thus the wise man neither fears it nor chases after it.⁴³³

Since not even the soul, the most seemingly intangible of entities, is exempt from

material status and can be explained by means of an atomic theory, a fortiori, every other natural phenomenon can be explained in this manner as well. Even the immortal gods are made of atoms.⁴³⁴ Subsequently, the materialist account of the universe reveals that the movements of the heavenly bodies do not dictate our fate but are just one of many natural phenomena whose

actions are controlled by the collision of atoms.⁴³⁵ While it is pure speculation that Kant’s derivation of the three forms of dialectical illusion was influenced by the three forms of

superstition highlighted by Epicurus, the three-fold parallel does seem to validate Kant’s claim

430 Epicurus Letter to Herodotus 33-34.

431 A modern-day physicist of course knows better than to attribute state changes such as ‘gas’ and ‘plasma’ to the size of atoms.

432 Ibid 61-64 and Principal Doctrines 69.

433 Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus 63-64.

434 Presumably they have more resilient bodies and souls and thus do not die. As it is evident that our bodies do die, the mortality of man and the immortality of the gods are not at odds.

435Epicurus, The Letter to Herodotus (19-42) and the Letter to Pythocles (43-60) firmly establish these mechanistic laws.

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that Reason is necessarily drawn to speculate in these three manners (especially since the parallels run even further, such as how the Second Antinomy is simultaneously about atoms and the soul).

Even though these theoretical investigations into the soul, the world, and God are not practical investigations, like those in the Critique of Practical Reason, they are motivated by practical ends. As Epicurus reminds Pythocles at the beginning of the Letter to Pythocles: “[We]

must not think that there is any other aim of knowledge about the heavens, whether treated in connection with other doctrines or separately, than peace of mind and unshakeable confidence, just as it is our aim in all other pursuits.”⁴³⁶ This brings us back into the orbit of prudence and the role it plays in determining the right course of action. Prudence may not have the capacity to dispel superstition but it does encourage us to pursue philosophy for the sake of dispelling

superstitious anguish. Here we see Kant’s criticism of the Epicurean ethic in its most transparent

superstitious anguish. Here we see Kant’s criticism of the Epicurean ethic in its most transparent