Splits: How Terrorist Groups End?

In their 2008 study Jones and Libicki noted that of the six-hundred and forty-eight terrorist organisations they analysed that one hundred and thirty splintered, this includes

241 _{Miller (1983), pp.323-324.}

twenty-six of the forty-five religious terrorist groups in their sample.242 While their statistical analysis may prove enlightening their viewpoint on the nature of splits must be considered significantly flawed. Throughout their analysis of the splintering of terrorist organisations they continuously refer to it as a way in which a terrorist group ends.243 This fails to acknowledge in full the complete process of a terrorist split. An

organisational schism need not constitute the end of the parent organisation, as by definition it is only a section of the membership which are leaving, and therefore the parent organisation can still remain in existence. It can prove more accurate to describe an organisational split as a way for a new terrorist organisation to form, or the end of an organisation as a unified political movement.244 While the parent organisation may change in membership levels, and possibly strategy, tactics and goals, the organisational split does not necessarily constitute the end of this group as can be viewed from the examples cited previously, as well as in the case studies of splits in the Irish Republican Movement. The problems which needed to be acknowledged with the Dyck and Starke model of organisational split are therefore similarly faced here. The viewpoint taken is much too narrow to constitute an accurate description of all forms of splits.

While it is clear that organisational splits do not purely constitute the end of terrorist groups there are comparable elements which play a significant role in both actions. Therefore it would be narrow-minded to completely discount what this literature has to offer to the enhancement of understanding. For years the terrorism literature has widely ignored the need to engage in a detailed and wide reaching analysis of the factors contributing to the end of terrorist organisations. What research there was mainly concentrated on the analyses of individual case studies, from the demise of the European left wing terrorists245 to the deterioration of radical Islam.246 In recent years this has begun to change with a number of books, and reports being published exclusively looking at the end of terrorist groups, the end of terrorism or disengagement from terrorism, or at

242 _{Jones and Libicki (2008), pp.35-36} 243_{Ibid, p.10, p.13, p.36}

244 _{Oots (1989), p.142.} 245

See for example Jamieson (1990); Weinberg, L. and Eubank, W.L. (1987). The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism. London: Westview.; Horchem, H.J. (1991). The Decline of the Red Army Faction. Terrorism and Political Violence, 3(2), pp.61-74

least dedicating a significant section to these subjects.247 However, while up until recently there has been a dearth of literature theoretically assessing the disintegration of terrorist organisations the three most informative studies on the subject can be dated back to the 1980s and to this day they provide the foundations for a number of the modern day approaches to the topic. The studies referred to are those of Ross and Gurr,248 Oots249 and Crenshaw.250 Both the works of Crenshaw and Ross and Gurr developed their own individual theoretical interpretations of the decline of terrorist organisations. In their separate works they each developed a list of conditions which may produce the demise of the terrorist group.

Through their research on the decline of terrorism in Canada and the United States251 Ross and Gurr outline four principal conditions which may precipitate the decline of the terrorist organisation and/or their utilisation of the tactic of terrorism. These can be divided into two separate groups, external and internal conditions as illustrated below.

External Factors: • Pre-Emption • Deterrence Internal Factors: • Burnout • Backlash

The external factors described are pre-emption and deterrence and the internal factors burnout and backlash. In this framework the external factors refer specifically to counterterrorist policies and actions, while the internal factors are general conditions which reduce the organisation’s capabilities to continue utilising the tactic of terrorism.

247 _{See for example Horgan (2009); Gupta (2008); Cronin (2009); Jones and Libicki (2009)} 248 _{Ross and Gurr (1989)}

249

Oots (1989) 250

Crenshaw (1987). How Terrorism Ends. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987.

In her analysis of the end of terrorist organisations Crenshaw initially stipulated that a decline in terrorism can take place due to three factors. Those conditions detailed by Crenshaw are

• Physical Defeat

• Abandonment of the tactic of Terrorism • Organisational Disintegration

Rarely is it that any of these conditions take place independently of one of the others. Crenshaw went on to develop her theory further by looking at the end of terrorism rather than merely the end of the terrorist organisation with a later paper. Similar to Ross and Gurr she noted that it is important in bringing about an end to terrorism to consider both internal organisational and external factors. Considering how governmental policy can actively respond to terrorism she outlined four separate strategies which can possibly be implemented in order to tackle the terrorist threat. These were

• Deterrence • Criminal Justice • Enhanced Defence • Negotiations252

Acknowledging the role these variables may have in ending a group or at least their utilisation of the tactic of terrorism she acknowledges that the end of terrorism will come about due to one or more of five separate situations.

• Success • Preliminary Success • Organisational Breakdown • Decline in Support 252 _{Crenshaw (1999), pp.2-3.}

• New Alternatives253

Within the context of organisational splits it is likely that of these five separate factors organisational breakdown and dwindling support may prove to have the most significant effect.

Other more recent authors have developed their own lists of conditions which can bring about the end of terrorism or the end of the terrorist group.254 There proves to be a

significant overlap between their contributions and those of Crenshaw and Ross and Gurr. There is one point raised by Gupta255 that terrorists may transition from political terrorism to other forms of criminal activity. Within Crenshaw’s factors this may come under the heading of new alternatives. It may also take place in the aftermath of organisational success, or preliminary success, as the organisation no longer has the need for the

application of terrorist violence they may now revert to other forms of criminal activity to fill the void left by the lack of terrorism. This is a significant factor which is and must continue to be appreciated by governments and policy makers alike