‘The tinder piled up and it went on fire in ‘69.’ 332
8a.1 Introduction
The origins of each of the splits lies in the years and decades previous. A thorough analysis must look a number of years back in order to gain the most comprehensive understanding of not only the cause but the significance of each individual micro-process to fully understand the entire macro-process. Many would suggest that this analysis should not just focus on the actions of the years previous but that there should initially be a clear foundation of understanding of the Republican history from generations past, an opinion put forward by Sean O’Bradaigh in his assessment of the origins of the 1969/70 split.
“I suppose you can find the proximate roots of it, the immediate, within a couple of years and then you can find the approximate roots going back even further. I suppose the approximate roots are going back to the Treaty almost, because each time this comes up we are coming up against the same question, ‘do we recognise the Free State?’ … Will we maintain the Republican position or will we go and take part in [Dail Eireann].’”333
A clear understanding of Republican history enhances ones understanding of each of the splits. However, the majority of interviewees focused the ‘proximate roots’ of the divides. The origins of the splits were detailed to lie in the years previous to the ultimate organisational divisions. While those of extended organisational experience, especially at a leadership level, at the time of each of the splits were able to go into the most detail about the significant events of the years previous those with less operational experience at the very least acknowledged the significance of specific incidents, policies and strategies
332 Anthony Coughlan
from previous years. The process leading up and including the split of 1969/70 has been identified as the derivation of Irish Republican involvement in Troubles.
Of all the splits 1969/70 is the one which has most defined modern day Irish
Republicanism. It resulted in the birth of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein as well as the formal introduction to Republicanism of many of its most influential modern day actors. The significance is observable throughout all elements of Irish Republicanism from 1969 to today. Therefore without a clear understanding of this divide one cannot completely understand modern day Irish Republicanism.
In total thirty-five participants discussed the 1969/70 split. Table 8a.1 displays the make- up of these participants.
Group Leadership Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70 Joined group significantly after 1969/70 Total Official 3 2 5 1 11 Provisional 3 2 16 1 22 External334 0 0 0 1 (IRSM) 1 Other 1 0 0 0 1 Total 7 4 21 3 35
Table 8a.1: Participants who discussed 1969/70 split
The present chapter presents the process in the lead-up to the 1969/70 split. The process has been divided into 5 stages. The dominant themes are illustrated within the sub- sections of each stage. These are the themes which the analysis showed to be the most important in each of the separate stages. They should not be interpreted as separate sub- stages but as, at times, overlapping themes relevant during the specific stage of the process. The title of each stage illustrates the stage’s dominant characteristic and function. The title of each sub-section illustrates the dominant themes described. Analysis presented in this and each of the sub-chapters was guided by the analysis of the interview data. However, this was expanded to also include relevant primary and
334 This refers to individuals who were not involved in this particular split but referred to it in the interview process
secondary sources. This strengthens the validity of the analysis presented in each of the sub-chapters.
The five stages identified in the process of the 1969/70 split are supportive of the model proposed in Chapter 4:
Stage 1: The Origins of 1969/70 Stage 2: Factional Development
Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split
Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation
Stage 5 and Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation.
The fifth and final stage of the micro-process must also be regarded, in combination with the rest of the split process, as the opening stage of the micro-processes of the 1974 and 1986 splits.
8a.2 Stage 1: The Origins of 1969/70
While the ‘approximate’ origins of the split lie within the history of Irish Republicanism each of the participants interviewed who had extended experience prior to 1969 identified the culmination of the Border Campaign of the late 1950s and early 1960s as the requisite starting point for any understanding of the ‘proximate’ origins of the split.335 Similarly six of the participants without extensive Republican experience discussed the effect of the aftermath of the Campaign. However, for the majority of new recruits to the movement in the lead up to and after 1969/70 the origins of the split through their own experiences took place in the immediate lead up to the formal division of the movement.
Of those participants who outlined the importance of the aftermath of the Border Campaign all agreed to its transitional nature. This is reflected in the analysis of those from both sides of the split.
335 For description of the Border Campaign see Coogan, T.P. (2000). The IRA. London: Harper Collins. Pp.297-329.
Within this first stage of the 1969/70 split the dominant themes to be covered are
• Public Support: Weakened
• Membership: Exit, Weakening and Disillusionment • The Origins of Factionalism
8a.2.1 Public Support: Weakened
One of the major consequences of the Border Campaign was that there was deterioration in the public support for the Movement and what it could offer the general public of Ireland. This was a campaign which initially gained the support of the people.336
However, this support was short lived and in1962 the Army Council of the IRA officially declared its end. Whatever support the Republican Movement had gained at the
beginning of the campaign had dissipated, and was probably even lower than it had been prior to the beginning of the operation. This decline was evident in the weakening of both passive and active support.
“After beginning the campaign it was obvious that we didn’t have enough weapons or support, safe houses etc.”337
This lack of support was a result of a public feeling that the Republican Movement was not representative of the beliefs of the wider Irish population in general, and the
nationalist population particularly. There was disconnect between the actions and beliefs of the Republican leadership and the populations they claimed to represent. With this decline in support it proved extremely difficult for the IRA to operate to any significant degree of success. The Irish public were not supportive of any form of armed action to achieve a united Ireland. This proved a critical issue in the failure of the campaign. It is recognised by those within the Movement that in order to sustain any form of military campaign they needed support within the community. Without this support the armed
336
This support was displayed at the election of four Sinn Fein candidates to the Dail in 1957, each of whom was an abstentionist candidate.
campaign invariably fails. This would later prove to be a lesson which future generations of Republican leaders would bestow on new recruits.
“It is vital you cannot sustain a military campaign without the support of a substantial section of the population… Why the 56 campaign failed is because the Republican Movement had become isolated from the people, had become divorced from the people, had become elitist, had become obsessed with ending partition and had turned a blind eye to issues like unemployment and poverty and
emigration and bad housing.”338
This reaffirms that if a movement is to gain the public support it requires it is first of all necessary to make their groups objectives relevant among their existing and potential support base.339 During the Border Campaign the focus of the leadership was not on those issues of importance to the general Irish population. Instead there was perceived to be an almost blinkered focus on the achievement of a united Ireland and the ending of partition. This issue of disconnect with the wider public was one which was sought to be addressed in the aftermath of this failed armed campaign.
With the end of the Border Campaign in 1962 the deterioration of support for the Irish Republican Movement continued. Even for those who remained supportive of the movement there was a heightened disillusionment with its trajectory. This lack of support led to a drop in the finances of the movement and resultantly a drop in their accessibility to new weapons and artillery.340 Without a significant degree of public support it proves impossible to succeed in achieving objectives, unless they can alter the issues which have distanced them from the population they claim to represent. Each of the interviewees across the splits emphasised the importance of public support in determining the results of an intra-organisational conflict.
338 ‘Paul’
339
Oots (1989) p.145 340
This is why it is essential for organisations to continue to recruit new members and support so as to maintain organisational survival and therefore the continued actions of the group should look to maximise support Siqueira (2005) pp.220-222
8a.2.2 Membership: Exit, Weakening and Disillusionment
This disillusionment with the IRA and Sinn Fein within the public sphere was reflected in the membership with a number of members exiting at both armed and political levels.341 The Border Campaign was seen by members as a failure. This is a view put across by both sides of the split. This is illustrated in the quotes below, the first from Tomas MacGiolla the 1960s president of Sinn Fein and after the split president of Official Sinn Fein and the second from ‘Alex’ an influential Belfast IRA member who was among those Belfast Republicans who overthrew the Belfast IRA leadership and refused to support the national leadership of Cathal Goulding in 1969. ‘Alex’ was an influential northern member in the formation of the Provisional IRA and in the aftermath of the 1986 split chose to support the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein.
“When the campaign eventually ended, that’s the 1950s campaign, which was Operation Harvest…It was a disaster from the very beginning and after a couple of years there were many people who already were disillusioned and didn’t want the campaign and wanted it to stop. It went on for another four years.”342
“The Border Campaign was a fiasco, looking back on it now it was a total fiasco. I don’t think they had a clue to be honest with you about what they were up against.”343
As with the public this operational failure resulted in the disillusionment of large proportions of the organisational membership which in turn brought about the exit of members who neither saw the possibility of success nor agreed with the strategies and tactics of the organisation at that point in time.
341 The disillusionment within the movement during the Border Campaign is illustrated in an extensive IRA statement from April 1964. The IRA outlined the fractious nature of the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein during the Border Campaign, and especially when the campaign was called off by the IRA. IRA Department of Publicity. (April, 1964). IRA Army Council Statement. (p.5)
342 Tomas MacGiolla 343 ‘Alex’
As well as a large number of members exiting the movement there were also a significant number either interned or on the run. With large proportions of the IRA leadership on the run for the concluding years of the campaign the standing and relevance of IRA was further weakened. There were also those who were forced to exit for reasons not directly related to the Republican Movement, largely due to economic issues. As with all sectors of the population this significantly affected the IRA and Sinn Fein during the 1950s and 60s as numerous existing and potential members were forced to emigrate, and in turn the majority of them ceased active involvement with the movement. Therefore the public good which the Republican Movement were aiming to achieve, a united Ireland, was significantly detached from the public goods desired by the majority of the population, economic stability.344
The aftermath of the Border Campaign resulted in such a detrimental weakening of the IRA that it can be considered from both a morale and physical capability point of view that it was at one of its weakest points. Resultantly in the aftermath of the campaign even within those areas which historically, would be considered as strong Republican regions the membership levels were extremely sparse. This was evident in the Republican heartlands of Belfast where the IRA membership was close to non-existent.
“When I got out I reported back to the Republican Movement…I think there was only about eight people in the Movement in Belfast, most of them just didn’t come back in… So basically it was starting from scratch all over again.”345
This deterioration in the membership cannot purely be blamed on the failure of the Border Campaign and outward migration. The weakening of the movement was taking place prior to the Border Campaign. As with the deterioration in support many people no longer saw the relevance of joining the IRA or Sinn Fein. As a result there were very few members in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Republican Movement for the most part was a deteriorating group irrelevant to the vast majority of the population of Ireland, and
344 This can be regarded as a ‘push’ factor for both members and supporters, Horgan, (2006). 345 ‘Alex’
therefore ineffective in operations and in attaining objectives. It is invariably the levels of membership, and their choices of who to side with in an intra-organisational conflict and the resultant split, which decides the successes and failures of either side.346
8a.2.3 The Origins of Factionalism
The fragility of Republicanism in the aftermath of this campaign emphasised the need for a re-evaluation in order to maintain organisational survival.347 This necessity resulted in an overhaul of the national leadership, a move widely supported. The new leadership with Cathal Goulding as the IRA Chief of Staff distanced their policies from the armed struggle and placed a greater emphasis on a left-wing political approach.348 They realised that in order to achieve the basic aim of organisational survival that they needed to first of all reconnect with both their membership and support base. The emphasis was placed on making the aims and strategies of the organisation relevant to the wider Irish population. At this stage of the process the new leadership were largely setting about re-organising both the IRA and Sinn Fein. This resulted in moving away from the armed struggle and the introduction of new strategies and policies largely centred on politically left-wing ideals.
The left-wing political policies espoused by the Goulding leadership at this time were significantly removed from the policies traditionally promoted by the organisation. For many of the traditional old-guard within both the IRA and Sinn Fein these policies would have been considered negatively as ‘extreme socialism.’ This led to discontent among a number of old-guard traditionalists at this initial stage of the process of split, a discontent which resulted in a number of them exiting. This theme is resonant throughout each of the micro-processes and is supportive of
346 Throughout this and the subsequent sub-chapter there is an analysis of individual participants’ allegiance choice in the aftermath of and process of the splits. The reasons established in these sub-chapters are generally focusing on reasons linked to the reasons for organisational split. However, allegiance choice is often times made for non-split related reasons. For an analysis of some of these factors see Appendix G 347 English (2003) P.83
HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational survival in a form which they respect and recognise.
HO1. The immediate objective for all organisations is the survival of the organisation. While this requires the recruitment of new members it also requires the maintenance of the existing support. Times of significant change within an organisation are the most likely times of membership exit. Therefore it must be the aim of the organisational leadership to convince a significant majority of the membership of the necessity for these changes. At this stage of the process the exit of these members was not as damaging to organisational survival as it is in later stages. The necessity for change in the movement provided the Goulding leadership to adjust the policies and strategies to fit better with their aspirations for the left-wing politicisation of the movement
The new left-wing ideology advocated by Cathal Goulding and his affiliates was largely influenced and formulated by some of the new members and advisors introduced to organised Republicanism at the dawn of the new leadership. The most influential of these was Dr Roy Johnston.349
One of the methods he utilised to open debate within the movement, as well as externally, was the development of the Wolfe Tone Society in 1963. This group was made up of individuals who were predominantly external to the movement. In their meetings they discussed the future development of Republicanism in Ireland. The ideas generated from the Society in turn influenced much of the positioning of Republican policy of the time. These groupings were predominantly made up of left wing political activists and
academics. Some of the most prominent voices were those promoting and supporting the politicisation of the IRA and Sinn Fein. The politicisation process took place
independent of the Wolfe Tone Society. However, it was within these meetings that many of the influential policies were developed in depth and resultantly adopted either in
part or completely by the leadership.350 Prominent to this influence was their distancing from armed Republicanism.
While the promotion of peaceful political strategies was the cornerstone of the
leadership’s re-organisation this was not fully supported by all members. Many of the